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11.
INTRODUCTION 
ON CONSERVATISM, CONCEPTS, AND CONTEXTS
Anschauungen ohne Begriffe sind blind.
IMMANUEL KANT
1.1 THE LIMITS OF CONSERVATISM 
More than two centuries ago, the conservative thinker Edmund Burke (1729-1797) 
could never have imagined that his magnum opus Reflections on the Revolution in 
France (1790) would play a central part in discussions among Chinese intellectuals 
during the early 1990s. 1
Raising the issue of conservatism in a Chinese context is problematic. In order 
to show why, this introduction takes, in the tradition of the “essay-review,” a book as an 
entry point. This approach is beneficial in that it both presents the problems at hand and 
addresses the way in which others have attempted to resolve these problems, which 
amounts to what the intellectual historian Dominick La Capra has called a “dialogical” 
Around that time, the curious phenomenon of the re-
examination of a century of history through the medium of Western thinkers—Edmund 
Burke being one of the most prominent among them—spread throughout Chinese 
academia. In addition, the concept of “conservatism” became an essential ingredient of 
debates on the nature of modern Chinese history. It is ironic, to say the least, that the 
ideas of a man who had been obsessed with particularity and context were now applied 
to a context with which they seemed to have nothing in common. What, then, did this 
reference to Burke and other thinkers in early 1990s China signify? Did debates on  
“conservatism” reflect a mere juggling with “isms,” a rhetorical and instrumental trick, 
or did they mark a shift in the intellectual world that can be described as a move toward 
conservatism? 
1 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France and on the Proceedings in Certain 
Societies in London Relative to that Event: In a Letter Intended to Have Been Sent to a 
Gentleman in Paris (London, 1790). Reprinted in Frank M. Turner, ed., Reflections on the 
Revolution in France (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 2003).
2critical discourse. 2 The book in question concerns the only Western monograph on 
modern Chinese conservatism during the Republican period, the 1976 volume The 
Limits of Change, which was the outcome of a 1972 conference at Harvard University 
on “Intellectuals and the Problem of Conservatism in Republican China.”3 This volume 
is not only relevant because it addresses the issue of conservatism in a Chinese context; 
it is also useful for the study of intellectual developments in 1990s China because at that 
time, many Chinese intellectuals were acquainted with the book and referred to it in 
articles on conservatism.4
The general framework of this 1976 monograph attempted to revise the 
argument put forward by the historian Joseph Levenson that after the encounter with the 
West, the Chinese resort to tradition could only arise from emotional and psychological 
needs.5 For Levenson, the arrival of the West had distorted the balance between Chinese 
“history” and universal “value,” and the embrace of Chinese tradition served to restore 
this balance. As such, Levenson’s “traditionalism” is reminiscent of the term as it has 
been used by the sociologists Karl Mannheim and Max Weber, namely as an 
unreflective and psychological clinging to tradition. 6 Hugh Cecil has referred to 
“traditionalism” as “natural conservatism,” whereas Rossiter has called it 
“temperamental conservatism.”7
The greatest shortcoming of the book was that it made an attempt to integrate a 
variety of phenomena into a general framework that suited some cases, but certainly not 
all—it ignored the limits of the concept of “conservatism.” In their introduction, both 
The positive contribution of The Limits of Change was 
that it rightly indicated that the resort to tradition in modern China was a modern 
phenomenon based on conscious choice. 
2 La Capra, Rethinking Intellectual History, 20-21.
3 Charlotte Furth, ed., The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservative Alternatives in Republican 
China (Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 1976). (Henceforth: LOC)
4 Most of the essays in LOC (with the exception of the essays by Schneider, Eastman, and 
Dirlik) are translated in Zhou Yangshan and Yang Suxian, eds., Jindai Zhongguo sixiang 
renwulun: baoshou zhuyi (Taipei: Shibao wenhua chuban shiye youxian gongsi, 1980).
5 Levenson, “‘History’ and ‘Value’: The Tensions of Intellectual Choice in Modern China,” 
146-194.
6 Mannheim, “Conservative Thought,” 152-156; Max Weber used the term both in his The 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism and in his studies on religious sociology. 
7 Cecil, Conservatism, 9; Rossiter, Conservatism in America, 5. However, as Vierhaus has 
rightly noted, the distinction between “traditionalism” and “conservatism” is not absolute; many 
words derived from the field of meaning of “traditionalism” are used to define conservatism. 
Examples are the notions of organic growth, preservation and nurture, order, historical 
development and continuity. See Vierhaus, “Konservativ, Konservatismus,” 533.
3Charlotte Furth and Benjamin Schwartz argued that a Western notion of conservatism 
based on the accounts of the German sociologist Karl Mannheim and the “founding 
father” of conservatism, Edmund Burke, could be applied to modern China. In his 
monumental article on conservatism in Germany, Mannheim had asserted that 
conservatism could be portrayed as a “style of thought,” a “dynamic, historical 
structural configuration” that changed over time and that had to be situated above 
concrete manifestations, but that was nevertheless connected to these individual 
expressions. 8
Conservatism approached things from the past—everything that existed was the 
result of historical growth. Reform in this context was not based on future ideals, but on 
this very historical process: change had to be congruent with what had historically 
become. Progressivism, on the other hand, approached things from something above or 
beyond, such as a future utopia or transcendent principles. If one understood 
conservatism as an opposition to rationalism, it did not have to disapprove of change as 
such—what mattered was how change was approached. In his Reflections on the 
Revolutions in France, Edmund Burke had also underlined gradualism and continuity—
society for Burke was a contract between past, present, and future generations. As 
Burke put it, “[p]eople will not look forward to posteriority, who never look backward 
to their ancestors.”
As such, according to Mannheim, it allowed for both inner unity and 
variations in content. As a “style of thought,” conservatism opposed the rationality and 
abstract thought of the Enlightenment and replaced it with a stress on particularity and 
the historically grown. As distinct from “traditionalism,” modern conservatism only 
arose in particular circumstances. Whereas the progressive movement was marked by a 
belief in the “consciousness of the possible,” conservatism clung to the concrete and the 
qualitative. 
9
Basing herself on Mannheim, Charlotte Furth, the editor of The Limits of 
Change, argued that modern Chinese conservatism was characterized by a certain “style 
of thought” to which all subjects studied in the volume adhered, regardless of variations 
in content. This “style” was a historical consciousness according to which change 
through individual action could only have limited influence on the environment, since 
On this basis, Burke made a case for historically grown institutions 
against changes based on revolutionary “blueprints” of society. 
8 Mannheim, “Conservative Thought,” 132, 155.
9 Burke, Reflections, 29.
4this environment was ruled by external and contingent forces. 10 Furthermore, both 
Charlotte Furth and Benjamin Schwartz claimed that modern Chinese conservatism was 
primarily a “cultural conservatism”; it was not a Burkean conservatism aimed at the 
preservation of the sociopolitical status quo. 11 They asserted that this was the case 
because the decline of the “mystique of the imperial monarchy” since the 1890s had 
separated the political order from the moral and cultural orders. 12
Using this framework, then, the book included articles on National Essence 
(guocui), on political modernizers such as Yuan Shikai (1859-1916) and the 
Kuomintang (KMT), on the so-called “New Confucians”—who based their 
understanding of Confucianism on the Neo-Confucianism of the Song (907-1279) and 
Ming (1368-1644) dynasties—and on “modern historicism.” The latter was used to refer 
to both the social evolutionism of the historian Tao Xisheng (1899-1988), and to the 
writer Zhou Zuoren’s (1885-1967) cyclical view of history and his retreat from the 
public sphere.
Apart from this 
distinction between culture and politics, Furth also divided conservatives into 
“nativists” for whom Chinese culture was a particular, and “universalists,” for whom 
Chinese values were primarily universal values. 
13 These trends already indicate the problem with the term conservatism: 
how could the notion of “cultural conservatism” be applied to figures such as Yuan 
Shikai? And how could the defense of timeless universal values by New Confucians be 
interpreted as a Mannheimian rejection of abstract thought or a Burkean defense of the 
historically grown? Furth asserted that both were marked by what she termed 
“presumptions of continuity.”14
Schwartz posed the question: “Can people who are wholeheartedly committed to 
modernization ever be considered conservative?” 15
10 Furth, “Culture and Politics,” 51.
11 Schwartz, “Notes on Conservatism,” 16. 
12 Furth, “Culture and Politics,” 25. However, Furth also notes that this separation was by no 
means a permanent attribute of modern Chinese conservatism. By the 1930s, the two realms 
were reunited in a “sociological view of historical evolution” as represented, for example, by 
Tao Xisheng, Chen Lifu, and Feng Youlan. See ibid., 46.
13 Tao Xisheng’s social evolutionism, in which class struggle was not considered an 
indispensable element of dialectical materialism, represented the left KMT position on Chinese 
society. Tao defended this position in the so-called “social history controversy” of the late 
1920s and early 1930s. After 1937, Tao had close ties with the KMT leadership under Chiang 
Kai-shek. Zhou Zuoren, a translator and essayist, was the younger brother of Lu Xun. 
14 Furth, “Culture and Politics,” 50.
15 Schwartz, “Notes on Conservatism,” 12.
For Schwartz, the answer was 
positive, since modernization was a process independent of human will, a process that 
5required stability and an awareness of the unique nature of Chinese historical culture.16
Furth did not distinguish between different motives behind advocacies of historical 
continuity; for her, both a subscription to continuity that was recommended for practical 
reasons and a defense of continuity based on the belief that things were historically 
grown were manifestations of conservatism. However, the resort to tradition of a Yuan 
Shikai was by no means marked by a Burkean belief in the historically grown; it was a 
utilitarian and calculated resort to tradition. Although one might perceive continuity, it 
was nevertheless a constructed effort based on pragmatic selection. Hence, the question 
rises of whether a belief in some sort of historical continuity as such is sufficient to 
apply the term “conservatism,” especially when the historical continuity that is upheld 
does not stem from a belief in the inherent value of tradition.17 Another problem with 
Furth’s argument is that she presents conservatism both as the belief that there are limits 
to the human interference in historical processes and as the endorsement of some sort of 
historical continuity. These, however, are two distinct definitions, and, as Arif Dirlik’s 
article on Tao Xisheng demonstrates, it is perfectly possible to combine an advocacy of 
of historical continuity with a promotion of progress and voluntarism.18 If conservatism 
entails a belief in the “limits of change,” then this definition cannot be applied to all 
subjects of the study.19
Most authors in the volume did not adhere to the framework outlined in the 
introduction. Guy Alitto, for example, treated Chinese conservatism as part of a global 
reaction against modernization as rationalization.20 In late modernizing countries such 
as China, Alitto contended, modernization was perceived of as a Western product; the 
result was a cultural conservatism that joined hands with nationalism.21
16 Ibid., 14, 18-19.
17 In his article on Tao Xisheng, Dirlik has phrased it as follows: “His stress on historical 
process was not so much a consequence of commitment to tradition as a reflection of concern 
with change in the present.” Dirlik, “T’ao Hsi-sheng: The Social Limits of Change,” 325.
18 Ibid., in LOC, 305-331.
19 A case in point is Liang Shuming’s rural reform program, which had strong utopian traits. 
Alitto has even compared some aspects of it to socialist programs. 
20 Alitto, “The Conservative as Sage: Liang Shu-ming,” in LOC, 213-241.
21 Alitto has also formulated this argument in The Last Confucian: Liang Shu-ming and the 
Chinese Dilemma of Modernity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987). See also Ai 
Kai (Guy S. Alitto), Shijie fanwei nei de fan xiandaihua sichao: lun wenhua shoucheng zhuyi
(Guiyang: Guizhou renmin chubanshe, 1991).
This, then, was 
in accordance with Levenson’s argument that the resort to tradition could only be 
emotional; it outlined the possibility of intellectual choice. Moreover, it also excluded 
6the possibility of a universalism that was not utilized in the service of cultural 
nationalism.  The New Confucians in the volume, Tu Wei-ming and Chang Hao, also 
discarded Levenson’s thesis, but instead of adhering to the historical consciousness 
argument, they posited that New Confucianism was either a purely intellectual construct 
or a reaction to an intellectual crisis that was a crisis of meaning.22
Finally, Eastman’s article on the Kuomintang was based on the definition of 
conservatism as a defense of the status quo, a definition that Furth certainly did not 
share.
Nowhere did Tu and 
Chang discuss “the limits of change”; on the contrary, although for New Confucians, 
the individual was indeed part of a larger cosmological scheme, this did not imply that 
the individual could have only a limited effect on the environment. It was through the 
inner cultivation of the individual that change in the outer world could be achieved.
23 Following Clinton Rossiter’s argument that there was no conservatism in 
rapidly modernizing societies—in America, industrialism and democracy turned 
conservatism into a progressive force—Eastman held that this type of conservatism that 
was keen on preserving the status quo had been rare in modern China. The Kuomintang 
chose to create a new and modern order, not to preserve the status quo.24 Consequently, 
this implies that the term was not suited to refer to the Kuomintang in a period of rapid 
change instead of preservation, which contradicts other articles in the book in which the 
term conservatism was associated with the Kuomintang. In the light of these 
observations, the question of whether the term “conservatism” is useful at all to discuss 
intellectual trends in modern China comes to mind. The book could be considered an
example of what La Capra has termed “synoptic content analysis,” or the unproblematic 
identification of entities or structures that are presented in a narrative form.25
The Limits of Change was not the first book in which the term “conservatism” 
was used inconsistently; Mary Wright applied the term to discuss the Tongzhi 
22 Tu Wei-ming, “Hsiung Shih-li’s Quest for Authentic Existence,” in LOC, 242-275; Chang 
Hao, “New Confucianism and the Intellectual Crisis of Contemporary China,” in LOC, 276-302. 
Throughout this study, the names of those New Confucians who are generally referred to in 
Wade-Giles will be transcribed in Wade-Giles instead of in Pinyin. This is done because many 
overseas and Taiwanese scholars, including Yü Ying-shih, would not identify with a Pinyin 
transcription for political reasons. Hence, in this case, faithfulness to the convictions of the 
authors overrules consistency. (In the character list, however, these names have been organized 
alphabetically according to the Pinyin system, with the Wide-Giles transcription mentioned in 
parentheses).
23 Young, “The Hung-hsien Emperor as a Modernizing Conservative,” in LOC, 171-190.
24 Rossiter, Conservatism in America, 219.
25 La Capra, Rethinking Intellectual History, 33.
7Restoration (1862-1874) in her 1957 book The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism.26
Wright declared that modern Chinese conservatism differed from “Western” 
conservatism in several important respects. The latter was typified by a belief in the 
divine and in original sin; it postulated the sacred character of private property; it 
distrusted reason and preferred a “prejudice” based on experience; it renounced the 
universal in favor of the parochial. Chinese conservatism, on the other hand, adhered to 
beliefs that were “radical” from the point of view of “Western” conservatism, such as 
the notion of a rational natural order; the priority of group interests over private 
property; the postulation of the innate goodness of man; the reverence of customs as a 
reflection of reason instead of a remedy against it; and the concept of the universal state. 
The reason why Wright availed herself of the term was, as she put it, that both European 
and Chinese conservatism had “the intent to conserve.”27
Michael Gasster employed the term in a similar fashion in his 1969 book 
Chinese Intellectuals and the Revolution of 1911: The Birth of Modern Chinese 
Radicalism.
However, if conservatism was 
merely about preservation, then the differences listed by Wright were not differences in 
the essence of conservatism; they were merely differences in the status quo that 
conservatives intended to preserve. For the Chinese side, Wright merely described the 
characteristics of a Confucian sociopolitical order and identified these with a Chinese 
conservatism. 
28 Gasster associated the term “radicalism” with the birth of a new 
intelligentsia and its quest for “rapid and thoroughgoing social, economic, and political 
change,” or modernization. 29 In line with the modernization theories of the 1960s, 
Gasster contrasted this “modern radicalism” with a “traditional conservatism” not so 
keen on innovation. 30
26 Mary Wright, The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T’ung-Chih Restoration, 1862-
1874 (New York: Atheneum, 1966 (Stanford University Press, 1957)).
For Gasster, “radicalism” was a dissatisfaction with present 
conditions that was translated into both the creation of utopian goals in the future and 
reformist or revolutionary optimism. Conservatism, then, was merely the opposite of 
innovation. This dualist interpretation led Gasster to conclude that all modernizers 
27 Ibid., 2.
28 Michael Gasster, Chinese Intellectuals and the Revolution of 1911: The Birth of Modern 
Chinese Radicalism (Seattle, London: University of Washington Press, 1969).
29 Ibid., viii.
30 Ibid., xvii.
8during the first years of the twentieth century had been “radicals,” regardless of whether  
they had been revolutionaries or reformers. 
Notwithstanding the simplistic identification of conservatism with preservation 
in the accounts of both Gasster and Wright, Wright’s account in particular raises 
questions about concrete manifestations of conservatism and their relation to general 
conservative themes. For example, authors such as Isaiah Berlin and Andreas 
Kinneging have argued that the conservative opposition to Enlightenment was not a 
mere opposition to abstract rationalism, as Mannheim claimed; it was directed against 
the denial of original sin in particular.31
1.2 1990S CHINA: THE “SYNCHRONIC” APPROACH 
The editors of The Limits of Change have 
treated the absence of the question of original sin in China as a mere variation in content 
that did not contradict the Mannheimian “style of thought,” but where does the 
“content” end and the “style” start? 
As can be seen from The Limits of Change and from the two books discussed above, 
much confusion arises because authors have applied different approaches in their 
analysis of “conservatism,” from which different definitions follow. For some, 
including Wright and Gasster, “conservatism” is the preservation of the status quo, an 
approach that one author has called the “commonsense” approach.32 Although this is the 
literal meaning of the term, it is not very useful, for it robs conservatism of any 
consistent content: if the status quo changes, the content of conservatism changes. In 
addition, since all ruling parties, including revolutionaries, aim to preserve their power, 
a functional definition is too broad to be useful.33
As one author notes, the projection of the label “conservatism” onto a Left-Right 
axis, in a “two-dimensional field,” is mostly a strategy to relate beliefs in an 
“unambiguous” way.34
31 Berlin, “The Counter-Enlightenment,” 264; Kinneging, “Het conservatisme,” 1-33.
32 Allen, “Modern Conservatism,” 583-584.
33 Epstein, “Introduction,” 5, 8. 
34 McAllister, Revolt Against Modernity, 8.
This strategy might be politically efficient, but academically, it 
has little value. The praxis of locating conservatism on a Left-Right axis could be called 
a “horizontal” or “synchronic” approach, in which the focus is on the attitude towards 
the status quo. The Mannheimian and Burkean notions of conservatism, on the contrary, 
9could be called “diachronic” or “vertical” notions of conservatism in which the crucial 
aspect is the link between the past, the present, and the future. In the latter, change is 
not simply disapproved of; the core of conservatism is rather how to bring about 
change, a point that will be addressed further in this chapter. Therefore, in their 
objection to the “commonsense” approach, many authors are right in pointing out that 
conservatives do want change; some conservatives are reformers, whereas others are 
reactionaries.35
Other approaches to conservatism are equally problematic. Mannheim has 
linked his notion of different “styles of thought” to different social groups or classes. 
According to this sociohistorical approach, interests are the driving force behind ideas 
and ideologies. Conservatives, then, defend the interests of the ruling class. According 
to Mannheim, intellectuals are unattached in the sense that they do not constitute a 
separate class or social group—they are “free-floating.” Intellectuals move freely 
between classes and are like “ideologues”: they come up with arguments for whatever 
cause they support. Since they are independent, it is easier for them to know the 
interests of others.36
The opposite approach in which thought is reduced to certain reappearing core 
ideas—as, for example, in Lovejoy’s notion of “unit ideas”—is equally problematic 
because it can lead to anachronism and false continuity.
However, this does not explain why they choose to defend the 
interests of one class and not the other, which is in the end also a matter of rational 
choice. For this reason, the interest-driven approach reduces all forms of conservatism 
to apologetics, thereby depriving them of any philosophical content and intellectual 
choice. 
37 Lovejoy’s approach does not 
account for individual aims: if all systems of thought consist of basic “unit ideas” that 
are continuous, then no thought can ever be attributed to a specific era or a specific 
thinker—all we have is a set of basic components that are combined in various ways.38
35 Epstein, for example, distinguishes between “defenders of the status quo,” “reform 
conservatives,” and “reactionaries.” See Epstein, “Introduction,” 7-15.
36 Mannheim, “Conservative Thought,” 185.
37 For Lovejoy’s “unit ideas” approach, see his “Introduction: The Study of the History of 
Ideas,” 3-23.
38 For a criticism of Lovejoy, see Mandelbaum, “History of Ideas,” 33-66.
The danger of this approach is, as the historian Butterfield puts it, that history might fall 
prone to the fallacy of “abridgment,” or the repression of discontinuities and the 
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straightening of curved narratives. 39 La Capra has used the notion of “retrospective 
reconstruction” to indicate the danger of this approach: by focusing on certain core 
ideas in the present, one is inclined to rewrite history as the history of the unfolding of 
these core ideas, thereby ignoring other core ideas that have been equally important. In 
a similar vein, Fischer has referred to the “fallacy” of “presentism,” an approach in 
which the author starts from a certain condition in the present and understands the past 
merely in the light of this current state of affairs—he fails to see the past in its own 
terms. 40
The German author Epstein has solved the problem of the relation between 
timeless values and concrete manifestations by arguing that we can find some conscious 
conservative principles—which are tied to the denunciation of a progressive rationalism 
and utopianism—but we can only do so in specific forms in specific periods of time.
One might object that all historians unavoidably embed facts in a certain 
narrative, as Hayden White reminds us, but by reducing intellectual history to certain 
basic themes, dissimilarities between individual manifestations are more likely to be 
obliterated and aberrations are more prone to exclusion. 
41
Similarly, Muller has applied an approach to conservatism that identifies a 
“constellation” of recurrent assumptions, themes, and images that acknowledges both 
historical and national diversity and continuity. 42 Hence, Muller describes certain 
“conservative” characteristics—such as the conviction that humans are imperfect and 
that institutions and habits (what Burke has termed the “second nature” or the “veil”) 
are needed to restrain individuals; the adherence to historicism and particularism; the 
emphasis on duties instead of voluntary contracts; and the belief in the social utility of 
religion—but he is still skeptical about meaningful general statements because 
conservatism is tied to very specific contexts.43
This skepticism regarding general statements seems all the more justified if one 
looks at, for example, certain manifestations of post-1945 American conservatism. On 
the one hand, the “neo-conservatism” of the American intellectuals Russell Kirk (1918-
1994)44 and Robert Nisbet (1913-1996)45
39 Butterfield, Whig Interpretation of History, 24, 103.
40 La Capra, Rethinking Intellectual History, 17; Fischer, Historians’ Fallacies, 135-140.
41 Epstein, “Introduction,” 13.
42 Muller, “Introduction,” 23.
43 Ibid., 10-14, 19-22, 23.
might be said to correspond largely to the 
44 Kirk studied at Michigan State University and Duke University and is most famous for his 
book The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Santayana (Chicago: H. Regnery Company, 
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characteristics of Burkean conservatism.46 Kirk has underlined the importance of social 
order, customs, and tradition, as well as the link between property and freedom. 47
Nisbet has likewise mentioned the importance of a “prejudice” based on experience; he 
has reiterated order, private property, religion, tradition, and the irreconcilability of 
liberty and equality. 48 On the other hand, however, there are important distinctions 
between Burkean and American conservatism; Rossiter has maintained that the latter is 
more optimistic, materialistic, and individualistic than the former.49
Whereas Kirk and Nisbet have clearly reworked Burkean themes, it is harder to 
find these concerns in the works of, for example, the political philosopher Leo Strauss 
(1899-1973), 50
1953). In this book, Kirk outlined six “canons” or common themes in conservatism, namely (1) 
the belief in a transcendent order; (2) an attachment to the “variety and mystery” of human life; 
(3) the notion that social order is needed; (4) the conviction that property and freedom are 
linked; (5) the adherence to custom and convention; (6) the view that innovation must take 
place in relation to existing habits and traditions. In The Politics of Prudence (Bryn Mawr, PN: 
Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 1993), Kirk expanded the six “canons” to ten principles. For an 
early version of these ten principles, see Kirk’s 1957 article “The Essence of Conservatism” at 
http://www.kirkcenter.org/index.php/detail/essence-1957/. See also the extended excerpt of his 
1993 essay “Ten Conservative Principles” at http://www.kirkcenter.org/ index.php/detail/ten-
conservative-principles/.
45 Robert Nisbet was a sociologist trained at the University of California, Berkeley. He is 
famous for his Conservatism: Dream and Reality (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1986). 
46 Epstein even criticizes “neo-conservatives” in the United States for identifying specific
manifestations of conservatism, namely Burkean conservatism, with conservatism as such. He 
refers to both Kirk and Nisbet in this respect.
47 See Kirk, The Conservative Mind, 21-69.
48 Nisbet, Conservatism, 37-84.
49 Rossiter, Conservatism in America, 68-73.
50 The political philosopher Leo Strauss was born in Kirchhain, Prussia, and obtained his Ph.D. 
at the University of Hamburg under the supervision of the Neo-Kantian philosopher Ernst 
Cassirer. In 1949, Strauss became a Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. 
Strauss’s most famous work is Natural Law and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1971). In the latter, Strauss criticized historicism, positivism and modern rationalism and argued 
in favor of a return to the natural right theory of classical political thought.
another important founder of post-1945 American conservatism. 
Strauss’s criticism of the inherent relativism in liberalism has led him to speak for a 
return to classical philosophy.  In Strauss’s works, there is a tension between the 
Burkean reliance on tradition and the affirmation of a normative order that defies all 
forms of historicism and relativism. For McAllister, who has analyzed Strauss’s 
writings, conservatives are defenders of Western civilization; the belief in transhuman 
normative structures—whether it is in the form of the natural law tradition, revelation, 
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or Platonic essences and forms—is the basic characteristic of conservatism.51 Because 
there is a clear tension between a Burkean emphasis on the historically grown and a 
Straussian quest for a normative order that casts aside relativism, Axel Schneider has 
made a distinction between a “classicist” conservatism that identifies timeless, universal 
norms—examples are Leo Strauss, Eric Voegelin (1901-1985), 52 Michael Oakeshott 
(1901-1990),53 and Irving Babbitt (1865-1933)54—and a “historicist” conservatism that 
leaves the question of universal standards unanswered and that stresses the particularity 
of traditions. Whereas the former can be found mostly in the Anglophone world, the 
latter was a crucial aspect of nineteenth-century German conservative thought, but it has 
also been present—be it in an embryonic form—in Burke’s thought.55
From the above, it can be seen that a reduction of conservatism to either the 
defense of the status quo and certain interests, or to some general principles that can be 
applied to all times and places does not do justice to the complexities at hand. This 
leads us to the question of how both European and American authors have approached 
the issue of conservatism in 1990s China. How have they dealt with the issues that 
Furth and Schwartz addressed in the 1976 volume? What approaches have they brought 
into play and what definitions have resulted from this? A first point that can be made is 
that the dominant approaches for 1990s Chinese conservatism were the “commonsense” 
approach and the sociohistorical approach. In the former situation, the term “neo-
conservatism” was associated with the preservation of the status quo—centralization in 
51 McAllister, Revolt Against Modernity, 12, 262-264.
52 Eric Voegelin was born in Cologne and studied political science at the University of Vienna, 
where he obtained his Ph.D. under the Neo-Kantian Hans Kelsen. His most famous book is The 
New Science of Politics: An Introduction (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), a 
criticism of modernity’s belief in the power of knowledge to transform reality and an attempt to 
restore premodern political theory. 
53 Michael Oakeshott studied history at the Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge, and later 
became a Professor of Political Science at the London School of Economics (LSE). Oakeshott is 
most famous for his collection of essays Rationalism in Politics, and Other Essays (London: 
Methuen, 1962). In “Rationalism in Politics,” Oakeshott distinguished between immediate or 
“practical knowledge” and general, abstract knowledge or “knowledge of technique.” 
54 Irving Babbitt was born in Dayton, Ohio, and studied Sanskrit, Buddhism, and romance 
languages at Harvard University and the Sorbonne. In 1912, Babbitt became Professor of 
French Literature at Harvard University. Together with Paul Elmer More, Babbitt developed the 
core ideas of what later came to be known as New Humanism, in which an attack was launched 
on the romanticism of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. 
55 Schneider, “The One and the Many,” unpublished paper for AAS, 2005.
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times of economic liberalization—and in the latter instance, the term was reduced to the 
defense of the “interests” of certain groups or individuals.56
Most European and American researchers of Chinese “neo-conservatism” during 
the 1990s were political scientists, which explains why the term has mostly been 
associated with elitist struggles over reform. 57 According to this framework, “neo-
conservatives” intended to preserve the centralized state of the pre-reform era in the 
face of the destabilizing consequences of economic reform. In addition, “neo-
conservatism” was a response to both questions of political legitimacy and the crisis of 
Marxist ideology. To the element of centralization, most authors have thus also added 
nationalism, populism, authoritarianism, political stability, and ideology, the result of 
which was the emergence of a kind of “neo-conservative” “configuration.” 58 The 
German political scientist Schubert, for example, has used the term “neo-conservatism” 
in the context of a paradigm of “political nationalism.”59 Some American authors have 
focused on the “anti-liberal” traits of “neo-conservatism” in particular.60
The greatest disadvantage of this paradigm is that it reduces “neo-conservatism” 
to a debate on policy, thereby excluding the use of the term in intellectual circles and 
depriving it of any content that goes beyond questions of political legitimacy and the 
search for a new ideological foundation. Conservatism in this context is but a positional 
ideology that has nothing to do with a philosophical stance in which abstract thought is 
discarded in favor of the concrete or the qualitative; it does not oppose progressivism 
and it does not defend continuity because of the notion that things are historically 
grown. The general approach to 1990s conservatism, then, was synchronic—it was 
mostly concerned with how conservatism was utilized for present purposes, but it did 
not address the question of how conservatism, which was also concerned with the 
nature of change, could be employed to analyze the relation between past, present, and 
future. 
56 McCormick and Kelly, “Limits of Anti-Liberalism,” 805. Lin Min distinguishes between 
“hard” neo-conservatives (He Xin and Xiao Gongqin) who support the status quo, and “soft” 
neo-conservatives (Dai Qing, Wu Jiaxiang, and Yuan Zhiming) who support the reformers. See 
Lin Min, “Overview,” 70-71.
57 Fewsmith, “Neoconservatism,” 79.
58 Chen, “Neoconservative Political Thought,” 593.
59 See Gunter Schubert, Chinas Kampf um die Nation: Dimensionen nationalistischen Denkens 
in der VR China, Taiwan und Hong Kong an der Jahrtausendwende (Hamburg: Institut für 
Asienkunde, 2002).
60 The title of McCormick and Kelly’s article, “The Limits of Anti-Liberalism,” is telling in this 
respect.
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Those European and American researchers who have made use of the term “neo-
conservatism” to refer to intellectual developments of the 1990s have analyzed it as part 
of a paradigm of “cultural conservatism,” but they have nevertheless reduced the latter 
to ideological perspectives in line with “cultural nationalism.” As Guo Yingjie has 
explained, cultural nationalists do not conceive of the nation in political-territorial or in 
civic terms; the nation is a “primordial expression of a national spirit and national 
solidarities like families, organic beings and living personalities.”61 The core of the 
nation is its unique civilization. Contrary to political nationalists, for whom the focus of 
loyalty is the Party, for cultural nationalists, the nation forms the primary object of 
loyalty.62
By thinking of “cultural conservatism” and “cultural nationalism” together, 
analysts have interpreted references to Chinese tradition as a mere emotional response 
to a history of humiliation. As such, rather than analyzing “conservatism” in relation to 
intellectual trends of previous decades, they have merely concentrated on the relation 
between China and “the West.” Schubert, for example, has associated “cultural 
conservatism” with “cultural nationalism,” whereas Guo Yingjie has drawn on the 
notion of “cultural nationalism” to analyze a variety of intellectual phenomena during 
the 1990s, ranging from New Confucianism and revisionist historiography to debates on 
postmodernism and language reform.63
This synchronic model has also reduced intellectual discussions to discussions 
on policy; questions that surpassed matters of political legitimacy and reform have 
therefore been ignored. Sullivan, for example, has read intellectual debates on 
“conservatism” as an attempt to seek a middle position between radical reformers and 
Regardless of whether or not conservatism can 
be universalistic in nature—as Furth has insisted for New Confucianism—this 
framework is problematic because it either politicizes all references to tradition, or it 
presents them as emotional reactions. Although there are certainly some political and 
emotional aspects to the return to tradition, the rise of tradition cannot merely be 
reduced to these two factors. For some, the return to tradition was a conscious and 
intellectual choice.
61 Guo, Cultural Nationalism, 18. Emphasis in original.
62 Ibid., 20.
63 Schubert, “Was ist Neokonservativismus?,” 57-74; Guo Yingjie, Cultural Nationalism in 
Contemporary China: The Search for National Identity under Reform (London, New York: 
Routledge Curzon, 2004).
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hard-line conservatives. 64 Meissner has ascribed the revival of traditional political 
thought in China to the official embrace of Confucianism since 1986; he has thus 
treated the resort to culture and tradition as an instrumental means to create order and 
stability and to construct a new national identity. Similarly, he has associated “neo-
conservatism” with intellectuals who support the status quo, with the interests of “cadre 
capitalists” and with the rise of nationalism.65
Although some attempts have been undertaken to reconcile developments in the 
political world with those in the intellectual world, once more, the actors involved have 
been political scientists. In a study on conservative thought in contemporary China, for 
example, Peter Moody has made use of the term “conservatism” to investigate power 
struggles among the elite, which has led him to a study of “traditionalism,” nationalism, 
populism, and “neo-conservatism.” 66 Although Moody has also dealt with some 
intellectual manifestations of conservatism, he has not addressed questions that go 
beyond policy matters. Fewsmith’s impressive book China Since Tiananmen has 
successfully addressed both political and intellectual changes since 1989, but it has been 
short on the wider implications of debates on conservatism for the intellectual world.67
1.3 CONTESTED CONCEPTS: METHODOLOGICAL OUTLINE
The above reveals that the topic of what Chinese conservatism implied for the 
intellectual world of the 1990s has mostly been absent from European and American 
accounts. Instead of posing the question of how intellectual debates have shaped policy, 
this study deals with the broader meaning of intellectual debates in which figures such 
as Edmund Burke have been invoked; much more than a mere manifestation of 
nationalism or debates on policy, Chinese intellectuals tried to come to terms with the 
past and to redefine what it meant to be Chinese and to be an intellectual in a rapidly 
changing society. The resort to Chinese tradition surpassed questions of political 
legitimacy; for some, it was an intellectual choice to deal with problems of morality, 
whereas others made an attempt to rework socialist notions of Chinese identity. In 
64 Sullivan, Democracy and Developmentalism, 339.
65 Meissner, “New Intellectual Currents,” 18-19.
66 Peter Moody, Conservative Thought in Contemporary China (Lanham, Boulder: Lexington 
Books, 2007), 14.
67 Joseph Fewsmith, China Since Tiananmen: The Politics of Transition (Cambridge, New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
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dealing with these issues, instead of applying preconceived notions of “conservatism” to 
Chinese currents of thought that are then labeled as such, this research looks into how 
the concepts of “conservatism” (baoshou zhuyi) and “neo-conservatism” (xin baoshou 
zhuyi) were used and discussed in a Chinese context. Consequently, like Lovejoy’s 
“history of ideas,” this study moves away from “systems” and “isms,” but instead of 
focusing on “unit ideas,” it turns toward language. 
This choice is justified by the fact that, as La Capra has rightly noted, “the 
rethinking of intellectual history by way of the text-context problem raises the issue of 
language.”68 By turning to language, the “dialogical” relation to the past that La Capra 
had in mind can be realized, because instead of engaging in a “retrospective 
construction” in which clarity is assumed, this approach reveals the sense-making 
efforts of the historical subjects themselves.69 A Chinese author has made the distinction 
between “neo-conservatism” as a “label” and “neo-conservatism” as a “banner,” the 
latter of which denotes the advocacy of a specific program. 70
Certain basic concepts form the primary unit of analysis in this study. As for 
Koselleck, the concept is a “factor,” or, in Skinner’s terminology, it is a weapon or an 
instrument.
This research 
distinguishes between “labels” and “banners” and attempts to understand why and how 
Chinese intellectuals have utilized them rather than to apply “labels” to Chinese 
intellectual currents on the basis of European or American “banners.”
71 The great merit of the approach that Koselleck and others have employed 
in their monumental work Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe was that it connected the 
history of concepts with a social and political history.72
68 La Capra, Rethinking Intellectual History, 18.
69 Ibid.
70 Jin Yuanpu, “He yi ‘baoshou zhuyi,’” 385. 
71 Koselleck uses this term in Futures Past, 156. 
72 Otto Brunner, Werner Conze and Reinhart Koselleck, eds., Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe:
Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 
1972-1997). 
This approach broke with the 
older German approach of Geistesgeschichte, an approach that, drawing upon the 
history of philosophy, suggested the autonomous development of ideas of which 
concepts were the unproblematic reflection. The authors of the Geschichtliche 
Grundbegriffe, on the contrary, linked concepts to different groups, classes, and strata in 
society and showed how concepts were contested. Secondly, they concentrated on 
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changes, ruptures, and conflict; these conceptual changes were related to changes in 
political, economic, and social structures. 
As in Koselleck’s Begriffsgeschichte, the key concepts analyzed here will be 
treated as contested intellectual constructions. However, whereas Koselleck aimed at 
documenting the sociopolitical order in its entirety by looking into the use of concepts 
among different social groups, this study concentrates on the use of concepts by 
different intellectuals. Hence, this study could be considered a microscopic version of 
Koselleck’s approach, since the focal point is not how concepts are contested between 
different groups (inter-group), but on how they are contested within a certain group 
(intra-group). Another modification with regard to Koselleck’s approach concerns the 
time frame of this study. Whereas Koselleck studied how the use of concepts changed 
over a period of a hundred years, this study only deals with the use of concepts during 
the early 1990s; as such, this study is more synchronic than diachronic. Nevertheless, 
given the rapid social changes at the time and the consequent change in the use of 
concepts, some diachronicity is nevertheless present.
Although Koselleck focused on contestation and rupture, he still believed in the 
possibility of the construction of a history of concepts, which meant that a general 
meaning could be derived from the use of concepts in various contexts. Intellectual 
historians such as Skinner, however, have argued that “there can be no histories of 
concepts; there can only be histories of their uses in argument.”73 Similarly, Pocock has 
applied the term “discourse” to point at the variety of contexts in which a concept can 
be put to use. However, although both Skinner and Pocock have centered on language 
and context, their approaches diverge in some crucial respects. For Pocock, what the 
author can say is constrained by existing language; it is because language is ambivalent 
that ideas are ambivalent. Criticism of this approach is therefore that individual beliefs 
are left out and that the idea is a mere reflection of social structures.74
73 Skinner, “Reply to my Critics,” 283. Quoted in Richter, “Political Languages,” 64.
For Skinner, 
since every speech act is unique, one can only concentrate on the speech acts of 
individuals; no general meaning can be derived from it. Thus, Skinner has taken 
linguistic conventions as a focal point; he has treated theories as intentional speech acts. 
74 For a criticism of Pocock and Skinner, see for example Bevir, “Mind and Method in the 
History of Ideas,” 167-189.
” 167-189.
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Consequently, for Skinner, beliefs are subordinate to intentions. 75 Critics of both 
Skinner and Pocock have accused them of not being concerned with coherence or belief 
systems, or of having treated the notion of “intention” as unproblematic.76
In this context, Koselleck’s notion of Gegenbegriffe or “counterconcepts” is 
extremely useful.
Taking this criticism into account, this study also focuses on the use of concepts 
in argument, but unlike Pocock and Skinner, it does not exclude the question of 
coherent beliefs or meaning from the start. The focus of attention will not be on how 
existing language restricts its users, but whether or not the concrete uses of language 
can be tied to a coherent set of beliefs shared by all participants. Following Koselleck, 
this study does not rule out the possibility that concepts can obtain a meaning that is
passed over time despite different uses in context. By focusing on the use of concepts, 
but by also asking the question of whether there is a higher unit behind them—
individuals, groups, or even “styles of thought”—this study is an intellectual history that 
aims to be more than a history of “men thinking.” Consequently, this research takes 
from Koselleck the idea of contested concepts, but leaves out the diachronic aspect; it 
exchanges the history of concepts for a study of their use in argument.
77
The “counterconcept” that will be examined in this study is that of “radicalism” 
(jijin zhuyi), against which the concepts of “conservatism” (baoshou zhuyi) and “neo-
conservatism” (xin baoshou zhuyi) were projected. The idea for this entry point came 
As Koselleck explains, “counterconcepts” are utilized for self-
definition; those who apply them attempt to create unity through the reliance on 
simplistic dualisms. In some instances, these dualisms are unequally antithetical or 
asymmetric, which means that those who set up the dualism present their own stance in 
such a way that readers cannot but negate the “counterconcept” and identify with their 
stance. Moreover, those who are associated with a certain “counterconcept” mostly do 
not identify with this position. Simplistic dualisms are therefore set up for polemical 
reasons; more than theoretically valuable, they are politically instrumental. Koselleck 
adds that one should not rely on these dualisms to read history; rather, one should look 
at how historical subjects employ these constructions, and one should question this 
usage in order to obtain historical meaning.
75 See for example Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas,” 3-53.
76 Bevir, “Mind and Method,” 167-169; LaCapra, Rethinking Intellectual History, 36.
77 For an explanation and some examples of “counterconcepts,” see Reinhart Koselleck, “The 
Historical-Political Semantics of Assymetric Counterconcepts,” in Futures Past, 155-191.
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after the discovery of a Chinese volume entitled Intellectual Positions: The Turbulence 
between Radicalism and Conservatism.78
By starting from both the usage and the meaning given to the notion of 
“radicalism” in different contexts, the discursive construction of conservatism will be 
analyzed. Since the meaning of “radicalism” and “conservatism” is contested and 
constructed through discourse and dialogue, we are dealing with, as Mikhail Bakhtin 
has phrased it, a “dialogical” construction. In Bakhtin’s view, language can be 
perceived of as enabling “an almost Manichean sense of opposition and struggle.”
This 1999 volume is a collection of debates on 
“radicalism” and “conservatism” in a variety of contexts, which hence unites both 
manifestations of a so-called “neo-conservatism” as described above, and a “cultural 
conservatism” in which intellectuals resort to traditional culture. However, the volume 
does not contain an introduction in which an attempt is made to bring these different 
manifestations together and to compare the use and content of the concepts at hand. 
This research, then, attempts to fill that gap because it considers the unifying 
“counterconcept” of “radicalism” to be a fruitful entry point for analysis.
79
Language incessantly stratifies, leading to an interaction between different languages 
that can be perceived of as “dialogism.” Bakhtin has used the metaphor of the ray of 
light, which is refracted and distorted before it reaches object and receiver. In other 
words, any action of transmission of information is also an action of appropriation.80
Although Bakhtin’s focus of research was the novel, his notion of “heteroglossia” can 
also be interpreted as a general model of discourse in which meaning is “refracted,” to 
use a term from physics. Words for Bakhtin were “multi-accentual,” or, as Eagleton 
puts it, “they were always the words of one particular human subject for another,” 
which is why Eagleton links Bakhtin’s philosophy of language to that of J.L. Austin.81
Eagleton makes this link because both Bakhtin and Austin have accentuated the 
particular context of statements and the particular audience to which they are addressed. 
Austin notes that statements are always made in certain circumstances, to a certain 
audience, for certain purposes, and with certain intentions.82
78 Li Shitao, ed., Zhishi fenzi lichang: jijin yu baoshou zhijian de dongdang (Changchun: shidai 
wenyi chubanshe, 1999).
79 Holquist, “Introduction,” xviii.  
80 Bakhtin, The Dialogical Imagination, 424, 432.
81 Eagleton, Literary Theory, 102-103.
82 Austin, Doing Things with Words, 145.
For Bakhtin, every speaker 
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has a “social horizon”; the enunciation is always directed at a well-defined audience.83
We find an echo of this claim in La Capra’s definition of intellectual history: “If 
intellectual history is anything, it is a history of the situated uses of language 
constitutive of significant texts.”84 Secondly, for both Bakhtin and Austin, language is 
not just descriptive; it is a form of social action. Austin argues against what he calls the 
“descriptive fallacy,” or, the idea that statements are merely made to describe or state 
facts. Since “constative” speech acts are also “performative,” one should not just 
analyze the meaning of words but also look into what act was performed in what 
circumstances.85 Bakhtin agrees with the fact that isolated enunciations constitute the 
substance of language, but he rejects the “individual subjectivism” in favor of a social 
understanding of enunciations—verbal interaction is the key to understanding.86
This research, then, picks up the linguistic contextualism of both Bakhtin and 
Austin, and it draws on Bakhtin’s “pluriaccentuation” in particular, but it detaches these 
notions from their original frameworks. 87
83 Yaguello, “Introduction,” 15.
84 La Capra, Rethinking Intellectual History, 18-19.
85 In How to Do Things with Words, Austin distinguishes between three different “uses of 
language”: (1) “locutionary acts” or utterances that have meaning (what we do in saying 
something); (2) “illocutionary acts” or utterances that have a certain force; and (3) 
“perlocutionary acts” or utterances that achieve a result by saying something. 
86 Bakhtine, Philosophie du langage, 134, 136.
87 Term from ibid., 44.
This is done because Bakhtin’s Marxist 
philosophy of language reduces the struggle of meaning to a mere ideological struggle 
between classes, whereas Austin’s speech act theory does not move beyond the 
utterance as a unit of analysis. Instead, the central research question that will be dealt 
with here is the following: was the use of the concepts of “conservatism” and “neo-
conservatism” by intellectuals during the early 1990s tied to a general “style of thought” 
that went beyond individual utterances? The term “conceptions” in the title of this study 
refers to both the aspects of the concrete use of terms and the question of a general 
“style of thought.”  On the one hand, it includes the word “concept,” which, as the 
English translation of Koselleck’s Begriff, refers to the specific use of the terms 
“conservatism” and “radicalism.” On the other hand, however, “conception” also refers 
to a more general understanding, or to a broad or abstract idea of something. Since the 
term “conception” also means “fertilization,” it is also suited for the study of 
conservatism in a Chinese context, because new formations and creations occurred 
when Chinese intellectuals appropriated existing terms. 
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The question of whether the use of concepts is tied to a more fundamental shift 
in ways of thinking can be said to be a return to the Mannheimian “style of thought” 
question, but the approach is very different, or, to put it in the words of the object of 
research, more “conservative”: it starts from the particular use of concepts instead of 
from abstract notions or ideas. Do the concepts used represent a certain Denkstil or 
Zeitgeist, and if not, are they at least expressions of a common set of presuppositions? 
Or, are we merely dealing with individual speech acts in which concepts are invoked for 
unrelated purposes? In order to judge whether various uses of concepts were indeed 
manifestations of a conservative “style of thought,” it is necessary to first define what is 
understood by that term. Contrary to Furth’s conviction that notions of continuity are 
sufficient to identify conservatism, this study does not treat references to tradition based 
on practical motives as manifestations of conservatism. In 1861, a German author 
claimed that the deeper meaning of conservatism could only be understood through the 
question of what was being preserved on which grounds and for which goal. 88
For Rossiter, the goal of change must be the preservation of tradition, laws, 
habits, or customs, all of which belong to the community. The change that is 
recommended must be limited, and it must be a response to a social need. According to 
this definition, the mere defense of status or property—what Rossiter calls “possessive 
conservatism”—or the defense of the status quo because one is satisfied with it—
“practical conservatism”—are not conscious conservative positions.
As 
distinct from a mere focus on the reference to tradition or the defense of historical 
continuity, both the principles on which tradition is upheld and the goal of this 
promotion will be taken into account. 
89
The philosophical conservative subscribes consciously to principles designed to justify 
the established order and guard it against careless tinkering and determined reform. His 
conservatism is explained in intellectual as well as psychological, social, and economic 
terms. He is conscious of the history, structure, ideals, and traditions of his society; of 
the real tendencies and implications of proposals of reform; and of the importance of 
Only what 
Rossiter calls “philosophical conservatism” is a conscious conservative position. 
Rossiter describes this as follows: 
88 Vierhaus, “Konservativ, Konservatismus,” 561. Vierhaus refers to Wagener, “Konservativ,” 
in Staats- und Gesellschafts-Lexicon, Vol. 5 (1861), 541.
89 Rossiter, Conservatism in America, 5-8.
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conservatism in maintaining a stable social order. (…) His loyalty to country projects 
into the past, and his sense of history leads him to appreciate the long and painful 
process through which it developed into something worth defending.90
In other words, Rossiter asserts, the true conservative prefers stability to change, 
continuity to experiment, and the past to the future. Change must take place respectful 
of the past; the possibilities of reform are limited. Rossiter’s distinction between 
different kinds of conservatism clearly shows the importance of the question of how 
things are defended, and for what goals. A reference to tradition must be based on 
conservative principles, such as a criticism of the modern as regards its progressivism, 
its notion of mechanical and calculated time, and its abstract Enlightenment thought.  
Instead, a conservative mode of thinking focuses on the organic, on the historically 
grown nature of things, on the “prejudice” of habits and institutions, and on the 
particular. In other words, a defense of tradition or historical continuity can only be 
called a conservative outlook if it is based on anti-progressivism and on the belief in the 
weight of the historically grown. True conservatism does not return to tradition because 
this suits modernization—it does so because it is critical of the time consciousness of 
modernity; because it argues against an abstract reason that does away with the local, 
the particular, and the historically grown; and because it defies a progressivism in which 
utopian goals are projected into the future.
1.4 ADVANTAGES OF THE APPROACH FOR THE STUDY OF 1990S CHINA
Based on models from political science, intellectuals can be categorized as those 
“within the system” (tizhinei), and those “outside the system” (tizhiwai); in other words, 
there are the “state” actors and the “society” actors.91
90 Ibid., 9.
91 For a distinction between “state” and “society” actors, see, for example, Fewsmith, China 
Since Tiananmen, xvi.
As Bonnin and Chevrier have 
claimed, though, the “state” versus “society” distinction is too simplistic with regard to 
the post-Mao era. Instead, the relation between intellectuals and political actors during 
that epoch needs to be conceived of as a “continuum”: even autonomous-based 
intellectuals often deliberately sought political patrons; they were also subjected to 
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informal influences and political circumstances.92 Moreover, like the Confucian literati, 
Chinese intellectuals had an ambiguous relation with the state—they were both its 
servants and its critics. 93 Even those intellectuals who were not “establishment 
intellectuals” did not necessarily criticize the government; they rather wanted “to 
discover and transmit the truth” about their objects of research.94
Gu and Goldman have contended that there are two main definitions of 
“intellectuals,” one that categorizes them as experts, the other which focuses on their 
critical nature. Whereas the first definition is positive in that it is encompassing, its 
negative aspect is that it equates intellectuals with professionals. The second definition, 
although narrower, problematically focuses on the confrontational aspect of the relation 
between intellectuals and the state only.95 Given these limitations, then, what definition 
of intellectuals suits the context of 1990s China? In order to answer this question, it is 
useful to look into Zhidong Hao’s modes of organization of intellectuals.96
If we combine these various modes of organization, we can say that in this 
study, intellectuals are mostly “humanistic” intellectuals “outside the system,” but 
“technocrats” “within the system” will also be investigated. As will be demonstrated, 
those “outside the system” could have certain “organic” qualities; it was not necessarily 
the case that all intellectuals “outside the system” were “critical” intellectuals. In 
addition, even those intellectuals “within the system” were also very “critical” in several 
respects. Concerning the “humanistic” intellectuals in this study, as Schumpeter has 
phrased it, they “talk or write about subjects outside their professional competence.”
Apart from 
the location of intellectuals as a criterion—within the system or outside the system—
Hao has also made a distinction between “humanistic” and “technocratic” intellectuals 
based on their professional orientation. If one takes the distance between intellectuals 
and interest groups as a criterion, they can be categorized as “organic,” “critical,” 
“unattached,” and “revolutionary” intellectuals. “Organic” intellectuals, as Gramsci has 
defined them, represent the interests of the new class—the bourgeoisie. In a Chinese 
context, this means that “organic” intellectuals support the interests of the CCP. 
97
92 Bonnin and Chevrier, “The Intellectual and the State,” 579, 582.
93 Ibid., 571.
94 Gu and Goldman, “Introduction,” 12.
95 Ibid. 2-4.
96 Hao, Intellectuals at a Crossroads, 1-72.
97 Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 146.
Similarly, Irving Kristol has defined an intellectual as “a man who speaks with general 
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authority about a subject on which he has no particular competence.”98
These “humanistic” intellectuals raised their voices from within universities
because, as distinct from the organization of intellectual debate around publishing 
houses and editorial committees during the 1980s, universities were the driving factor 
behind debates during the 1990s.
Kristol adds that 
this seems ironic, but it is not—the lack of specialization separates the intellectual from 
the professional. Many of those who engaged with the terms “radicalism” and 
“conservatism” in modern Chinese history were not historians by training—some were 
philosophers, others were literary critics.
99 In the tradition of the Confucian scholar-official, 
Chinese “humanist” intellectuals discussed social, political, and cultural issues because 
they still considered the fate of the nation their personal responsibility.100 Although the 
modern zhishi fenzi (knowledgeable elements) differed from the traditional literati (shi)
in several respects, what the two had in common is that they both underscored the 
importance of public concerns. The Western term “intelligentsia,” which had emerged 
in Russia in the 1860s, also contained this meaning of public concern and of serving the 
nation.101
Because reflections on modern Chinese history were driven by present 
problems, a Chinese history Professor Emeritus has remarked that the rewriting of 
history during the 1990s by intellectuals of various disciplines resembled H.G. Wells’s 
The Outline of History (1920). The predicament of the post-war era had urged Wells to 
rewrite the history of mankind with a stress on humanism and education. The 
predicament that Chinese intellectuals faced during the early 1990s was that of a 
conflict between a revolutionary past and a present that focused on reform, and between 
the break with tradition and the rediscovery of that tradition. Following the suppression 
of the Tiananmen Square demonstrations on June fourth, 1989, and in the context of the 
decline of socialism, the scrutiny of history was not just a historical effort; it was also a 
moral effort to found “norms of objective historical judgment” that were not susceptible 
In 1990s China, then, this concern with the fate of China translated itself into 
the implicit question of the role of the intellectual in society. In spite of the differences 
in attitude pertaining to the question of political engagement, it was clear that most 
intellectuals nevertheless envisaged a leading role for intellectuals in Chinese society.
98 Kristol, Neoconservatism, 75. 
99 Wang, “Introduction,” 14.
100 Davies, Worrying about China, 50, 54.
101 Hao, Intellectuals at a Crossroads, 377-385.
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to the mistakes of past norms. It was assumed that the intellectual who engaged with a 
century of history had “the authority to judge the past for its moral flaws and merits 
from the vantage point of an omniscient observer.”102
The discursive approach allows for an interaction between culture and politics 
and between intellectual phenomena and official policy. By including “radicalism” in 
particular, the interaction between a semi-official “neo-conservatism” and intellectual 
manifestations of conservatism becomes manifest: many intellectuals, regardless of 
whether they were “humanistic” or “technocratic” intellectuals, utilized the same 
concepts. Nevertheless, the fact that intellectuals employed terms from official
propaganda did not mean that they simply echoed official reform policies. During the 
1990s, intellectual thought did not serve as a “weathervane of reform directions” 
anymore, as had been the situation during the 1980s.103 Nevertheless, the two were not 
entirely separated; both often mirrored each other because both sides managed to 
appropriate discourses according to their own needs and advantages. This “curious 
parallel” between official ideology and intellectual debates first appeared in the theme 
of reflections on “radicalism,” a theme on which both groups “initiated discussions 
separately, yet converged pragmatically.”104 By focusing on “radicalism,” it becomes 
clear that intellectual debates were not simply “orchestrated” by official ideology; 
instead of a “coerced outcome,” they were a response to the same conditions as official 
ideology was.105
Moreover, by including the “counterconcept” of “radicalism,” “conservatism” 
can be studied in a wider context, since a variety of debates come into the picture. In a 
footnote, one author has noted the interconnection between debates on “radicalism” and 
other debates by pointing out that the Harvard-based “New Confucian” Tu Wei-ming 
also took part in rejections of “radicalism.”106
102 Davies, Worrying about China, 55.
103 Wang, “Introduction,” 15.
104 Ibid., 16, 17.
105 Chen, “Neoconservative Political Thought,” 596.
106 Wang, “Introduction,” 18, fn. 17. Wang refers to Tu’s article “Beyond the Enlightenment 
Syndrome,” EYS 1 (December 1990), 12-13.
This research shows that the overlap went 
much further than what can be explained in the space of one footnote. The issue of 
“radicalism” was entangled with debates on civil society, New Confucianism, 
commercialization, and postmodernism. By focusing on the concepts of both 
“conservatism” and “radicalism,” the practice of Chinese “taxonomy,” as Davies has 
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called it, in Chinese discourse can be mapped. Davies goes as far as treating the 
“taxonomy” of “conservatism” versus “radicalism” as an example of the Confucian 
practice of “rectifying names.”107
Most importantly, however, the dialogical approach takes into account the 
diachronical nature of the reference to tradition. The main focus is not on the relation 
between China and “the West,” but on the relation between a present based on reform 
and a revolutionary past that has discarded tradition. As such, reductionist 
interpretations in which all treatments of tradition are explained as manifestations of a 
merely emotional and “anti-Western” “cultural nationalism” can be avoided. By also 
reading the debates as an expression of a conflict between the present and the past, the 
question of identity can be dealt with without necessarily leading to a narrow concern 
with “cultural nationalism.”  Although Guo Yingjie has also concentrated on the 
relation between the return to tradition and a past revolutionary identity, he has 
nevertheless still interpreted all resorts to tradition as instances of “cultural 
nationalism,” as explained above. Although, as Davies has rightly declared, Chinese 
discourse is a “nation-centered discourse,” this does not mean that all Chinese 
intellectuals who have applied the term “radicalism” can be referred to as “cultural 
nationalists.”
The fact that positive or negative moral qualities were 
projected onto concepts reveals once more that the use of concepts went beyond an 
academic exercise. 
108
That the relationship between present and past is of crucial importance for the 
understanding of rejections of “radicalism” can be seen from the central role that history 
occupied in the debates. History functioned as a medium to discuss political, economic, 
social, or ethical issues, and, in some instances, in the tradition of “allusion 
historiography,” the detour of history was used to discuss sensitive political issues in 
particular. This had been a well-known practice among Chinese intellectuals during 
previous decades, which is why officials had often interpreted historical works as 
political criticisms.109
107 Davies, Worrying about China, 127.
108 Ibid., 15.
109 A famous example that comes to mind is Wu Han’s play on the dismissal of the Ming 
official Hai Rui, which was seen as a reference to the dismissal of Peng Dehuai after the latter 
had criticized the Great Leap Forward. On this play, see Tom Fisher, “‘The Play’s the Thing’: 
Wu Han and Hai Rui Revisited,” in Jonathan Unger, ed., Using the Past to Serve the Present, 9-
45.
Nonetheless, the reference to history in intellectual debates on 
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“conservatism” and “radicalism” cannot be reduced to the practice of “allusion 
historiography.” 
History also constituted the very object of debate: events in modern Chinese 
history were subjected to reinterpretation. The condemnation of “radicalism” points at 
“the road not taken”—by suggesting that certain incidents had been mistaken, the 
rewriting of modern history was in some way also an exercise in counterfactual history. 
The attempts to cast off “radicalism” were, as Nietzsche has formulated it, “an attempt 
to gain a past a posteriori.”110 In this sense, for the participants, the disclosure of the 
“essence” of history was more important than the reconstruction of historical facts.111
Some intellectuals went even further and tied their revaluation of modern 
Chinese history to a conception of an ideal moral order that they desired to restore. In 
Chinese historiography, the image of a mirror has often been invoked with reference to 
the relationship between past and present, or, by extension, the past and the future—it
was believed that one could “know the future in the mirror of the past” (jianwang 
zhilai). Hence, the past was looked upon as a storehouse of moral examples that could 
be used for guidance; the past was perceived of as being reflected in the present. 
Benjamin Schwartz has called this reference to history an “‘unhistorical’ history” 
because it considered history to be a “reservoir of metahistorical experience in ethical, 
political, and other aspects of life.”
This revaluation of modern Chinese history, as will be demonstrated, had important 
consequences with regard to conceptions of the political legitimacy of the CCP, national 
identity, and the role of intellectuals in society.
112 As Schneider has phrased it, “it was by writing 
history that the dao was made visible to the present.”113 Since it was believed that the 
ideal moral order had been realized in history—namely during the Three Dynasties—
history was, so to speak, a channel to Truth.114
110 Nietzsche, The Use and Abuse of History, 21. 
111 Weigelin-Schwiedrzik has characterized Party historiography in China as a combination of 
shi (historical facts, shishi) and lun (historical interpretation (pinglun) and theories (lilun)). 
Whereas the former aims to reconstruct the facts for remembrance, the latter is more interested 
in what is perceived of as the “essence” of history than in factual details. See Weigelin-
Schwiedrzik, “Party Historiography,” 160-162.
112 Schwartz, “History in Chinese Culture,” 23.
113 Schneider, “Between dao and History,” 55. Schneider mentions the position of Zhang 
Xuecheng as an example. According to Zhang, “all classics are history” (liu jing jie shi), which 
implies that their description of past events is also an exposure of the dao.
114 Ibid., 8. The Three Dynasties include the Xia Dynasty (ca. 2000 B.C.- ca. 1600 B.C.), the 
Shang Dynasty (ca. 1600 B.C.- ca. 1100 B.C.), and the Zhou Dynasty (ca. 1100 B.C.-249 B.C.). 
Although the rise of modern Chinese 
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historiography meant that many Chinese historians turned towards scientific methods, 
modern historiographers still resorted to history to make moral claims. The study of 
historiography should thus be investigated in a wider perspective. 
Finally, the focus on the use of concepts in Chinese debate allows us to pay 
closer attention to the process of appropriation, a process that requires us to abandon 
preconceived and familiar notions in favor of the study of the use of concepts in a new 
context. As Davies notes, intellectual discourse in China is tied to the very 
consequences of political violence; it is, in many respects, a “battlefield.”115 Another 
important characteristic of Chinese discourse that Davies identifies is the quest for 
national perfection and the notion that the Chinese intellectual has a moral obligation 
toward his or her country, as already briefly touched upon before. As such, foreign 
theories are often employed instrumentally in the service of this very “crisis mentality” 
(youhuan yishi) of the Chinese intellectual; they are employed to identify and solve 
Chinese problems.116
1.5 SOURCES AND OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS
This is not to say that all theories are used instrumentally in a 
Chinese context, but observations like these remind us of the fact that, in a Chinese 
context, the concept of conservatism might be subjected to a “creative transformation.”
Given the notion of contested concepts, this study mostly relies on debates among 
intellectuals, but it also investigates articles that were not part of academic discussions. 
Articles published in the leading academic Hong Kong journal Ershiyi shiji (Twenty-
first Century) and in the mainland journals Dongfang (Orient) and Dushu (Reading) 
constitute the main object of research. The older journal Reading, which was founded in 
1979, had a liberal orientation, whereas the intellectuals around Dongfang—which was 
founded in 1993, but closed down at the end of 1996—were mostly liberals, but they 
also included intellectuals with conservative inclinations. Twenty-first Century is of 
particular importance because Chinese intellectuals overseas inspired mainland 
criticisms of “radicalism”; the journal Twenty-first Century functioned as a bridge 
between mainland and overseas scholars. Since this research concentrates both on 
intellectuals who were based at universities and on intellectuals who operated in the 
115 Davies, Worrying about China, 2-3.
116 Ibid., 5-8.
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vicinity of policy circles, journals that were closer to official ideology and more 
politically-oriented, such as Zhanlüe yu guanli (Strategy and Management)—a journal 
that one scholar has referred to as the “major forum of neo-conservatism”—have also 
been consulted.117
Although Xiao Gongqin’s theory contained many of the features of the theory of 
“neo-conservatism” as discussed in Chapter Two, the projection of “radicalism” into 
modern Chinese history also resembled the intellectual practice of “humanistic” 
Apart from these Hong Kong and mainland journals, some Chinese journals in 
the United States, such as Zhongguo zhi chun (China Spring), have also been included 
for the evident reason that those who had sought refuge abroad after the suppression of 
the Tiananmen uprising during the spring of 1989 uttered criticism of “neo-
conservatism” in overseas journals. Moreover, given the nature of intellectual debate 
during the 1990s—namely, the interaction between overseas intellectuals and 
intellectuals from mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan—these journals also need 
to be taken into account. Secondly, in addition to debates in journals, the collective 
writings of some intellectuals have also been consulted in order to link their viewpoint 
on “anti-radicalism” with their broader intellectual framework. Finally, interviews 
conducted by the author with both the key intellectuals in this study and prominent 
other Chinese intellectuals in the field constitute a third important source of 
information. 
The unifying thread throughout this study is the rejection of something referred 
to as “radicalism.” In Chapters Two and Three, this happens in the context of the 
advocacy of a political theory of “neo-conservatism,” that is, a theory that deals with the 
legitimacy and authority of government. Chapters Four to Six deal with various uses of 
the term “conservatism” in response to “radicalism” in modern Chinese history. As will 
be demonstrated, the advocacies of “technocratic” intellectuals and the concerns of 
“humanistic” intellectuals greatly overlapped, and a crucial chapter in this respect is 
Chapter Three, which investigates the “neo-conservatism” of the historian Xiao 
Gongqin. 
117 Zhao, “Nationalistic Writing,” 736. Strategy and Management was founded in 1993 by the 
Chinese Strategy and Management Research Society, which reportedly had ties with the 
headquarters of Military General Staffs. According to Suisheng Zhao, his interviews suggest 
that the intellectuals behind the journal used this military influence in support of their work. See 
ibid., fn. 35.
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intellectuals of the time. Therefore, Chapter Three functions as a hinge between the 
criticism of “radicalism” by the “technocratic” intellectuals of Chapter One, and the 
reflections on “radicalism” in modern Chinese history that are expressed in Chapters 
Four, Five, and Six. Because Xiao’s theory contained both elements, it is presented as a 
“politics of history” that not only dealt with questions in the political realm, but that 
also overlapped with the critique of “radicalism” in modern Chinese history.
Chapter Two first analyzes the study of Chinese “neo-conservatism” in 
American and European research, after which it focuses on how Chinese intellectuals 
made use the concept in relation to the discarding of “radicalism.” Apart from dealing 
with Xiao Gongqin’s interpretation of the concept, this chapter also discusses the 
concept of “neo-conservatism” as it appeared in the semi-official document “Realistic 
Responses and Strategic Options for China After the Soviet Coup,” which was drafted 
in response to the Soviet Coup of August 1991. Throughout this chapter, special 
attention is paid to the issue of contextualization and to the question of whether the 
concept was used in a way that surpassed questions of political legitimacy. 
The tension between the renunciation of “radicalism” for the promotion of 
stability in the present, on the one hand, and the challenge to political legitimacy 
through the location of this very “radicalism” in the past, on the other hand, becomes 
manifest in the writings of the intellectual Xiao Gongqin, the subject of Chapter Three.
This chapter reveals a side of Xiao Gongqin that has hitherto not been studied, namely 
his distinction between three “types” of “radicalism” in modern Chinese history, as well 
as his Burkean reading of the late nineteenth-century translator Yan Fu. Based on this 
reading, Xiao argued that society was a social organism; tradition was the product of 
historical growth. Conversely, this Burkean element was contradicted with the stress on 
a strong central authority, which leads to the question of just how Burkean Xiao’s 
beliefs really were.
Chapter Four deals with the first public debate on “conservatism” and 
“radicalism” in modern Chinese history, a debate that was conducted between mainland 
intellectuals and the Princeton-based scholar Yü Ying-shih in 1992. Yü’s critique of 
“radicalism” and his plea for historical continuity largely transcended the gradualism 
that was subscribed to for reasons of political legitimacy in Chapter Two. As such, it 
offers a picture of a reference to “conservatism” that dealt with questions such as the 
role of intellectuals in society, the nature of Chinese modernity, and the future of 
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Confucianism. Mainland intellectuals transformed Yü’s argument by advocating 
gradual economic reform in particular, but their engagement with the topics of 
revolution, socialism, and the Enlightenment of the 1980s also revealed a concern with 
questions of identity and the role of intellectuals in society. 
Chapter Five exemplifies the interconnection between criticisms of “radicalism” 
and different debates, in this case, that of New Confucianism. This chapter looks into 
the contributions to the debate on “radicalism” by the philosopher Chen Lai. It analyzes 
how Chen Lai reconciled his rejection of the “radicalism” of the May Fourth Movement 
with his New Confucian convictions. Although Chen Lai also discussed “radicalism” 
throughout modern Chinese history, his main concern was the “antitraditionalism” of 
the May Fourth intellectuals and the effects of this attitude on Confucianism. This 
chapter analyzes Chen Lai’s unusual interpretation of “radicalism” as “instrumental 
rationality” and it explores the consequences of this reading in connection with the 
solution Chen Lai proposed in response. 
Chapter Six, finally, discusses another discarding of the “radicalism” of May 
Fourth, this time from the angle of the 1994 debate on the Literary Revolution that was 
triggered by the poetess Zheng Min. The debate on language reform was entangled with 
the debate on postmodernism because both Zheng Min and other intellectuals resorted 
to post-theories in the debate on language reform. Consequently, here, the criticism of 
“radicalism” became transformed into a question of “Chineseness,” and the main issue 
of debate turned into the relation between China and “the West.” This chapter looks into 
the reasons why postmodernism was used to defend historical continuity, and, in 
extension, it explores the validity of criticisms of Chinese postmodernism as 
manifestations of a “neo-conservative” trend. 
32
2.
DOING THINGS WITH “ISMS”
ON CHINESE “NEO-CONSERVATISM”
No one created a doctrine and called himself a neoconservative.
MARTIN LIPSET
2.1 INTRODUCTION: WHY “NEO-CONSERVATISM”?
When the term “neo-conservatism” rose to prominence in an American context several 
decades ago, three objections to the use of the concept were raised. For some, the “ism” 
was the main problem; they maintained that there was no coherent unity behind the 
stances denoted as such. Others claimed that the conservative element was missing 
because, in a country with a distinct liberal tradition, all conservatives were in fact 
liberals. Still others questioned the prefix “neo” and argued that “neo-conservatism” 
was no different from conservatism.118
During the early 1990s, the concept of “neo-conservatism” made its entry into 
Chinese intellectual and policy circles. Remarkably, however, neither Chinese nor 
foreign analysts objected to the use of the term. This was peculiar given the fact that, as 
outlined in the previous chapter, it was not clear what Chinese conservatism entailed—
how, then, should the “neo” and the “conservative” part of the term be understood? In 
addition, if all American “neo-conservatives” were in fact liberals, could it be said that 
all Chinese “neo-conservatives” were in fact socialists? As already briefly indicated in 
the previous chapter, those European and American political scientists who analyzed 
Chinese “neo-conservatism” applied the term in the context of the struggle over reform, 
All these objections make sense in some way: as 
addressed in the previous chapter, American “neo-conservatism” was both consistent 
with certain Burkean themes and in tension with it because some “neo-conservatives” 
attempted to fight relativism with absolute moral standards. Moreover, in an American 
context, “neo-conservatism” did indeed acquire new features, such as respect for the 
market and economic growth. 
118 Steinfels, “Short Happy Life,” 20. The argument that the United States are characterized by 
an essentially liberal tradition has been made by, among others, H.G. Wells and Louis Hartz. 
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but they did not question the term in itself. In an article on the topic, Chen Feng wrote 
in a footnote:
Using “neoconservatism” to label the arguments discussed in this article may cause 
terminological confusion, because it is a precise term used in the United States for a 
political position that combines a definite dedication to personal freedom, civil rights 
and a free market econony (sic), with a stress on limited social welfare policies. 
Neoconservatism shares with the older variety of conservatism a high respect for 
tradition and a view of human nature that some would call pessimistic. However, in the 
past few years the term has acquired its specified connotation in the Chinese context, 
which has been accepted by students of Chinese politics both in China and in the West. 
Indeed, just as liberalism and conservatism mean different things in the U.S. and 
Europe, a contextual interpretation of neoconservatism in the Chinese political society 
should not be viewed as improper.119
It is unusual, to say the least, that Chen Feng wrote an entire article on Chinese “neo-
conservatism” without exploring the question of the appropriation of the theory in a 
Chinese context in detail. Why was the term “neo-conservatism” coined at all? Were 
Chinese theorists inspired by American “neo-conservatism”? Moreover, if American 
“neo-conservatism” was related to previous manifestations of conservatism in its 
respect for tradition and its pessimistic view of human nature, was it possible, then, that 
Chinese “neo-conservatism” was in any sense also connected with older manifestations 
of conservatism, either in a Chinese setting or in a European context? 
The nebulous prefix “neo,” as one author has put it, may be reminiscent of the 
“hard glare of the neon sign,” but it generates “more heat than light.”120 In general, the 
prefix is used either to provide a theory with respectability by giving it a historical 
dimension, or to discredit it by linking it to a previous theory with negative 
connotations.121
119 Chen, “Neoconservative Political Thought,” 593.
120 Kroes, “Neo-conservatism,” 7.
121 Robertson, Routledge Dictionary of Politics, 337.
In Chen Feng’s article, as in most articles on the topic, questions about 
this possible historical dimension or negative connotation were avoided. Instead, 
European and American political scientists used the term to denote “a body of 
arguments calling for political stability, central authority, tight social control, role of 
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ideology and nationalism.”122
This chapter will investigate whether Chinese “neo-conservatism” was indeed a 
mere preservation of the status quo and a blunt defense of interests—as the 
“commonsense” and “sociohistorical” approaches would have it—or whether there was 
more to the theory in its new context.
Although the “neo-conservative” elements mentioned by 
analysts were certainly present in the works of many intellectuals at the time, the 
elements as such had nothing to do with conservatism; they might as well be associated 
with Marxism. This suggests that, although “neo-conservatism” was presented as a 
substantive configuration of ideas, it was rather a positional concept that was linked to 
the preservation of the status quo. In a Chinese context, “neo-conservatives” wanted to 
preserve both the centralized rule of the pre-reform era and the interests of the CCP. 
123 If there was indeed more to “neo-
conservatism,” did this imply the existence of some Burkean traces? Was it in any way 
marked by a defense of conservative goals on the basis of conservative principles? In 
order to answer these questions, this chapter will first challenge the notion of a unified 
concept of “neo-conservatism” by analyzing different uses of the concept as a “label,” 
after which the two most famous—or infamous—examples of “neo-conservatism” as a 
“banner” will be discussed. 
2.2 A POSITIONAL CONFIGURATION: PRESERVATION AND RENEWAL
European and American political scientists have related the rise of Chinese “neo-
conservatism” to the political situation between 1989 and 1992 in particular. This 
period was a kind of intermezzo that started with the repression of the demonstrations 
on Tiananmen Square on June fourth, 1989, and that ended with the deepening of 
economic reforms following Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour (nanxun) in early 1992.124
122 Chen, “Neoconservative Political Thought,” 593.
123 For a description of these two approaches, see Chapter One, 8-9.
124 Deng’s Southern Tour was highly symbolic in comparison with the negative and disruptive 
image of the South that had been propagated during the Mao era. For the positive image of the 
South during the reform era, see Friedman, “Reconstructing China’s National Identity,” 67-91.
Two important international events in this respect were the decline of socialism in the 
international arena and the so-called “Soviet Coup” that took place in Moscow on 
August 19, 1991. The coup was important because it heralded the beginning of the end 
of the Soviet Communist Party and the USSR. Given the fact that China’s twentieth-
century history was greatly affected by developments in the Soviet Union, the Soviet 
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Coup, the subsequent end of the Soviet Communist Party, and the implosion of the 
Soviet Union had a great impact on China.125
The repression of the spring 1989 demonstrations—which were perceived of as 
an attempt to overthrow the CCP and to end the socialist regime—on June fourth, 1989, 
and the blow to socialism in the international arena, then, confronted the CCP with a 
crisis on two fronts. In response, some coined the theory of “neo-conservatism,” which 
was an attempt to mediate the dangers of both an outdated socialism and an excessive 
liberalism by means of centralization, the stress on political stability, and alternative 
sources for cohesion, such as the resort to tradition and nationalism. Then again, the 
theory of “neo-conservatism” never became official policy; by 1992, when Deng 
Xiaoping managed to reassert his vision of reform, it had lost momentum. The true 
deathblow to “neo-conservatism” as a political theory of reform arrived with the 
Fourteenth Party Congress in October 1992, which confirmed Deng Xiaoping’s vision 
of rapid economic reform.126
As Fewsmith has noted, for the period after 1989, the characterization of policy 
struggles as debates between “conservatives” and “reformers” is not accurate; it was too 
late to oppose reform after more than a decade. As Fewsmith put, “the question is not so 
much whether to reform as to how to hold on in the face of reform.”127 The paradox of 
the Chinese reforms was that they threatened the authority of those who had enabled 
those very reforms, as some analysts have noted.128 “Neo-conservatism” can be said to 
reflect this very paradox, which consisted of “development on the one hand and the 
Communist Party’s attempts to maintain its hegemonic grip on political power on the 
other.”129
Because “neo-conservatism” tried to mediate between economic development 
and the preservation of political power, American and European political scientists have 
located the concept in the middle of a Left-Right axis. It was an “intermediate” 
ideology, a “middle position” or a “middle path” between “conservatives”—which in a 
Chinese context would mean the Old Left, namely figures such as Hu Qiaomu, Deng 
125 For the impact of these events on the CCP, see Garver, “The Chinese Communist Party and 
the Collapse of Soviet Communism,” 1-26.
126 Fewsmith, China Since Tiananmen, 80.
127 Fewsmith, “Neoconservatism,” 635. 
128 See Goldman and MacFarquhar, eds., The Paradox of China’s Post-Mao Reforms 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999).
129 Schell and Shambaugh, The China Reader, xx.
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Liqun, and Chen Yun—and “radical reformers” or liberals.130 Some have also described 
it as a modus vivendi between different groups, including capitalists, rulers, and liberal 
intellectuals.131 In accordance with this perception, others have also asserted that “neo-
conservatism” safeguarded the interests of particular institutions or groups. 132
Depending on whether one considered the glass half empty or half full, then, “neo-
conservatism” was either a move away from Leninism or the very continuation of it. 
Sullivan, for example, has analyzed the emergence of “neo-conservatism” as part of 
discourses on transitions from Leninism. 133 Similarly, McCormick and Kelly have 
pointed at the “ironies of New Conservatism” because it attempted to counter 
liberalism, but it made “crucial concessions” to liberalism that opened the door for 
others to resort to liberal arguments. 134 For Wen-hui Tsai, on the other hand, the 
transition from Leninism was less clear, since “neo-conservatism” resisted political 
democratization.135
The middle position of “neo-conservatism” on this political axis meant that the 
question of what was “conservative” and what was “new” about the theory could be 
resolved with the argument that it advocated the preservation of the status quo, but that 
the grounds on which this happened were new. For Chen Feng, “neo-conservatism” 
defended the existing political order, but it did so from different “approaches” and with 
a different “rhetoric.” 136 Others noted that, on the one hand, the theory broke with 
Marxism-Leninism, but on the other hand, it wanted to preserve those elements of the 
latter that supported its legitimacy.137 Since “neo-conservatism” attempted to preserve 
the power structure of the elite but replace its ideology, Li Youzhuo has coined the term 
“communist liberalism.”138
What all these accounts referred to concerning the “replacement” of Marxism as 
a guiding ideology was the reliance on traditional Chinese culture and nationalism as 
legitimating devices. Because of the instrumental use of cultural tradition, some 
130 McCormick and Kelly, “Limits of Anti-Liberalism,” 821; Gu and Kelly, “New 
Conservatism,” 220; Fewsmith, China Since Tiananmen, 80; Sullivan, Democracy and 
Developmentalism, 342.
131 Gu and Kelly, “New Conservatism,” 231.
132 McCormick and Kelly, “Limits of Anti-Liberalism,” 805.
133 Sullivan, Democracy and Developmentalism, 328.
134 McCormick and Kelly, “Limits of Anti-Liberalism,” 821.
135 Tsai, “Resistance to Political Modernization,” 1.
136 Chen, “Neoconservative Political Thought,” 593.
137 Gu and Kelly, “New Conservatism,” 220. 
138 Li, “Neo-conservatism,” 39.
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scholars have compared “neo-conservatism” to the policies of Yuan Shikai and 
Kuomintang leader Chiang Kai-shek (1887-1975); both these figures had made use of a 
“traditionalism” in which tradition was incorporated in the modernization project.139
According to Suisheng Zhao, since the reference to tradition in “neo-conservatism” was 
purely instrumental, “neo-conservatism” was in accordance with the outlook of state-led 
nationalism.140
Economically, some authors have noted that “neo-conservatism” moved away 
from orthodox Marxism because it was the continuation of the theory of “neo-
authoritarianism.”
According to these interpretations, the reliance on tradition was not an 
expression of a conservative “style of thought,” since it had nothing to do with the 
belief in the inherent value of tradition. Tradition was but a vehicle that could be 
utilized to increase political legitimacy in a period of both national and international 
crisis. 
141
The emphasis on strengthening the power of the central government and ensuring 
authority over a limited but important part of the economy puts neoconservative 
economic thinking in the tradition of Chinese conservative thought. What is new about 
neoconservative economic thought is first, the acceptance of a much broader and more 
important role for market forces than traditional conservative thinking ever 
contemplated, and second, the application of contemporary economic concepts to the 
management of both planned and market economies.
This theory had been coined during the late 1980s; it championed 
a mixture of economic liberalization and political centralization. Since “neo-
conservatism” also attempted to combine these two elements, it was at the same time 
“conservative” in its advocacy of political centralization and “new” in that it turned to 
market forces. Fewsmith has described the “conservative” and the “new” elements of 
“neo-conservatism” in the economic realm as follows: 
142
In brief, political scientists associated the term “neo-conservatism” with a political Left-
Right specter in which it was located somewhere on the middle of the axis; in this 
defense of the status quo on different grounds, traditional elements only played an 
instrumental role. Based on these accounts, at this point, it seems impossible to answer 
139 Gu and Kelly, “New Conservatism,” 229.
140 Zhao, Nation-State, 246-247.
141 Gu and Kelly, “New Conservatism,” 221.
142 Fewsmith, “Neoconservatism,” 640.
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the question of the connection between Chinese “neo-conservatism” and conservative 
principles positively. Nonetheless, “neo-conservatism” was less clear-cut than it seems: 
as will be developed in the next section, “neo-conservatism” did not only serve to 
strengthen political legitimacy; it also contained certain traits that challenged the 
legitimacy of the CCP. As we will see, this challenge had everything to do with the 
conception of the nature of change implicit in “neo-conservatism.”
2.3 “NEO-CONSERVATISM” AND OFFICIAL IDEOLOGY
At first sight, “neo-conservatism” seems very close to the official ideology of the times. 
After Tiananmen, a period of repression followed, which was part of a cycle of reform 
and retrenchment of economics, politics, and ideology since the start of the reforms in 
1978. As Baum has stated about Chinese leaders of the post-Mao era: “Letting go (fang)
with one hand, they instinctively tightened up (shou) with the other.”143 In the aftermath 
of Tiananmen, the pace of reform was slowed down, and the CCP launched propaganda 
campaigns in order to promote stability in the face of chaos. After the death of Hu 
Yaobang and the ouster of Zhao Ziyang in 1989, conservative moderates such as Jiang 
Zemin and Li Peng, and hard-line ideologues of the ilk of Gao Di—then editor of 
Renmin Ribao (China Daily)—and Deng Liqun gained power. This power shift enabled 
the occurrence of propaganda that emphasized patriotism, political stability, economic 
development, and the importance of “national conditions” (guoqing). The latter was 
particularly put to use to fight “universalist” discourses on human rights and 
democracy.144
In combination with this propaganda, the CCP launched Party rectification 
campaigns and anti-corruption campaigns. The stress on “national conditions” was part 
of a patriotic education campaign that started after Tiananmen, that came in full swing 
at the time of Deng’s so-called Southern Tour in early 1992, and that peaked in 1994. 
The unique “national conditions” underscored in the campaign included China’s 
overpopulation, limited natural resources, an economy that was not fully developed due 
to a history of foreign imperialism and struggle, and, finally, China’s long history and 
143 Baum, Burying Mao, 5. Baum’s model was a modification of Deng Liqun’s 1987 claim that 
between 1978 and 1987, the even-numbered years had witnessed openness (fang), whereas the 
odd-numbered years had seen relative restriction (shou).
144 Sullivan, Democracy and Developmentalism, 324-326, 328. 
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cultural tradition. These “national conditions” revealed that the current strategy of 
“reform and opening up” (gaige kaifang) was the right one—China was still in “the 
primary stage of socialism.” 145 As Suisheng Zhao has noted, this statement also 
indicated that the leadership of the CCP was indispensable.146 The “national conditions” 
required a path of development distinct from Western approaches; China was not ready 
for political liberalization.  By pointing at restraining elements, authoritarian rule was 
justified as a conditio sine qua non.147
During 1990 and 1991, the CCP’s policy toward the Soviet Union was to a great 
extent guided by the anxiety over the mounting global hegemony of the United States. 
Fears over a domino effect of “peaceful evolution” (heping yanbian) were uttered in 
Chinese policy circles.148 Conservative ideologues interpreted the Soviet Coup and the 
concomitant implosion of the Soviet Union a few months later as the confirmation of a 
Western strategy of “peaceful evolution”; in response, they coined the slogan “defend 
state power and stop peaceful evolution” (baowei zhengquan, fangzhi heping yanbian). 
Deng Xiaoping himself was against this campaign, but the old ideologues controlled the 
media at the time and Deng was also in bad health.149
There were important similarities between “neo-conservatism” and official 
ideology, such as the emphasis on ideology, the reliance on nationalism, and the 
advocacy of a strong state and political stability in the context of fears over implosion. 
Deng drew exactly the opposite 
lesson from the Soviet experience: that more reform was needed. This stance would 
gain the upper hand by October 1992, when the Fourteenth Party Congress was held.
145 As Barmé notes, the term guoqing—which literally means “national situation” (Zhongguo 
qingkuang)—had been used in cultural and political debate long before the 1990s: at the end of 
the nineteenth century, those who opposed reform used the term to claim that Western 
institutions did not suit China, whereas during the 1930s, opponents of communists employed 
the term to make the same argument with regard to communism. Barmé traces the use of the 
term for propaganda purposes back to 1981. See Barmé, “To Screw Foreigners,” 212, fn. 11.    
146 Zhao, Nation-State, 218-227.
147 As Zhao notes, there was even a special course named “National Conditions,” as well as 
textbooks and magazines on the topic. Zhao further mentions the foundation of the Research 
Center on National Conditions (Zhongguo guoqing yanjiu zhongxin) at Peking University. See
Zhao, “Nationalistic Writing,” 743. Barmé also mentions the 1989 Beijing journal Guoqing 
yanjiu (Studies in National Conditions), See Barmé, “To Screw Foreigners,” 212, fn. 11-13.
148 The term “peaceful evolution” was first used in a 1958 speech held by president 
Eisenhower’s Secretary of State John Foster Dulles (1888-1959). In this context, it was used to 
denote peaceful means—such as cultural and scientific exchange—to influence communist 
nations.
149 Zhao, Nation-State, 214-217. Die-hard ideologues included Chen Yun, Ding Guangen, and 
Deng Liqun; Deng Xiaoping received support from Yang Shangkun, Liu Huaqing, Qiao Shi, Li 
Ruihuan, Zhu Rongji, and Tian Jiyun.
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This was the occasion because both were a response to a crisis of legitimacy, which, as 
Habermas has claimed, is at the same time always also a crisis of identity.150
Official ideology and “neo-conservatism” differed in the solution they offered to 
the legitimacy crisis. Since the Party’s legitimacy was founded on revolution, it could 
not abandon revolution. As Arif Dirlik has phrased it, the official solution was a 
“negotiated settlement on the past that seeks to historicize the revolution while 
distancing it from the present.”
Externally, 
the revolutionary identity of the CCP was threatened by the decline of socialism, 
whereas internally, its role of the vanguard of economic reforms was challenged by its 
repression of the Tiananmen Square demonstrations in June 1989. 
151 The CCP’s strategy was to supplement Marxism with 
culture and nationalism. For “neo-conservatives,” on the other hand, the revolutionary 
identity was part of the problem; they pleaded for a move away from Marxism and the 
revolutionary identity and envisioned a greater role for culture and nationalism. For 
some nationalists, the problem with the Leninist anti-imperialism of the Mao era was 
that it had failed to create a common identity, which is why nationalism should be 
utilized to foster cohesion and to prevent political chaos.152
Although in practice, both “neo-conservatism” and official policy embraced 
economic reform instead of revolution, they differed in their justification of economic 
reform. Official ideology presented the reforms as a continuation of the former 
emphasis on class struggle; they by no means formed a break with Marxism or the 
revolutionary identity of the CCP. At the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central 
Committee in 1978, the move from class struggle to economic development had first 
been legitimated with the argument that “practice as the sole criterion of truth” was in 
line with Mao’s own statements. Furthermore, in the 1981 Resolution on CPC History,
it was declared that Mao Zedong Thought had been part of the revolution, but that 
Mao’s teachings had been wrong. At the Twelfth Party Congress in 1982, the phrase 
“socialism with Chinese characteristics” was coined. At the same Party Congress, Hu 
Yaobang declared that, since 1979, the Party had returned to ideological orthodoxy after 
the detour of the Cultural Revolution. Hu Yaobang also argued in favor of the 
150 Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, 46.
151 Dirlik, “The Past as Ideology and Critical Resource.”
152 Friedman, “China’s National Identity,” 83. 
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development of a “socialist spiritual civilization.”153
By 1987, the reform policies had challenged the “national myth” of liberation 
and revolution; the Party responded by coining the theory of the “first stage of 
socialism.”
By using this phrase, Hu wanted to 
reiterate the Marxist project and to restore the morality of the CCP. 
154 Because China had never gone through a capitalist stage, so it was 
argued, its forces of production had not been developed and, hence, it was only in the 
“primary stage of socialism.” At the Fourteenth Party Congress in 1992, Mao Zedong 
was once more relegated to the past: he was associated with the “first revolution,” 
whereas Deng Xiaoping’s reform program was declared to be a “new revolution.” In 
addition, the phrase “socialist market economy” was coined.155 These developments 
demonstrate that official ideology attempted to justify economic reform as congruous 
with the future goal of socialism; it was not contradicted to the former stress on class 
struggle. For “neo-conservatives,” on the other hand, economic reform did not have to 
be justified on Marxist grounds. As a Chinese theorist has noted, “neo-conservatism” 
recommended the market economy on the basis of Western theories, whereas official 
rhetoric had always presented the market economy as a necessary step for the 
realization of socialism.156
As Chen Feng has rightly noted, another crucial distinction between “neo-
conservatism” and official ideology concerns their conception of nationalism. Whereas 
for the regime, “nationalism” stood for the Party, the state, and the nation, the “neo-
conservative” imagery of “nationalism” did not entail loyalty to the Party or the state in 
particular, but to China as a country. An important element of official ideology that was 
lacking in “neo-conservatism” was the notion of patriotism. In official ideology, 
patriotism was defined in historical and cultural terms, or, as Suisheng Zhao has 
In “neo-conservative” accounts, the Marxist rhetoric was 
replaced with a reference to foreign theorists, something that will be discussed further. 
153 Ye Jianying had first used the term in 1979; Deng Xiaoping had elaborated the phrase as part 
of his program of “reform and opening up.”
154 The first stage had been that of a transition from capitalism to socialism, which had been 
completed in the 1950s. The second stage, the “primary stage of socialism,” would last until 
about 2050, when the third stage of the completion of socialist modernization would commence. 
The “primary stage” itself was also divided into three phases: (1) doubling the GNP of 1980 
(which Zhao Ziyang considered accomplished in 1987), (2) doubling the economy by the year 
2000, and (3) a GNP at the level of that of relatively developed countries by 2050.  
155 Kluver, Legitimating the Chinese Economic Reforms, 39-119.
156 Wang Shaoguang, “Xin baoshou zhuyi,” 76-77.
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formulated it, as a “somewhat simplified or imagined Chinese history and tradition.”157
The emphasis on patriotism during the early 1990s was in fact nothing new; since the 
beginning of economic reform in 1978, the socialism of class struggle had been 
supplanted with a socialism that underlined patriotism. Since the reliance on class as a 
category of identity only had a limited appeal and was not inclusive, patriotism could be 
utilized as a source of cohesion.158 This patriotism had not only been present in the 
agenda of economic construction, but also in the agendas of unification and opposition 
to international hegemony.159 Already at the beginning of the reforms, Deng Xiaoping 
had made it clear that the CCP was the object of loyalty by coining the “Four Cardinal 
Principles”—adherence to the socialist road, the leadership of the CCP, the dictatorship 
of the proletariat, and Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought—which “amounted 
to the claim that “the party is the country.”160
Official ideology and “neo-conservatism” further differed on the issues of 
democracy and a strong state. For the regime, democracy could not be envisioned 
because it would overthrow the regime, whereas “neo-conservatives” disapproved of it 
because of its impracticality. “Neo-conservatives” did not challenge democracy outright 
and considered it an eventual outcome, whereas the regime cast it aside and did not 
commit to it, not even in the long run. For “neo-conservatives,” a strong authority was 
needed as a means to reach the final goal of democracy, whereas the regime considered 
it an end in itself and part and parcel of its very ideology.
In “neo-conservatism,” on the other hand, 
ideology was replaced with national interest and the country was more predominant 
than the Party was. 
161
Because there were both similarities and dissimilarities between “neo-
conservatism” and official ideology, Xu Ben has coined the term “rivalry-complicity 
relationship”: they were complicit in their denunciation of immediate democratization, 
their stress on political stability, and their advocacy of cultural nationalism; they were 
rivals because “neo-conservatism” discarded revolution and promoted cultural 
tradition.162
157 Zhao, Nation-State, 212. 
158 Smith, National Identity, 5-6.
159 Hughes, Chinese Nationalism, 12-15. Hughes refers to Deng Xiaoping’s 1980 speech “The 
Present Situation and the Tasks Before Us,” Selected Works, 224-258.
160 Goldman, Link, and Wei, “China’s Intellectuals,”136.
161 Chen, “Neoconservative Political Thought,” 611.
162 Xu Ben, Disenchanted Democracy, 183-184.
Both the critique of revolution and the return to Chinese tradition, then, also 
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posed a threat to the legitimacy of the CCP. In this sense, “neo-conservatism” was a 
double-edged sword. The fact that “neo-conservatism” implied a denial of revolution—
which means that it had a different conception of how to bring about change—leads us 
back to the question of conservative principles.  Was the reference to tradition in “neo-
conservatism” only instrumental, or was it part of a new mode of identification that 
went beyond issues of legitimacy? 
2.4 “ISMS” AND LABELS: SOME EXAMPLES
In order to answer these questions, we will move from an abstract characterization of 
“neo-conservatism” as a unified concept to a discussion of the works and persons 
commonly associated with the term in a Chinese context. By looking into the use of the 
label “neo-conservatism” in American research on China in particular, some 
problematic aspects of the term can be identified. Some authors have clearly recognized 
the limits of the “neo-conservative” configuration approach. As Fewsmith has phrased 
it, “neo-conservatism” is a “loose term” that indicates a “set of concerns and a “broad 
intellectual orientation rather than a well-developed and consistent body of thought.”163
The themes that Fewsmith has associated with “neo-conservatism” are 
“incrementalism,” “central-local relations,” its roots in “neo-authoritarianism,” “state-
centered nationalism,” and a move away from “cultural cosmopolitanism” to cultural 
nationalism.164
The application of the label “neo-conservatism” to works in which nationalist 
sentiments were expressed, for example, is questionable. As both Hughes and Barmé 
have argued, during the early 1990s, nationalism could be found across the political 
spectrum; it was used as a strategy by both “leftists” and those in favor of 
marketization.
The question then rises: if a work manifests one or some, but not all of 
these traits, what is “neo-conservative” about it? 
165 An example of the perceived link between Chinese “neo-
conservatism” and nationalism in American research concerns the 1997 theme issue of 
Chinese Law and Government on “Nationalism and Neoconservatism in China in the 
1990s.”166
163 Fewsmith, China Since Tiananmen, 80.
164 Ibid.
165 Hughes, Chinese Nationalism, 8; Barmé, “To Screw Foreigners,” 215.
166 CLG 30:6 (November-December 1997).
Whereas the nationalism favored by “neo-conservatives” arose in the specific 
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context of post-1989 and post-1991 events in China, Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union, the nationalism of some authors that was linked to “neo-conservatism” in this 
journal dated from a later period and had nothing to do with the fear of political 
instability. 
Liberal Chinese intellectuals in particular have employed the label “neo-
conservatism” to discredit nationalists, even though it is difficult to pinpoint what 
exactly was “neo-conservative” about these works. As Rosen has noted, during the 
1990s, intellectual independence was considered a badge of honor, and different 
factions accused each other of alignment with the government. 167
The theme issue included one 1996 article by Wang Xiaodong—under the 
pseudonym of Shi Zhong— in which the latter argued that the rise of nationalism during 
the 1990s was a return to normalcy after the “reverse racism” or “national nihilism” of 
the 1980s.
In this context, 
liberals applied the term “neo-conservatism” to suggest the complicity of intellectual 
opponents with the government. In the 1997 theme issue, then, both works in which 
Chinese liberals used the term “neo-conservatism” and works that contained nationalist 
or other “neo-conservative” traits were presented as manifestations of “neo-
conservatism.” In the above-mentioned journal issue, the works of authors such as 
Wang Xiaodong, Sheng Hong, and Xiao Gongqin were supplemented with criticism of 
“liberal” intellectuals such as Xu Jilin and Xu Youyu. 
168 According to Wang Xiaodong, this nihilism had been especially strong in 
the documentary River Elegy (Heshang).169
167 Rosen, “Guest Editor’s Introduction,” 7.
168 Shi Zhong, “Chinese Nationalism,” 8-27. The article was a translation of Shi Zhong, 
“Zhongguo de minzu zhuyi he Zhongguo de weilai,” which appeared in Mingbao yuekan
(Mingbao Monthly) 9 (1996). 
169 On Heshang, see Su Xiaokang and Wang Luxiang, Heshang (River Elegy) (Beijing: Xiandai 
chubanshe, 1988); Su Xiaokang and Wang Luxiang, Deathsong of the River: A Reader’s Guide 
to the Chinese TV Series Heshang (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); Woei-Lien Chong, 
“Su Xiaokang on His Film ‘River Elegy,’” China Information 4:3 (Winter 1989-1990), 44-55; 
Chen Feng and Jin Guantao, From Youthful Manuscripts to River Elegy: the Chinese Popular 
Cultural Movement and Political Transformation 1979-1989 (Hong Kong: Chinese University 
Press, 1997); Jing Wang, “Heshang and the Paradoxes of the Chinese Enlightenment,” in idem, 
High Culture Fever, 118-136. For a brief overview of the cultural movement of the 1980s, see 
Fong-ching Chen, “The Popular Cultural Movement of the 1980s,” in Gloria Davies, ed., 
Voicing Concerns, 71-86.
Broadcasted in the summer of 1988, the 
six-part series Heshang presented China’s cultural symbols—such as the Great Wall, 
the dragon and the Yellow River—not as markers of China’s greatness, but as symbols 
of its backward nature. Symbolically, the makers of Heshang argued for more openness 
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towards the West and urged the “Yellow River” to flow towards the “Blue Ocean.” 
Under a growing U.S. pressure, Wang Xiaodong argued, China should be aware of its 
national interests, but it should opt for a “constructive” instead of an “emotional” 
nationalism.170 He further asserted that both Western media and Chinese liberals had 
deliberately linked nationalism with “authoritarianism” and “anti-democracy,” whereas 
Chinese nationalists were not against democracy; they just looked for efficient ways to 
obtain it. Nationalists often underscored order and state power because they knew—as 
the events in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe had shown—that the West 
would not come to rescue in the event of chaos.171
Wang Xiaodong had also expressed his nationalist views some years earlier in 
several articles in the newly founded journal Strategy and Management (Zhanlüe yu 
guanli), one of the main vectors of debates on nationalism. The journal had organized 
two national conferences on the topic of nationalism, in 1994 and 1995 respectively.172
One of Wang Xiaodong’s articles was a response to the thesis put forward by the 
American political scientist Samuel Huntington (b. 1927) that future conflicts would not 
be ideological, but cultural in nature. Inspired by the historian Arnold Toynbee, 
Huntington had divided the world into a handful of civilizations that would form the 
basis of future clashes. 173 In line with his emphasis on national interests, Wang 
Xiaodong refuted Huntington’s thesis and argued that future conflicts would remain 
economic in nature.174
Similarly, the economist Sheng Hong’s article on nationalism referred to in the 
issue was not linked to the “neo-conservative” concerns as described above. Sheng 
Hong discussed the cultural strategies of nationalism and “cosmopolitanism” (tianxia 
Wang Xiaodong’s nationalism clearly arose in the new context 
of tension with the United States and the regained confidence after the economic boost 
of 1992; it was different from the concerns as expressed between 1989 and 1992. 
170 Shi Zhong, “Chinese Nationalism,” 19, 21.
171 Ibid., 22, 24-25.
172 Zhao, “Nationalistic Writing,” 736. The 1994 conference was entitled “Changing World 
Patterns,” whereas the 1995 conference dealt with “Chinese Nationalism at the Turn of the 
Century.” 
173 Huntington, “Clash of Civilizations,” 22-49. The civilizations that Huntington mentioned in 
his article were: Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin-
American, and African. Arnold Toynbee (1889-1975) had studied the rise and fall of 
civilizations in his twelve-volume A Study of History (1934-1961).
174 Shi Zhong, “Weilai de chongtu,” ZYG 1993:1, 46-50. Another article on nationalism by Shi 
Zhong was “Zhongguo xiandaihua mianjian de tiaozhan,” Zhanlüe yu guanli 1994:1, 7-9.
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zhuyi) from the angle of global economic efficiency. 175 Referring to the Chinese 
philosopher Liang Shuming (1993-1988) and Toynbee, Sheng Hong insisted that China 
had been a cosmopolitan cultural civilization ever since the unification under the Qin 
(221 B.C.-A.D. 206) dynasty, whereas a divided Europe had only known nationalism 
and “warring states rules.”176 In response to the “bullying and humiliation” of Western 
powers ever since the First Opium War (1839-1842), China had no choice but to 
embrace nationalism. Nevertheless, its nationalism still contained “cosmopolitan” traits: 
it was defensive, not expansionist, and it included elements of compromise.177
Like Wang Xiaodong, Sheng Hong had also expressed his nationalist concerns 
in a response to Huntington in the journal Strategy and Management.178 In an article 
with a much sharper tone then the one mentioned above, Sheng Hong upheld that the 
expansion of Western civilization had not been based on rules of free trade, but on brute 
force. Chinese civilization, on the contrary, had disapproved of this Social Darwinism. 
This aggressive nationalism could clearly not be related to a “neo-conservative” stance; 
it was neither about political legitimacy, nor about social stability. Although in terms of 
his views on economic reform, as Fewsmith has argued, Sheng Hong can be identified 
as a “neo-conservative” because he criticized the “romantic attitude” toward reform and 
exchanged it with gradual reform, this does not suffice to treat his viewpoint in any 
other field as a manifestation of “neo-conservatism.”179
The examples of Wang Xiaodong and Sheng Hong demonstrate that one should 
distinguish manifestations of nationalism from a “neo-conservative” stand. Although 
the two might be related in the sense that both stressed Realpolitik, there was a great 
contrast between the advocacy of nationalism in 1996 and the concerns that intellectuals 
expressed between 1989 and 1992. Since the articles mentioned above were written in 
1996, they were a response to an entirely different context. This context included a 
growing national Chinese pride as a result of economic success, and the perception that 
other nations were hostile to China after the Yinhe incident and the award of the 2000 
175 Sheng Hong, “From Nationalism to Cosmopolitanism,” 31-42. Originally published as 
“Cong minzu zhuyi dao tianxia zhuyi,” ZYG 1996:1, 14-19.
176 Ibid., 38. On Liang Shuming, see also Chapter Five, 218-221.
177 Sheng Hong, “From Nationalism to Cosmopolitanism,” 39-41.
178 Sheng Hong, “Shenme shi wenming,” ZYG 1995:5, 88-98. In the February 1996 issue of 
ZYG, both Sun Liping and Xu Youyu criticized Sheng Hong.
179 Fewsmith, China Since Tiananmen, 81-82.
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Olympics to Sydney instead of Beijing in 1993.180 Other factors that had given rise to 
this nationalism were the opposition to China’s bid to enter GATT, as well as the 
Taiwan Straits crisis of 1995 and 1996. This popular nationalism was more in line with 
the anti-Americanism expressed in the 1996 bestseller China Can Say No than with 
“neo-conservative” concerns of political stability and centralized rule.181 In addition, 
this popular nationalism, as Fewsmith has noted, also contained an antigovernment 
tone, whereas “neo-conservatism” was rather an attempt to strengthen government; it 
was highly elitist in nature.182
Another work often associated with “neo-conservatism” is the 1994 book 
Looking at China Through a Third Eye, which addresses a whole range of different 
topics. 183 The book was allegedly written by a German author, in Chinese Luoyi 
Ningge’er, and translated by Wang Shan, a deputy director of the Beijing Opera 
Academy. Nevertheless, after an interview with the Hong Kong magazine Asia Weekly
during which Wang could not mention the English title of the book, it was admitted that 
Wang Shan was the author.184
180 On August 3, 1993, the U.S. Navy stopped the Chinese ship Yinhe in international waters 
because the U.S. believed that the ship carried materials to produce chemical weapons.
181 Song Qiang, Zhang Zangzang, and Qiao Bian, Zhongguo keyi shuo bu (Beijing: Zhonghua 
gongshang lianhe chubanshe, 1996). On China Can Say No, see Fewsmith, China Since 
Tiananmen, 154-156.
182 Fewsmith, China Since Tiananmen, 156.
183 Wang Shan, Disanzhi yanjing kan Zhongguo (Taipei: Zhouzhi wenhua, 1994).
184 Fewsmith, China Since Tiananmen, 148. See also Liu Binyan, “Ping Disanzhi yanjing kan 
Zhongguo,” 23-39. Former Minister of Culture Wang Meng criticized the book for its anti-
intellectualism. According to He Pin, there was a “third hand” involved in the publication of the 
book, namely the “princeling” Pan Yue. Because of its attack on popular movements, He Pin 
has also linked the book to He Xin. See He Pin, “‘Disanzhiyan’ haishi ‘disanzhi shou’?,” 21-22.
Pan Yue was not the only person who was allegedly involved in the publication of the book. In 
a footnote, Liu Kang suggests that the book had the backing of top leaders, including Jiang 
Zemin. See Liu Kang, “Debate about Modernity,” 215, fn. 36. 
The themes treated in the six chapters of the book were 
the foreign intervention in Chinese affairs, the dangerous problem of the peasants, the 
weaknesses of Chinese intellectuals, Chinese cadres, methods for social control, and 
China in the international community. The common theme in all the chapters was the 
mounting disintegration as a result of Deng Xiaoping’s reforms, which had led to a 
decline in authority, the waning of ideology and morality, and the rise of social 
problems. Deng Xiaoping stood in contrast with Mao Zedong, who was not to blame for 
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any mistakes—present problems were to blame on intellectuals, who “lacked an 
autonomous spirit,” and on the peasantry, which was a source of great danger.185
The book has been labeled “neo-conservative” because, as Suisheng Zhao has 
formulated it, it was a “kind of mournful elegy” that marked the death of the socialist 
model.186 Hughes has argued that the views expressed in the book came “closest to the 
wholesale departure from socialism in favor of elitist authoritarianism,” as expressed in 
some “neo-conservative” advocacies. 187
Although Peter Moody has also treated Wang Shan’s book as an expression of 
“neo-conservatism,” he has applied the label for different reasons. For Moody, the book 
was part of a trend of “conservative populism,” or “radical conservatism,” in which it 
was identified with leftist tendencies. In his definition of conservatism, Moody has 
included the “leftist” tendencies, because they were  “an as-it-were conservative 
populist critique of market liberalism.”
Author Wang Shan criticized both Deng 
Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin for not taking the right measures with regard to the 
weakening of the state as a consequence of reform and opening up. Nationalism came in 
as part of the new ideology of the “third eye” point of view, the other two elements 
being Social Darwinism and Marxism. In general, then, what was “neo-conservative” 
about the book was its advocacy of elitist nationalism to guide market reforms and the 
stress on the importance of the middle class, as Hughes has rightly argued. However, 
“neo-conservatives” would certainly dismiss the anti-intellectualism of the book.
188 Hence, for Moody, Wang Shan’s book 
belonged to the same type of conservative reform criticism as the so-called 1996 Ten-
Thousand-Character Manifesto that was attributed to the Marxist ideologue Deng 
Liqun. 189
185 Wang Shan, Disanzhi yanjing, 147.
186 Zhao, Nation-State, 263.
187 Hughes, Chinese Nationalism, 93. Hughes also mentions the support of Chen Yuan and Pan 
Yue, both relatives of CCP officials, for the book.
188 Moody, Conservative Thought, 7.
189 The official title of the Ten-Thousand-Character Manifesto that was attributed to Deng 
Liqun was “Various Factors Influencing the Country’s National Security” (Yingxiang wo guo 
guojia anquan de ruogan yinsu). For a selected translation of the document, see Shell and 
Shambough, The China Reader, 116-135.
Here, we see the recurrence of a “neo-conservative” configuration that is 
defined in a positional rather than in a substantive way: for some, Wang Shan’s book 
marked the decline of Leftist tendencies, whereas for others, it was a Leftist criticism of 
reform.  
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He Xin (b. 1949), a former literary critic and researcher at the Institute of 
Modern History of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), is also often 
dubbed a “neo-conservative.” The political liberal Liu Xiaobo (b. 1955) has called He 
Xin “the most visible symbol of China’s so-called ‘neo-conservatism’ movement” in 
the aftermath of the June Fourth incident.190 Although Liu Xiaobo applied the term to 
utter political criticism of He Xin’s support for the government crackdown in 1989—in 
this sense, the use of the term resembles the liberal criticism of nationalists as discussed 
above—others have called He Xin a “neo-conservative” because of his emphasis on 
statism, nationalism, gradual economic reform, and Realpolitik. 191 Fewsmith has 
referred to He Xin as an example of a “muscular” “neo-conservatism,” since his 
nationalist writings in particular were more extreme than those of other nationalists.192
Already in 1988, He Xin had compared the “radicalism” of 1980s liberalism 
with that of the Cultural Revolution.
He Xin’s advocacies were invoked in the official media to promote gradualism. 
193 On March 24, 1989, an article appeared in The 
People’s Daily in which He Xin criticized the “radical antitraditionalism” of May 
Fourth and the 1980s that had peaked in the documentary River Elegy.194 In a January 
1991 article in China Youth Daily, it was reported that He Xin argued in favor of 
gradual modernization in line with a creative transformation of Chinese culture.195 He 
was further said to condemn rash reform talk and to expose the “latent strategic 
interests” behind the Western bourgeoisie’s “peaceful evolution.” He Xin’s call for a 
calm and rational approach to modernization and his cultural nationalism were further 
expressed in his 1991 book The Renaissance of the East.196
190 Liu Xiaobo, “Neo-Political Conservatism,” 12. The fact that Liu Xiaobo used strong 
language is not surprising given the fact that He Xin, in a secret report to the authorities, 
reportedly mentioned Liu Xiaobo as one of the people who had been responsible for the spring 
1989 demonstrations. He Xin worked as the research assistant of Li Shu, Marxist-Leninist 
historian at CASS; he later became affiliated with the department of Cultural History in the 
Modern History Institute of CASS. He Xin allegedly received the support of Hu Qiaomu and 
the son of Chen Yi, the “princeling” Chen Haosu.
191 On statism, see for example He Xin’s collection of writings Lun zhengzhi guojia zhuyi 
(Beijing: shishi chubanshe, 2003).
192 Fewsmith, China Since Tiananmen, 93.
193 See He Xin, “Wode kunhuo yu youlü,” Xuexi yuekan 12 (1988), 36-37. Translated by Barmé 
in “Word of Advice,” 54-55.
194 Liu Qingfeng, “Topography of Intellectual Culture,” 63. The article was entitled “‘Wusi’ 
jingshen de jicheng yu chaoyue” (Continuing and going beyond the spirit of May Fourth).
195 Fang Wang, “He Xin de wenhuaxue yanjiu,” 4.
196 He Xin, Dongfang de fuxing: Zhongguo xiandaihua de mingti yu qiantu (Ha’erbin: 
Heilongjiang renmin chubanshe, Heilongjiang jiaoyu chubanshe, 1991).
In various other writings, 
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He Xin warned against the global hegemony of the United States and criticized the 
“romanticism” of Chinese reform.197
Although many of the “neo-conservative” themes can be found in He Xin, an 
important point that needs to be made is that he was, apart from being an exponent of 
tradition, also a fervent supporter of Chinese Marxism; he even argued that it should 
become a “national religion.” 198
Finally, the names of Hu Angang and Wang Shaoguang have been linked with 
“neo-conservatism” because of their 1993 research report on China’s state capacity.
This contradicts the argument of some political 
scientists that “neo-conservatism” exchanged Marxism for tradition and nationalism; it 
is not clear in which respect He Xin’s theories differed from official ideology.  He Xin’s 
advocacy of a strong state in particular can be said to be a Leftist theme as much as a 
“neo-conservative” theme. There was also nothing particularly “neo-conservative” 
about an advocacy of nationalism, as will be elaborated further. 
199
Wang Shaoguang, a political scientist, was based at Yale University at the time; Hu 
Angang, an influential economist, worked at the Chinese Academy of Science 
(CAS).200 In the report, the two researchers only addressed one aspect of state capacity, 
namely its capacity to extract central state revenues. They argued that this capacity had 
been weakened due to the tax reforms of the 1980s; it mostly depended on state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs). 201
197 See Fewsmith, China Since Tiananmen, 93-95. Fewsmith quotes from a vast amount of 
articles that are collected in He Xin, Zhonghua fuxing yu shijie weilai (Chengdu: Sichuan 
renmin chubanshe, 1996).
198 Barmé, “Word of Advice,” 342.
199 Hu Angang and Wang Shaoguang, Jiaqiang zhongyang zhengfu zai shichang jingji 
zhuanxing zhong de zhudao zuoyong: guanyu Zhongguo guojia nengli de yanjiu baogao 
(Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chubanshe, 1993). The report was translated by Joseph Fewsmith 
as Wang Shaoguang Proposal (I) and (II) in The Chinese Economy 28: 3 and 4 (May-June and 
July-August 1995). A shorter version of the report appeared in the February 1994 issue of EYS
under the title “Zhongguo zhengfu jiqu nengli de xiajiang ji qi houguo,” and it was followed by 
a debate.  Participants in the debate included Hu Angang, Wang Shaoguang, Dali Yang, Cui 
Zhiyuan, Rao Yuqing, and Xiao Geng. In the April 1994 issue of EYS, Wang Shaoguang replied 
to the criticisms uttered in the debate. 
200 Wang Shaoguang received his Ph.D. in political science from Cornell University in 1990,
after which he taught at Yale University until 2000. Since 2000, Wang Shaoguang is based at 
the Chinese University of Hong Kong.
201 Fewsmith, China Since Tiananmen, 134-135. As other components of state capacity, 
Fewsmith mentions legitimation capacity, corruption, and bureaucratic efficiency (134). In the 
United States, research on state capacity flourished under Joel Migdal, John Zysman, and others 
during the 1980s (132).
Deng Xiaoping’s reforms had led to decentralization—or, in 
specific terms, to “devolving authority and granting benefits” (fangquan rangli)—and 
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thus, the authors advocated a more centralized reform.202 The dissimilarities between 
the report and the Old Leftists’ point of view become clear if we compare the report to, 
for example, the series of Ten-Thousand-Character Manifestos that appeared between 
1995 and 1997, of which the one attributed to Deng Liqun has been mentioned above. 
These manifestos considered both the decline of the public sector and the emergence of 
a “non-governmental bourgeois class” and embryonic “new bureaucrat and comprador 
bourgeoisie classes” a threat, whereas Wang Shaoguang and Hu Angang did not oppose 
these changes as such.203 As Fewsmith has correctly pointed out, the “neo-statists” had 
some things in common with the “popular nationalists”: both wanted to bring in the 
voice of the people and to deconstruct the special interests of the privileged.204
The case of Hu Angang and Wang Shaoguang in particular illustrates the fact 
that the advocacy of a strong state was both a Leftist and a “neo-conservative” theme. 
For Zhang Xudong, a member of the so-called New Left—another example of the 
practice of “labeling”; the term was put forward by liberal opponents, and those 
designated as such did not always accept the label—the argument of Hu Angang and 
Wang Shaoguang was congruent with the concern for social justice that members of the 
New Left expressed. For Zhang Xudong, Wang Shaoguang belonged to the New Left, 
together with intellectuals such as Cui Zhiyuan, Gan Yang, Wang Hui and others.205
Moreover, for Zhang Xudong, the “state capacity” theory was about exploring a 
“socially just” way to reach a “socialist market economy.”
Zhang Xudong considered the “state capacity” thesis a response to the disaster of 
unchecked neoliberalism in the former Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia. 
206 In line with Zhang 
Xudong’s interpretation, Fewsmith has also argued that the central concern of Hu 
Angang and Wang Shaoguang was social justice, which was also the main concern of 
New Left intellectuals.207
202 See also Hu Angang and Wang Shaoguang, The Political Economy of Uneven Development: 
The Case of China, Mark Selden, ed. (Armonk, NY, London: M.E. Sharpe, 1999). 
203 Fewsmith, China Since Tiananmen, 136.
204 Ibid., 139-140. Hu Angang and Wang Shaoguang also collaborated with Kang Xiaoguang, 
the author of Xin baoshou zhuyi zhenglunji (Beijing, s.n., 2002). Thanks to Joseph Fewsmith for 
mentioning this book to me. See also Fewsmith’s translation of Kang Xiaoguang’s article 
“Zhongguo gaige shidai de zhengzhi fazhan yu zhengzhi wending” (Political development and 
political stability in the era of reform), The Chinese Economy 35:5 (September-October 2002), 
6-92.
205 Zhang Xudong, “Post-Tiananmen Intellectual Field,” 49-50.
206 Ibid., 57.
207 Fewsmith, China Since Tiananmen, 138-139.
This application of the label “neo-conservatism” to Leftist 
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concerns can also be found in Suisheng Zhao, who has linked the term not only to the 
works discussed above, but also with the “Mao fever” of the early 1990s.208
2.5 A CONSCIOUS CONSERVATIVE POSITION?: ENTER “RADICALISM”
As the examples above demonstrate, situating the term “neo-conservatism” on a 
political Left-Right axis creates confusion because “conservatism” is somehow equated 
with the preservation of the Chinese socialist status quo. Even the association of “neo-
conservatism” with a set of core themes tells us little about what was truly conservative 
about “neo-conservatism.” In order to dig deeper into the essence of Chinese “neo-
conservatism,” we will first investigate whether it was linked to American “neo-
conservatism” in any respect. This is done because, as argued above, some 
manifestations of American “neo-conservatism” managed to reconcile issues that were 
particular to an American context with general Burkean themes. 
Some Chinese intellectuals have referred to American “neo-conservatism” in 
their analysis of its Chinese counterpart. Chen Xiaoming, a researcher in the Institute of 
Literature of CASS, has claimed that those who made use of the term in a Chinese 
context did recognize the American version, but in terms of content, there was no 
connection between the two.209 Wang Yuechuan, a Professor of Chinese Literature at 
Peking University, has not only related the use of the prefix “neo” in a Chinese context 
to the revival of conservatism after a long period of decline, but also to the fact that 
Chinese “neo-conservatism” acknowledged classical liberalism.210 If we compare this 
statement with the findings of American and European researchers, this appears to be a 
contested claim. Wang Sirui has questioned the applicability of the label “neo-
conservatism” to China. In the United States, “neo-conservatism” took the form of 
Burkean conservatism, but its essence was classical liberalism. Chinese “neo-
conservatives,” however, were anti-liberal; they upheld “statism” (guojia zhuyi), “new 
order-ism” (xin zhixu zhuyi), and nationalism.211
In order to find out whether American and Chinese “neo-conservatism” were 
indeed unrelated to each other, we briefly have to investigate American “neo-
208 Zhao, “Nationalistic Writing,” 735. 
209 Chen Xiaoming, “Baoshouxing yu hefahua,” 93.
210 Wang Yuechuan, “Jijin yu baoshou zhiwei,” ZFL, 432.
211 Wang Sirui, “Xin baoshou zhuyi,” 412. 
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conservatism.” American “neo-conservatives,” most of them sociologists, resisted a 
strong state, but respected the market, as well as traditional values and institutions.212
Irving Kristol, a leading figure in American “neo-conservatism,” has identified religion, 
nationalism, and economic growth as the three pillars of modern American 
conservatism. To these he has added “neorealism” in foreign policy, which took the 
form of anti-communism. 213 Others have noted that American “neo-conservatives” 
discerned a crisis of authority and legitimacy in governing institutions, and that they 
accorded importance to social stability. 214 Another aspect of American “neo-
conservatism” was its belief in the rise of the so-called “New Class,” a class of 
professional intellectuals that subverted civilization through modernism, and that was 
responsible for the rise of an “adversary culture.”215 Finally, Martin Lipset, another 
protagonist of American “neo-conservatism,” has argued that there was an affinity 
between American “neo-conservatism” and liberalism, especially in terms of welfare 
policy and anti-Stalinism. 216 The argument that American “neo-conservatism” was 
linked to the liberal tradition can be found in a different form in Huntington’s thesis that 
conservatism was not an inherent theory that defended the interests of a particular 
group, but a positional ideology that responded to a specific social situation. Since 
conservatism was about the preservation of institutions rather than about a belief in 
particular ideas, American liberals should engage in a defense of institutions that were 
liberal in nature.217
If we adhere to the analysis provided above, then Chinese “neo-conservatives,” 
among them many economists, supported traits that were in many ways opposite to 
American “neo-conservatism.” They were not against a strong state, but they argued 
precisely the opposite, namely that a strong state was required. Huntington’s reference 
to the “crisis of authority,” which in an American context signified an overload of the 
state, was invoked to press for more state power in a Chinese context. The individual 
212 Steinfels, The Neoconservatives, 51-52.
213 This was the reason why Kristol founded the journal The National Interest in 1985.
214 Steinfels, The Neoconservatives, 53-69.
215 Van Rossem, “Neo-conservatism,” 20. The idea of the “New Class” and its ideological 
instrument of “modernism” was taken from the writings of both Lionel Trilling and Joseph 
Schumpeter.
216 Lipset, “Neoconservatism,” 2. However, Steinfels adds that liberalism itself contains 
conservative traits as well, both in the U.S. and in the “classical” version. See Steinfels, The 
Neoconservatives, 3. 
217 Huntington, “Conservatism as an Ideology,” 463, 467-468, 472. 
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was subordinated to the interest of the state.  Nonetheless, as will be discussed below, 
since those who applied the term “neo-conservatism” in a Chinese context did not 
oppose the goal of political liberalism per se—some presented “neo-conservatism” as a 
more efficient road to political liberalism—it is possible that the term was also coined 
because some proponents were convinced that their theory was a theory in the service of 
liberalism. 
Another considerable distinction between American and Chinese “neo-
conservatism” concerns the absence of the turn to morality in a Chinese context; it was 
simply not an issue. The cultural and moral crisis, which was central to the American 
“neo-conservative” ideology, took the form of a crisis of legitimacy in the Chinese 
context. Chen Xiaoming has argued that “neo-conservatism” could engage in the 
construction of a non-mainstream value system precisely because of the crisis of
legitimacy that took place.218 Chinese “neo-conservatism” sought to resolve this crisis 
through the reference to traditional cultural values, but these values were used 
instrumentally, as a means to restore political legitimacy; they were not invoked 
because of a perceived moral crisis in society.  For this reason, Moody’s thesis that both 
Chinese and American “neo-conservatism” reacted against “leftists” and returned to 
traditional values and that both shared a similar “temperament,” but different “contents”
needs to be modified.219
In an American context, the term was first coined as a label to discredit political 
renegades—“no one created a doctrine and called himself a neoconservative,” as Martin 
Lipset has put it.220 The label was used in particular to denote the intellectual trajectory 
of the so-called New York Intellectuals—a group of socialists who had first turned to 
liberalism, after which they embraced what critics called “neo-conservatism”—between 
the 1930s and the 1960s.221
218 Chen Xiaoming, “Baoshouxing yu hefahua,” 96.
219 Moody, Conservative Thought, 151.
220 Lipset, Neoconservatism, 15. 
221 During the 1930s, this had been a group of radicals organized around the journal Partisan 
Review, but the totalitarianism in the Soviet Union under Stalin turned them into anti-
communist liberals who exchanged their earlier critical attitude towards the United States for a 
praise of the “death of ideology” by the 1950s. This was expressed in the works of, for example, 
Daniel J. Boorstin and Daniel Bell. It was the socialist Michael Harrington, the leader of the 
Democratic Socialists, who first used the term “neo-conservatism” to discredit the social 
democrats on the right.
Some “neo-conservatives” nevertheless accepted the label. 
Irving Kristol, for example, who is often considered to be the “godfather” of the 
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American neo-conservative “movement,” has described his own intellectual 
development from “youthful socialism” over “self-critical liberalism” to “neo-
conservatism.”222
In a Chinese context, on the contrary, some intellectuals consciously used the 
term “neo-conservatism” to set up a reform program. This was very different from the 
use of the label on behalf of liberal opponents to criticize nationalist viewpoints, as 
discussed in the previous section. In the next part of this chapter, we will move from the 
term as a “label” to those who have applied the term as a “banner,” as Jin Yuanpu has 
phrased it.223
The term “radicalism” is no less problematic than the term “conservatism” is. 
The Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe—in which Koselleck and others have reconciled the 
history of core concepts in Germany between 1750 and 1850 with the social and 
political history of the era—also contains an overview of the use of the term 
“radicalism.”
More specifically, the use of the term “neo-conservatism” as a “banner” 
will be related to the use of the “counterconcept” of “radicalism”  (jijin zhuyi), because 
this term appeared in many Chinese discussions on conservatism and “neo-
conservatism.” In order to answer our question of whether there was indeed a 
conservative “style of thought” behind different uses of the term “conservatism,” it is 
useful to compare how the “counterconcept” of “radicalism” was defined in relation to 
“conservatism.” 
224 Although the context and time frame is different from that of this study, 
it is nevertheless helpful to look at the different meanings ascribed to the term. Initially, 
the term “radical” meant “deep-seated,” “rooted,” or “inborn,” but since the eighteenth-
century, the term was applied in the sense of “that what goes to the root.” 225
222 Kristol, Neoconservatism, ix. The founding of the magazine The Public Interest in 1965 by 
Irving Kristol and Daniel Bell is generally considered the start of “neo-conservatism” in 
retrospect, but Kristol adds that the term was not used at the time, and that those around the 
magazine still considered themselves liberals. Other influential journals around which neo-
conservatives organized themselves were Commentary (edited by Norman Podhoretz from 1960 
until 1995), The New Criterion (since 1982, lead by Hilton Kramer), The National Interest
(published by Irving Kristol since 1985), and, finally, The American Spectator, a less academic 
journal. Other famous “neo-conservatives” include Midge Decter, Nathan Glazer, and Seymour 
Martin Lipset; most of them are sociologists by training.
223 Jin Yuanpu, “He yi ‘baoshou zhuyi,’” 385.
224 Wende, “Radikalismus,” in Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, Vol. 5, 113-133.
225 Ibid., 113.
In 
philosophy, at the end of the eighteenth century, Immanuel Kant employed the term 
“radical” evil in the sense of innate evil, but in political vocabulary, the term was hardly 
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used before 1830.226
As a political concept, “radicalism” was also associated with certain goals and 
means of action. These were defined as a priori goals, as opposition for the sake of 
opposition, and as the expression of a will for renewal and progress. Whereas all of 
these were perceived of as negative, some tried to return to the initial—and positive—
meaning of the term as “that what goes to the root.” After 1848, the concept became 
historicized and “ideologized”: in order to emphasize the antirevolutionary stance of 
conservatism and national liberalism, “radicalism” was linked to revolution and 
socialism. “Radicalism” was now defined as a worldview that dwelled in the utopia and 
actions of a blind will to renew. It followed Enlightenment axioms and it ignored reality 
through a faith in abstract reason. Moreover, it adhered to the belief that new 
institutions could bring about new people. In contradistinction to its initial meaning of 
thorough change, “radicalism” now became associated with a nihilistic nature and an 
abstract worldview of a flat “radicalism” that was inconsiderate and willing to go to 
extremes. 
It was only after the July Revolution of 1830 that the term was 
utilized as a political concept, but its content was by no means fixed. The author of the 
entry on “radicalism” in Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe has discerned three meanings of 
“radicalism” as a political concept, which existed more or less at the same time. Firstly, 
“radicalism” meant being true to one’s principles. Secondly, and in a more narrow 
sense, “radicalism” was tied to a concrete political content, such as “democracy” or 
“revolution.” Thirdly, the term was invoked to denote the political program of parties. 
As the German use of the concept of “radicalism” shows, the correlation 
between “radicalism” and a political faction of democrats, as reflected in the works of 
some Chinese analysts, might be too simplistic; “radicalism” could also stand for 
certain goals and means of action. An example of the association of “radicalism” with a 
concrete political content concerns a 1992 article by Wang Zhaojun in the journal 
Zhongguo luntan (China Forum). According to Wang Zhaojun, the “radical” faction 
against which “neo-conservatism” reacted pressed for natural rights, social justice and 
private ownership. In addition, most intellectuals of the “radical” faction were elitist 
intellectuals located outside of the political system, whereas “neo-conservatives” were 
226 Kant used the term “radical” in his Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft 
(Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason), 1793, 32, 37.
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mostly non-elitist and part of the system.227 Another example of how “radicalism” was 
mostly understood as a program of political parties concerns a 1993 article by Wu Yifu 
in Beijing zhi chun (Beijing Spring). In the article, Wu Yifu did not only connect 
“radicalism” with liberalism, but also with socialism. In Wu Yifu’s view, both liberals 
and “neo-conservatives” denounced violent revolution and argued for the foundation of 
a pluralist democracy.228
2.6 THE USE OF “NEO-CONSERVATISM” AND “RADICALISM”
In order to move away from vague statements about “neo-conservatism” and 
“radicalism” such as the ones above, we will focus instead on how advocates of the 
theory applied these two terms. The question will be posed of whether exponents of 
“neo-conservatism” only referred to the “counterconcept” of “radicalism” to reject a 
concrete political content, such as, for example, democracy, or whether they also 
employed it to refer to the nature of goals and means of action, as in the German 
treatment of “radicalism.” As discussed in the introduction, a true conservatism upholds 
gradual change because it opposes Enlightenment progressivism. If “radicalism” also 
stood for “progressivism,” then it was possible that Chinese “neo-conservatism” did 
indeed rise above a plea for centralization and strong rule. 
2.6.1 “Radicalism” and “Neo-conservatism” in Xiao Gongqin
As briefly indicated, unlike in the American context, the term “neo-conservatism” did 
not first arise in China as a derogatory label coined by political opponents. Xiao 
Gongqin (b. 1946), a historian from Shanghai Normal University, first coined the term 
“neo-conservatism” (xin baoshou zhuyi) at a December 1990 conference on “Chinese 
Tradition and Socialist Modernization,” which was organized by the Ideology and 
Theory Department of China Youth Daily (Zhongguo qingnian bao).229
227 Wang Zhaojun, “New Conservatism,” 83, 86-87, 91.
228 Wu Yifu, “Ziyou zhuyi he ‘xin baoshou zhuyi,’” 14.
229 Xiao Gongqin was the son of a Kuomintang general from Sichuan province. See Sullivan, 
Democracy and Developmentalism, 231 (fn.) One year after graduation, in 1982, Xiao became a 
lecturer at the History Department of Shanghai Normal University, where he would later 
become Professor, a position he still holds up to this date.
Xu Weicheng 
and Yuan Mu, two former Cultural Revolution propagandists, reportedly attended the 
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conference. 230 According to the Hong Kong media, the literary critic and political 
commentator He Xin and affiliates of China Youth Daily also attended the conference. 
Xiao allegedly also received the support of Chen Haose, the son of marshal Chen Yi; in 
addition, Xiao is believed to have had contact with associates of Jiang Zemin and the 
offspring of several officials.231
An extended version of Xiao Gongqin’s speech at the December 1990 
conference appeared in China Youth Daily of February 1991 under the title “Yan Fu’s 
Reflections on China’s Modernization and its Enlightenment.”
Nevertheless, it remains unclear to what extent there 
was political support for Xiao’s theory.
232 In this article, Xiao 
argued that the nineteenth-century translator Yan Fu (1854-1921) had been a proponent 
of “gradualist” or “incrementalist” modernization (jianjin zhuyi de xiandaihua). Unlike 
“radical modernizers,” Yan Fu had not considered traditional culture and values 
obstacles to modernization; he had treated them as indispensable “media” (meijie) and 
“levers” (ganggan) in the process of modernization.233 In the February 1991 article, 
Xiao Gongqin summarized the advocacy of “gradual modernizers” like this: 
[B]y using enlightened despotism as an authority lever to push Chinese modernization 
and by considering traditional cultural value symbols intermediaries for modernization, 
they propose to induce the growth and maturation of endogenous modernization 
factors. They do this in order to let them harmonize with the correspondent new system 
and to form a development mechanism with the endogenous as the mainstay (…).234
As can be seen from this brief passage, Xiao invoked organic terms such as “growth”
and “maturation,” terms that can also be found in Burkean conservatism. Remarkably, 
in this edited version of the speech, the term  “neo-conservatism” (xin baoshou zhuyi)
230 Xu Weicheng was also the vice-mayor of Beijing. According to the Hong Kong press, Xu 
was the person behind the 26 April 1989 editorial in People’s Daily “We Must Take a Firm 
Stand and Oppose Turmoil” (Bixu qizhi xianming de fandui dongluan).
231 “Behind the CCP Princes Party,” Pai-hsing (Paihsing), Hong Kong, no. 260 (March 16, 
1992), 32-35. Translated in Inside China Mainland (Taipei) 14: 5 (May 1992), 6-10. Chen 
Haose was the vice-minister of telecommunications at the time. His father Chen Yi (1901-1972) 
had been a commander in the Chinese army in the 1930s and 1940s. In 1955, he became a 
Marshal in the PLA. Between the 1950s and 1970s, Chen Yi had held the positions of vice-
premier and Minister of Foreign of Affairs.
232 Xiao Gongqin, “Yan Fu dui Zhongguo xiandaihua de sikao ji qi qishi,” Zhongguo 
qingnianbao, February 6, 1991, 3.
233 Ibid.
234 Ibid.
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did not appear once; it was supplanted with the term “neo-gradualism” or “neo-
incrementalism” (xin jianjin zhuyi). Then again, in a longer version of the speech that 
appeared in Xiao Gongqin’s Collected Works (1995), the term “neo-conservatism” was 
mentioned; the word “conservatism” even appeared in the title.235
Apart from Xiao Gongqin’s reference to tradition as a “lever” in the introduction 
of foreign elements, tradition could also function as a means to strengthen political 
cohesion. For Xiao, in a transitional era of modernization, nationalism in a broad 
sense—loyalty towards one’s nation—could function as a coagulation force; it was a 
“‘natural’ political resource.”236 The problem with Chinese nationalism since modern 
times, Xiao argued, was precisely that it had not relied on “mainstream culture” (zhuliu 
wenhua), namely Confucianism, but had rejected it fiercely. Nevertheless, since the 
“mainstream culture” was the collective experience of a people grown in response to 
challenges, and since it represented the “national character” (guoxing) of a nation, it was 
particularly useful to strengthen legitimacy.237 Since 1949, both Chinese nationalism 
and patriotism had drawn from marginal cultural elements, such as the wisdom of the 
lower classes, anti-imperialism, or scientific and technological achievements. The 
cohesion force of this patriotism was limited, but for the period before the economic 
reforms, it had been sufficient. With the start of economic reform since 1978, however, 
it had become inadequate.238 Here, we can find some similarities with official ideology, 
in which tradition was also utilized to complement socialism. Xiao pledged allegiance 
to socialism by stressing his adherence to the “Four Cardinal Principles.” Nevertheless, 
he also noted that the principles had changed in relation to the realities of the reform 
era: the “socialist road” had become “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” the 
“leadership of the party” was in fact the leadership to push reforms, and the “thought of 
Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong” had turned into “practice as the sole criterion for 
truth.”239
235 Xiao Gongqin, “‘Yan Fu beilun’ yu jindai baoshou zhuyi biangeguan,” XGJ, 18-41. The 
article was originally published in Zhongguo yanjiu 1996:6. Excerpts of the article have been 
translated in CLG 30:6 (November-December 1997), 64-76.
236 Xiao Gongqin, “Minzu zhuyi yu Zhongguo zhuanxing shiqi de yishi xingtai,” XGJ, 350-358.
Originally published in ZYG 1994:4. Quote from 351.
237 Ibid., 352.
238 On economic performance as a source of legitimacy, see for example Chen Feng’s article 
“The Dilemmas of Eudaemonic Legitimacy in Post-Mao China,” Polity 29:3 (1997), 421-440.
239 Zhongguo shibao zhoukan bianji, “Dalu xin baoshou zhuyi” (xia), 98.
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Xiao Gongqin claimed that his “neo-conservatism” was rooted in his criticism of 
“radicalism.” He distinguished between three kinds of “radicalism,” namely “mental 
radicalism” (xintaishang de jijin zhuyi), “system determinism” (zhidu juedinglun) and 
“political romanticism” (zhengzhi langman zhuyi). 240 The first type,  “mental 
radicalism,” stood for reform plans based on a sense of anxiety instead of on a realistic 
assessment of affairs, which resulted in rash and impetuous action. This type of 
“radicalism” often manifested itself in times of crisis, when those who resorted to 
sudden action used it to obtain peace of mind. As Xiao explained it: 
In reality, this “mental” radicalism implies that when people demand a bold and 
resolute destruction of the old order and the old systems, and when they demand the 
import of new systems through swift and violent battle-style methods that seek to 
accomplish the task in one stroke, subconsciously, they often consider this way of 
doing things to be a strategy for psychological balance and self-comfort.241
“System determinism” was “radical” in that it advocated the import of Western systems 
without taking into account that every institution or system was the product of a long 
process of social and historical growth. 242 According to Xiao Gongqin, if one 
transplanted a system without the supporting elements of the society of which it was the 
product, the result in another context would be different; it might even lead to social 
disorder. Xiao described this type of “radicalism” as follows:
In the West, a certain system A produces a certain effect B. For this kind of causal 
relation, it is necessary that a number of social, economic, and cultural elements 
internal to society function as supporting conditions.  When people, in order to obtain 
the effect described above in China, import a certain Western system in isolation, then, 
because Chinese society lacks the relevant Western social supporting conditions, the 
240 Xiao Gongqin, “Zixu,” XGJ, 9.
241 Xiao Gongqin, “Lishi jujue langman: Zhongguo gaige di’er sichao de jueqi,” XGJ, 109-122. 
Quote from 115. The article also appeared in Zhongguo xiandaihua yanjiu, 9 December 1994. 
An abstract was published in Beijing qingnian bao, 19 January 1992, 6. A revised translation 
can be found in CLG 30:6 (Nov-dec 1997), 77-88.
242 In an ironic twist of fate, the New Left intellectual Cui Zhiyuan has used a similar term for 
radically different purposes, namely “institutional fetishism” (zhidu baiwujiao). Like Xiao 
Gongqin, Cui Zhiyuan has applied this term to refer to the equation of institutions with abstract 
ideals without taking into account specific contexts. See Cui Zhiyuan, “Zhidu chuangxin yu 
di’erci sixiang jiefang,” EYS 8 (August 1994), 5-16.
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outcome will not only be that it is impossible to produce the causal relation between 
system A and effect B, but also—because the original old system has already been 
artificially destroyed, and because the new system lacks the supporting conditions and 
cannot be established or operate—that the new and old systems are both unable to
carry out the integration of the social order. The result of this is that an increasingly 
severe loss of order and various “landslide effects” might emerge.243
Finally, “political romanticism” implied a notion of reform based on abstract principles 
and blueprint designs of society, as in French revolutionary rationalism. This type failed 
because it ignored the particular and the historically grown. 
Under the effect of aspirations and projections, people with this mentality are often 
likely to regard certain principles that are considered “naturally reasonable” abstract 
principles, utopian-style “natural laws,” or transcendent “first moral principles” as the 
basis for the reconstruction of the social order. The reason why this trend is called 
“idealism” is that those who hold this kind of ideas profoundly believe that history can 
be reconstructed or transformed according to certain a priori and self-explanatory 
logical ideas—just like engineers design products—and that it is unnecessary to take 
into account the empirical facts of history proper.244
Although Xiao Gongqin did not mention Karl Popper here, the perceived link between 
“radicalism” and “romanticism” and the very imagery of the engineer in connection 
with social reform were two elements present in Karl Popper’s The Open Society and Its 
Enemies.245
243 Xiao Gongqin, “Lishi jujue langman,” 116.
244 Ibid., 117.
245 See Popper, The Open Society, Vol. 1, “Chapter nine: Aestheticism, Perfectionism, 
Utopianism,” 157-168.
Whereas Xiao Gongqin’s “radicalism” implicitly referred to the political 
liberalism of the late 1980s in particular, it also exceeded a concrete political content. It 
entailed certain goals and means of action dominated by a priori principles, utopianism, 
and abstract rationalism. In accordance with this rejection of abstract principles and 
utopian projections, Xiao underscored the weight of the historical growth of institutions 
and the particular contexts in which they had been shaped. In Western research on the 
topic, though, this more abstract dimension of Xiao’s conception of “radicalism” has 
been ignored. For example, Chen Feng has argued that there was an ironic twist in 
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Xiao’s usage of “rationalist radicalism”: whereas Western scholars had employed the 
term before to attack “radical communist programmes,” Xiao directed it at a “capitalist 
utopia,” or, at  “an attempt at a total change of China along Western lines.”246
Then again, Cheng Feng was not entirely mistaken. If one only takes into 
account how Xiao Gongqin’s theory was utilized in the Chinese media, the 
identification of “radicalism” with a concrete political content seems correct. In the 
media, Xiao’s theory was presented as a theory of gradual reform that avoided both 
Leftist and liberal extremism. Apart from Xiao’s article on Yan Fu in the China Youth 
Daily, several other of Xiao’s articles were published in both Beijing Youth Daily and 
China Youth Daily.
For Chen 
Feng, Xiao’s “radicalism” was “democratic radicalism”; the term was reduced to a 
concrete political content. 
247 Xiao was also mentioned in a book entitled The Third Generation 
of the PRC (Gongheguo de di sandai), which contained an introduction by propagandist 
Yuan Mu.248 The book included a section on “radicalism,” in which author Yang Fan, a 
Beijing-based economist, defined it along these lines: 
So-called “radicalism” is a kind of thing that is similar to “leftist” opportunism. It is 
characterized by subjective aspirations that transcend objective reality; it hopes to 
develop China through exceeding stages and with increasing speed. (…) During the era 
of reform and opening up, radicalism manifests itself in two trends of thought. The first 
one is “the trend of thought of extreme democratization,” which manifests itself 
politically in bourgeois liberalization; the second one is “the trend of thought of 
returning to the ancients and remembering the past,” which manifests itself politically 
in the opposition to modernization.249
Yang Fan explained that the trend of “extreme democratization” considered the Western 
model of multiple parties, private property, and a market economy its ideal, whereas the 
246 Chen, “Neoconservative Political Thought,” 599.
247 Articles by Xiao Gongqin appeared in Beijing qingnianbao, 4 September 1990, 4; Beijing 
qingnian bao, 19 January 1992, 6 (extended version appeared in XGJ, 109-122 and in Zhongguo 
xiandaihua yanjiu 12 (1994); and in Beijing qingnianbao, 13 May 1993, 3 (an extended version 
appeared in XGJ, 123-139).
248 Yang Fan, Gongheguo de di sandai (Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1991). 
249 Ibid., 187. The author also mentioned two other manifestations of “radicalism” that predated 
the reform era, namely the “trend of thought of blood lineage theory” (xuetonglun sichao) and 
the “trend of thought of the rebel factions” (zaofanpai sichao) of the Cultural Revolution era. 
They are described in chapter two of the book. 
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trend of “returning to the ancients and remembering the past” was rooted in “peasant-
style utopia” and populism. The convergence of these two trends, then, had formed the 
intellectual basis of the “June fourth incident.” Both manifestations of “radicalism” 
were marked by the ignorance of China’s “national conditions,” by a subjective 
mentality divorced from reality, by ideal models, by praising virtue over history, by 
“overcorrection,” by the philosophy of struggle, by a stress on oppositions, and by the 
appraisal of revolution at the expense of reform. 
The author further mentioned that The Third Generation of the PRC was a 
defense of “gradualism” (wenjin zhuyi) against both conservatives and liberals within 
the Party, and it was here that he invoked Xiao Gongqin. According to Yang Fan, Xiao 
distinguished “gradualism” from “conservatism”; the basic difference between the two 
was that “conservatives” identified with traditional value symbol systems, whereas 
“gradualists” “merely considered these traditional value symbols, principles and rules, 
along with the traditional authority form, to be levers that were indispensable for 
orderly evolution and economic reform.”250
250 Yang Fan, Gongheguo de di sandai, 251-255. Quote from 255.
As regards Xiao Gongqin’s theory of “neo-conservatism” and the way it was 
presented in the official media, several things can be noted. Firstly, whereas Xiao’s 
“radicalism” clearly also referred to certain goals and means of action—namely, 
blueprint designs, utopianism, and abstract rationalism—in the official media, 
“radicalism” was merely associated with Old Leftism and liberalism. Secondly, by 
including the Leftists in the camp of “radicalism,” “gradualism” could be presented as a 
“middle road” in between Old Leftists and liberal reformers. Here, we can see that the 
view of “neo-conservatism” as presented in European and American accounts does 
indeed apply to the theory as it was presented in official media. But, as will be argued 
further, this was only one side of the story. Thirdly, from the propagandists’ point of 
view, “conservatism” was a dangerous term because it implied the identification with 
traditional elements, whereas “gradualism” could be presented as a strategy in which 
traditional elements only functioned as a means for political stability. Consequently, the 
term “neo-conservatism” was replaced with the more neutral term “neo-gradualism.” 
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2.6.2 “Radicalism” and “Neo-conservatism” in “Realistic Responses”
The “banner” of “neo-conservatism” was also raised in the policy paper “Realistic 
Responses and Strategic Options for China after the Soviet Coup” (Sulian jubian zhihou 
Zhongguo de xianshi yingdui yu zhanlüe xuanze), a document that has been attributed to 
the relatives of high officials referred to as the “princelings” (taizidang). 251 The 
document was published by the Ideology and Theory Department of Zhongguo 
qingnian bao (China Youth Daily)—the same organ that had organized the conference 
at which Xiao Gongqin had coined the theory of “neo-conservatism” one year earlier—
on September 9, 1991.252
“Realistic Responses” was a response to the Soviet Coup that had taken place in 
August of the same year, a coup during which communist “hardliners,” including the 
heads of the KGB, army, and police, had plotted against the president of the Soviet 
Union, Mikhail Gorbachev. 253
Despite the official background of “Realistic Responses”—the China Youth 
Daily is a research department within the central office of the CCP’s Youth League—
the document was only published informally; it never appeared in official Party 
journals. Overseas Chinese critics have attributed this to the fact that an official 
publication would be tantamount to publicly admitting the Party’s “ideological 
bankruptcy.”
Yet the President of the Russian Federation, Boris 
Yeltsin, managed to rally the people against the plotters and mass demonstrations 
followed. Although order was restored and the plotters were arrested by August 21, the 
putsch had exposed the cracks in the Soviet ideology and it brought Boris Yeltsin to the 
foreground. The coup was of great importance because it was the prelude to the end of 
the Soviet Communist Party and the USSR. 
254
251 The document first circulated internally as a publication of the Ideology and Theory section 
of China Youth Daily (Zhongguo qingnian bao). After it had leaked, however, it was published 
in the New York-based democratic liberal Chinese journal Zhongguo zhi chun (China Spring) 1 
(January 1992), 35-39. An English translation of the document can be found in CLG 29:2 
(March-April 1996), 13-31. This theme issue on the document “Realistic Responses” also 
contains translations of liberal democratic criticism by overseas Chinese intellectuals.
252 Fewsmith, “Neoconservatism,” 642. 
The alleged author of the document was the head of the Ideology and 
Theory Department of China Youth Daily, Yang Ping, but it has also been related to the 
princelings Chen Yuan and Pan Yue, as well as to Wang Xiaodong, who later became 
253 On the Soviet coup, see Michael Mandelbaum, “Coup de Grace: The End of the Soviet 
Union,” Foreign Affairs 71:1 (1992), 164-183; John B. Dunlop, “The August 1991 Coup and Its 
Impact on Soviet Politics,” Journal of Cold War Studies 5:1 (Winter 2003), 94-127.
254 Hu Ping, “Program of CCP Heirs,” 36.
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the editor of the journal Strategy and Management.255 In brief, one could use the words 
of critic Hu Ping to summarize the nature of the document: it had an “obviously official 
background,” but no “official affiliation.”256
The influence of Chen Yuan, a graduate of Qinghua University and the vice-
governor of the People’s Bank of China,257 can be discerned in the document in the 
form of a critique of the “radical reform” in the Soviet Union. Since the late 1980s, 
Chen Yuan had gathered a group of “largely conservative economists and social 
scientists” around him in the “Beijing Young Economists Association.” 258 Already 
before the coup, Chen Yuan had emphasized that planning and centralization were 
crucial with regard to economic reform.259 Chen Yuan had also criticized reform in both 
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe because it went hand in hand with social, 
economic, and political instability. Instead, Chen Yuan argued for gradual and stable 
reform; he found an example of this in the reform policies of premier Li Peng.260
“Realistic Responses” outlined the tasks that China needed to carry out in order 
to avoid the same fate as the Soviet Union. It predicted that the Soviet Union would 
255 According to one source, Yang Ping wrote the document together with China Youth Daily
deputy editor Pan Yue, the son-in-law of general Liu Huaqing, who was the vice-chairman of 
the Central Military Commission (CMC), and a Politburo member. According to another 
source, Yang Ping based the document on a speech delivered at a 1990 conference. Among the 
attendants of the 1990 conference that reportedly led to the document “Realistic Responses” 
were Jiang Hong and Tang Ruoxi. Jiang Hong worked for the Beijing Municipality Policy 
Research Department at the time. Tang Ruoxi established the Rural Research Institute together 
with Deng Yingtao, the son of Deng Liqun, and was involved in the reform policy of the SEZ 
Shekou. Chen Yuan was the son of Chen Yun, the chairman of the Central Advisory 
Commission (CAC).
256 Hu Ping, “Program of CCP Heirs,” 36.
257 Zhao Ziyang had given Chen Yuan this post after he had lost the 1987 “elections” to the 
Beijing Party Committee. See China Since Tiananmen, 84.  See also Lam, “China’s ‘Gang of 
Princelings,’” 1.
258 Lam, “Chen’s Son Bids to Expand Power Base,” 11. This group, which was also dubbed 
“Chen’s club,” included scholars from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), 
scholars and cadres from the Research Office of the Communist Party Central Committee, and 
members of a former think tank under the State Council, namely the Chinese Economic System 
Reform Research Institute (CESRRI). The former director of this now dysfunctional institute 
was Chen Yizi, one of the persons allegedly associated with the “northern” school of “neo-
authoritarianism.” Other princelings in the group included Deng Yingtao, Tang Ruoxi, and Du 
Ying, the nephew of Hu Qiaomu.
259 Fewsmith mentions two papers that Chen Yuan presented on this topic. One dates from 1987 
and was entitled “Report on the Stages of the Socialist Economic Operating Mechanism.” The 
second paper, presented in 1990, was entitled “China’s Deep-Seated Economic Problems and 
Choices: Several Issues Regarding China’s Economic Development Situation and the Operating 
Mechanism (Outline).” See Fewsmith, China Since Tiananmen, 84-85.
260 Kwan, “Stability Put Before Reform,” 12.
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witness a rise of “racial nationalism.”261 On an international level, the document warned 
against the “collective hegemony of the West.” 262 Within China, instability and 
separatist minority forces would increase, and the battle over radical versus gradual 
reform would recommence. Nonetheless, the authors noted that there were important 
differences between China and the Soviet Union, which meant that reaction should not 
be too fierce.263
The document went on to describe the deeper cause of the Soviet and Eastern 
European upheavals as “utopian capitalism” (kongxiang ziben zhuyi) in the people’s 
mode of thought.
These concerns already indicate that the document focused more on 
policy issues—such as economic reform, unity, and the transnational question of 
China’s location in the world—than Xiao Gongqin’s “neo-conservatism” did. Xiao 
Gongqin’s theory was coined in response to the problems of reform and the political 
liberalism of the late 1980s; Xiao analyzed these issues from an academic perspective. 
“Realistic responses,” on the contrary, was a more practical and immediate response to 
the Soviet Coup of August 1991.  
264 It further criticized the economic “shock therapies” (xiuke liaofa) of 
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, which were “radical reform plans” based on 
abstract blueprints and revolutionary methods that ignored the gradual nature of 
reform. 265 Apart from “utopian capitalism,” the authors also discerned “utopian 
socialism” (kongxiang shehui zhuyi), which they described as follows: “Its mode of 
thought is concretely manifested in thinking that as soon as some perfect system has 
been established, all other problems will be readily solved.” 266
261 Zhongguo qingnianbao sixiang lilunbu, “Yingdui yu xuanze,” 35. This claim needs to be 
understood against the background of demonstrations in Tibet and Xinjiang in March 1989 and 
April 1990, respectively.
262 Ibid.
263 The main differences were: that economic reforms were more successful and had reached a 
higher stage in China; that ethnic minorities constituted less than five percent of the population 
in China, versus about fifty percent in the Soviet Union; that there were relatively more 
educated people in the Soviet Union than in China, where peasants made up eighty percent of 
the population; that the Soviet Union had been “transformed into a Western country” due to 
Western influence, as opposed to China; and that in China, contrary to the situation in the Soviet 
Union, the first generation of revolutionary leaders, among them Chen Yun and Deng Xiaoping, 
still left its imprint on policy. 
264 Zhongguo qingnianbao sixiang lilunbu, “Yingdui yu xuanze,” 36.
265 Ibid.
266 Ibid.
The authors further 
criticized the “utopian socialism” manifested in the Great Leap Forward (1958-1961) 
and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). 
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The “realistic responses” and “strategic options” that the authors proposed, then, 
were several. The CCP should be transformed from a “revolutionary party” 
(gemingdang) into a “ruling party” (zhizhengdang) in response to the state of socialist 
construction.267 The party should not underline class struggle during the construction 
phase; “populism” and mass movements should be avoided. The reason for this was that 
reforms, as Huntington had phrased it, were often “the forerunner of revolution.”268
In order to counterattack “socialist liberalization,” and, at the same time, in order to 
eliminate the radicalism, romanticism, and irrationalism within the bourgeois camp, 
many bourgeois scholars came out in defense of the capitalist system. For example, 
Russell, Popper, von Hayek, and others epitomize Western rationalist philosophy and 
science. They played a significant role in eliminating “countercharge” mechanisms and 
radical aspects from the bourgeois system, and they provided a new theoretical basis 
for the transformation of the bourgeoisie from a revolutionary to a ruling party, and for 
the safeguarding of the capitalist system. A socialist political party is essentially 
different from the bourgeoisie, but at the stage of holding power, they face many
common problems, such as, for example, social stability, gradual reform, and the 
like.
The 
socialist party could learn from the experience of “bourgeois political parties” for its 
transformation:
269
The document further addressed changes on the ideological level, where transformation 
required the “creative interpretation” of “socialism with Chinese characteristics.” Given 
the fact that one of the sources of legitimacy of the CCP, namely the October 
Revolution of 1917, had dried out with the end of the Soviet Communist Party, there 
was only one source left, namely the “socialism with Chinese characteristics” that had
been favored by Mao Zedong. The authors argued that the latter had to be reinterpreted 
with a stress on China’s “particular national conditions” (teshu de guoqing). China was 
a huge, populous, and long-term oppressed country, which determined “that only
socialism can save China and only socialism can develop China.” 270
267 Ibid.
268 Ibid. 
269 Ibid., 36-37.
270 Ibid., 37.
Thirdly, these 
“national conditions” also dictated that gradual reform based on realism (xianshi zhuyi)
68
and rationalism (lixing zhuyi) was the only way to carry out the process of “reform and
opening up.” Gradual reform should draw from two things: (1) “neo-conservatism” in 
the history of reform of modern China” and (2) Western rationalism.271
By neo-conservatism, we mean a view of reform that differs from that of the traditional 
die-hard conservative forces. It stands for the use of rational elements in the traditional 
and current orders, and for the gradual introduction of the rational elements in Western 
systems in order to realize China’s modernization. Western rationalist philosophy 
refers to a school [of philosophy] different from romanticist and irrationalist 
philosophy. It stands for proof, instrumental rationality, and orderly, gradual 
advancement. It opposes romanticism and violence, as well as the anti-order, anti-
society, and anti-culture conduct of irrationalism. Neo-conservatism and Western 
rationalist philosophy have always existed in opposition to radicalism (…).
The document 
said:
272
Another element mentioned by the authors was the importance of nationalism, 
patriotism, and national interest in the struggle against “peaceful evolution.”273 Also, 
China’s interests, its socialist system, and its modernization could be safeguarded by the 
“creative transformation of traditional Chinese culture.”274
The authors further argued that the “romantic reform view” (langman zhuyi 
gaigeguan) that wanted to “solve problems from the very basics” and the “mentality of 
deep-level reform” (shencengci gaige silu), according to which the issue of ownership 
was the crux to solving problems of reform, should be done away with.
The Confucian tradition of 
collectivism and altruism in the field of ethics, its “this-worldly spirit” of common 
responsibility, and its “heroic manner of man” should be used as a “source of values” in 
the process of socialist modernization. In the economic sphere, the “radical reform 
view” (jijin de gaigeguan) should be refused, because a change in the relations of 
production could possibly intensify the contradictions within the system and weaken the 
control of the central government. 
275
271 Ibid.
272 Ibid.
273 Ibid.
274 Ibid.
275 Ibid., 38.
Changing 
Mao Zedong’s famous dictum that “power comes from the barrel of a gun,” the authors 
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stated: “The CCP must grasp not only the gun but also the asset economy.”276 For the 
authors, government and enterprise should be separated strictly, but Party and
government should only be separated up to a certain degree. 277 Finally, the authors 
insisted that a policy based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and “national 
interest” should take the place of a foreign policy guided by moral principles and
ideology.278 A “greater Chinese cultural and economic sphere” should be founded in 
response to the emergence of regional economic blocs. China should cooperate 
economically with those areas in Asia that had “the same culture and the same race” 
(tongwen tongzhong) as the Chinese.279
Since there was no open debate on “neo-conservatism” on the mainland, the 
only dissenting voices that could be heard were those of liberal democrats in Hong 
Kong or the United States. Some denounced the document as a program of fascism.280
Others stressed that the agenda of Party ownership was irreconcilable with the idea of a 
“Third Way” in between capitalism and socialism; the program was nothing but a 
reflection of Party interests.281 In this respect, the program offered nothing new; it partly 
supported Chen Yun’s “birdcage economy” and it partly supported Deng Xiaoping.282
Still others claimed that in essence, “neo-conservatism” did not differ from the “old 
Stalinist dogma”—like father, like son. 283
276 Ibid.
277 Ibid. There were four reasons why the princelings recommended CCP ownership of assets: 
(1) the CCP was most closely linked with the “process of economic movement”; (2) conflicts 
between the functions of managers/supervisors and asset owners could be avoided; (3) it helped 
to attain stability and advanced political reform because the Party would be an interest group 
separated from the government; (4) it was easy to carry out.
278 Ibid. Zhou Enlai coined the “Five Principes of Peaceful Coexistence” at the 1955 Bandung 
Conference. The principles were: mutual respect for territorial sovereignty, mutual 
nonaggression, mutual noninterference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and 
peaceful coexistence.
279 Ibid.
280 See, for example Su Wei, “Yifen taizi dang jiebian de baipishu,” Zhongguo zhi chun 1
(January 1992), 28-29. Translated in CLG 29:2 (March-April 1996), 58-51; Zhao Yuesheng, 
“Xin faxisi zhuyi de xuanyan,” Zhongguo zhi chun 1 (January 1992), 29-30. Translated in CLG 
29:2 (March-April 1996), 52-54.
281 Lu Wei, “Taizidang paozhi ‘shizheng gangling’ shimo,” Qianshao 2 (February 1992), 92-93. 
Originally published in Xin bao, 16 January 1992. Translated in CLG 29:2 (March-April 1996), 
32-34.
282 Chen Kuide, “Wangchao mori de xinzheng,” Zhongguo zhi chun 1 (January 1992), 24-25. 
Translated in CLG 29:2 (March-April 1996), 38-41.
283 Ruan Ming, “Cong xin quanwei zhuyi dao xin baoshou zhuyi,” Kaifang Zazhi, February 
1992, 28-32. Translated in CLG 29:2 (March-April 1996), 58-70. Quote from page 64.
Moreover, the CCP’s resistance against
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“peaceful evolution” was useless.284 Conversely, other critics pointed at the new aspects 
of “neo-conservatism”: it was an attempt at formulating a new theory in times of “the 
ideological bankruptcy of the CCP.”285 Seen from this point of view, the document 
urged a shift from a “revolutionary” to a “ruling” party and already manifested this shift 
in terms of language.286 As to the lack of a concrete time schedule for democracy, one 
critic stated: “If this speed is maintained at the same rate as that which can be reached 
by the mainland government, then new conservatism might as well set up office in Li 
Peng’s toilet.”287 Other criticisms were that “neo-conservatism” did not prescribe how 
to avoid an arbitrary authority, that it remained vague on how to achieve democracy, 
that it was elitist, that it wrongly reduced corruption and bureaucracy to problems of 
individual behavior, and that it placed too much stress on the political and economic 
orders and stability.288
2.6.3 A Comparison between Xiao Gongqin and “Realistic Responses”
As already noted, the main overall distinction between Xiao’s “neo-conservatism” and 
the term as it was used in “Realistic Responses” was that the former was coined in the 
context of the political instability following the repression of the Tiananmen Square 
demonstrations in June 1989, whereas the latter was a response to both the decline of 
socialism in the international arena and the dangers of rapid economic reform. Since 
“Realistic Responses” was formulated in response to an external threat that could have 
serious consequences for China, it was notable for its advocacy of Realpolitik. On the 
other hand, since Xiao Gongqin reacted mostly to internal threats related to quick 
political liberalization, he was more concerned with conflicts within the Chinese 
system. Moreover, Xiao Gongqin was a humanistic scholar working for a university, 
284 Xue Wei, “Heping yanbian bu ke zudang,” in Zhongguo zhi chun 1 (January 1992), 26. 
Translated in CLG 29:2 (March-April 1996), 42-43.
285 Hu Ping, “Bitan Zhonggong jiebanren de gangling: ruhe kandai ‘yingdui yu xuanze,’” 
Zhongguo zhi chun 1 (January 1992), 23-24. Translated in CLG 29:2 (March-April 1996), 35-
37.
286 Ding Chu, “Cong ‘yi’ dao ‘li’ de zhanlüe zhanbian,” Zhongguo zhi chun 1 (January 1992), 
30-31. Translated in CLG 29:2 (March-April 1996), 55-57. Quotes from pages 55-56.
287 Wang Zhaojun, “New Conservatism,” 96.
288 Yin Huimin, “Xin baoshou zhuyi yu Zhongguo qianjing,” Jiushi niandai 4 (April 1993), 86-
88. Translated in CLG 29:2 (March-April 1996), 77-81; Ruan Ming, “Cong xin quanwei zhuyi 
dao xin baoshou zhuyi,” 58-70; Wang Zhaojun, “Xin baoshou zhuyi yu dalu zhishi fenzi,” 
Zhongguo luntan 21 (July 1, 1992), 106-114. Translated in CLG 29:2 (March-April 1996), 83-
96.
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whereas the princelings were technocratic intellectuals close to the power center. It is 
evident that the latter were more concerned with the future of the CCP and its 
preservation of power in particular. 
Xiao Gongqin’s own view on the relation between “Realistic Responses” and 
his “neo-conservatism” was that there were both important similarities and 
dissimilarities. The two overlapped in the sense that both examined the impact of 
“radicalism” on the PRC, and both criticized the Cultural Revolution and Mao Zedong’s 
policies from the perspective of the preservation of stability. Xiao added, however, that 
the authors behind “Realistic Responses” started from class interests (jieji liyi)—the 
interests of the “offspring of the revolution,” whose “empire” was threatened by 
“radicalism”—whereas his own underlying concerns were related to China’s “national 
interests” (minzu de liyi). 289
Apart from Xiao Gongqin’s own views on the differences between the two 
references to “neo-conservatism,” what can be said if we compare them? Firstly, Xiao 
Gongqin and the princelings had a different conception of the “counterconcept” of 
“radicalism.”  The princelings mentioned “radicalism” in the same breath with 
“romanticism” and “irrationalism.” Rationalism was a good thing; it was related to 
order, proof, and reason, whereas romanticism and irrationalism were linked with 
disorder. The princelings adhered to rationalism because they wanted to throw light on 
the rational and practical nature of the Party, in response to the utopian dominance of 
the Mao era.
Nevertheless, Xiao also stated that although the CCP 
should be cleared of its radical heritage, its continuity should not be questioned. 
290
More specifically, Xiao Gongqin and the princelings each talked about a 
different kind of rationalism: the princelings referred to rationalism (lixing zhuyi) as the 
opposite of “irrationalism” (fei lixing zhuyi); for them, it was about using the positive 
powers of reason instead of relying on emotions and “utopian ideals.” Xiao Gongqin 
applied the term in an epistemological sense; he referred to the philosophical tradition 
of rationalism (weili zhuyi), according to which knowledge is gained through reason. 
Xiao Gongqin discarded this tradition in favor of the tradition of empiricism (jingyan 
For Xiao Gongqin, on the other hand, “radicalism” was related to 
abstract rationalism; his “neo-conservatism” attempted to retreat from rationalism by 
focusing on the concrete and the historically grown nature of societies. 
289 Interview with Xiao Gongqin, Shanghai, August 4, 2006. 
290 Davies, Worrying about China, 168.
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zhuyi), which holds that knowledge is gained through experience. In accordance with 
conservative beliefs, Xiao Gongqin found fault with rationalism because he associated it 
with universalism and the ignorance of particular historical conditions. The princelings 
mentioned Bertrand Russell (1872-1970), Karl Popper (1902-1994), and Friedrich von 
Hayek (1899-1992) as representatives of “Western rationalism.” Russell was a logician 
and mathematician; Popper was a philosopher of science. Although von Hayek was not 
a rationalist in the strict sense, he dealt with the problem of the rational distribution of 
resources in an economy. 
A second important difference between Xiao Gongqin and the princelings 
concerns their economic advocacies. From the terminology used by the princelings, we 
can see that they still adhered to a Marxist framework; they disapproved of “radical” 
reform because it would change the relations of production. The princelings clearly 
associated market reforms with capitalism, whereas Xiao Gongqin was very much in 
favor of market reforms, as long as they were introduced in a gradual manner. 
Furthermore, whereas Xiao Gongqin subscribed to private ownership and the 
depoliticization of economics, the princelings argued that the Party should not give up 
its control over the economy; it should even become the owner of assets. Although the 
princelings upheld that the use of Western theories could be useful for the 
transformation of the CCP from a “revolutionary” into a “ruling” party, they still 
thought within a Marxist framework of “socialist” versus “bourgeois” thought and the 
“capitalist system.” 
A third point that can be noted is that Xiao Gongqin and the princelings invoked 
different foreign thinkers, something that will become more clear in the next chapter. 
Michael Sullivan is the only researcher who has analyzed how Western political thought 
has been re-appropriated for the formation of “neo-authoritarianism” and “neo-
conservatism.” As Sullivan has stated: “Once entering a different political-historical 
context, theory often plays a role in the transformation of that society and the theory 
itself is also recreated.” 291
According to Sullivan, Chinese “neo-conservatives” invoked Edmund Burke’s 
criticism of “radicalism” during the French Revolution to denounce the universal 
Sullivan has argued that Chinese “neo-conservatives” 
referred to Edmund Burke, Karl Popper, Paul Tillich (1886-1965), Alexis de 
Tocqueville (1805-1859), and Samuel Huntington. 
291 Sullivan, “Western Political Thought,” 79.
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models of liberal reform and democracy and to promote gradual change. Burke had not 
only criticized the destruction of the old, but also the usage of abstract universals. Burke 
was also useful for “neo-conservatives” because he had not opposed change—he had 
recommended gradual change, not a mere preservation of the status quo. 292
Sullivan has also argued that Chinese “neo-conservatives” invoked Karl Popper 
and the theologian Paul Tillich to criticize utopianism. Since the princelings were not 
concerned with the moral aspects of tradition, but only with its “rational” elements and 
how these could be used practically, they only referred to Popper in their denunciation 
of “utopianism,” “romanticism,” and “irrationalism.” The appropriation of Popper in the 
service of state interests was ironic in the sense that Popper had gone to great lengths to 
criticize Plato’s theories of justice and truth in his The Open Society and Its Enemies
precisely because they merely served the interests of the state.
As the 
analysis of “Realistic Responses” has revealed, this claim is only true for some “neo-
conservatives”; the princelings did not refer to Burke. As will be explored in the next
chapters, both Xiao Gongqin and other intellectuals used Burke to criticize the Cultural 
Revolution and to argue that gradual economic reform was needed. 
293
Sullivan has further noted that “neo-conservatives” championed the 
postponement of democracy by referring to Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in 
America (1835-1840). According to Tocqueville, political participation required a 
certain degree of economic development without which the people would fall prone to 
arbitrary rulers. Since the authors of “Realistic Responses,” in line with official policy, 
discarded the goal of democracy outright, they did not invoke Tocqueville. As will be 
discussed in the next chapters, though, other intellectuals did rely on Tocqueville to 
make this point. Finally, Sullivan has mentioned that “neo-conservatives” promoted 
political stability and authoritarianism through an interpretation of Samuel Huntington’s 
Political Order in Changing Societies (1968). The princelings referred to Huntington to 
argue that a stable environment was needed for reform, since reform might lead to 
instability and even revolution. In the next chapter, Xiao Gongqin’s use of Huntington 
The staunch liberal 
Popper, whose major concern had been the foundation of democratic policy, was now 
put to use as a means to strengthen the legitimacy of the CCP. 
292 Ibid., 86.
293 The first volume of Popper’s The Open Society and Its Enemies is entirely dedicated to a 
criticism of Plato’s theories of justice and truth. See Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its 
Enemies, Vol. 1: The Spell of Plato (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1962).
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will be discussed in detail. What can be noted at this point is that the only common 
thinker referred to by Xiao Gongqin and the princelings was Samuel Huntington. 
From this comparison between the two most notable uses of the concept “neo-
conservatism” and the counterconcept of “radicalism” during the early 1990s, it can be 
concluded that there was a substantial difference between the two that is important 
concerning our question of whether “neo-conservatism” was in any sense linked to 
Burkean themes. Xiao Gongqin’s conception of both terms does reveal some Burkean 
traits at first sight: he referred to the notions of “growth” and “maturation”; he was 
critical of abstract principles; and he underscored the importance of context and the 
historically grown nature of institutions. “Realistic Responses,” on the contrary—
although it also emphasized the gradual nature of reform and although it denounced 
abstract blueprints models—upheld rationalism and discarded “irrationalism” and 
“romanticism” in a fashion that appeared to oppose Burkean notions of conservatism 
that were critical of the notion of rationalism. The princelings even referred to 
“instrumental rationality” and gradual “progress” in their description of “neo-
conservatism,” both of which indicate that their gradualism was a mere procedural 
gradualism that was supported for instrumental purposes.
2.7 THE CONTINUATION OF “NEO-AUTHORITARIANISM”?
The findings above indicate that “neo-conservatism” was not a unified theory. This also 
raises questions about the relation between “neo-conservatism” and the so-called theory 
of “neo-authoritarianism,” which was popular among Chinese intellectuals during the 
late 1980s. Researchers on Chinese “neo-conservatism” have agreed that “neo-
conservatism” was the “re-emergence,” “re-making,” or “reworking” of the political 
theory of “neo-authoritarianism.”294 Richard Baum has even gone as far as calling “neo-
conservatism” “a highly centralized, repressive variant of neo-authoritarianism.”295
294 See Fewsmith, China Since Tiananmen, 75; Schubert, “Was Ist Neokonservativismus?,” 59; 
Li, “Will Neo-conservatism Dominate?,” 32; Tsai, “Resistance to Political Modernization,” 7; 
Sullivan, “Western Political Thought,” 85; Fewsmith, “Neoconservatism,” 637; Chen, 
“Neoconservative Political Thought,” 593; Gu and Kelly, “New Conservatism,” 221; Lin, 
“Overview,” 70; McCormick and Kelly, “Limits of Anti-Liberalism”, 821-822; Sullivan, 
Democracy and Development, 324.
295 Baum, Burying Mao, 328.
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Both theories advocated strong rule, but the contexts in which this happened 
differed. During the late 1980s, as Kalpana Misra has phrased it, “the terms of 
discussion were largely set by radical reformers”; neo-authoritarians would thus stress 
that they had the same goals as liberal democrats.296 Yet during the early 1990s, the 
advocacy of authoritarian rule was not only related to the establishment of a market 
economy, but also to the prevention of political instability.297 However, both theories 
were a response to uncertainties amidst rapid socioeconomic change.298 As both Ma Shu 
Yun and Waterman have asserted, the elitist and gradualist strategy behind “neo-
authoritarianism” was conservative in nature. 299 Nevertheless, economically, “neo-
authoritarianism” moved away from orthodox Marxism and supported market 
mechanisms and privatization. From this perspective, as Ma Shu Yun has argued, “in 
terms of its demand for the replacement of public ownership with a market and private 
economy, it is perhaps the most radical doctrine that has ever been proposed in the 
history of Communist China.”300
Once again, it was Xiao Gongqin who reportedly first used the Chinese term for 
“neo-authoritarianism” (xin quanwei zhuyi) at an August 1988 conference on problems 
that Chinese intellectuals faced. Discussions on the topic of “neo-authoritarianism,” 
however, can be traced back to 1986.301 On the 1988 conference, Xiao Gongqin gave a 
speech on three choices that Chinese intellectuals had made in modern times concerning 
policy. These choices were policy renewal under the traditional system, “parliamentary 
romanticism,” and, finally, “neo-authoritarianism.” The latter, Xiao Gongqin explained, 
had a modernization orientation; through the “visible hand” of authoritarian rule, it 
created the “invisible hand” of the market economy and the conditions for democratic 
rule.302
296 Misra, “Neo-Maoism and Neo-Conservatism,” 147.
297 Ibid., 148. 
298 Gong and Chen, “Neo-Authoritarian Theory,” 84-85; Petracca and Xiong, “Chinese Neo-
Authoritarianism,” 1102.
299 Ma, “Rise and Fall,” 1-2; Waterman, “Which Way to Go?,” 14.
300 Ma, “Rise and Fall,” 16.
301 The conference was held at Beidaihe and organized by the World Economic Herald, China 
Youth News, the theoretical department of Guangming Daily, and the Xingzhi Institute. As to 
earlier manifestations of similar arguments, Zhang Bingjiu, for example, had used the term 
“semi-authoritarian” (banjiquan) in 1986. Also during the late 1980s, Wang Huning had argued 
in favor of a strong government and gradual democratization. 
302 Xiao Gongqin, “Zixu,” in YZLG, 6. One month after the conference, on September 8, 1988, a 
report on the conference appeared in Guangming Daily. According to Xiao Gongqin, this was 
the first time the term “neo-authoritarianism” was used in the Chinese media.
Xiao also presented his ideas on “neo-authoritarianism” to Jiang Zemin—the 
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Party Secretary of Shanghai at the time—at a bi-monthly gathering with intellectuals in 
November 1988.303
On January 16, 1989, an article by Wu Jiaxiang, an economist and researcher in 
the General Office of the Central Committee and an advisor to premier Zhao Ziyang, 
was published in the Shanghai newspaper World Economic Herald (Shijie jingji 
baodao). 304 Wu Jiaxiang argued that, in the transition from authoritarianism to 
democracy, an intermediate stage of “neo-authoritarianism” was needed. The latter 
would differ from the traditional form of authoritarianism because authority would be 
deployed for the development of individual freedom.305 One day later, Xiao Gongqin 
published his views in the Shanghai paper Wenhuibao.306 The debate that followed was 
an exchange between advocates of “neo-authoritarianism” and liberal democrats. 
Whereas the former, basing themselves on development models in East Asia, argued 
that economic reform had to predate political reform, the latter argued that, because 
China’s situation was special, political reform could not be postponed.307 As Sautman 
has noted, these two viewpoints mirrored debates on the topic among Western scholars 
during the 1960s and 1970s in the context of decolonization.308
The publication of the articles by Wu Jiaxiang and Xiao Gongqin in January 
1989 also marked the official launch of the so-called “northern” and “southern” schools 
With the repression of 
the Tiananmen Square demonstrations on June fourth, 1989, the debate ended abruptly. 
Nevertheless, since most supporters of immediate political liberalization fled abroad, 
the discussion continued outside mainland China.
303 Sullivan, “Western Political Thought,” 84.
304 More specifically, Wu Jiaxiang, who had studied economics at Peking University, was an 
associate researcher at the Policy Research Centre of the General Office of the Central 
Committee of the CCP (CCPCC). Wu Jiaxiang specialized in the modernization of property 
rights. See Sautman, “Neo-Authoritarianism,” 74, fn. 8. Wu’s article was entitled “Xin quanwei 
zhuyi shuping.” It was reprinted in Qi Mo, Xin quanwei zhuyi, 4-8, and in Liu Jun and Li Lin, 
Xin quanwei zhuyi, 34-38.
305 Fewsmith, China Since Tiananmen, 75-76.
306 Xiao Gongqin, Zhu Wei, “Tongku de liangnan xuanze: guanyu ‘xin quanwei zhuyi’ lilun 
dawenlu,” Wenhui bao, January 17, 1989. Reprinted in Qi Mo, Xin quanwei zhuyi, 13-19.
307 Critics of “neo-authoritarianism” included Qin Xiaoying, Gu Xin, Huang Wansheng, Zheng 
Yongnian, Rong Jian, Sun Hui, Yu Haocheng, Zhou Wenzhang, Zhang Zhonghou, Wang 
Yizhou, and Li Shengping. For an English translation of democratic criticism before 1989 by 
critics residing in China, see Chinese Sociology and Anthropology 23:4 (Summer 1991); for 
criticisms of democrats residing in the United States after Tiananmen, see ibid., 24:1 (Fall 
1991).
308 Sautman, “Neo-authoritarianism,” 96. Sautman refers to Michael Sahlin, who considered 
Gunnar Myrdal to embody arguments in favor of the theory, whereas Maurice Duverger 
represented the views of opponents.
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of “neo-authoritarianism,” whose spokesmen were located in Beijing and Shanghai
respectively. The “northern school,” of which the main proponents were Wu Jiaxiang, 
Chen Yizi, Zhang Bingjiu, and Yang Baikui, 309 and the “southern school” of Xiao 
Gongqin and Wang Huning differed over three issues: (1) the causes of China’s socio-
economic crises, (2) the issue of “state power,” and (3) the speed of economic 
reform. 310 For the “northern school,” the causes of the crisis were inflation and 
corruption, whereas the “southern school” attributed them to a “governmental authority 
crisis and the lack of autonomous societal organizations.” 311 The “northern school” 
wanted to adhere to state power to stabilize the market; state power could prevent the 
fragmentation of economic units and it could remove bureaucratic obstacles to reform. 
This would enable quick-paced reforms. The “southern school,” on the other hand, 
favored state power in order to gradually push reforms forward and to retain political 
stability. It further emphasized the importance of the development of an independent 
middle class and the need for continuity with China’s traditional culture.312
Another distinction between the two schools was that the “northern school” 
highlighted the universal applicability of “neo-authoritarianism,” whereas the “southern 
school” argued that the theory was only applicable to late-modernizing Third World 
countries in their early stages of modernization.313 The attempts of these countries to 
establish parliamentary democracies after decolonization had failed because of the “lack 
of internal factors for modernization.” 314 Finally, some members of the “northern” 
school—notably Wu Jiaxiang and Chen Yizi—were advisors to Zhao Ziyang, whereas 
the members of the “southern school” had no clear political affiliation at the time.315
309 Chen Yizi was the director of the Chinese Economic System Reform Research Institute 
(CESRRI) under the State Council. Zhang Bingjiu was a Ph.D. candidate at Peking University; 
Yang Baikui was a political scientist at CASS and a research assistant of the democrat Yan 
Jiaqi, who was heading the Political Science Institute at CASS at the time. Wang Huning was a 
Professor of International Politics at Fudan University. Wang Huning did not take part in the 
1989 debate. 
310 Sullivan, Democracy and Developmentalism, 247, 249, 257.
311 Ibid., 256. 
312 Ibid., 248-249 and 256-257.
313 Sautman, “Neo-authoritarianism,” 82, 88. See, for example, Xiao’s article “Quanwei yu 
minzhu: houfazhan guojia xiandaihua de liangnan xuanze,” XGJ 42-52. A different version of 
the same article appeared in Wenhuibao, January 17, 1989; see also Xiao Gongqin and Zhu 
Wei, “A Painful Dilemma,” 69, 76. 
314 Ibid., 69; Qi Mo, Xin quanwei zhuyi, 13.
315 At the time, because in 1995, Wang Huning became the head of the Political Section of the 
Central Committee’s Policy Research Office under Jiang Zemin.
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Xiao Gongqin also argued that he was more skeptical than the “northern school” 
about the democratic outcome of “neo-authoritarianism”—the theory might as well lead 
to a regression, depending on whether or not a strong middle class could be created.316
The fact that the traditional value system on which “neo-conservatism” drew was 
autocratic-oriented facilitated a regression; the personification of power in the figure of 
the “strongman” could lead to corruption and the mishandling of power. Xiao’s answer 
was that “checks and balances” should be built in to prevent a setback.317 Moreover, it 
was more likely that a relapse into “traditionalism” would take place in an early stage; 
with the “spread of modernization consciousness” and the “increase of the democratic 
consciousness of the populace,” the chances of a successful transition to democracy 
would increase.318 Because the presence of a strong middle class was a crucial factor in 
the transition to democracy, and because this class had been artificially destroyed 
during the planned economy, Xiao Gongqin stated: “China should take the path of 
modernization that fits its own conditions and that has its own characteristics.” 319
To indicate the weight of political stability, “neo-authoritarians” drew on 
Samuel Huntington’s 1968 book Political Order in Changing Societies, which was 
translated into Chinese in 1988.
Although Xiao Gongqin questioned the applicability of “neo-authoritarianism” to 
China, he indicated that it could be used as a reference and a source of inspiration. 
320 Huntington’s main thesis had been that “rapid social 
change and the rapid mobilization of new groups into politics coupled with the slow 
development of political institutions” would lead to political instability. 321
316 Sullivan, Democracy and Developmentalism, 246. In an interview, Xiao referred to the 
theory of “path dependency” in relation to the dilemma of “neo-authoritarianism.” Once the 
path of strong rule had been chosen, it was difficult to deviate from this path; the possibility of 
“degeneration” was hence always present.
317 Sautman, “Neo-Authoritarianism,” 86.
318 Xiao Gongqin and Zhu Wei, “A Painful Dilemma,” 74.
319 Ibid.
320 Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, London: Yale 
University Press, 1968). The most widely read translation of POCS was Li Shengping, Yang 
Yusheng et al., Biange shehui zhong de zhengzhi zhixu (Beijing: Huaxia chubanshe, 1988). It 
was part of the series Ershi shiji wenku, of which the main editor was Deng Pufang, the son of 
Deng Xiaoping. Some Chinese intellectuals had reportedly been familiarized with Huntington’s 
book as early as 1986, through study abroad or by reading the original version.
321 Huntington, POCS, 6.
In other 
words, economic development did not automatically lead to political stability, but 
could, especially in transitional stages, also lead to political disorder. As with other 
theories, though, Chinese intellectuals interpreted the theory according to their own 
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needs. According to Pye, “Huntington stressed political stability as rule by law and not 
as rule by a modernizing elite.” 322 Whereas Huntington had underscored both the 
importance of state action and the integration of social forces, Chinese intellectuals only 
concentrated on the former.323 Peter Moody has argued that Huntington’s point had 
been that economic and social modernization did not necessarily lead to democracy; in 
the initial stage of economic modernization, reform could lead to disorder. For Chinese 
intellectuals, on the contrary, Huntington’s theory was a theory of democratization, 
namely, to reach democracy, authoritarian rule had to come first.324
Different readings of the theory have led to a very diverse picture of “neo-
authoritarianism,” ranging from a tool in elitist struggles over reform to a continuation 
of advocacies of “enlightened despotism” and “political tutelage,” or an outgrowth of 
debates on democracy in previous decades.325 Sullivan has analyzed the debate as an 
“intellectual cum political” debate of which the political aspect was not restricted to a 
reform struggle between the factions of Zhao Ziyang and Deng Xiaoping, as is 
generally accepted.326 For Sullivan, the debate was also linked to an intra-Zhao Ziyang-
camp-struggle, namely that between Zhao Ziyang and Jiang Zemin.327
322 Sullivan, “Western Political Thought,” 82.
323 Ibid., 82-83.
324 Moody, Conservative Thought, 152-153. The relationship between economic and political 
development has been perceived of as a process of different stages. As Petracca and Xiong have 
pointed out, the most famous thesis in which economic growth and democratization were linked 
was Walt Rostow’s The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-communist Manifesto (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1960). Both the “Austrian school of economics,” represented by 
Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich von Hayek, and the “Chicago school of economics,” of which 
the most famous associate was Milton Friedman, argued that political freedom was the result of 
economic freedom in a democratic system. See Petracca and Xiong, “Chinese Neo-
Authoritarianism,” 1108, fn. 21.
325 Sullivan, Democracy and Developmentalism, 225. The first interpretation can be found in 
most articles on “neo-authoritarianism.” For an example of the second perspective, see Arthur 
Waldron’s “Warlordism Versus Federalism: The Revival of the Debate,” China Quarterly 121 
(March 1990), 116-128. Merle Goldman’s book Sowing the Seeds of Democracy (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994) represents the third interpretation. See ibid., 267, fn. 3-
5.
326 This view is supported by the fact that Wu Jiaxiang, the main advocate of the “northern 
school,” was a policy advisor to Zhao Ziyang. Sullivan, Democracy and Developmentalism,
236. On Wu’s political connections, see also Sautman, “Neo-Authoritarianism,” 74, fn. 8. On 
the political entanglements of the theory, see for example Ma, “Rise and Fall,” 5, 12-13; 
Petracca and Xiong, “Chinese Neo-Authoritarianism,” 1116; Sautman, “Neo-authoritarianism,” 
77, 89. Zhao Ziyang reportedly promoted “neo-authoritarianism” to Deng Xiaoping in March 
1989. See Sullivan, “Western Political Thought,” 80-82.
327 Sullivan, Democracy and Developmentalism, 230, 263-266.
It was also an 
intellectual debate because intellectuals explored non-Leninist development models 
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after the Cultural Revolution; they turned to the study of social and political aspects of 
modernization.328
2.8 CONCLUDING REMARKS
This brief overview demonstrates that “neo-authoritarianism” was no less a 
fragmented theory than “neo-conservatism” was. “Neo-conservatism” in general can be 
said to be a continuation of “neo-authoritarianism” only with respect to its stress on a 
strong central authority. Yet from an economic point of view, only Xiao Gongqin’s 
“neo-conservatism” was the continuation of “neo-authoritarianism.” Even this statement 
is only partly true, for Xiao Gongqin did not agree with the advocacies of the “northern 
school” of “neo-authoritarianism.” Both Xiao Gongqin’s “neo-conservatism” and the 
“southern school” of “neo-authoritarianism” advocated gradual modernization, the 
creation of a middle class, the introduction of market mechanisms, as well as the 
importance of central authority for social stability, in order to reach the final goal of 
democracy. A key element of both the “northern” and “southern” versions of “neo-
authoritarianism” was the advocacy of privatization and market mechanisms; the 
princelings’ “neo-conservatism” was not a continuation of this crucial aspect. Their 
controversial advocacy of Party ownership of assets and their association of market 
mechanisms with “capitalism” indicate that they were not concerned with the creation 
of a market economy or future democracy. Their program was designed to keep the 
CCP in power and to provide alternative means of legitimacy. 
In American and European research, only political scientists have analyzed the term 
“neo-conservatism”; they have related it to the struggle over economic reform between 
1989 and 1992. In this setting, “neo-conservatism” has been defined as a “middle 
position” between the Old Left and liberal factions; it has been associated with the 
themes of centralization, the advocacy of a strong state, nationalism, political stability, 
gradual reform, and the resort to traditional elements. Analysts have further asserted 
that “neo-conservatism” differed from official ideology in several important respects: it 
did not justify economic reform as a necessary step towards socialism, but made use of 
foreign theories instead; its reference to nationalism did not merely stand for loyalty to 
328 By the late 1980s, works by authors such as Daniel Bell, Cyril E. Black, Alex Inkeles, 
Barrington Moore, Jr., Talcott Parsons, W.W. Rostow, and Joseph Schumpeter had been 
translated into Chinese.
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the Party, but for loyalty to China as a country; and, finally, it did not oppose 
democracy as an eventual outcome of reform.
Nevertheless, none of these traits have revealed why Chinese intellectuals 
coined the particular term of “neo-conservatism” at the time. The themes that political 
scientists have identified with “neo-conservatism” were not specifically “conservative”; 
both centralization and nationalism—as in Wang Xiaodong, Sheng Hong, Wang Shan, 
and Wang Shaoguang, for example—were also Marxist themes. In American and 
European research, the term has been explained as a positional rather than a substantive 
concept: it has been interpreted as a defense of the status quo—the power of the CCP—
on different grounds, namely through the use of alternative resources, such as 
nationalism and Chinese tradition. Implicitly, the themes of centralization and ideology 
have been related to a defense of the interests of the CCP in particular. This positional 
interpretative framework left no room for the question of what was inherently 
“conservative” and “neo” about “neo-conservatism.”
Instead of merely locating the term within the political framework of the 
struggle over reform, it has been investigated whether Chinese “neo-conservatism” was 
in any way related to a conscious conservative position in which a return to tradition 
was not upheld for reasons of political legitimacy, but because tradition was the product 
of historical growth. For this reason, Chinese “neo-conservatism” has been compared to 
its American counterpart, which both contained Burkean elements and new traits that 
were the product of the interaction with a new context. As such, American “neo-
conservatism” was a good example of how the theory had both been linked to a 
conservative constellation that surpassed specific contexts and to a particular setting 
that had required a careful appropriation. It has been concluded that Chinese “neo-
conservatism” was in many respects the exact opposite of American “neo-
conservatism,” which opposed a strong state and which was convinced that American 
society faced a rampant moral crisis.
An important distinction between American and Chinese “neo-conservatives” 
was that the former did not invoke the term “neo-conservatism” to denote a reform 
program of their own making; in an American context, the term had first been used as a 
derogative label by political opponents. Because of this distinction, this chapter has 
attempted to move from the use of the term “neo-conservatism” in American and 
European research as a “label” for nationalist positions or advocacies of a strong state to 
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the use of the term as a “banner,” as one Chinese intellectual has phrased it. Two 
concrete usages of the concept have been studied, both of which have been analyzed in 
relation to the “counterconcept” of “radicalism.” The meaning of concept, as has been 
noted by the authors of the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, had been threefold in a 
German context. It had been given a concrete political content, or the content of the 
program of political parties, but it had also denoted certain means and goals of action, 
such as a priori goals, or the will to renew. 
Those Chinese intellectuals who made use of “neo-conservatism” as a banner, 
namely the Shanghai-based historian Xiao Gongqin and the offspring of officials known 
as princelings, both invoked the counterconcept of “radicalism” as part of a program of 
“neo-conservatism.” Xiao Gongqin, who coined the term “neo-conservatism” in 
December 1990, applied the term in the context of the advocacy of a gradual 
modernization program in which traditional elements would function as “levers.” Xiao 
Gongqin based his program for gradual modernization on a criticism of three kinds of 
“radicalism,” namely “mental radicalism,” “system determinism,” and “political 
romanticism.” Although Xiao Gongqin implicitly connected these types of “radicalism” 
with the concrete concept of instant democratization, they also referred to certain goals 
and means of action; Xiao cast aside abstract rationalism and a priori principles. This 
suggests that Xiao Gongqin’s “neo-conservatism” might have gone beyond a positional 
conservatism—Burkean conservatism also criticized abstract Enlightenment thought 
and first principles. In the Chinese media, though, Xiao’s thought was invoked to 
discard a “radicalism” that was related to both the Old Left and liberals. At this point, it 
can be concluded that we can at least suggest that Xiao’s “neo-conservatism” was more 
than a positional ideology on a Left-Right axis. 
The so-called princelings used the term “neo-conservatism” in the 1991 
document “Realistic Responses and Strategic Options for China after the Soviet Coup,” 
which was written in response to the Soviet Coup of August 1991.  For them, “neo-
conservatism” stood for a reform program based on rational elements in tradition and a 
rational philosophy that stood in contrast with “romanticism” and “irrationalism,” 
which were mentioned in the same breath with “radicalism.” From this, it can be seen 
that the princelings’ “neo-conservatism” was in fact in tension with Burkean 
conservatism, according to which the irrational and the romantic would be accepted 
precisely because they opposed abstract rationalism. Moreover, the princelings 
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advocated Party ownership of assets, which was not in accordance with Xiao Gongqin’s 
defense of market principles and the depoliticization of the economy. Given these 
differences between the uses of the term “neo-conservatism,” the general claim that 
“neo-conservatism” as such was the continuation of “neo-authoritarianism” has been 
contested.  Since the latter argued for a combination of economic privatization and rule 
by strongmen, only Xiao Gongqin’s “neo-conservatism” was a continuation of “neo-
authoritarianism”—and of the “southern school” in particular. The princelings’ 
advocacy of Party ownership of assets was in tension with the economic privatization 
that was promoted in “neo-authoritarianism.” 
A final point that needs to be made is that “neo-conservatism,” with its advocacy 
of political stability and gradual reform, was in fact already in contradiction with the 
logic of the revolution on which the legitimacy of the CCP was based. Consequently, 
the very usage of the term “radicalism” in support of stability was a double-edged 
sword. As long as it referred to the economic “shock therapies” of the Soviet Union and 
the political turmoil of the spring 1989 demonstrations on Tiananmen Square in the 
present, a denunciation of “radicalism” suited the interests of the CCP. Conversely, as 
soon as the concept of “radicalism” was projected into the past, it invaded the domain of 
the legitimacy of the CCP. As Feng Chen has noted on “neo-conservatism,” “[I]ts 
critique of radicalism, though aiming at stability and order, paradoxically poses a threat 
to the legitimacy of the central authority that grew out of a radical revolutionary 
tradition.” 329
329 Chen, “Neoconservative Political Thought,” 613.
In the following chapters, the consequences of the projection of 
“radicalism” into the past will be explored.
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3.
THE POLITICS OF HISTORY
XIAO GONGQIN’S “NEO-CONSERVATISM”
Natura non facit saltum.
GOTTFRIED W. LEIBNIZ
3.1 INTRODUCTION: FROM POLITICS TO HISTORY
As indicated in the previous chapter, at first sight, Xiao Gongqin’s “neo-conservatism”  
appeared to transcend a mere defense of the status quo on the basis of alternative 
resources such as nationalism and Chinese tradition—Xiao’s emphasis on aspects such 
as the “growth” of indigenous elements, as well as his condemnation of “radicalism” as 
abstract rationalism, suggested a concern with Burkean themes. Nevertheless, it was of 
course also possible that Xiao’s reference to “growth,” particular circumstances, and the 
historical nature of institutions did not serve conservative goals such as the preservation 
of the community; it might have been a rhetorical device to argue for a strong state and 
to oppose immediate democratization. However, instead of discarding the question 
altogether, this chapter will look deeper into the nature of Xiao’s reference to Burkean 
themes.
Apart from the Burkean factor in Xiao’s advocacies, another element that needs 
to be investigated is the fact that, as distinct from those behind “Realistic Responses,” 
Xiao projected his “radicalism” into modern Chinese history. In general, Xiao’s 
historical take has been either ignored or interpreted as a history in the service of 
politics. Nonetheless, since Xiao Gongqin was a historian, was it not possible that he 
identified with the concerns of “humanistic” Chinese intellectuals? This chapter will 
analyze the role of history in Xiao’s “neo-conservatism” in order to find out whether his 
flirtation with history was but a manifestation of the practice of “using the past to serve 
the present,” or whether there was more to the picture. 
In American and European research, it has been argued that Xiao’s reference to 
history was merely rhetorical. For example, on Xiao’s famous essay on Yan Fu, which 
will be analyzed later in this chapter, Gu Xin and David Kelly have stated: “While it is 
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couched as an essay in modern intellectual history, it is in fact a customary mode of 
expression for Xiao, as for many contemporary Chinese intellectuals, to deliver 
opinions through the mouths of historical personages.” 330 With this statement, they 
suggested that Xiao only employed the form of intellectual discourse, whereas in terms 
of content, his “neo-conservatism” did not differ from the manifestations discussed in 
the previous chapter.331
Any reference to a conservative outlook in which conservative goals are 
subscribed to on conservative grounds has been absent from research on Xiao Gongqin; 
he has not been associated with intellectual concerns, but with an explicitly political 
“neo-conservatism.” In spite of this, Gu and Kelly have claimed that Xiao was 
“concerned with three perennial sources of controversy among Chinese intellectuals,” 
namely the issue of gradualism versus radicalism, the role of traditional values in the 
modernization process, and the question of who was privileged by “the modernizing 
social force.” 332 In general, though, Xiao’s critique of “radicalism” has not been 
addressed in the context of intellectual concerns. Sullivan, for example, has excluded 
Xiao from the subgroup of “intellectual historians” who debated “radicalism” after a 
lecture on the “radicalization” of modern Chinese thought by the Princeton-based 
historian Yü Ying-shih in 1988, the subject of the following chapter.333
In accordance with this “political determinism”—an excessive stress on the 
political aspects of Xiao’s theory at the expense of other equally important traits—the 
focus has been on the “anti-liberal” aspects of Xiao’s thought and on “apologetic” 
interpretations of Xiao’s “neo-conservatism” as an expression of his surrender to “the 
Machiavellian ambition to whisper in the ear of the prince.”334 A plethora of sources 
have mentioned Xiao’s alignment with the government or with “neo-conservative-type 
elites,”335 have used a framework of anti-liberalism,336 have considered his work the 
“preparation” for “Realistic Responses,”337
330 Gu and Kelly, “New Conservatism,” 223.
331 Ibid., 221.
332 Ibid.
333 Sullivan, “Western Political Thought,” 84.
334 Walzer, Interpretation and Social Criticism, 60.
335 Sullivan, Democracy and Developmentalism, 347; Lin, “Overview,” 70; Meissner, “New 
Intellectual Currents,” 19. 
336 McCormick and Kelly, “The Limits of Anti-Liberalism,” 804-831.
337 Tsai, “Mainland China’s Resistance,” 7-8.
or have criticized his authoritarian form of 
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“Maistrian” conservatism. 338 Others have merely studied him as a “cultural 
nationalist,” as a “political conservative,” or as both.339 Nevertheless, Chen Feng has 
noted: “It is important to point out that, although the following analysis is confined to 
its political dimensions, neoconservative ideas, unlike the neo-authoritarian debate, go 
beyond the political domain. (…) Their cultural ramifications, however, deserve a 
separate study.”340
Xiao Gongqin regretted the fact that an overseas scholar called “neo-
conservatism” “the principal culprit of human nature,” and that other overseas journals 
have treated him as a mere representative of political forces.
This “separate study,” however, has never exceeded the space of a 
footnote.  
341 He felt that his views 
had at times been “considerably misunderstood by the world, and even by his 
friends”.342 Xiao considered himself part of an “academic faction” that differed from the 
“policy faction,” the “scholarly faction,” and the “social critique faction” in terms of its 
concerns.343 The distinction that Xiao made between these several factions was based 
on the degree of proximity of intellectuals to the political center. The “policy faction,” 
Xiao explained, consisted of policy advisors; the “academic faction” was concerned 
with politics but did not directly affect it; the “scholarly faction” was one of literati who 
dealt with the consequences of commercialization on literary creation; and the “social 
critique faction,” or, the so-called “New Left,” criticized the official reform policy.  The 
concerns of the “academic faction” with which Xiao identified included the history of 
Chinese modernization, civil society, the transformation of traditional Chinese culture, 
and the Chinese national character. The “policy faction,” on the other hand, was 
concerned with the relation between central and local government, the relation between 
the population and its resources, and the relation between state power and democratic 
rule.344
338 Xu Ben, Disenchanted Democracy, 169. Xu Ben called Xiao’s conservatism “Maistrian” in a 
reference to the conservative thinker Joseph de Maistre (1753-1821). As opposed to Burke, de 
Maistre linked political stability with the Catholic Church and sacrosanct institutions. See 
Muller, Conservatism, 134-135.
339 Schubert, “Was ist Neokonservativismus?,” 61-62; Zheng, Chinese Nationalism, 71.
340 Chen, “Neoconservative Political Thought,” 594.
341 Xiao Gongqin, “Zixu,” YZLG, 8.
342 Xiao Gongqin, “Zixu,” XGJ, 16.
343 Xiao Gongqin, “Zhuanxingqi Zhongguo renwen zhishi fenzi de sizhong leixing,” XGJ, 182-
189. Originally published in Tansuo yu zhengming 1994: 8.
344 Ibid., 183-185.
The topics that Xiao associated with the “policy faction” have been identified as 
major themes of “neo-conservatism” as discussed in the previous chapter. Although 
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Xiao Gongqin is generally considered to be the main figure of Chinese “neo-
conservatism,” the academic concerns that he mentioned have nevertheless been absent 
from existing research.
Regarding the role of history in Xiao’s works, Xiao has indicated that history 
was important for his study of reform.345 Xiao has referred to himself as a “historian 
who shows solicitude for the nation’s fate,” and, as a historian, he considered himself to 
be privileged: he could enter history through the door of reality and vice versa.346 The 
key to understanding social problems in reality, according to Xiao, was to “break the 
historical code” and to use this code to disentangle problems in real life.347 Being a 
historian, Xiao did have a genuine interest in history, and most of his works revolved 
around history and the role of intellectuals in the history of reform in China.348 Xiao has 
further claimed to be against the use of history as a tool to legitimize a certain belief 
system, as had happened during the 1950s as well as after the revolution of 1911, when 
history was written to justify the beliefs of the “winners.” 349
3.2 FROM THE YUAN DYNASTY TO THE 1980S: XIAO’S INTELLECTUAL TRAJECTORY
Both Xiao’s remarks 
regarding Chinese intellectuals and his reference to history indicate that the picture was 
at least more complex than research suggests. 
It is useful to look at both Xiao’s understanding of the different “stages” in his 
academic research and his view of intellectual history. For Xiao, in a Toynbeean 
fashion, thought was “a strategy to deal with the challenges of the environment”; it was 
“the great solution of people facing problems.”350
345 See, for example, his article “Lishixue zai Zhongguo biange shidai de yiyi,” XGJ, 359-364.
Originally published in Shixue lilun 1988: 4.
346 Xiao Gongqin, “Zixu,” XGJ, 12, 16.
347 Xiao Gongqin, “Lishixue,” XGJ, 360.
348 The titles of Xiao’s main works reveal a plethora of issues that go far beyond an advocacy of 
strong rule and order. See for example Rujia wenhua de kunjing: Zhongguo jindai shidaifu yu 
xifang tiaozhan (Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1986); Weiji zhong de biange: qingmo 
xiandaihua jincheng zhong de jijin yu baoshou (Shanghai: Shanghai sanlian shudian, 1999); Yu 
zhengzhi langman zhuyi gaobie (Wuhan: Hubei jiaoyu chubanshe, 2001); Zhishi fenzi yu 
guannian ren (Tianjin: Tianjin renmin chubanshe, 2002); Rujia wenhua de kunjing: jindai 
shidaifu yu zhongxi wenhua pengzhuang (Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, 2006).
349 Xiao Gongqin, “Lishixue,” XGJ, 363. See also Xiao Gongqin, “Qingmo xinzheng yu 
Zhongguo xiandaihua yanjiu,” XGJ, 251-264. Originally published in ZYG 1 (November 1993), 
61-66.
350 Xiao Gongqin, “Sixiang de meili,” 4-5.
To understand why a certain thought 
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appeared at a certain place and time, it sufficed to look at the specific problems people 
faced at that point in time. Xiao has used the metaphor of a “river-with-rocks”: if the 
river is a specific era, and the rocks in that river represent the problems faced at that 
particular time, then the foam of the waves, which is aroused by the existing 
contradictions and problems, is the thought of that era.351
Xiao has divided his intellectual path into four stages. The first stage (1978-
1981) covers his years as an MA-student. After having spent twelve years as a factory 
worker in Shanghai’s suburbs during the Cultural Revolution, dedicating the scarce free 
time he had to reading, Xiao was admitted to the History Department of Nanjing 
University, where he specialized in the history of the Yuan dynasty (1260-1368).
The problems of different 
eras, according to Xiao, have a similar structure, which is why one should rely on the 
enlightening views of thinkers of previous eras to solve contemporary problems. 
352
During the second stage (1982-1987), Xiao started to research issues in modern Chinese 
history that were related to the problems of reform at that time. He made a leap from the 
Yuan dynasty to the clash of Chinese and Western culture and the reasons behind this 
clash. He considers The Predicament of Confucian Culture: Modern Chinese Literati 
and the Challenge of the West his main work of this stage. In this book, Xiao explored 
the reasons for the failure of China’s modernization process from the angle of those 
who had obstructed these changes. For Xiao, it was the “cultural conservatism” and the 
“fundamentalist-style Confucian dogmatism” of the literati under what Xiao perceived 
of as a “closed system” that had led to the setback in the modernization process.353 This 
interpretation of the distortion of the “cultural mode of thought” of the literati under a 
“closed system” was shaped by Xiao’s own experiences during the Cultural Revolution. 
People of his generation, so Xiao claimed, had a strong “problem consciousness” when 
it came to a closed system because they had experienced it first-hand.354
351 Ibid., 4-6.
352 Xiao Gongqin, “Zixu,” XGJ, 2. Xiao’s MA thesis, which was entitled Lun Yuandai de 
huangdi jicheng wenti (On the issue of throne succession during the Yuan dynasty), was an 
analysis of the political crisis during the Yuan dynasty (1260-1368) from a cultural angle, which 
focused on the tensions between the political systems of the pastoral and farming communities 
respectively. Xiao further mentioned that his interest in “the conflicts between heterogeneous 
systems and the political disorder aroused from this” started here, an issue he would later relate 
to the Durkheimian concept of “anomy” (shifan). (Ibid.) During this stage, apart from systems 
theory, Xiao also applied structuralism in his historical research.  
353 Ibid., 3. 
354 Xiao added that his criticism of Confucianism did not apply to pre-Qin Confucianism 
because the latter had not yet been allied with political authoritarianism; it had instilled a sense 
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Xiao has underlined the continuity of this stage of thought with his later 
advocacy of “neo-conservatism”: his criticism of the “fundamentalism that created the 
disease of cultural confinement” during this stage did not entail a radical denial of 
tradition.355 As he has phrased it, a criticism of the negative aspects of tradition and the 
advocacy of reform that preserved “the continuity of historical culture” were  “two 
organic components” of his thought. 356 Nonetheless, at that point, in line with the 
Zeitgeist of the mid-1980s, Xiao’s answer to this “inertia” was an advocacy of more 
reform, a solution he later criticized for being too simplistic. In his third stage of 
thought (1988-1989), Xiao shifted his focus from the conservative forces that had 
“obstructed” modernization to an investigation of the extent to which the reform faction 
had been responsible for the failure of reform. He has called this “research on the 
history of early modernization” (zaoqi xiandaihua lishi yanjiu), which is distinct from 
“research on modern history” (jindaishi yanjiu). At this point, Xiao became concerned 
with the political choices of Chinese reformers; in this context, he criticized the “radical 
mode of thought” of reformers since modern times.357
During the fourth stage (1989-), Xiao shifted to the theoretical aspects of 
reform; he wanted to apply his research on early modernization to the study of reform. 
Borrowing from political sociology, Xiao analyzed which political models were most 
suited to the completion of the modernization process. For this, he drew inspiration 
from the French sociologist Émile Durkheim (1858-1917) and from the Chinese 
translator of English works Yan Fu. As for Durkheim, the concept that Xiao found most 
suited to explain the problems of Chinese modernization was that of “anomy” (shifan),
which Durkheim had coined in The Division of Labor in Society, and which had later 
reappeared in Suicide.358
of mission in Chinese intellectuals. Xiao has explored this topic further in an article entitled 
“Ruxue de sanzhong lishi xingtai,” XGJ, 315-337.
355 Xiao Gongqin, “Zixu,” XGJ, 4.
356 Ibid.
357 Ibid., 6-7.
Secondly, Xiao used Durkheim’s distinction between different 
358 Émile Durkheim, De la division du travail social: étude sur l’organisation des societés 
supérieures (Paris: Alcan, 1893); Émile Durkheim, Le Suicide: étude de sociologie (Paris: 
Alcan, 1897). Xiao mentioned that The Division of Labour in Society had been translated into 
Chinese in the 1930s; he regretted both the fact that it had been out of print ever since, and that 
no new translation had appeared (XGJ, 3). The 1930s translation referred to by Xiao was Wang 
Liaoyi, Shehui fengonglun (Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan chubanshe, 1935). Against Xiao’s 
claim, a Chinese translation of Durkheim appeared in 1985, namely Wang Li, Shehui 
fengonglun (Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan chubanshe, 1985). In 2000, another translation 
came out: Qu Dong, Shehui fengonglun (Beijing: Sanlian shudian chubanshe, 2000). The name 
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modes of cohesion in societies, namely “organic solidarity” (youji tuanjie) and 
“mechanical solidarity” (jixie tuanjie). Linking this differentiation to political reform, 
Xiao argued that societies marked by different modes of cohesion required different 
political systems and value systems.359
3.3 THE “YAN FU PARADOX,” OR WHY COWS WILL NEVER BE HORSES
As to Yan Fu, he was the first Chinese thinker 
who had paid attention to the different conditions behind Western and Chinese systems; 
he was able to avoid the pitfalls of modernization.
3.3.1 The Contested Legacy of Yan Fu
Xiao Gongqin’s “neo-conservatism,” then, was a modernization theory. Xiao 
considered the late nineteenth-century translator Yan Fu to be the first representative of 
the theory. At first, this interpretation seems quite remarkable, given the fact that Yan 
Fu, upon his return from England in 1879, had been an early spokesman for Western 
ideas in China—Mao Zedong mentioned Yan Fu on a par with personalities such as 
Hong Xiuquan, the leader of the Taiping rebellion, Sun Yat-sen, and Kang Youwei, all 
of whom had “turned towards the West to seek truth.”360 Similarly, the CASS historian 
Zheng Dahua has interpreted Yan Fu as an early pleader for Westernization.361
To the historian Ma Yong, who is based at the Institute for Modern History 
(jindaishi) at CASS, Yan Fu was one of the most famous “Enlightenment thinkers” of 
modern China. 362 What accounted for Xiao Gongqin’s reading of Yan Fu as a 
“conservative” was the fact that the latter neither supported the revolution of 1911 nor 
the foundation of a republic; he advocated a constitutional monarchy. Ma Yong added 
that Yan Fu’s support for Yuan Shikai after 1912 was also a factor that was conducive 
to a “conservative” reading.363
“Durkheim” has been translated into Chinese as both “Di’er kaimu” (1985 translation) and 
“Tu’ergan” (1935 and 2000 translations). 
359 Xiao Gongqin, “Zixu,” XGJ, 10. 
360 Mao Zedong, “Lun renmin minzhu zhuanzheng,” Mao Zedong xuanji (1991), Vol. 4, 1469.
361 Zheng Dahua, “Xiandai Zhongguo wenhua baoshou zhuyi,” 446.
362 Ma Yong, “Yan Fu wannian sixiang,” 46.
363 Interview with Ma Yong, Beijing, August 8, 2005. 
Ma Yong’s remarks already indicate the problematic use 
of the term “conservatism” with reference to Yan Fu: some have called the late Yan Fu 
a “conservative” either because of his political views or because of his “traditionalism,” 
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but not because he recommended change that respected historical continuity, as in 
Burkean conservatism. 
Moreover, some theorists, including Yan Fu’s biographer Zhou Zhenfu, have 
contrasted Yan Fu’s late “conservatism” and “traditionalism” with his early “liberalism” 
and “Westernization,” whereas others have focused mainly on the liberal traits in Yan 
Fu’s thought.364 In his 1964 work on Yan Fu, In Search of Wealth and Power, Benjamin 
Schwartz discarded the simplistic image of either a liberal, “antitraditionalist” Yan Fu, 
or the idea of a “break” between a young “liberal” and an old “conservative” Yan Fu.365
Yan Fu’s most “radical” defense of democracy, namely the 1895 essay “In Refutation 
of Han Yu,” already contained traits of his later “conservatism.”366 Yan Fu’s ultimate 
aim was wealth and power, and whether or not his belief in democracy was genuine, he 
nevertheless interpreted it as a means to reach this goal. 367
364 Others who adhered to the view that Yan Fu was essentially a liberal and an
“antitraditionalist” include Wang Zhongjiang, based at Qinghua’s Philosophy Department, and 
Lei Yi, a researcher at CASS. An example of the perceived “break” in Yan Fu’s thought can be 
found in Chow Tse-tsung. For Chow Tse-tsung, Yan Fu was a “leading liberal reformer” 
between 1895 and 1902, and a “conservative” since 1902. The latter denounced revolution, 
liberalism, and nationalism; he promoted ancient Chinese thought. Chow has also discussed 
Yan Fu as an advisor to Yuan Shikai; he has included Yan Fu’s name among the “six 
gentlemen” who founded the Peace Planning Society (Zhou’an hui) that financed Yuan Shikai’s 
movement for the restoration of the monarchy in 1915 and 1916. See Chow, The May Fourth 
Movement, 62 fn. s and 64, fn. t. However, according to Schwartz, who has focused on the 
accounts of Yan Fu and Hou Yi, Yan Fu did not authorize the use of his name as a sponsor for 
the Peace Planning Society. See Schwartz, Wealth and Power, 215-216 and 224-228.
365 Benjamin Schwartz, In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1964).
366 Ibid., 215-216, 224-228. More precisely, Schwartz asserted that between 1911 and 1915, 
Yan Fu still believed in liberalism as the means to wealth and power, that his adherence to 
Confucianism could also be interpreted as a calculation, and that his support for the Peace 
Planning Society was questionable. The historian Ma Yong has also challenged the notion of 
the “break” in the thought of Yan Fu. See Ma Yong “Yan Fu wannian sixiang,” 46-53. For the 
essay “In Refutation of Han Yu,” see “Pi Han,” in Wang Shi, ed., Yan Fuji, Vol. 1 (Beijing: 
Zhonghua Shuju chubanshe, 1986), 32-36. The essay was originally published in Zhibao, March 
13-14, 1895, and in Shiwubao, April 12, 1897. Translated by François Houang in Les 
Manifestes de Yen Fou, 139-151.
Secondly, for Yan Fu, 
democracy could not be realized immediately, because conditions were not ripe yet. 
Schwartz further noted that Yan’s “conservatism” was much broader than 
“traditionalism” in the sense that it had also been influenced by Spencerian evolution 
367 Similarly, the Chinese intellectual Wang Rongzu has maintained that for Yan Fu, as for other 
intellectuals, liberalism was an instrument to reach wealth and power. Because Yan Fu stressed 
the importance of enlightening the people and because he thought the road to liberty was long, 
Wang argued, Yan avoided the term “liberty” in his Chinese translation of John Stuart Mill’s 
On Liberty. See Wang Rongzu, “Ziyou zhuyi yu Zhongguo,” 33-37.
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theory.368 Like Schwartz, Theodore Huters has also outlined the complexities in Yan 
Fu’s thought by arguing that Yan Fu stressed the difference between China and the 
West in order to return to an ancient past, but he also used the argument of difference in 
a “rhetoric of alarm,” namely to criticize China and to champion Westernization.369
In line with Schwartz’s interpretation, Xiao Gongqin has found fault with the 
commonly acknowledged “break” between the early “radical” Yan Fu and the late 
“conservative” Yan Fu, who discarded the parliamentary system of the early Republic 
and who supported Yuan Shikai’s authoritarian rule. It is questionable whether Yan Fu 
was a liberal: he believed that wealth and power were to be reached through enlightened 
authoritarian rule, not through liberalism.370 Elsewhere, Xiao Gongqin has stressed that 
Yan Fu did confirm the value of liberalism, but in the political realm, he opposed 
Western liberalism.371
3.3.2 The Theory of the Social Organism
For Xiao, the central aspect of Yan Fu’s “gradual modernization thought” was his 
“theory of the social organism” (shehui youjilun) as expressed in, for example, Shehui 
tongquan (A History of Politics, 1904).372 This theory had received influence from 
Spencer’s image of the “social organism” as being analogous with the biological 
organism, an idea that Spencer developed in The Principles of Sociology.373 It was Yan
Fu who introduced the terms “grouping” (qun) and “society” (shehui) to China, both of 
which stressed the strength of individuals and the relationship between them. The latter 
was expressed through the metaphor of “crystals chemically bonded together,” as
opposed to “loose potatoes in a sack.”374
368 Schwartz, Wealth and Power, 84.
369 Huters, “Appropriations,” 314.
370 Xiao Gongqin, “‘Yan Fu beilun,’” XGJ, 19-20.
371 Xiao Gongqin, “Dangdai Zhongguo xin baoshou zhuyi de sixiang yuanyuan,” EYS 40 (April 
1997), 126-135. Reference from 132. 
372 Xiao Gongqin, “‘Yan Fu beilun,’” XGJ, 22. Wang Shi, Yan Fuji, Vol. 4, 922-935. This was a 
1904 translation by Yan Fu of A History of Politics by E. Jenks (1861-1939), published in 1900. 
373 Herbert Spencer, The Principles of Sociology (London: Williams and Norgate, 1877-1896).
374 Wang Fanshen, “Evolving Prescriptions,” 75. Yan Fu used the term “grouping” in his 
translation of Huxley’s Evolution and Ethics (Tianyan lun), as well as in On Strength
(Yuanqiang) and On Liberty (Qunxue yiyan) (Ibid., 76-77). Yan first used the term “society” in 
On Liberty, in which he distinguished it from “grouping” by adding that “society” is “grouping 
with laws” (Ibid., 83). Furth has noted that Yan Fu’s term qunxue was an allusion to Xunzi’s 
idea of “groups.” Xunzi had claimed that those at the top of the social hierarchy had obtained 
this position through their instinct for “social” grouping. See Furth, “Intellectual Change,” 335.
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In China, as several authors have noted, Darwinism was used to promote 
collective strength.375 For Spencer, the quality of the social organism depended on the 
quality of the individuals in it; the release of physical, moral, and intellectual energies 
had individual happiness as its aim. Yet Yan Fu interpreted the release of energy as a 
means to national wealth and power—the nation was like one organism among many in 
the struggle for survival. 376 Another aspect of Yan Fu’s interpretation of evolution 
theory was that he stressed its voluntarism and its Faustian-Promethean aspect rather 
than its determinism, as Ban Wang has argued.377 On a more general plane, as Furth has 
noted, many Chinese intellectuals gave a “Lamarckian twist” to evolution theory during 
the late Qing dynasty (1644-1911), which was not only due to the fact that this had been 
inherent in Spencer, but also to the fact that, in human societies, characteristics that had 
been “acquired” were indeed transmitted. 378
For Xiao Gongqin, Yan Fu was a “neo-conservative” because his theory of the 
social organism was an expression of Burke’s “gradualist conservatism” (jianjin zhuyi 
de baoshou zhuyi). Although Xiao used the adjective “gradualist” in Chinese, he 
translated the term in English as “evolutionary.”
Therefore, some Chinese intellectuals 
focused on history and culture and their respective transmission.
379 This already indicates that, rather 
than considering Yan Fu’s thought a manifestation of Burkean conservatism, Xiao read 
Burke into Yan Fu’s evolutionism—Xiao even argued that Yan Fu had read Burke, and 
that is why Xiao discerned a Burkean influence in between the lines.380
375 Apart from Schwartz, as mentioned above, see also Wang Fanshen, “Evolving 
Prescriptions,” 76. Wang also refers to Pusey, China and Charles Darwin, 64. 
This already 
leads us to the following questions: why was the first representative of Xiao’s “neo-
conservatism”—a term that Xiao employed to indicate the effect of Burkean 
conservatism—a thinker who has generally been associated with Spencerian evolution 
376 Schwartz, Wealth and Power, 56, 59, 69-80. Schwartz has posed the question of whether this 
was a distortion of Spencer or but a logical conclusion of certain trends in Spencer unnoticed by 
Western researchers. These trends concern the fact that, in the biological organism, individual 
parts become more subordinated to the whole as the organism evolves. Hence, once could point 
out that the “individual” in Spencer was a mere “particle” and that Yan Fu’s interpretation was 
an extension of this inherent weakness.
377 Wang, Illuminations from the Past, 29.
378 Charlotte Furth, “The Sage as Rebel: The Inner World of Chang Ping-lin,” in LOC, 113-150.
Reference from 130-131.
379 Xiao Gongqin, “Zhongguo xin baoshou zhuyi de sixiang yuanyuan: Yan Fu dui zhengzhi 
jijin zhuyi de pipan ji qi dangdai yiyi,” YZLG, 25-40. Reference from 25-26.
380 Xiao Gongqin, “Dangdai Zhongguo xin baoshou zhuyi,” EYS, 134; Interview with Xiao 
Gongqin, Shanghai, August 4, 2006.
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theories? Why did Xiao Gongqin not take Edmund Burke himself as an example to 
make his point? How important was Burke really in Xiao’s “neo-conservatism”?
Xiao added that this Burkean conservatism needed to be distinguished from 
“Maistrian-style conservatism,” which was “reactionary” (fandong) in nature. 381 For 
this reason, whereas Schwartz had questioned Yan Fu’s “distortion” of liberalism, Xiao 
embraced this “authoritarian” interpretation but did not present it as such. Xiao also 
added a footnote to the application of Burke to China: whereas Burkean conservatism 
had civil society as its basis, this condition was lacking in China—the aim of “neo-
conservatism” there was precisely the realization of a civil society and the elimination 
of certain traditional elements. In China, the reverence of tradition could obstruct its 
modernization and, hence, “neo-conservatism” had a contradictory attitude toward its 
own tradition: it criticized radical antitraditionalism, but in returning to tradition it 
should be careful not to become a “fundamentalist conservatism.” 382
According to Yan Fu’s “theory of the social organism,” then, this organism 
reacted and adapted to circumstances; the adaptation of one single element affected the 
entire structure. Yan Fu compared the import of a foreign system to taking the hoofs of 
a horse, placing them on a cow’s nape, and expecting it to become a “winged steed” 
(qianlima).
As will be 
discussed further, Xiao’s advocacy of historical continuity was based on a selective 
interpretation of tradition. 
383
381 Xiao Gongqin, “Dangdai Zhongguo xin baoshou zhuyi,” EYS, 126. The distinction between 
“Burkean” and “Maistrian” conservatism was taken from Peter Viereck’s study on 
conservatism. See Peter Viereck, Conservatism from John Adams to Churchill (Princeton: Van 
Nostrand, 1956).
382 Xiao Gongqin, “‘Yan Fu beilun,’” XGJ, 36, 39-40.
383 Ibid., 23; Wang Shi, Yan Fuji, Vol. 3, 560. 
The reason why this was impossible was, according to Yan Fu, that the 
social organization (ti) and the system within society (yong) could not be separated 
from each other (tiyong bukeli lun). The early reformers had been mistaken in their 
advocacy of “Zhongti xiyong” (Chinese learning as the substance, Western learning as 
the function) because “ti” and “yong” were inseparable. Instead, Yan Fu called it 
“Zhongxue tiyong” and “Xixue tiyong” (Chinese learning as substance and function; 
Western learning as substance and function). As such, Yan Fu had been the first to 
realize the dilemma of Chinese modernization, namely the dilemma between “single 
import” (danxiang yinjin) and “wholesale import” (quanxiang yinjin). “Single import” 
was impossible because each element was part of an organic system and needed the 
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support of other elements of that system. Consequently, the import of one element 
automatically had to lead to the import of an entire system. “Wholesale import,” on the 
other hand, was also impossible because the elements that supported and defined the 
system were in fact endless; it was impossible to import every supporting element 
behind a certain system. Even if one would transplant all the elements that made a horse 
a horse onto a cow, the cow would never be a horse. Xiao has termed this the “Yan Fu 
paradox” (Yan Fu beilun) because Yan Fu was the first to point out the problems of 
both the “single” and “wholesale” import strategies. Xiao did admit that Yan Fu 
discussed these problems in different texts; it was not a systematic theory in Yan Fu’s 
work.384
Xiao Gongqin phrased it as follows: “One could say that Yan Fu was the earliest 
neo-conservative thinker in China since modern times who argued that gradual reform 
was necessary from the angle of ‘circumstance theory’ (tiaojianlun).” 385 What this 
meant was that for Yan Fu, one had to take into account the “customs and popular 
feelings” when considering reform because these customs and feelings had been shaped 
over a long period of time. Yan Fu compared good government with vegetation, which 
could only grow if the three conditions of “heaven, earth, and man” were suitable.386
Yan Fu already advocated gradual reform in Yuanqiang (On Power) in 1895, three years 
before the reform movement of 1898.387 Xiao has contrasted Yan Fu’s approach with 
the approach of the reformers of 1898, whose radical reform strategy was a “crisis 
theory” (weijilun): reformers wanted to imitate the Japanese Meiji reforms of 1868 
without taking into account the variations between China and Japan.388
Xiao described Yan Fu’s way of overcoming the “Yan Fu paradox” in these 
words: “It was that one should pay special attention to the degree of development and 
ripening of new elements inside the social organism and that one should regard this as 
384 Interview with Xiao Gongqin, Shanghai, August 4, 2006. 
385 Xiao Gongqin, “‘Yan Fu beilun,’” XGJ, 29. 
386 Ibid.
387 Wang Shi, Yan Fuji, Vol. 1, 5-15. This text appeared in the Tianjin journal Zhibao of March 
4 to 9, 1895, and in the Shanghai journal Shiwubao, October 1896. Translated by François 
Houang in Les Manifestes de Yen Fou, 47-99.
388 Xiao elaborated these differences in “Zhongguo zaoqi xiandaihua de cuozhe ji qi lishi 
houguo,” XGJ, 199-223. See 207-208 and 218-220 in particular. The article was originally 
published in Yang Nianqun, ed., Jiawu bainian cha: duoyuan shiye xia de Zhongri zhanzheng 
(Beijing: zhishi chubanshe, 1995).
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the basis for the import and use of external systems.”389 One should guide the survival 
and growth of inner elements and make them function as the “endogenous basis” 
(neiyuanxing) for the import of external systems, so that internal elements and external 
systems could merge.390
Different from Liang Qichao’s definition of the Chinese “national character” in 
terms of language, custom, and religion, Xiao defined it in terms of Confucianism.
This was the case because the common culture, beliefs, virtues 
and customs of a people formed its “national character” (guoxing)—they were the 
“cultural soul” (wenhua linghun) of a nation, without which survival was impossible. 
The national character was embodied in the collective experience of a nation and in its 
“mainstream culture” (zhuliu wenhua), value symbols, and ideology. As briefly noted in 
the previous chapter, this “mainstream culture” for Xiao consisted of Confucianism. 
391
Xiao’s stance was not unique; figures such as Liang Shuming’s father Liang Zhi had 
also defined the Chinese character in terms of Confucian values.392 But whereas Liang 
Zhi and others had conceived of Confucian values as universal values, a topic that will 
be further explored in Chapter Five, Xiao defended the particularity of Chinese culture; 
it was the product of the particular experience of the Chinese nation. Tradition was a 
“carrier” (zaiti), “intermediary” (zhongjie), or “receptor” (shouti) of outer system 
elements because its basis was “national particularity” (minzi texing), without which 
traditional culture would be nothing but an empty shell. This stress on historical 
continuity, then, concerned the main difference between Xiao’s previous advocacy of 
“neo-authoritarianism” and his theory of “neo-conservatism.” To be sure, Xiao had 
already referred to the “traditional value system,” which could act as  “supporting 
ground for the coagulation of the social spirit,” in the context of his research on the 
theory of “neo-authoritarianism.”393
The distinction between “neo-conservatism” and “radicalism” and between 
“neo-conservatism” and “fundamentalist conservatism,” then, was that tradition, for 
Yan Fu, had a positive meaning for modernization. Yan Fu approached tradition from a 
Then again, behind his view of tradition as a means 
to enhance nationalism and cohesion, there had been no systematic and historical 
argument as it was developed in his theory on “neo-conservatism.” 
389 Xiao Gongqin, “‘Yan Fu beilun,’” XGJ, 31.
390 Ibid., 32.
391 Liang had expressed his ideas in “Guoxing pian” (On national character), Rongren bao (The 
Justice) December 1, 1912.
392 See Lin Yü-sheng, “The Suicide of Liang Chi,” LOC, 151-168.
393 Xiao Gongqin and Zhu Wei, “A Painful Dilemma,” 73; Qi Mo, Xin quanwei zhuyi, 17. 
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pragmatic philosophical angle: it was the “experience” (yueli) shaped in response to the 
challenges of the natural and social environment. Cultural tradition394 was a condensed 
“collective experience” (jiti jingyan). This view is somewhat reminiscent of Hayek’s 
definition of tradition as stemming from “habits of responding.”395 Xiao Gongqin then 
employed one of his many organic metaphors to describe the function of Chinese 
traditional culture in the process of the import of foreign systems: 
It is like a naturally grown ecological forest belt that encircles the throng of a certain 
area. It has the ecological function of buffering, filtering, and regulating the “wind, 
sand, rain, and dew” of external cultures. This function of ecological regulation is not 
the result of rational and conscious planning and design by the people who have lived 
at the place in question for a long period of time; it is the result of a natural ecology of 
balancing and “screening” in the long-term process of historical evolution. If people 
practically fell it because of insect pests, once the buffering and screening of this 
cultural protective screen is lost, although on the surface, external cultures can be 
vastly implanted without difficulty or resistance, in reality, it can only result in all-
round and rapid soil erosion (…).396
It can be seen from this passage that Xiao Gongqin stressed the importance of “natural 
growth,” evolution, and the limits of human interference in this process—processes of 
change are beyond human will.397 Another important element concerned the long-term 
and gradual nature of the process, which meant that tradition could not be destroyed 
overnight. Xiao repeatedly quoted Yan Fu’s phrase: “The new has not been obtained 
yet, but the old has already been destroyed.”398
394 During the 1980s, a debate unfolded on the difference between “cultural tradition” (wenhua 
chuantong) and “traditional culture” (chuantong wenhua). The scholar Pang Pu was the first to 
make a distinction between the two terms. Pang considered the latter to be something that 
belonged to the past, whereas the former was a living tradition that was still developing, a view 
that was shared by the philosopher Tang Yijie.
395 Hayek, Collected works of F.A. Hayek, 21-22.
396 Xiao Gongqin, “‘Yan Fu beilun,’” XGJ, 36.
397 Xiao Gongqin, “Dangdai Zhongguo xin baoshou zhuyi,” EYS, 130.
398 For example, Xiao Gongqin, “‘Yan Fu beilun,’” XGJ, 31; Xiao Gongqin, “Zhongguo zaoqi 
xiandaihua,” XGJ, 221. 
Yan Fu paid attention to the growth and 
ripening of new elements in the social organism, but his weakness lay in the fact that he 
did not truly transform tradition, possibly because the Classics were too close to him. 
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Yet on a positive note, Yan Fu was the first thinker who had been truly aware of the 
complexity of East and West and the respective differences between the two. 
3.3.3 Burkean Conservative or Social Darwinist?
Xiao Gongqin appears truly convinced that Yan Fu’s theories bore a Burkean stamp. 
The thought of Yan Fu and Burke does overlap in the sense that both are characterized 
by the belief in “trial-and-error,” by the stress on natural growth, and by the importance 
given to particular circumstances, all of which justify a limited interference in the 
process of change. Also, both in the case of Burkean conservatism and Yan Fu’s 
thought, the cultural and the natural are conflated. Conservatives have invoked the 
metaphor of the “second nature” for habits, customs, and culture in order to stress the 
inevitability of things. 399 Social evolutionists like Yan Fu have likewise compared 
social processes to natural processes. Moreover, one might argue that both social 
evolutionism and conservatism are preoccupied with continuity and order; some 
theorists do find the two theories compatible.400
Nevertheless, as the conservative Robert Nisbet has argued, social evolutionism 
and conservatism have different views of change. For the former, change is continuous, 
directional, endogenous, necessary, and related to big, abstract entities, whereas for 
conservatives, change is accidental, exogenous, and related to concrete historical 
data. 401
Another important dissimilarity between conservatism and social evolutionism 
concerns the reference to nature. Whereas Social Darwinists make natural analogies for 
the purpose of predictability, conservatives do so in order to show the inevitability of 
events. For Social Darwinists, nature plays a major part because it can offer a model to 
analyze societies; for conservatives, although nature should be respected, culture and 
history play an equally important role. Or, whereas Social Darwinists remain within the 
framework of natural group markers, such as climate, conservatives use cultural group 
Also, social evolutionism is determinist in that it reduces change to natural 
laws, which leaves little room for human interference. Conservatives, on the other hand, 
underscore that processes of historical change are complicated, but they nevertheless 
believe that there is some room for human interference. 
399 Muller, “Introduction,” 19-20.
400 For example, Larry Arnhart, Darwinian Conservatism (Exeter, Charlottesville: Imprint 
Academic, 2005).
401 See Robert Nisbet, “Reflections on a Metaphor,” in idem, Social Change, 240-304. 
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markers, such as history and language.402
Perhaps the issue of the role of tradition in the modernization process could 
clarify the nature of Xiao Gongqin’s “neo-conservatism.” As discussed above, Xiao 
argued that traditional elements should function as “levers” in the modernization 
process. Nowhere, though, did Xiao specify how this was to be realized in concreto. As 
regards China, the “mainstream culture” Xiao referred to was Confucianism, and, more 
particularly, the “moral autonomy” (daode zizhuxing)—a central element in the Kantian 
tradition of moral philosophy—that Xiao discerned in original Confucianism.
For conservatives, it is culture that restrains 
man from natural inclinations; culture is needed precisely because of the limits of 
human nature. On the one hand, Xiao Gongqin stressed the naturally grown aspect of 
the cultural markers to the extreme—which implied that human interference was in fact 
impossible and not just limited—but on the other hand, he did mention the importance 
of the restraining force of culture. 
403 But 
apart from some vague Confucian slogans, Xiao did not explain how this “moral 
autonomy” could function as a lever in the Chinese modernization process.404 Xiao’s 
claim that Confucianism contained moral autonomy was in line with Thomas Metzger’s 
argument in Escape from Predicament.405
402 The terms “natural group markers” and “cultural group markers” are taken from Margaret 
Sleeboom, who used them in the context of a discussion of academic nationalism in China and 
Japan. See Margaret Sleeboom, Academic Nationalism (Ph.D. diss., University of Amsterdam, 
2001).
403 See Xiao Gongqin, “Ruxue de sanzhong lishi xingtai,” XGJ, 315-337.
404 Xiao mentioned Confucian adages such as “weiren youji” (acting benevolent from within the 
self) and “qiuren deren” (seek benevolence and get benevolence) as manifestations of moral 
autonomy. Ibid., 336. Elsewhere, Xiao also referred to “ziqiang buxi” (continuous self-
renewal). Xiao Gongqin, “Minzu zhuyi,” XGJ, 356. On the Weber-Metzger discussion, see also 
Chapter Five.
405 Thomas A. Metzger, Escape From Predicament: Neo-Confucianism and China’s Evolving 
Political Culture (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977). The book was translated into 
Chinese in 1990 under the title Baituo kunjing: xin ruxue yu Zhongguo zhengzhi wenhua de 
yanjin, published by Jiangsu renmin chubanshe.
Metzger had put forward this argument in 
response to Max Weber’s claim that Confucianism could not have the same function as 
Protestantism had had in the West as regards the rise of the spirit of capitalism because 
Confucianism lacked moral autonomy. In Chinese intellectual circles, Metzger’s 
argument of the moral autonomy of Confucianism had been utilized in debates on New 
Confucianism, the subject of Chapter Five. In this context, New Confucians had 
subscribed to the Confucian value of benevolence (ren), a universal value that could be 
applied to tackle problems of modernization. The liberal Lin Yü-sheng, whose thesis of 
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“radical anti-traditionalism” had inspired mainland intellectuals—as will be discussed 
in Chapter Four—had also mentioned the moral autonomy of Confucianism in the 
context of his theory of the “creative transformation” of Chinese tradition.406
Xiao Gongqin used the moral autonomy argument in a different way. He argued 
that it was moral autonomy that had instilled literati with a feeling of mission, an inner 
conscience and a “crisis mentality” (youhuan yishi).
Lin Yü-
sheng had used the theory to argue for the foundation of a liberal and democratic order 
in particular. 
407
Given this historical development, Xiao argued that the value rationality of 
“benevolence” could revive the repressed moral autonomy of Confucianism; it could 
provide intellectuals with a “feeling of mission.” This stress on “benevolence,” 
however, was in tension with Xiao’s argument that some elements in Chinese tradition 
could function as “levers” in the modernization process. It is hard to imagine how the 
abstract notion of “moral autonomy” could function as a “lever” for Chinese 
modernization. It would have seemed more logical for Xiao to stress Confucian values 
that suited the promotion of order, stability, or harmony, as happened in the official 
The problem with different 
manifestations of Confucianism was that moral autonomy had been repressed. In 
original Confucianism, the stress on benevolence (ren) had been contradicted with an 
equal stress on propriety (li). After the Han dynasty (206 B.C.-A.D. 220), when 
Confucianism became “bureaucratized” and merged with the autocratic system, the 
function of propriety become more important, which resulted in a repression of moral 
autonomy and a passive national character. After the chaos of the Five Dynasties (4th-6th
century), scholars of the Song dynasty (907-1279) reacted against the ritualized 
Confucianism of the previous dynasties and developed lixue, which Xiao considered a 
third form of Confucianism. This was an attempt to restore moral autonomy, but it 
failed because although the Heavenly principles (li) were reflected in people’s hearts 
(xing), and although the unity between Heaven and man could be brought about by 
individual moral cultivation, the content of the Heavenly principles was nevertheless 
still the feudal Confucian ethical code. Therefore, if the second form of Confucianism 
had created a passive personality from outside, the third form had created it from inside.
406 Lin Yü-sheng, “Reflections,” 91-100.
407 Xiao Gongqin, “Ruxue de sanzhong lishi xingtai,” XGJ, 336. On the “crisis mentality” in 
Chinese critical discourse, see Gloria Davies, Worrying about China: The Language of Chinese 
Critical Inquiry (Cambridge, MA, London: Harvard University Press, 2007).  
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promotion of Confucianism, which will be discussed in Chapter Five. The role of 
tradition in Xiao Gongqin’s “neo-conservatism,” then, was rather ambiguous; perhaps a 
focus on the discursive communalities between Xiao Gongqin and other intellectuals at 
the time will shed more light on the question of the Burkean factor in Xiao’s theory.
3.4 THE LESSONS OF HISTORY: THREE KINDS OF “RADICALISM”
As will be discussed in the next chapter, intellectual historians and historians who 
engaged in public debates on “radicalism” and “conservatism” during the early 1990s 
based themselves on Edmund Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790) 
for their criticism of “radicalism” in modern Chinese history. The reason why Chinese 
intellectuals invoked Burke was, according to Xiao, that Burke was easy to 
understand—Chinese intellectuals read his criticism of the French Revolution as a 
criticism of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). The conservatism of American 
thinkers such as Leo Strauss and Carl Schmitt, on the other hand, was not recognizable 
for Chinese intellectuals, because China lacked the Greek tradition that they referred 
to.408 Xiao Gongqin also noted that he himself had invoked Burke because the latter did 
not oppose change, but argued instead that change was necessary for preservation.409
On “radicalism,” Xiao has stated: “One can say that the criticism, reflections, 
and research with regard to radicalism in the early Chinese modernization process are 
the historical resource for the formation of my reform thoughts with gradualism as a 
basis.”410
408 Interview with Xiao Gongqin, Shanghai, August 4, 2006.
409 Xiao Gongqin, “Dangdai Zhongguo xin baoshou zhuyi,” EYS, 126.
410 Xiao Gongqin, “Zixu,” XGJ, 10. 
A common pattern used in the revaluation of modern Chinese history at the 
beginning of the 1990s was that of three “stages” of “radicalism.” The beginning of the 
first stage was generally situated at the end of the nineteenth century, when reformers 
Kang Youwei (1858-1927), Tan Sitong (1865-1898), and Liang Qichao (1873-1929) 
launched the so-called “Hundred Days Reform Movement” (wuxu bianfa) of 1898. The 
second stage revolved around the revolution of 1911, or, for some, the May Fourth 
Movement, which critics applied in a broad sense, namely to refer to both the cultural 
and political movements between 1917 and 1921. The third and final stage consisted of 
Marxism, and, in particular, of the Maoist excesses of the Cultural Revolution. Just like 
other Chinese intellectuals who condemned this century-old radicalism, Xiao said 
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farewell to what he called “utopianist political myths,” and he did so by looking into 
China’s past.411 Although this conception of “radicalism” only became a consensus in 
the intellectual world of mainland China during the 1990s, Xiao claimed to have 
“discovered” the destructive forces of “radicalism” as early as the 1980s, because he 
was “more lucky”: he studied history.412
Like other intellectuals at the time, Xiao condemned “radicalism” as a mode of 
thought that Chinese intellectuals had adhered to since modern times.413 In particular, 
Xiao criticized the impact of the revolutionary thought model since modern times, 
which had unconsciously created a “dislocation” (cuowei) of reform thought, or, a 
“destructive mode of thought” (pohuaixing siwei) relating to reform. This was 
manifested in the mentality of “overcorrection” (fei jiaowang bu zuyi guozheng); in the 
perception that reform was a revolution; in the dichotomy of good versus bad; and in 
the belief that aims could be reached in one step.414
As already noted in the previous chapter, Xiao discerned three types of 
“radicalism,” which he termed “mental radicalism,” “system determinism,” and 
“political romanticism.” Here, the focus will be on how Xiao located these types of 
“radicalism” in the Chinese past, since Xiao argued that they could be perceived as 
“successive stages” (cengceng dijie) in modern Chinese history.415
411 Xiao Gongqin, “The Political Attitudes,” 59.
412 Interview with Xiao Gongqin, Shanghai, August 4, 2006.
413 Ibid.
414 Xiao Gongqin, “Zouxiang chengshu: Zhongguo gaige de fansi yu zhanwang,” XGJ, 123-139. 
Reference from 134. An earlier version of the article appeared in Zhongguo shibao zhoukan,
February 1993. An abstract was published in Beijing qingnianbao, 13 May 1993, 3.
415 Xiao Gongqin, “Zixu,” XGJ, 9. Xiao also mentioned the “relationship of stages” (dijiexing 
guanxi) of the three kinds of radicalism in “Lishi jujue langman,” XGJ, 117. 
The Hundred Days 
Reform of 1898 was marked by “mental radicalism,” the parliamentary democracy of 
the Republic (1912) suffered from “system determinism,” and during the period before 
and after the May Fourth Movement (1917-1921), “political romanticism” flourished in 
the form of “radical anti-traditionalism” (jijin fanchuantong) and “wholesale 
Westernization theories” (quanpan xihualun). Then again, the cycle that connected 
them reappeared in different historical conditions, and was by no means limited to a 
certain period in history. Xiao drew a parallel between these three types of “radicalism” 
in the early modernization stage and the reform modes of thought of some intellectuals 
103
during the 1980s. The history of modern China and the China of the 1980s manifested a 
“similar historical structure” (lishi tonggouxing).416
Elsewhere, Xiao contended that the radical attitude towards tradition of the late 
Qing intellectual Tan Sitong (1864-1898) had also been present in the May Fourth 
Movement (1910s), the Cultural Revolution, and in the so-called “culture fever” 
(wenhua re) of the 1980s. Xiao considered Tan Sitong a “radical” because he had 
attacked the kernel of the moral and social Confucian order, namely the doctrine of the 
three bonds (sangang)—that between ruler and subject, father and son, and husband and 
wife. As Tan put it in his Renxue (On Humanity), it was necessary to “smash the 
network” of tradition.417
Although Xiao associated each of these three periods in modern Chinese history 
with a distinctive “type” of “radicalism,” he added that this did not signify that the other 
forms of “radicalism” were nonexistent during that respective period; the three modes 
of “radicalism” were different aspects of one and the same “collective unconscious” (jiti 
wuyishi).418 Hence, the second stage of “radicalism” had in fact already been present 
during the late Qing period of “New Policies” (xinzheng).419 In addition, although Xiao 
situated “system determinism” during the early Republic, he also discerned “political 
romanticism” during the same period. He traced this romanticism back to the period 
before the Republic, and to the constitutionalist movement in particular.420
416 Xiao Gongqin, “Zixu,” XGJ, 9-10; Xiao Gongqin, “Zixu,” YZLG, 4.
417 On Tan Sitong’s Renxue, see Furth, “Intellectual Change,” 331-334.
418 Xiao Gongqin, “Sixiang de meili,” 109; Xiao Gongqin, “Zixu,” YZLG, 9. 
419 In “Qingmo xinzheng yu Zhongguo xiandaihua yanjiu,” Xiao has analyzed this top-down 
reform movement because he found it useful for research on the reform of centralized 
bureaucratic systems. See XGJ, 251-264. The “New Policies” reform was launched by the Qing 
court in 1901, and included, among other things, the abolition of the examination system 
(1905), the establishment of the first modern school system, and the reform of the judiciary and 
police. Xiao’s treatment of the reforms as a modernization movement was in line with Douglas 
Reynolds’s interpretation of the reforms as a “revolution,” a thoroughly transformative 
movement, and not, as commonly believed, as the efforts of a weakened dynasty to preserve its 
power. For Joseph Levenson, the movement was insignificant, and it revealed the 
incompatibility of the traditional imperial state and nationalism. 
420 See “Cong zhengzhi langman zhuyi dao zhengzhi jijin zhuyi: dui Zhongguo zaoqi yihui 
minzhu sichao de lishi kaocha,” XGJ, 265-280. This was a reprint of the same article that 
appeared in Zhongguo shehui kexue jikan, Hong Kong, 1993, no. 2.  
Xiao also 
added that the student demonstrations during the spring of 1989 had been the result of 
the convergence of two types of “radicalism,” namely the “system determinism” of the 
early Republic and the “political romanticism” after May Fourth. Despite the fact that 
different types of “radicalism” overlapped during one period in history, what united 
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Xiao with other intellectuals at the time was the perceived link between the “radicalism” 
of the 1980s and the “radicalism” manifested in modern Chinese history. 
3.4.1 The “Mental Radicalism” of the Hundred Days Reformers (1898)
In “Re-examining the Hundred Days Reform Movement: Discussing the Cultural Root 
of Early Political Radicalism,” 421 Xiao examined why the educational, political, 
economic, and military innovations that Kang Youwei and Emperor Guangxu had set 
up between June 11 and September 21, 1898, ended with a coup d’état and a revocation 
of the most important changes.422 Xiao argued that it was mistaken to reduce the failure 
of the Reform Movement to “unfavorable objective conditions” (keguan buli tiaojian)
or to the role of the conservative opposition. 423
In other words, Kang Youwei’s “mental radicalism” (xintaishang de jijin zhuyi)
was at the heart of the failure of the movement. Responding to their feeling of cultural 
anxiety (wenhua jiaolügan), the reformers used large-scale reforms to achieve 
psychological balance.
Instead, Xiao sought the causes of 
failure in the Reform Movement itself, and, more precisely, in the fact that reformer
Kang Youwei’s subjective perception of the crisis caused him to pursue fast and 
wholesale reform.
424 Xiao has called this translation of anxiety into massive 
reforms the “reform naivety disease” (gaige youzhibing).425 This feeling of crisis and 
urgency was related to the sorry state of affairs in which China found itself after its 
defeat in the Sino-Japanese war (1894-1895). As a result, there was a discrepancy 
between the reformers’ subjective aspirations and what was realistically feasible. Here, 
Xiao’s definition of “radicalism” is reminiscent of Michael Gasster’s definition of 
“radicalism” as a dissatisfaction with the present that leads to the creation of better 
conditions in the mind.426
421 Xiao Gongqin, “Wuxu bianfa de zai fanxing: jianlun zaoqi zhengzhi jijin zhuyi de wenhua 
genyuan,” ZFL, 121-141. This text was an adapted and shorter version of  “Wuxu bianfa yu 
Zhongguo zaoqi zhengzhi jijin zhuyi de wenhua genyuan,” XGJ, 224-250. The article also 
appeared in ZYG 1995: 4.
422 For the course and program of the Reform Movement, see Chang Hao, “Intellectual Change 
and the Reform Movement, 1890-1898,” 274-338.
423 Xiao Gongqin, “Wuxu bianfa,” ZFL, 135. 
424 Xiao Gongqin, “Zixu,” XGJ, 9. 
425 Xiao Gongqin, “Lishi jujue langman,” XGJ, 115.
426 Gasster, Birth of Radicalism, 237-238.
Just like Plato had compared social decay to an illness and the 
statesman to a physician, Xiao compared the reformers to “radical doctors” who 
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believed that a major operation was the only solution to China’s grave state of illness.427
Because this type of radicalism was driven by anxiety, Xiao has also referred to it as 
“feeling-of-anxiety radicalism” (jiaolügan de jijin zhuyi).428
For this last point, Xiao relied on Samuel Huntington’s research on political 
reforms in countries with large-scale bureaucratic systems. Huntington had argued that 
these countries—for example, Russia, China, and the former Austrian Empire— were 
much harder to reform than non-centralized countries such as Japan, which had a 
system of enfeoffment (fenfengzhi).
If Kang Youwei had taken the objective conditions into account, he would have 
known that the structure of the bureaucracy was not conducive to radical reform. There 
was a dual structure of authority, in which a complex amalgam of power relationships 
preserved the balance between the Empress Dowager Cixi (1835-1908) and the emperor 
Guangxu (1871-1908). Firstly, by proposing radical reforms, Kang Youwei caused a 
polarization of these two forces. Secondly, the contrast between Kang Youwei’s 
advocacies and the Confucian values of the bureaucracy was too great. Lastly, the vast 
size of the bureaucratic system negatively affected the chances of success of the 
reforms.
429 The Japanese emperor did not face the 
opposition of the old nobility; he was not forced to exclude some people from 
government because there was no selection process. Huntington had reiterated that 
gradualism was the only option for large bureaucracies, because fast and radical reform 
could turn hidden opponents into active opponents. In his book on the birth of 
“radicalism” in modern China, Michael Gasster had also referred to Huntington’s idea 
that successful modernization through revolution was unlikely, and that the disruption 
caused by modernization should be solved through institutionalization.430
The “right” strategy that Xiao proposed is what Huntington has termed the 
“Fabianist strategy” (Feibianshi de zhanlüe). 431
427 Xiao Gongqin, “The Political Attitudes,” 77. Since Plato was discussed in great length in 
Popper’s The Open Society and Its Enemies, it is possible that Xiao got the idea for the 
metaphor by reading Popper. See Karl Popper, The Open Society, Vol. 1, 40, 138-139. Plato 
used the medical analogy in Republic and Statesman.
428 Interview with Xiao Gongqin, Shanghai, August 4, 2006.
429 See Huntington, POCS, chapter 3: “Political Change in Traditional Polities” (140-191). See 
also 366-367.
430 Gasster, Birth of Radicalism, 246.
431 Xiao Gongqin,  “Wuxu bianfa,” ZFL, 128.
Huntington coined this term in the 
context of his research on the modernization of Turkey, in which it referred to the 
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strategy of the father of modern Turkey, general Mustafa “Kemal” “Atatürk.” 432
Huntington had contrasted Kemal’s “right” strategy to the “wrong” strategy of both 
Guangxu and Joseph II.433 Following Huntington, Xiao argued that Kemal disentangled 
problems and solved them one by one instead of coming up with one master plan to 
solve all problems at once. Secondly, Kemal started with easy issues, in order to secure 
the support of the majority. Xiao called this “first-the-easy-then-the-difficult-strategy” 
(xianyi hounan zhanlüe).434 Lastly, after each successful reform, Kemal hinted at the 
next step, but he did not make his entire plan public from the very beginning, which 
Huntington had referred to as the “foot-in-the-door approach.”435
The Qing reformers, on the contrary, Xiao argued, sought quick reforms because 
of the sense of crisis that blurred their capacity to think rationally. They advised a break 
with tradition because the old and the new were irreconcilable opposites to them. Xiao 
interpreted the optimism of the reformers as a psychological defense against their 
feeling of crisis. Kang Youwei’s extreme optimism was expressed in his view that it 
had taken Europe three hundred years to modernize, Japan had needed only thirty years, 
and China would need three years to set up a rough outline of modernization.
As such, Kemal was 
able to avoid explicit opposition. He resolved contradictions within the system, he used 
traditional authority to guide reforms, and he relied on the legitimacy he had obtained 
after each concrete step of reform to ensure the success of the next step. 
436 Unlike 
Kemal, Kang Youwei “forestalled his opponents by a show of strength” (xiansheng 
duoren). 437 Kang Youwei made his entire reform plan public from the start, which 
increased the oppositions between the different factions. Huntington had termed this the 
“blitzkrieg” approach, an approach that he disapproved of for overall reform, but that he 
approved of for piecemeal changes.438
432 Huntington applied the term “Fabianist” in reference to the British Fabian Society, which 
was founded in 1884. Fabianists advocated gradual and incremental reform instead of 
revolutionary approaches as a means to obtain social democracy. They chose the name “Fabian” 
in honour of the Roman General and politician Quintus Fabius Maximus  (ca. 280-203 B.C.), 
who was referred to as the “Delayer” with regard to his tactics in the Second Punic War (218-
201 B.C.) between Rome and Carthage. 
433 Huntington, POCS, 344-356.
434 Xiao Gongqin,  “Wuxu bianfa,” ZFL, 128.
435 Huntington, POCS, 346, 353.
436 More precisely, it would take three years to set up a “macroscopic model,” five years to 
arrange things properly, eight years to put things into practice, and ten years to establish a 
power map. 
437 Xiao Gongqin,  “Wuxu bianfa,” ZFL, 132.
438 Huntington, POCS, 36.
Moreover, by choosing the side of the reformers 
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instead of adopting a neutral stance, Kang Youwei also increased the tensions by 
turning the officials into opponents. In brief, the reformers focused on the necessity of 
the reforms (biyaoxing), but not on their feasibility (kexingxing).439
In a last section, Xiao located the roots of “psychological radicalism” in 
traditional Chinese political culture; the reformers felt morally superior and shunned 
compromise. They adhered to a dual structure of “good” versus “evil”; they ascribed 
failure to “evil opponents.” Here, Xiao made use of the term “consummatory value 
system, which had been coined by David Apter, a political scientist from Yale 
University.440 For Apter, there were two types of “political norms”: “consummatory 
norms,” which embodied “ultimate ends,” and “instrumental norms,” which embodied 
“empirical ends.”441 Drawing on Apter’s description of “consummatory norms,” Xiao 
translated the term as “wanmei zhuyi” (perfectionism) or “jizhi zhuyi” (ultimate ends-
ism), a term that he used to describe traditional Chinese political culture.442 Traditional 
Chinese political culture was not suited for reform, since reform required compromise 
and consensus instead of a politics of “you die, I live” (nisi wohuo), or “where you are, I 
am not” (youni wuwo). 443 To some extent, the connection that Xiao made between 
traditional Chinese political culture and “radicalism” is reminiscent of Lin Yü-sheng’s 
analysis of the “wholesale anti-traditionalism” of the May Fourth reformers.444
439 Xiao Gongqin,  “Wuxu bianfa,” ZFL, 136. 
440 Apter had used this term in Political Change: Collected Essays (London: Routledge, 1973). 
Xiao’s reference to the political scientist David Apter was in line with the renaissance of 
political science in China during the 1980s. Apter was one of the American visiting scholars in 
China, others being David Easton, Samuel Huntington, Robert Salisbury, Robert Scalapino, and 
Marc Petracca. Meissner, “Intellectual Currents,” 12-14. Huntington had referred to Apter’s The 
Politics of Modernization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965) in POCS, 174.
441 Apter, Political Change: Collected Essays, 106. Apter combined these two types of political 
norms with two types of “political structures,” which Apter termed “hierarchical” and 
“pyramidal,” to construct a model of “political systems types.”
442 Xiao Gongqin, “Zhongguo zaoqi xiandaihua,” XGJ, 208. Elsewhere, Xiao has also used the 
term “consummatory culture” (jizhixing wenhua), which he has contrasted with “instrumental 
culture” (gongjuxing wenhua). See “Wuxu bianfa,” XGJ, 248.
443 Xiao Gongqin, “Wuxu bianfa,” ZFL, 140. Xiao’s perception of Chinese political culture 
resembles Tang Tsou’s conception of Chinese politics as a “winner-take-all” conflict. See 
Fewsmith, Elite Politics in Contemporary China, xiv.
444 Lin Yü-sheng, The Crisis of Chinese Consciousness: Radical Antitraditionalism in the May 
Fourth Era (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1979).    
Lin Yü-
sheng also traced the roots of “radicalism” back to Chinese tradition: in the instance of 
the May Fourth reformers, their “radicalism” was caused by their “holistic” way of 
thinking, which made them pursue ultimate goals only. 
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Xiao’s interest in the reform movement of 1898 was not a coincidence. For 
Xiao, the division between traditional and modern China was neither the Opium War, 
nor the start of technological reforms since the 1870s. Modern China had started with 
the 1898 Reform Movement because it was only then that the feeling of crisis of the 
literati had taken shape.445 Yü Ying-shih has also situated the first sense of crisis of the 
literati around this time, when the “marginalization” of China finally occurred to 
them.446
More specifically, Xiao adhered to the so-called “impact-response model” of the 
Harvard-based scholar John King Fairbank to depict the process of Chinese 
modernization. According to this model, Chinese modernization was a “response” to the 
“impact” of the West since the Opium War.
Since the Reform Movement signified the start of modern China for Xiao, it 
was only logical that Xiao returned to this specific moment in history to solve problems 
of reform in the present. Xiao’s use of the 1898 Reform Movement to discuss the 
reforms of Deng Xiaoping was not unique at the time; during the early 1990s, there was 
a true revival of interest in late Qing politics, and in the Reform Movement of 1898 and 
the “New Policies” (xinzheng) between 1901 and 1907 in particular. 
447 This was reflected in Xiao’s argument 
that the ability to establish what he called a “comprehensive reaction capacity” (CRC) 
(zonghe fanying nengli) greatly determined the success of reform. Xiao defined this 
CRC as “the ability of traditional sovereign states to unite, to generate an efficient and 
rational response to the external impact of the Western challenge, and to adapt 
oneself.”448
445 Xiao dedicated an entire book to reform in late Qing China, with several chapters focusing 
on the Reform Movement of 1898. See Weiji zhong de biange: qingmo xiandaihua jincheng 
zhong de jijin yu baoshou (Shanghai: Sanlian shudian, 1999). Chapters 3-6 deal with the 
Reform Movement of 1898. 
446 Yü Ying-shih, “The Radicalization of China,” 135-136.
447 John King Fairbank and Ssu Yu-teng had outlined the “impact-response” model in China’s
Response to the West: A Documentary Survey, 1839-1923 (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1954). Fairbank’s student Paul Cohen criticized the model in his Discovering History in 
China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1984), which was translated into Chinese in 1989. Xiao acknowledged the 
value of Paul Cohen’s criticism, but he still considered the “impact-response” model to be the
model to understand the “basic trend of history” (lishi de jiben quxiang) in China. See Xiao 
Gongqin, “Zhongguo zaoqi xiandaihua,” XGJ, 203. 
448 This “comprehensive reaction capacity” consisted of three basic aspects: the leading value 
system, the structure of the traditional political system, and the policy-making abilities of the 
ruling elite. Xiao Gongqin, “Zhongguo zaoqi xiandaihua,” XGJ, 204.
The problem with China was precisely that it had lacked a CRC; it had 
therefore been unable to make objective judgments. 
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Xiao found an example of a quick CRC in Japanese modernization. The 
Sinocentrist cultural psychology of the Chinese “sunlight culture,” as the French 
sociologist Amoury de Riencourt put it, repressed knowledge of Western culture and 
led to cultural inertia, whereas Japanese culture was a “moonlight culture” that attracted 
foreign cultures. 449 The consequences of China’s slow CRC were, apart from its 
legitimacy crisis, the polarization of the political-intellectual elite into a conservative 
and a radical faction. Another consequence of the slow CRC was what Xiao called the 
“multiple diseases of anomy” (shifan zonghezheng), or, a downward spiral of political, 
cultural, and moral anomy. 450 Xiao also referred to Eisenstadt’s concept of “the 
breakdowns of modernization” (xiandaihua de duanlie), which referred to a setback 
after a period of relative progress in modernization.451
Xiao was also not the first Chinese intellectual to draw lessons from the Turkish 
experience. During the time of the Turkish revolution (1908-1910), Chinese 
revolutionaries in Japan had just ended a three-year long debate over the future of 
China, in which the central question had been whether revolutionary overthrow 
followed by republican-style government was the solution to the Chinese problem, or 
whether it would be better to preserve the dynastic system under a constitutional 
monarchy. The Turkish experience was then “immediately instrumentalized in the 
service of already formed political and ideological positions.”452
449 See, for example, the chapter on “The Moonlight Civilizations” in Amaury De Riencourt, 
The Soul of China (London: Jonathan Cape/Honeyglen, 1958), 109-132, and, in the same 
volume, the chapter on “The Collapse of Chinese Civilization,” 179-200. “Moonlight 
civilizations,” according to de Riencourt, appeared throughout Asia at a time when Chinese, 
Indian and Islamic civilizations were in decline. Under Western influence, they managed to 
adapt to “modern” life.
450 Xiao Gongqin, “Zhongguo zaoqi xiandaihua,” XGJ, 221.
451 Ibid., 222. Xiao also used the term xiandaihua de cuozhe (setbacks of modernization).
452 Karl, Staging the World, 177-178.
The model of Turkey 
had also played a role in the modernization of Taiwan under the Kuomintang. The 
“revival” of the Turkish model since the late 1980s can partly be attributed to the 
debates on “neo-authoritarianism,” in which Chinese intellectuals drew on Western 
modernization research of the 1960s and 1970s. In this context, Xiao’s reference to the 
Turkish revolution revealed a new interest in the role of the elite in reforms, as opposed 
to the past view that the masses constituted the driving force of history. 
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3.4.2 The “System Determinism” Following the Revolution of 1911
When analyzing early parliamentary democracy in China, Xiao discovered that one of 
the pitfalls of institutional reform at that time was the lack of consideration of the 
different conditions surrounding political systems in the West and in China, which 
resulted in a naive “transplantation” (zhiru) of an entire ready-made Western system. 
Problems in China were blamed on its system, and when the import of a Western 
system was not successful, the problem was believed to be that the import had not been 
thorough enough. Xiao called this excessive stress on the import of systems to solve 
problems “system determinism.”  He found examples of this in the thought of Sun Yat-
sen (1866-1925), the “father” of the revolution of 1911, but it had also been present in 
the earlier generation, namely in the thought of Kang Youwei and Chen Tianhua (1875-
1905).453
What these reformers did not take into consideration was that every system was 
the outcome of a long evolutionary process. A certain result could only be obtained 
through the existence of supporting conditions, as already exposed in Xiao’s discussion 
of Yan Fu. Chinese reformers, however, wrongly believed that the import of a system as 
such would produce the same effects as had been obtained in the original context. Kang 
Youwei, for example, was convinced that the solution to China’s problems was a mere 
imitation of the Western economic, political, and educational systems. To describe 
Western systems, Chen Tianhua used the metaphor of “delicacies” (zhenxiu) spread out 
on a table: they were ready to be prepared and enjoyed at once. For this reason, Chen 
Tianhua believed that there was a greater chance of success in imitating than in 
inventing.454
453 Xiao Gongqin, “Lun dangdai Zhongguo de langman zhuyi gaigeguan: dui ‘zhidu juedinglun’ 
de piping,” XGJ, 87-108. Reference from 89. The article also appeared in Zhishi fenzi 1989:1.
Chen Tianhua was an intellectual who had studied in Japan and who had engaged in anti-Qing 
politics. He had also been involved in the founding of the Revolutionary Alliance 
(Tongmenghui) in 1905. 
454 Ibid. From Chen Tianhua, “Lun Zhongguo yigai chuang minzhu zhengti,” in Xinhai geming 
qianshinian shilun xuanji, Vol. 2, Part 1, 122. 
Sun Yat-sen used the metaphor of an advanced machine for the Western 
political system: the invention of a new machine meant that years of patience were 
required before the actual manufacturing of products; the imitation of an existing 
machine, on the contrary, guaranteed output after a short period of time.  Another
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comparison Sun Yat-sen came up with was that it was always better to use the newest 
locomotives than to rely on old-timers.455
A basic problem of this “system determinism,” according to Xiao, was that it 
always explained problems within its own framework: if reform did not succeed, it 
could only be because there was a problem with the old system, which obstructed the 
successes of the new system. As a result, radicalism was fought with more radicalism, 
and a vicious cycle of destruction was born.456 Since the old system was blamed for all 
problems, the only solution was to break entirely with the traditional system. Reform, 
according to this logic, became a revolution.457 The final result of this spiral of “system 
determinism,” disorder, and radicalism was a social breakdown.458 Here, we can also 
discern some similarities with Gasster’s reference to the term “radicalism”: Gasster had 
made mention of a special form of “radicalism” according to which failure of reform 
was seen as a proof that more reform was needed. In this context, Gasster had 
mentioned exactly the same examples, including Sun Yat-sen’s locomotive analogy.459
Its core concept is that all sorts of maladies in Chinese economy and society come into 
being because the system is not rational; the rapid economic development of Western 
industrial countries and the East Asian newly industrialized areas reveals the vitality 
and rationality of the market economy system. Since the crux of being economically 
advanced or backward is a problem of the system, hence, one must utilize the 
authoritative and administrative power of the government to introduce effective market 
model economic systems and methods from abroad into Chinese economic life, in 
order to replace the ossified Soviet model planned economy system of the 1950s. Once 
the systems that people consider both indispensable for the market economic order and 
In “On the Romanticist View of Reform in Contemporary China: A Criticism of 
‘System Determinism,’” Xiao integrated his research on radicalism in modern China 
with the problems of contemporary reform. Xiao stated on “system determinism” during 
the reforms of the 1980s: 
455 Xiao Gongqin, “Lun dangdai Zhongguo de langman zhuyi gaigeguan,” 89. From Sun 
Zhongshan, “Zai dongjing liuxuesheng huanyinghui shang de yanshuo,” in Xinhai geming 
qianshinian shilun xuanji, Vol. 2, Part 1, 125. 
456 Xiao Gongqin, “Lun dangdai Zhongguo de langman zhuyi gaigeguan,” 93-94.
457 Ibid., 100.
458 Xiao Gongqin, “Lishi jujue langman,” XGJ, 116.
459 Gasster, Birth of Radicalism, 241.
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mutually corresponding are established in China, a new market economic order will 
certainly take shape naturally, and it will guide China toward its economic take-off.460
The mainstream thought of the 1980s, Xiao continued, was that the large-scale import 
of the market system would foster market mechanisms. Nonetheless, this was a reversed 
logic: importing a system without the required social structures was like “wearing a rain 
suit and hoping it will rain.” 461 Since the old system had already been wiped out, 
whereas the new system had not been established yet, the result would be anomy. Those 
who believed in system determinism would ascribe this anomy to the fact that the old 
system had not been wiped out thoroughly. They would propose “economic shock 
therapies” (jingji shangde xiuke liaofa) or the direct import of Western-style pluralist 
democratic rule, but the result would be more anomy and a decline of authority and 
efficacy. When the two vicious circles of anomy leading to more radicalism and anomy 
leading to the decline of authority and efficacy converged during the 1980s, the social 
background of Tiananmen was created.462 Expanding political participation during a 
time of crisis was like “quenching thirst with poison” (yin zhen zhi ke).463
Xiao put forward two basic strategies for system transplantation. The first one, 
which Xiao called the “guidance model system” (youdaoxing zhidu), stood for the 
import of a system in accordance with the ripeness of the “modernizable factors” (ke
xiandaihua de yinsu) of the social organization. The system in turn would stimulate the 
ripening of these factors, and during this process, the system and the internal factors 
would be able to integrate gradually. The second possibility, which Xiao called the 
“greenhouse model system” (wenshixing zhidu), was that a different system and its 
elements would first be imported in one relatively isolated area.  As in a greenhouse, in 
this closed environment, the reaction of the old system to the new system could be 
tested in order to avoid later confrontations on a larger scale. Examples of this model 
were the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in China, of which the first four came into 
being in 1979.464
460 Xiao Gongqin, “Dui ‘zhidu juedinglun’ de piping,” XGJ, 87.
461 Xiao Gongqin, “Zouxiang chengshu,” XGJ, 126.
462 Ibid., 126-127.
463 Ibid., 137.
464 Xiao Gongqin, “Dui ‘zhidu juedinglun’ de piping,” XGJ, 103-105. The first four SEZs, cities 
in which direct foreign investment was allowed to stimulate export and to introduce foreign 
technology, were Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, and Xiamen. In 1986, fourteen more cities and 
the island Hainan were turned into SEZs. Xiao also mentioned a third import method that could 
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Xiao proposed to use the “guidance model system” in an initial stage, when the 
level of modernity was still very low. On the other hand, Xiao also added that the 
process of ripening of the social organization’s inner elements was a very slow one; 
moreover, an extra obstacle concerned the fact that the natural ripening of these 
elements had been interrupted by the planned economy between the 1950s and the late 
1970s. In comparison with the blueprints of the reformers, this method of guidance was 
one of “ruling by non-action” (wuwei er zhi). 465 As a complementary system, the 
“greenhouse model system” could be employed. However, the latter could only be used 
after a certain period, when conditions for import were ripe. What these two methods 
had in common, however, was their “trial-and-error” way of solving problems instead 
of starting out from a rational design. 466 Xiao’s stress on the application of new 
elements in a relatively isolated area and on the importance of “trial-and-error” is 
reminiscent of Karl Popper’s defense of “piecemeal engineering.” In The Open Society 
and Its Enemies, Popper cast aside the argument that social experiments had to be 
conducted on a large scale in order to get enough information. For Popper, social 
experiments under “laboratory conditions” or in an “isolated village” were developed by 
“trial-and-error” and were based on reason instead of passion. 467 In spite of these 
similarities, though, Xiao made no mention of Popper in his exposition of the models.
3.4.3 The “Political Romanticism” around May Fourth
The third and final type of “radicalism” that Xiao discerned in modern Chinese history 
was that of “political romanticism.” For Xiao, “romanticism” had two interrelated 
layers of meaning, namely the specific “mood” of loving the spontaneous and breaking 
with the restrictions of existing norms, and, secondly, the projection of ideals and 
aspirations onto outer objects without taking into account the true nature of the objects 
in question. Because of this second aspect, according to Xiao, romanticists often started 
from a “rational state” (heli zhuangtai) or an “orderly state” (zhixu zhuangtai) that did 
only be used when the first two methods were already fully realized. He called this third 
strategy the “integration model system” (zhenghexing zhidu), which he only explained briefly 
and vaguely as “those regulating instrumental macro-systems that are considered to maintain the 
operation of the socio-economic order in industrialized societies.” (Ibid., 104). Examples Xiao 
mentioned were the use of inflation to stimulate production, and the thorough relaxation of price 
controls to facilitate market growth and to guide production and circulation.  
465 Ibid., 105.
466 Interview with Xiao Gongqin, Shanghai, August 4, 2006. 
467 Popper, The Open Society, Vol. 1, 162-163.
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not exist in reality, such as, for example, Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s (1712-1778) image 
of the Middle Ages, which the latter derived from poems on the countryside.468 The 
basic characteristic of romanticism was what Xiao called its “subjectivism” (zhuti 
zhuyi), and he referred to the intellectual historian Stromberg’s description of “the 
participation of mind in shaping reality” to define romanticism, as well as to John 
Keats’ saying “beauty is truth.”469
Whereas in the West, romanticism had arisen as a reaction against society’s 
mechanical, stiff, and mediocre life style, or against the loss of subjectivity that 
accompanied industrialization, in China, political romanticism arose against the 
background of the struggle for national survival. One of the earliest representatives of 
“romantic nationalism” (langman de minzu zhuyi) was Chen Tianhua. In his 1905 
article “On China’s Suitability for Establishing a Democratic Political System,” Chen 
Tianhua argued that the nature of Chinese people differed from that of other nations, but 
their brightness had been suppressed by the despotic system of the Qing dynasty.
This projection alleviated feelings of repression and 
anxiety, but romanticism also functioned as a spiritual resource for action.
470
Therefore, once this system had been reversed, due to the superior qualities of the 
Chinese people, a democratic system could be realized quickly. The same romantic 
aspect of idealization could be discerned in Wang Jingwei (1883-1944), who argued 
that liberty, equality, and fraternity were present in the Chinese spirit; Chinese people 
since ancient times had the ability for constitutionalism.471
By advocating the direct realization of Western parliamentary democracy, 
Chinese thinkers failed to recognize that the Western political system was the product 
of the evolution of society; it was linked to its economic system, social structure, and 
value system.
A third representative of 
romantic thought in the early twentieth century was Sun Yat-sen, who was convinced 
that the reversal of the Qing dynasty could immediately be followed by democratic rule. 
472
468 Xiao Gongqin, “Cong zhengzhi langman zhuyi,” 266.
469 Ibid. Quote from Roland N. Stromberg, European Intellectual History since 1789 (New 
Jersey: Printice Hall, Inc., 1981), 50. 
470 Xiao quotes from Chen Tianhua’s “Lun Zhongguo yi gaichuang minzhu zhengti,” in Xinhai 
geming qianshinian shilun xuanji, Vol. 2, Part 1, 120-125.
471 Wang Jingwei had studied in Japan and was a member of Sun Yat-sen’s Revolutionary 
Alliance. Initially a Left KMT politician, Wang collaborated with the Japanese during the time 
of the Wang Jingwei Government in Nanjing. Wang was also a strong opponent of Chiang Kai-
shek. 
472 Xiao Gongqin, “Cong zhengzhi langman zhuyi,” XGJ, 274.
Chinese intellectuals also fell prone to what the British philosopher and 
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mathematician Alfred Whitehead (1861-1947) called the “fallacy of misplaced 
concreteness” (cuozhi jutigan de miuwu), or the false belief that something was a 
concrete reality, when in fact it was an abstract belief.473 Xiao borrowed this reference 
to Whitehead from Lin Yü-sheng, who had used it to criticize the use of foreign 
concepts in a Chinese context.474 Although Lin had invoked the concept to criticize the 
liberal Hu Shi (1891-1962) and the New Confucian Tang Junyi (1909-1978) in 
particular, Xiao also applied it to Chen Tianhua, Sun Yat-sen, and Wang Jingwei, 
whose parliamentary democracy was nothing but a “projection of desires” (yuanwang 
toushe).475
In “History Rejects Romanticism: The Rise of the Second Trend of Reform in 
China,”
The early republic suffered from endless party struggles and a cabinet crisis 
because the old and the new system could not integrate. 
476 Xiao also referred to this third type of radicalism as “French-Revolution-
style rationalist radicalism” (faguo dagemingshi de weili zhuyi de jijin zhuyi).477 Xiao 
called this rationalism because reforms were based on abstract principles of natural law, 
or on transcendent “first moral principles” (diyi daode yuanli), as briefly touched upon 
in the previous chapter.478 Xiao’s equation of the French Revolution with “rationalism” 
and his discarding of “first principles” can also be found in Edmund Burke.479 Xiao 
clarified that this “rationalism” was also “romanticism” because unconscious ideals 
were projected onto a system that had nothing to do with reality anymore. This 
romanticism was thus directly linked with “system determinism.”480
473 Ibid., 275. Whitehead coined the concept of “the fallacy of misplaced concreteness” in his 
Science and the Modern World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1927 (1926)).
474 See, for example, Lin Yü-sheng, “Reflections,” 89. 
475 Xiao Gongqin, “Cong zhengzhi langman zhuyi,” XGJ, 276.
476 Xiao Gongqin, “Lishi juejue langman,” XGJ, 109-122.
477 Ibid., 117.
478 Ibid. See Chapter Two, 61-62.
479 Turner, “Introduction, ” xxv and xliii, fn. 13. Burke contrasted “first principles” with history 
and circumstances in a letter to Joseph Hartford that dates from September 27, 1780. Chen Feng 
has related Xiao’s “rationalist radicalism” to J.L. Talman’s concept of “political Messianism.” 
However, whereas Xiao directed his criticism at liberal democracy, Talman used the concept to 
attack “totalitarian democracy.” See Chen, “Neoconservative Political Thought,” 599, fn. 19.
480 Xiao Gongqin, “Dui ‘zhidu juedinglun’ de piping,” XGJ, 90. 
As a consequence 
of “political and economic romanticism,” two different systems came into being: the 
one that really existed, and the one created by the idealist projections of the reformers. 
To point out the problems of this approach, Xiao referred to the German theologian 
Paul Tillich, according to whom romanticism forgot all about the limitations of men and 
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created blueprints that were not conform to reality, the result of which was tragedy.481
Chinese intellectuals therefore had to refuse romanticism, although Xiao admitted that it 
was hard, especially given the fact that they had been repressed for a considerable 
amount of time.482 Notwithstanding his reference to a German thinker in the context of 
“romanticism,” Xiao emphasized that his “romanticism” differed from its use in a 
German context. For Xiao, “romanticism” was a “special state of mind” (yizhong teshu 
de jingshen zhuangtai) related to Chinese problems; it was a kind of “emotionalism” 
(qingxu zhuyi).483
This romanticism was prevalent during the 1980s, in the form of what Xiao 
referred to as “pan-moralistic democracy” (fan daode zhuyi de minzhu). In contrast with 
the existing “contractual democracy” (qiyuexing minzhu) in the West, which was the 
historical product of civil society and the market economy, the “pan-moralistic” version 
was nothing but a political ideal created in the minds of Chinese intellectuals. 
“Contractual democracy” was the manifestation of a social system in which 
autonomous individuals bargained for rights and interests in a market economy based 
on economic contractual relations. “Pan-moralistic democracy”—which had already 
been present in the thought of literati such as Wang Fuzhi (1619-1692) and Huang 
Zongxi (1610-1695)—treated democracy as a tool for virtuous rule, in line with 
Confucian ideals, but it was also influenced by idealism and Rousseau’s moral 
democracy.484 Because the conditions for democracy were missing in China, it often 
turned into political “radicalism,” as had happened in 1989. At that time, the “pan-
moralistic democrats” included a moderate constitutionalist faction and a more radical 
liberal human rights faction. The latter believed that the democratic order could be 
designed according to first principles.485
Apart from its appearance during the 1980s and 1990s, romanticism also 
manifested itself since May Fourth, in the form of theories of wholesale Westernization. 
In “Rethinking the Struggle Between ‘Isms and Problems’ in Modern Intellectual 
History,” Xiao argued that the period since May Fourth had witnessed “the adoration of 
481 Xiao Gongqin, “Lishi jujue langman,” XGJ, 122.
482 Ibid.
483 Interview with Xiao Gongqin, Shanghai, August 4, 2006.
484 Xiao Gongqin, “Zouxiang chengshu,” XGJ, 127-130.
485 Ibid., 130-132. In 1994, Xiao also used the terms “romanticism and “radicalism” in relation 
to the so-called “New Left.” For Xiao, they were idealists who had not experienced the Cultural 
Revolution, and hence, they had no understanding of China’s “national conditions” and the 
importance of economic reform. See Xiao Gongqin, “Renwen zhishi fenzi,” XGJ, 187.
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ideas” (linian chongbai).486 Thinkers were convinced that the solution to all problems 
resided in abstract concepts. In fact, Xiao stated, this trend had also existed before May 
Fourth, for example in the belief since the Russo-Japanese war (1904-1905) that 
“constitutionalism” would rescue China (lixian jiuguolun). 487 The first Chinese 
intellectuals who doubted “isms” to solve “problems” were, according to Xiao, Yan Fu 
and Hu Shi. Given Xiao’s admiration for Yan Fu, he devoted most of the article to Yan 
Fu’s criticism of natural law and “ideas determinism” (linian juedinglun). Yan Fu 
already criticized thinkers from Plato to Rousseau in his Zhengzhi jiangyi (1906).488
Since 1913, he specifically criticized Rousseau’s “natural law theory” (ziran gonglilun)
in several works, such as Tianyan jinhualun (Evolution Theory, 1913),489 Shuodang
(On Parties, 1913),490 and Minyue pingyi (A Critique of the Social Contract, 1914).491 In 
all these works, Xiao argued, Yan Fu attacked the rationalist tradition of continental 
philosophy. Yan Fu’s most representative work in this respect was Minyue pingyi, in 
which he criticized Rousseau’s social contract theory for its reliance on abstract 
principles and its ignorance of practical experience and historical reality. Yan Fu 
disapproved of the political “perfectionism” (wanmei zhuyi) in the rationalist tradition; 
he preferred the tradition of British-American empiricism, a tradition in which liberty 
had grown out of the old society.492
In “Zhuangzi” pingyu (Comments on “Zhuangzi”),
Yan Fu stressed the importance of inducting theory 
from experience instead of deducting theory from idealism because society was an 
organism that operated independent of the human will. 
493
486 Xiao Gongqin, “Jindai sixiangshi shang de ‘zhuyi yu wenti’ zhizheng de zai sikao,” ZFL,
142-157. The same text appeared in XGJ under the title “ ‘Ziran gonglilun’ yu xiandai jijin 
sixiang: Yan Fu yu Hu Shi de sikao ji qi qishi,” 281-299. A shorter version of the text, in which 
Hu Shi was not discussed, appeared in Zhishifenzi yu guannianren, 57-71.
487 Xiao Gongqin, “‘Zhuyi yu wenti’” ZFL, 142.
488 Wang Shi, Yan Fuji, Vol. 5, 1241-1316. Originally published in 1906 by Shangwu 
yinshuguan chubanshe. 
489 Wang Shi, Yan Fuji, Vol. 2, 309-319. The article appeared in the Beijing journal Pingbao of 
April 12-May 2, 1913; it was divided into twelve subsequent parts. 
490 Wang Shi, Yan Fuji, Vol. 2, 298-308. Originally appeared in Pingbao in six parts, from 
March 6 until May 4, 1913. 
491 Wang Shi, Yan Fuji, Vol. 2, 333-340. It was originally published in Yongyanbao, in a 
combined issue of February 1914 (25 and 26).  
492 Xiao Gongqin, “‘Zhuyi yu wenti,’” ZFL, 145.
493 Wang Shi, Yan Fuji, Vol. 4, 1104-1150.
Xiao further argued, Yan 
Fu mentioned the growth of habits out of experience; for him, tradition was shaped 
through dealing with challenges in the environment. In Yuedang, Yan Fu condemned 
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the use of “natural law” to measure tradition, because it could only lead to political 
radicalism. In the same work, Yan Fu considered the French Revolution to be the 
standard of this radicalism. In Tianyan jinhualun, Yan argued against the destruction of 
the old, because he realized that it would inevitably lead to the disintegration of both old 
and new. In brief, long before other Chinese intellectuals, Yan Fu understood the 
struggle between continental rationalism and British empiricism, the opposition 
between their respective methods of deduction and induction, and the link between 
rationalism and utopianism, on the one hand, and between empiricism and gradual 
reform, on the other hand.  Yan Fu also criticized idealism from another perspective, 
namely from the angle of the struggle for survival. In this sense, Yan Fu was, according 
to Xiao, the pioneer of “political realism” (zhengzhi xianshi zhuyi).494
Like Yan Fu, Hu Shi criticized rationalism in the journal Meizhou pinglun 
(Weekly Critic) in 1919.
Nevertheless, 
tragically, he lived in an era of chaos during which people sought immediate and total 
solutions. 
495 For Hu Shi, “isms” were solutions to concrete problems, a 
point that has also been made in Lin Yü-sheng’s research on Hu Shi. Hu Shi objected to 
separating “isms” from the concrete environment in which they had originated and 
argued that one should first study both the background of the “ism” and the essence of 
the problem in question. As in Yan Fu, Xiao discerned an empiricist stance in Hu Shi’s 
talk of “isms” and problems. Although one specific “ism” Hu targeted was socialism, 
according to Xiao, his criticism was much broader and was directed at “ism 
determinism” (zhuyi juedinglun) in general.496
Although Xiao supported Hu Shi’s empiricist approach, he was critical of Hu 
Shi because the latter had failed to see that there are two kinds of “isms”: empiricist-
type “isms” (jingyan zhuyi leixing de zhuyi) and rationalist-type “isms” (weili zhuyi 
leixing de zhuyi).497
494 Xiao Gongqin, “‘Zhuyi yu wenti,’” ZFL, 150.
495 Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao, who were both working for the recently established Peking 
University, founded this journal in December 1918.
496 Xiao Gongqin, “‘Zhuyi yu wenti,’” ZFL, 152.
497 Ibid., 153.
Whereas the former were related to concrete problems, the latter 
were derived from abstract “first principles,” or from ideas of the ultimate good. Only 
by making this division into two kinds of “isms” could one explain why, during the 
early twentieth century, Chinese intellectuals had only been attracted to “French 
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revolution style idealism” (Faguo dagemingshi de lixiang zhuyi), and not to “Anglo-
American style empiricist liberalism” (yingmeishi jingyan zhuyi de ziyou zhuyi).498
3.5 “RADICALISM,” BURKE, AND HISTORY
This 
point, Xiao claimed, distinguished Yan Fu’s analysis from Hu Shi’s. Yan Fu saw the 
connection between the rationalist philosophical tradition and the French Revolution. 
Both, however, offered criticism of abstract Western “isms” from the angle of 
empiricism, and both made their own particular historical reality their point of 
departure. “Rationalist “isms” were popular in China because they rose above concrete 
circumstances and they were considered to be universally valid. Given the crisis of the 
traditional cultural order since the late nineteenth century, it was easy for Chinese 
intellectuals to cast reality aside and to aim at idealist principles. Another reason why 
rationalist “isms” held sway was, according to Xiao, that they contained the same 
structure as Confucian tradition; both the dichotomy between good and bad and the idea 
of perfectionism were elements of Confucian tradition. 
What do these manifestations of “radicalism” in modern Chinese history tell us about 
the role of Burkean conservatism in Xiao Gongqin’s “neo-conservatism”? As regards 
“mental radicalism,” the only Burkean element present is the idea of caution when it 
comes to reform. Yet in this context, caution was not advocated because of the 
underlying notion that institutions were historically grown; gradual reform was not 
defended on conservative grounds. In addition, conservative goals related to the 
preservation of the community were absent from Xiao’s defense of the “Fabianist 
approach”; the goal as such was political reform. Xiao’s defense of gradualism, then, 
was driven by tactical reasons, by realism, and by efficiency. Gradual reform was 
upheld because it could avoid a legitimacy crisis, the polarization of the bureaucracy, 
and anomy. The only conservative aspect was the concern with political stability. The 
dominant force behind Xiao Gongqin’s “mental radicalism” was not Edmund Burke, 
but Samuel Huntington, who pressed for caution regarding reforms in large-scale 
bureaucracies. 
Xiao has combined this Huntingtonian approach with a psychological analysis 
of the reformers’ mindset. This move needs to be understood in the context of a 
498 Ibid.
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growing interest in a variety of Western theories that were now available in Chinese 
translation. The historian Ma Yong, for example, also made use of psychoanalysis in his 
historical research at the time; he likewise referred to the approach of the 1898 Reform 
Movement as “romantic idealism.” 499 Like Xiao Gongqin, Ma Yong blamed 
intellectuals of modern China for always seeking perfection, for wanting to change 
China overnight, and for not facing reality. All great men in Chinese history, Ma Yong 
claimed, suffered from the mental problem of not being able to accept imperfection.500
499 In an article on the Reforms of 1898, Ma Yong used the term “romantic political idealism” to 
refer to the reform strategy of the movement. However, in contrast with Xiao Gongqin, Ma 
Yong studied the intra-elite struggle in particular. He attributed the failure of the reforms to the 
errors in policy making and to the nature of the political system, in which the government was 
but an instrument of the emperor. Instead of reducing the problem to the “radicalism” of Kang 
Youwei, Ma Yong looked at the tensions between emperor Guangxu and the Empress Dowager 
Cixi, as well as at the wider context of a “fin-de-siècle” mentality in which hasty decisions were 
made. It would have been wiser, Ma Yong argued, to adhere to the gradual reform plans of 
Zhang Zhidong. See Ma Yong, “Jiawu zhanzheng yu Zhongguo jingying jieceng de jijin yu 
kun’e,” ZYG 1994:6, 97-105. Reprinted in ZFL, 103-120.
500 Interview with Ma Yong, Beijing, September 1, 2005.
These modes of analysis were a clear move away from the explanatory model of class 
analysis, as will be explained in detail below.
As for “system determinism,” Xiao criticized a naïve “system transplantation” 
on the basis that societies were historically grown and that they formed organic entities. 
Xiao emphasized the importance of evolution, ripening, and trial-and-error instead of 
engineering. Although the grounds on which Xiao defended his gradualism—namely, 
the notion of historical growth and the theory of the social organism—appeared to be 
conservative, his goal was nevertheless still economic reform. This goal can only be 
called conservative if it serves to protect tradition, habits, the community, or 
intermediate groups. But Xiao made no mention of these elements and merely focused 
on economic reform in se. In addition, the conservative grounds on which Xiao made 
his argument can also be questioned, for Xiao’s reading seemed more based on Yan 
Fu’s evolutionism than on Burkean conservatism. Xiao read Burkean notions into Yan 
Fu’s social Darwinism, but his advocacy of historical continuity was more evolutionist 
than Burkean in nature. The Burkean belief in the accidental nature of change—one 
never knows what exactly will happen, because processes of change are beyond the 
human ability to comprehend them—was exchanged for an evolutionist scrutiny of laws 
of development in order to apply them to small-scale models. 
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Xiao’s “political romanticism” resembles Burke’s criticism of rationalism and 
natural law, and in that respect, it can be said that Xiao made his argument on 
conservative grounds. However, as regards this type of radicalism, conservative goals 
were also lacking. Xiao talked about “contractual democracy” as the product of both 
civil society and the market economy, which suggests a liberal rather than a 
conservative framework. In fact, the argument Xiao makes here is reminiscent of 
Hayek’s comparison between two traditions of liberty in The Constitution of Liberty
(1960).501
Xiao had access to Hayek in Chinese because some of Hayek’s works had been 
translated in Taiwan during the 1970s and 1980s, after which mainland translations 
followed.
For Hayek, only the British tradition was a tradition of liberty because of its 
different view of evolution and the functioning of society. The French tradition, of
which Jean-Jacques Rousseau was one of the main representatives, based itself on 
Cartesian rationalism to design society rationally and ex nihilo. The British tradition of 
Edmund Burke and others, on the contrary, drew on experience to promote change, as 
well as on the belief that change was rooted in adaptive evolution and cumulative 
growth, which is why tradition played such an important role in processes of change.
502 Xiao can be said to be closer to Hayek than to Burke in that he defended 
the historical growth of societies in relation to Hayek’s liberal argument: political 
democracy had to be based on certain social structures that could not be imported 
overnight.  This interpretation is confirmed by Xiao’s argument that Yan Fu’s 
empiricism was influenced by the tradition of English liberalism. Hayek has referred to 
this tradition as “true liberalism,” namely the empiricist tradition rooted in history.503
Xiao has also noted that Burke’s conservatism was rooted in the tradition of civil 
society and “English-style liberalism.”504
3.5.1 “Using the Past to Serve the Present”?
As for the role of history in Xiao Gongqin’s argument, several elements can be 
discerned. On the one hand, since Xiao took the reality of reform during the late 1980s 
501 See F.A. Hayek, “Freedom, Reason, and Tradition,” in The Constitution of Liberty, 49-62.
502 Haiyeke, F.A., Dao nuyi zhilu, trans. Zhang Shangde (Taipei: Guiguan tushu gufen youxian 
gongsi, 1982); Haiyeke, F.A., Geren zhuyi yu jingji zhixu, trans. Xia Daoping (Taipei: Taiwan 
yinhang jingji yanjiushi, 1971); Hayeke, F.A., Geren zhuyi yu jingji zhixu, trans. Jia Zhan, Wen 
Yueran et al. (Beijing: Beijing jingji xueyuan chubanshe, 1989).
503 Xiao Gongqin, “Dangdai Zhongguo xin baoshou zhuyi,” EYS, 130. 
504 Ibid., 134.
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and early 1990s as a point of departure, his usage of history showed signs of what 
Timothy Cheek has called “historical pragmatism,” or, the reference to the past as a 
“storehouse of human experience” that was consulted to solve present problems.505
Concerning the Reform Movement of 1898, for example, the historian Ma Yong has 
noted that the 1880s and 1890s in many ways resembled the 1980s and 1990s. After 
several decades of exposure to Western impact, in both instances, intellectuals reached 
the conclusion that modernization required not only economic modernization, but also 
political modernization. In both cases, these reforms failed, caused a short period of 
setback, and were followed by new policies.506
Nevertheless, the difference between Xiao Gongqin and scholars like Ma Yong 
was that the latter engaged with the Reform Movement of 1898 because they wanted to 
answer questions concerning their field of specialization, whereas Xiao Gongqin was 
not a specialist on modern Chinese history; he used it for theoretical reflections on 
problems of reform. From Ma Yong’s perspective, Xiao Gongqin undoubtedly merely 
utilized history as a tool, which is why non-specialists such as Xiao should “give history 
back to the historians.”
This perceived similarity between the 
two eras explains why history was looked upon as a storehouse of examples. 
507 Then again, the distinction that Ma Yong made between a 
genuine interest in history and an instrumental exploitation of it was a bit simplistic, 
since his own engagement with the 1898 Reform Movement in particular was also 
driven by a growing interest in issues of political reform. The explosion of interest in 
the Reform Movement of 1898 was in itself also stimulated by the spirit of the times. 
Although specialists hence criticized the study of modern Chinese history by non-
specialists, in debates and books in which topics in modern Chinese history constituted 
the subject of discussion, their articles appeared side by side.508
505 Cheek, “Historians as Public Intellectuals,” 209.
506 Interview with Ma Yong, Beijing, September 1, 2005. The “setback” in the case of the 1890s 
lasted from 1898 until 1900, when the Qing government launched the “New Policies” 
(Xinzheng). In the case of 1989, a three-year period of relative closure followed, after which 
more thorough reforms were launched with Deng’s Southern Tour in early 1992.
507 Interview with Ma Yong, Beijing, August 8, 2005, and June 6, 2006. 
508 Interview with Ma Yong, Beijing, August 8, 2005. For example, Ma Yong’s article “Jiawu 
zhanzheng yu Zhongguo jingying jieceng de jijin yu kun’e” and Xiao Gongqin’s “Wuxu bianfa 
de zai fanxing: jianlun zaoqi zhengzhi jijin zhuyi de wenhua genyuan” both appeared in the 
1999 volume ZFL and in ZYG. Several texts by both authors—on topics ranging from the 1898 
Reform Movement and the elimination of the examination system in 1905 to the 1911 
Revolution—appeared in Chongxin renshi bainian Zhongguo. See Feng Lin, ed., Chongxin 
renshi bainian Zhongguo: jindaishi redian wenti yanjiu yu zhengming, Vol.1. (Beijing: Gaige 
chubanshe, 1998).
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Concerning the question of just how instrumental Xiao’s projection of 
“radicalism” into modern Chinese history was, one important distinction needs to be 
made, namely that between historical allusions and analogies. Whereas the latter is open 
and stresses the similar structure of events, the former is hidden and works by means of 
reference.509 Peter Moody has interpreted Xiao’s writings on 1898 as an allusion to both 
the turmoil of 1989 and Deng Xiaoping’s “radical” reform program; Xiao’s criticism 
amounted to a defense of the Jiang Zemin line of reform. According to this reading, 
1898 stood for 1989, the Empress Dowager was Deng Xiaoping, and both the emperor 
and Kang Youwei could stand for Zhao Ziyang. Or, Kang Youwei and other members 
of the Reform Movement could refer to the protest movement of 1989. Consequently, 
the meaning of the essay on 1898 would be that the goals of the liberal reforms were 
right, but that the methods were wrong.510
Another element that contradicts a pure “instrumentalist” reading of Xiao’s 
reference to history can be found in Xiao’s saying that for Yan Fu, any politics should 
be rooted in history; it should not be based on abstract principles.
This interpretation seems too narrow given 
the fact that other Chinese historians—Ma Yong could serve as an example—have used 
the late Qing reforms as part of a historical analogy between these reforms and the 
reforms of the 1980s and early 1990s. Moreover, Xiao’s research on the topic is much 
too extensive to be reduced to a mere allusion; it was so vast precisely because of 
elements of analogy, not of allusion. Like other historians, Xiao was convinced of the 
similar structure of the 1890s and the 1980s.
511
509 Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik has made this distinction in “Linear Versus Cyclical Time: 
The Problem of Restoration in Marxist Chinese Historiography,” conference paper for the 
conference on The Writing of History in 20th Century East Asia: Between Linear Time and the 
Reproduction of National Consciousness,” Leiden, June 4-7, 2007. 
510 Moody, Conservative Thought, 158-159.
511 Xiao Gongqin, “Dangdai Zhongguo xin baoshou zhuyi,” EYS, 133.
This quote reflects 
Xiao’s own view concerning history as a source of legitimacy. In a conservative sense, 
Xiao believed that only the historically grown contained legitimacy, which is why he 
spent so much energy on a reading of history. Hence, history did not merely function as 
mere decorum or as a mode of discourse in Xiao’s works; history contained a moral 
force because it was the accumulation of past wisdom. Xiao’s politics was a politics of 
history in the sense that he, on the one hand, made use of history to study problems of 
reform in the present—and to make his argument for political centralization—and that 
he, on the other hand, only valued a politics that was rooted in history. 
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What Moody has also overlooked is the fact that modern Chinese history itself 
also constituted the object of revision: the reform movement of 1898 was studied as 
“the earliest attempt of the Chinese people at the all-round pursuit of modernization.”512
By projecting “radicalism” into the past, Xiao applied the modernization paradigm to 
modern Chinese history, which was challenging with regard to official historiography. 
Xiao’s focus on modernization in modern Chinese history was in line with new 
developments in the historiography of modern China since the start of the reform period 
in 1978. Arif Dirlik has argued that this period signified a “paradigm shift” in Western 
historiography on China; the analytical framework of revolution was supplanted with 
that of modernization. In spite of this, the embrace of the modernization paradigm did 
not signify a total rejection of the revolutionary paradigm; the two still coexisted. In a 
Western context, Huntington’s Political Order in Changing Societies reworked 
modernization theory under the influence of revolution theory; it was by no means the
substitution of one paradigm for another. Huntington argued that modernization could 
lead to revolution, and therefore, “for non-Euramerican societies, authoritarian 
modernization provided an alternative to revolution.”513
Concerning the Chinese historiography of modern China, it can be said that 
there was also a “proliferation of paradigms,” but the modernization paradigm was 
never officially accepted and remains controversial up to this day.514
Different scientific communities have different research methods, emphases, methods 
to formulate questions, and theoretical systems—different “paradigms.” Scientific 
progress is the alternation of “paradigms”; the decline of old “paradigms” and the 
emergence of new “paradigms” are closely tied to the social environment and the 
social psychology of that moment. (…) From this point of view, it is no coincidence 
that the re-apprehension of a hundred years of history of modern China and the “new 
era” of reform and opening up almost started simultaneously. The “Zeitgeist” of this 
In a foreword to a 
volume entitled Re-apprehending a Hundred Years China, which includes one of Xiao 
Gongqin’s articles, Dirlik’s argument can be found literally, including a reference to 
Kuhn’s “paradigm shift”: 
512 Ma Yong, “Jindai lishi renwu,” 677.
513 Dirlik, “Reversals, Ironies, Hegemonies,” 258.
514 Dirlik, “The Past as Ideology and Critical Resource,” unpublished conference paper for 
Workshop on Revisionism, Leiden, November 2005.
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era had already shifted from fierce “revolution” and “struggle” to the pursuit of 
modernization (…).515
3.5.2 The Modernization Paradigm and Marxist Approaches
From the perspective of Marxist historiography, rewriting modern Chinese history as 
the history of modernization was a thorough shift. According to the old 
historiographical “paradigm,” the main narrative of modern Chinese history 
(jindaishi)—which stretched from the First Opium War (1839-1842) until the May 
Fourth Movement of 1919—was the struggle against both feudalism and imperialism.516
Firstly, the Opium War had marked the beginning of the “semi-colonial” and 
“semi-feudal” historical stage, but it had also meant the start of the revolutionary 
struggle against this stage. Second, the Taiping Rebellion (1851-1864) represented the 
“glorious revolutionary tradition” of the Chinese people, for it had struggled against the 
two “semis.” It had failed, however, because it had been a simple peasant rebellion that 
lacked the leadership of workers. Third, the Self-strengthening Movement (yangwupai)
(1860s-1890s) was judged negatively because it had relied on capitalism to preserve 
feudalist rule. The fourth event, the Sino-French war of the 1880s, had been a struggle 
of the Chinese people against imperialist invasion. Fifthly, the Sino-Japanese war 
(1894-1895) had heralded more “semi-colonization,” but it had also signaled the start of 
a more intense struggle against it. Sixth, the reforms of 1898 had been mistaken because 
Chinese society was a “semi-colonized” and “semi-feudal” society; historical incidents 
were weighed on the basis of their struggle against or alignment with colonization and 
feudal forces. This model was referred to as the “two semis” (liangban). In this scheme, 
there was a standard interpretation of the “great eight events” (bada shijian) in late Qing 
history. 
515 Lei Yi, “Zongxu,” 2.
516 The demarcation lines of “modern Chinese history” (jindaishi) have changed over time. In 
1950, when the historian Fan Wenlan founded the Modern History Research Institute of CASS, 
modern Chinese history (jindaishi) was conceived of as stretching from the Opium War (1840) 
until the May Fourth Movement of 1919. The period after 1919 was referred to as xiandaishi.
Nowadays, jindaishi usually stretches from the Opium War until the foundation of the People’s 
Republic of China in 1949. See Jiang Tao, “Wanqing zhengzhishi,” 19-22. Some researchers 
also claim that the “jindai” period only ended in 1976, with the death of Mao Zedong, after 
which the true period of modernization started. Another (older) viewpoint is that 1956 should be 
the demarcation line, because that was the year when socialism was purified of capitalist 
elements and when the march toward a “pure” socialism started. Interview with Ma Yong, 
Beijing, June 6, 2006. 
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they had caused China to embark on the capitalist road. It had been a movement lead by 
intellectuals driven by Western capitalist thought; it had upheld reformism and had thus 
boycotted the peasant revolution. The Boxer Rebellion (1899-1901), on the contrary, 
had been a great peasant rebellion, but its struggle against imperialism had failed 
because it lacked proletarian leadership. Finally, the revolution of 1911 had been the 
first “great democratic revolution”; it had ended two thousand years of monarchical 
rule. It had offered the conditions for the spread of capitalism in China, but this had 
paved the way for later liberation.517
A well-known example of this narrative was Fan Wenlan’s Modern Chinese 
History, which was first published in 1947.518 Fan Wenlan ended the first volume with 
the concluding phrase that the world proletariat would be “forever the true friend of the 
Chinese people,” whereas imperialism and its running dogs was “the evil enemy.”519
Fan Wenlan was also the historian who had developed Mao’s theory of the “two basic 
contradictions” (liangge genben maodun) in modern Chinese history, namely that 
between imperialism and the Chinese people, and that between feudalism and the 
Chinese masses.520 A variation on the same theme of the revolutionary struggle against 
foreign imperialism can be found in Hu Sheng’s well-known 1981 account From the 
Opium War to the May Fourth Movement.521 Hu Sheng applied the model of the “three 
revolutionary peaks” (sanci geming gaochao) of the period, namely the Taiping 
Rebellion, the period following the Sino-Japanese war (1895-1900), and the period 
from the founding of the Revolutionary Alliance until the Revolution (1905-1911).522
517 Jiang Tao, “Wanqing zhengzhishi,” 24-30.
518 In his preface, Fan indicated that he intended to write the history of the “old democratic 
revolution” before 1949 and that of the “new democratic revolution” since 1949. His Zhongguo 
jindaishi divided the former into two periods, namely the period from the Opium War until the 
Boxer Rebellion, and the period from the Boxer Rebellion until the May Fourth Movement of 
1919. See Fan Wenlan, Zhongguo jindaishi, 2 vols. (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1947). 
519 Ibid., Vol. 1, 403.
520 Mao had coined this phrase in his “Zhongguo geming he Zhongguo gongchandang”; Fan 
explained it in his article “Zhongguo jindaishi de fenqi wenti (yi),” Fanwenlan lishi lunwen 
xuanji (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1979), 117.
521 Hu Sheng, Cong yapian zhanzheng dao wusi yundong, 2 vols. (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 
1981).
522 The model of the “three revolutionary peaks” was not coined by Hu Sheng, but Hu Sheng 
adapted it by not reducing the second “peak” to the Boxer Rebellion, but by also including the 
“reformist movement that pursued capitalist ideals,” namely the Reform Movement of 1898. 
See Hu Sheng, Cong yapian zhanzheng, 4.
In 
this scheme, each revolution was analyzed according to the class basis of its instigators. 
The New Culture Movement had been mistaken because it believed in the primacy of 
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intellectual revolution, but it had broken with the feudalist tradition. It had been a 
patriotic movement against imperialism; it had “pronounced the end of the old 
democratic revolution led by the bourgeoisie and the beginning of the new democratic 
revolution led by the proletariat.”523
Hu Sheng started writing his From the Opium War to the May Fourth Movement 
in 1973, but by the time of its publication in 1981, the model of the “two semis” had 
come under attack; people were no longer satisfied with a historiography along 
revolutionary lines only. As Jiang Tao put it, the revolution against imperialism and 
feudalism concealed the other side of the story, namely that of semi-independence and 
semi-capitalism. The famous historian Liu Danian therefore rephrased the “two basic 
problems” of national independence and feudal rule as problems of modernization and 
industrialization.524 In 1980, the framework of three stages of development, namely the 
Self-strengthening Movement, the 1898 Reform Movement, and the “bourgeois” 
revolution of 1911, was applied in an article. This perspective was referred to as the 
“three ladders” (sange jieti).525
Pang Pu followed this new model of interpretation by arguing that Chinese 
modernization had first been oriented towards material aspects, such as military 
equipment. Later, it focused on political and cultural reform respectively.526 One of the 
leading Chinese scholars on modernization theory was Luo Rongqu (1927-1996) of 
Peking University.527 Luo Rongqu was a graduate of the History Department of Peking 
University who later specialized in modern world history and the history of the relations 
between China and the United States. As the head of the newly founded Research 
Center of the Global Modernization Process (Shijie xiandaihua jincheng yanjiu 
zhongxin) of Peking University, Luo Rongqi became a pioneer of modernization 
research on mainland China.528
523 Ibid., 965.
524 Jiang Tao, “Wanqing zhengzhishi,” 38. Ma Yong also mentioned that historians of the older 
generation, such as Liu Danian, acknowledged the existence of a third set of contradictions in 
modern Chinese history, namely that between a modern and a backward China. Interview with 
Ma Yong, Beijing, June 6, 2006.
525 Jiang Tao, “Wanqing zhengzhishi,” 37-38.
526 Interview with Ma Yong, Beijing, June 6, 2006.
527 See for example Luo Rongqu, ed., Cong “xihua” dao xiandaihua (Beijing: Beijing daxue 
chubanshe, 1990); Luo Rongqu, Dong Zhenghua, eds., Dongya xiandaihua: xin moshi yu xin 
jingyan (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 1997). 
528 Zhongguo dangdai mingrenlu, 579.
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The focus on modernization meant that the former “heroes” of modern Chinese 
history—the leaders of peasant rebellions and mass movements—had lost ground. Since 
the yardstick was now modernization instead of the struggle against feudalism and 
imperialism, a “reversal of verdicts” (fan’an) on historical figures took place. Therefore, 
research on the heroes of the Opium War, such as Lin Zexu (1785-1850), or the leader 
of the Taiping rebellion, Hong Xiuquan (1814-1864), now made room for research on 
members of the ruling class or literati, such as the late Qing Empress Dowager Cixi, or 
Zeng Guofan (1811-1872), the general who had fought against the Taiping rebels.529
Chinese historians praised the “Self-strengtheners” and the reformers of 1898, whereas 
Sun Yat-sen and the “bourgeois revolution” became the objects of criticism.530 The 
historian Ma Yong has attacked the mushrooming of reversals of verdicts on historical 
figures during the 1990s because they turned into a mere “research method of the denial 
of denial.”531 Similarly, Jiang Tao has compared this reversal of verdicts during the 
1990s to a  “flipping pancake”-style.532 A famous example of this reversal concerns 
Zeng Guofan, the man who had previously been considered a “traitor” in Chinese 
historiography because he had suppressed a progressive peasant rebellion. During the 
1990s, however, Chinese historians evaluated Zeng as a great man with Confucian 
qualities.533
Although modernization was also the central preoccupation of the CCP during 
the early 1990s, the CCP did not accept the modernization paradigm as a narrative of 
modern Chinese history. Efforts were made to keep the paradigm out of historical 
textbooks, and they continue up to this day. An example concerns the controversy 
529 Ma Yong, “Jindai lishi renwu yanjiu,” 660; Chen Baiming, “Wenhua jijin zhuyi,” 133-134.
For an overview of the “heroes” and “villains” of the early 1990s, see Zhang Haipeng, “Jinnian 
lai Zhongguo jindaishi yanjiu zhong de ruogan yuanzexing lunzheng,” Makesi zhuyi yanjiu
1997: 8, 14-22.
530 Other historical figures that were evaluated negatively included Li Dazhao (1888-1927) and 
Lu Xun (1881-1936). Among those who were revaluated were Li Hongzhang (1823-1901), 
Yuan Shikai (1859-1916), Hu Shi (1891-1962), Chiang Kai-shek (1887-1975), and Wang 
Jingwei (1883-1944). 
531 Ma Yong, “Jindai lishi renwu yanjiu,” 683
532 Jiang Tao, “Wanqing zhengzhishi,” 42.
533 See Guo Yingjie, “Rewriting National History: The ‘Zeng Guofan phenomenon,’” in idem, 
Cultural Nationalism, 49-71. In 1993, Tang Haoming’s historical novel Zeng Guofan came out, 
and it became such a success that it was printed 19 times between October 1993 and May 1996 
(ibid., 49). Zeng Guofan was also positively portrayed in the series Zouxiang Gonghe (Toward 
the Republic), and a TV-series called Zeng Guofan was dedicated to him. Tang Haoming’s 
trilogy on Zeng Guofan can be found at http://www.shuku.net/dblx/html/52/1057-2-0.html
(accessed on February 2, 2009).
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caused by a 2006 article by Yuan Weishi, a Professor in the Philosophy Department of 
Zhongshan University in Guangzhou, who condemned the heroic and patriotic portrayal 
of the Chinese struggle against foreign invasion in both the Opium Wars and the Boxer 
Rebellion from the perspective of Chinese modernization.534 In response to the article, 
the Marxist historian Zhang Haipeng reiterated that the basic themes in modern Chinese 
history were the struggle against imperialism and feudalism.535
Xiao Gongqin’s engagement with modernization research, although it partly 
suited official interests, was also in tension with these very interests, since it challenged 
official interpretations of modern Chinese history. By rewriting modern Chinese history 
as the history of modernization, Xiao did not just “use the past to serve the present”; he 
also engaged in a revision of modern Chinese history. Xiao’s emphasis on the role of 
intellectuals in modern Chinese history also implied that he, as an intellectual, could 
play an important role in China’s modernization process. Nevertheless, there was still a 
difference between Xiao’s rewriting of modern Chinese history and the critique of 
“radicalism” that will be discussed in the next chapter. Whereas Xiao never explicitly 
attacked the legitimacy of the CCP, other intellectuals explicitly and directly criticized 
the notion of revolution, as will be explained further. 
3.6 A “NEO-CONSERVATISM” SUI GENERIS: “STRUCTURES” AND “SYSTEM 
CULTURES”
For the final piece of the puzzle of Xiao’s “neo-conservatism,” we have to look into his 
reference to the French sociologist Émile Durkheim. Apart from Xiao’s use of the 
Durkheimian concept of anomy, as mentioned before, Xiao also drew on Durkheim’s 
distinction between different types of “solidarity” in societies to support his idea that 
different social structures required different political, economic, and cultural systems. 
As such, Xiao did not base his relativist argument on differences in culture or values, 
534 Yuan Weishi’s article “Modernization and History Textbooks” (Xiandaihua yu jiaokeshu)
was originally published in Bingdian (Freezing Point), a weekly supplement of China Youth 
Daily, on January 11, 2006. After the publication of this article, Freezing Point was shut down 
and its editors, Li Datong and Li Erliang, were replaced. For Yuan Weishi’s article and debates 
surrounding the issue, see http://edu.people.com.cn/GB/1055/4016350.html (retrieved on 
February 27, 2008).
535 Freezing Point resumed publication in March 2006; Zhang Haipeng’s article appeared in the 
March 1st issue. The article was entitled “The Main Theme in Modern Chinese History Is Anti-
Imperialism/Anti-Feudalism.” 
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but on differences pertaining to the structural bases of Eastern and Western systems. 
The use of Durkheim underscored Xiao’s criticism of “system determinism” in 
particular, but it was also consistent with his criticism of other types of “radicalism.” 
In “The Research of Durkheim, Marx, and Xunzi on Homogenous Societies and 
Its Enlightenment,” Xiao took Durkheim’s distinction between “mechanical” and 
“organic” “solidarity” as a starting point of inquiry. 536
Following Durkheim in his The Division of Labor in Society, Xiao discerned 
two different types of solidarity in societies: “mechanical solidarity” (jixie tuanjie) in 
societies with “homogenous” individuals (tongzhi geti), and “organic solidarity” (youji 
tuanjie) in societies composed of “heterogeneous” individuals (yizhi geti).
Durkheim had made this 
distinction in the context of his research on the division of labor in society. For 
Durkheim, primitive societies were marked by “mechanical solidarity,” or, the 
domination of a collective conscience that left little room for the development of 
individual personalities. Advanced societies, on the contrary, following the division of 
labor, were typified by “organic solidarity,” or, the development of individual 
consciences and the specialization of functions that led to cooperation and the mutual 
interdependence of individuals. 
537
Xiao explained that in societies based on “mechanical solidarity,” people shared 
the same values and lacked autonomy; society was orderly, as in an army. With the 
division of labor, the differentiation of functions, the rise of autonomy, and the 
pluralization of values substituted for this orderly form. Consequently, horizontal 
contractual relationships (qiyuexing renji guanxi) and interest groups (liyi jituan) came 
into being. Following Durkheim, Xiao compared societies based on “organic solidarity” 
Xiao 
argued that for Durkheim, the relationship between these two types of solidarity had 
been chronological: Durkheim had applied “mechanic solidarity” to primitive societies 
only; “organic solidarity” could merely be found in industrial societies. Durkheim’s 
model was a European model in which European societies were mapped over different 
periods of time. Xiao criticized this “Eurocentrism” and modified the theory into a 
theory to explain differences between East and West. “Mechanical solidarity,” Xiao 
argued, was not just a characteristic of primitive societies; it was also present in 1980s 
China, where the division of labor was still on a basic level. 
536 Xiao Gongqin, “Du’erkaimu, Makesi yu Xunzi dui tongzhi shehui de yanjiu ji qi qishi,”
XGJ, 3-17. The article also appeared in Tianjin shehui kexue 1992: 6, and in YZLG, 435-448.
537 Ibid., 3-4.
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to living organisms in which each “organ” had its own function.538 For Xiao, the type of 
solidarity of a society determined its “system culture” (zhidu wenhua), a conviction that 
supported his view that systems could not be transported because they were the product 
of long-term historical factors.539
In China, on the contrary, the planned economy between the 1950s and the 
1970s had created an unnatural division of labor. The relationships among individuals 
were not a natural outgrowth of the social structure; they were formed by means of 
authority. Xiao called this a “para-homogenous structure” (leitong zhiti jiegou): 
although society was not “homogenous” anymore, individual autonomy and the 
horizontal voluntary contractual relationships were still on the lowest level.
The problem with Chinese reformers since modern 
times was precisely that they had been unaware of the existence of different social 
structures underneath the Chinese and the Western systems; they had considered it 
sufficient to simply transplant the “system culture” of Western societies. It was the 
difference between “mechanical” and “organic” solidarity in particular that determined 
the differences between Eastern and Western cultures. Contemporary Western culture, 
because its society was heterogeneous, had developed a system of multiple democratic 
parties, interest groups, contractual relationships, autonomy, and self-rule. 
540 Since this 
structure was the furthest away from the heterogeneous, organic social structure found 
in Western societies, different strategies of reform were required. The existing authority 
had to push reforms forward; the market economy was needed for the ripening of 
autonomous and heterogeneous individuals. Consequently, authority also functioned as 
a kind of intermediary between the existing structure and new elements of 
modernization.541
Xiao took this basic distinction between “homogenous” and “heterogeneous” 
societies as a point of entry to read both Karl Marx’s writings on the so-called “Asian 
mode of production” (AMP) and the ancient Chinese philosopher Xunzi’s (ca. 315-235
B.C.) argument in favor of clear social divisions in society.542
538 Ibid., 5.
539 Ibid.
540 Ibid., 16.
541 Xiao Gongqin, “Lishi jujue langman,” XGJ, 113. On the “authority lever” for modernization 
in a “post-totalitarian society,” see Xiao Gongqin, “The Political Attitudes,” 59.
542 Xunzi, a philosopher whose real name was Xun Kuang, but who is generally known as Xun 
Qing, was born in the state of Zhao during the Warring States period (453-256). For a 
translation of Xunzi’s complete works, see John Knoblock, Xunzi: A Translation and Study of 
the Complete Works, 3 vols. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988).
Marx, Xiao argued, had
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partly explained the despotic rule in Asian societies by relying on the fact that they 
consisted of homogenous individuals. The other part of Marx’s explanation was that 
these homogenous individuals had turned to a despotic and centralized form of 
government in order to deal with social and environmental challenges. Xunzi had also 
favored hierarchy by basing himself on the fact that Chinese society was a homogenous 
society. As Xunzi formulated it: “All men desire and dislike the same things, but since 
desires are many and the things that satisfy them are relatively few, this scarcity will 
necessarily lead to conflict.”543 In other words, it was because homogenous individuals 
had similar interests that Xunzi defended hierarchy.544
As Nisbet has noted, although modern functionalism started with Durkheim, his 
The Division of Labor in Society was still written in the classic pattern of nineteenth-
century social evolutionism. What Durkheim described were “the stages of 
development of social solidarity within human society at large.”
Since there were no horizontal 
contractual relationships in “homogenous” societies, Xiao explained, there was a 
Hobbesian struggle of all against all. Analogous with his reading of Xunzi, Xiao 
defended his own advocacy of centralized rule as a necessity for a society that still 
largely consisted of homogenous individuals. 
545
Nevertheless, Xiao’s reference to Durkheim was congruent with his reference to 
Yan Fu and his theory of the social organism in that Xiao recommended the move 
towards an “organic solidarity” in which society was an organism and in which 
The different types 
of social organization outlined in this work were a way to show that the evolution of 
societies could be explained entirely from within the system, and that mankind was 
evolving in a positive direction. In other words, Xiao’s reference to Durkheim 
underscored social evolutionism rather than Burkean conservatism. Although Xiao 
referred to Durkheim to indicate the historically grown nature of Eastern and Western 
cultures, Durkheim’s analysis was at the same time a structural explanation that was in 
tension with Xiao’s stress on the importance of historical growth. 
543 Knoblock, Xunzi, Vol. 2, 121. Xunzi made a division between, on the one hand, the upper 
classes of society, which consisted of the ranks from “knight” (shi) to ruler, and, on the other 
hand, the commoners, which included farmers, artisans, and merchants. Whereas the former 
were to be controlled by means of rituals and music, the latter were to be regulated by penal 
law.  
544 More precisely, Xunzi stressed the importance of “fen,” which Xiao explains as status 
(mingfen) or position (zhifen). Xiao’s reference to “fen” is taken from book 10, “Fuguo” (On 
enriching the state), translated in Knoblock, Xunzi, Vol. 2, 120-138.
545 Nisbet, Social Change, 229.
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individuals performed different tasks in accordance with the division of labor. On the 
other hand, however, Xiao’s text on homogenous societies also reveals how Xiao’s 
theory of the social organism was linked to a liberal argument: Xiao argued that 
political pluralism, contractual relationships, and autonomy were characteristics of 
heterogeneous societies. Yet since China was still largely a homogenous society, 
centralized rule could be defended as something that was required in the present. 
3.7 CONCLUDING REMARKS
Xiao Gongqin was an intellectual who was specialized in history, which means that 
there was another side to his theory of “neo-conservatism”—a side that has generally 
been ignored in research on the topic. Xiao coined the term “neo-conservatism” for his 
theory of modernization because it was based on a Burkean reading of the social 
evolutionism as upheld by the late nineteenth-century translator Yan Fu. Affected by 
the Social Darwinism of Spencer, Yan Fu had interpreted society as an organism that 
adapted to historical circumstances. For Yan Fu, both the import of single Western 
elements and the import of an entire Western system into a Chinese context were 
problematic, an awareness that Xiao referred to as the “Yan Fu paradox.” In response, 
Yan Fu argued that, given the historical growth of social organisms, reform should be 
executed gradually and with respect for national particularity and historical continuity; 
internal elements should function as “levers” for the gradual introduction of foreign 
elements. 
Although there are certainly some similarities between Burkean conservatism 
and the social evolutionism as championed by Yan Fu, such as the belief in the 
historically grown nature of things and the notion that each element should be 
understood as part of a larger whole—both of which lead to the conclusion that human 
interference in these processes can only be limited—there are some crucial differences 
between the two that prevent a Burkean reading of Yan Fu. One important difference 
concerns their conception of the nature of change. In social evolutionism, change is 
based on natural laws of evolution; conservatism shuns any law-like approach and 
argues instead that change is based on contingency. Consequently, social evolutionists 
and conservatives conceive of the relation between past, present, and future in different 
ways. Social evolutionism considers the present but the beginning of more progress; 
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humankind moves in ever better directions. Conservatives, on the other hand, treat the 
present as the result of a long historical chain; they are skeptical of progress. 
Even though for Xiao, societies were historically grown and particularistic, his 
support of gradual reform was not based on the Burkean notion that the present was but 
the last part of a historical chain. Like the thought of Yan Fu and Durkheim, Xiao’s 
thought was marked by evolutionary optimism and the desire to make China prosperous 
and strong—his “neo-conservatism” was a modernization theory. Hence, although he 
promoted his gradualism on conservative grounds, his goal as such was not 
conservative. His advocacy of historical continuity was not part of a move to protect 
traditions and habits; it served to ensure that Chinese modernization would not bring 
about social instability. In Yan Fu, the element of historical growth had been 
subordinated to China’s struggle for survival and the dream to make China prosperous 
and strong. As Xiao phrased it, Yan Fu understood that China’s “wealth and power” and 
modernization could only be realized under the condition of a respect for the existing 
order and historical continuity.546
Xiao Gongqin did not only call upon Yan Fu in his defense of “neo-
conservatism”; another important distinction between Xiao’s advocacy and the “neo-
conservatism” as favored by the princelings was that Xiao, like other intellectuals at the 
time, based his theory on a denunciation of three “stages” of “radicalism” in modern 
Chinese history. Xiao associated “mental radicalism” with the Reform Movement of 
1898; the early Republic suffered from “system determinism,” and after May Fourth, 
“political romanticism” flourished. Though Xiao denounced “radicalism” on Burkean 
grounds—the critique of wholesale change, the stress on particularity and the 
historically grown, the belief that society is an organism, and the criticism of abstract 
principles and blueprint designs—it has been argued that the goal of his enterprise was 
everything but conservative.
For Xiao, then, this was no different. 
Apart from the impact of Samuel Huntington, another influence that can be 
discerned in Xiao is that of the liberal intellectual Friedrich von Hayek. Like Hayek, 
Xiao defended the historically grown nature of institutions; he further contrasted the 
French tradition of “rationalism” with the British tradition of “empiricism,” a point of 
view he discerned in Yan Fu’s criticism of Rousseau. Especially in Xiao’s criticism of 
“political romanticism,” it becomes clear that Xiao’s goal was the establishment of a 
546 Xiao Gongqin, “Dangdai Zhongguo xin baoshou zhuyi,” EYS, 133.
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market economy and the creation of a civil society. Moreover, Xiao’s emphasis on 
contractual relationships and liberal autonomy was also closer to liberal than to 
conservative goals. As Muller has argued, contractualism is very much a liberal trait; 
conservatives would stress moral duty instead of contractual relations between 
people.547
At the same time, though, Xiao highlighted the significance of a strong 
authority, which was inconsistent with his emphasis on spontaneous growth. Huntington 
has also noted that, under a Confucian framework, since it perceives of state and society 
as one, there is no legitimacy for autonomous social groups. 548 The New Left 
intellectual Wang Hui has criticized the belief of economic liberals in the spontaneous 
growth of a civil society because they treat democracy as an apolitical process, whereas, 
especially in China, reform had been initiated by a strong state.549
Liberals would also discard Xiao’s notion of the social organism. Although Xiao 
and Karl Popper, for example, overlapped in their defense of gradual and partial social 
reform, Popper was an individualist whose “open” society was a society in which 
individuals made personal decisions; the social organism, if anything, would represent 
the “closed” tribalist and collectivist society that Popper fiercely opposed. Popper 
explicitly stated that the social organism was not compatible with his theory of the 
“open” society because there was no competition among its members; “there is no 
inherent tendency on the part of the legs to become the brain, or of other members of 
the body to become the belly.”
Edmund Burke very
much opposed a strong state. Therefore, Xiao’s eclectic mix of Huntington, Burke, and 
Hayek locates him in between political theories of “neo-conservatism” in defense of a 
strong state and Burkean criticisms of “radicalism” in which a strong state is 
condemned for having destroyed the natural growth of civil society. It is paradoxical, to 
say the least, that Xiao invoked a Hayekian belief in spontaneous growth to champion a 
strong authority in response to a fear of chaos. 
550
Xiao’s reference to history was more than a mere instrumentalism or “allusion 
historiography,” as some political scientists have argued. Rather, like other intellectuals 
The dynamic and competitive character of society that 
Xiao envisioned, then, was incompatible with Xiao’s organicist analogy. 
547 Muller, “Introduction,” 12-13.
548 Gamer, “Modernization and Democracy in China,” 56. 
549 Wang Hui, China’s New Order, 87-90; 175-181.
550 Popper, The Open Society, Vol.1, 174.
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at the time, Xiao made us of historical allegories in the context of research on the 
history of modernization. At the same time, history also constituted the object of 
revision. By rewriting modern Chinese history as the history of modernization, and by 
focusing on the role of Chinese intellectuals in this process, Xiao challenged the official 
historiographical paradigm of modern Chinese history as the struggle against 
imperialism and feudalism. By focusing on the larger agenda of modernization, as 
opposed to a narrow concern with political stability in the present, Xiao’s concerns 
surpassed those of the princelings as discussed in the previous chapter. 
Xiao further invoked Durkheim’s distinction between “mechanical” and 
“organic” “solidarity” in societies to support his argument that Western culture and 
values could not be imported to China. Since democracy, autonomy, self-rule, and 
contractual relations were traits of “heterogeneous” societies that were based on 
“organic solidarity,” they could only be applied to China if the suitable underlying 
structures were also present. Nevertheless, in 1980s China, heterogeneity was only 
developed on a very basic level; this still largely “homogenous” society required 
different strategies of reform in which political centralization and economic reform 
occupied a central role. As has been argued, Xiao’s reference to Durkheim made his 
explanation more structural than historical; his association of liberal values with 
“organic solidarity” also demonstrates that his reference to the social organism was not 
part of a conservative argument. 
What concerns the role of tradition in Xiao’s framework, Xiao argued that 
traditional elements should function as “levers” in the modernization process, but he 
also referred to the importance of “benevolence” (ren), a term Xiao adopted from the
moral discourse of New Confucianism. Yet given the vagueness of this reference, it can 
be said that Xiao’s reference to tradition remained largely instrumental in nature. As 
such, his conservatism was limited to a form of “conservative modernization,” as had 
been manifested in, for example, Yuan Shikai, who had made use of traditional values 
in the modernization process, and who had argued against political modernization.551
551 Young, “The Hung-hsien Emperor,” LOC, 189.
In 
the end, Xiao’s thought was shaped more by a flirtation with the ideas of Huntington, 
Hayek, and the Social Darwinism of a Yan Fu than by a Burkean belief in the limits of 
change. 
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4.
ON “RADICALISM” AND REVOLUTIONS
THE 1992 DEBATE AND BEYOND
In spite of all the sacrifices made, we may never get anywhere at all.
KARL POPPER
4.1 INTRODUCTION: HISTORY IN A BINARY KEY
We have now reached the third part of the trilogy on “conservatism” and “radicalism.” 
In Chapter Two, the main focus has been on a “neo-conservatism” that was mainly 
concerned with issues of political legitimacy and social stability; the document 
“Realistic Responses” can be considered a manifestation of this type of “neo-
conservatism” that was not Burkean in any sense. Although Xiao Gongqin’s advocacy 
also contained many of the traits discussed in Chapter Two, it has been argued in 
Chapter Three that Xiao’s theory also included features of intellectual rejections of 
“radicalism” at the time: it was based on a criticism of three “stages” of “radicalism” in 
modern Chinese history. As such, it can be situated in between the “neo-conservatism” 
of Chapter Two and the intellectual critique of “radicalism” in modern Chinese history 
that constitutes the subject of this chapter and the following chapters.
This chapter analyzes the first public debate on “conservatism” and 
“radicalism,” which took off in the spring of 1992 in the pages of the Hong Kong-based 
highbrow journal Ershiyi shiji (Twenty-first century). The geographical location of the 
journal was symbolic, for Twenty-first Century connected mainland scholars with 
scholars in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and overseas. The context in which the debate was 
conducted differed considerably from the background against which the political theory 
of “neo-conservatism” had been coined: now, the main political threats had been 
overcome, and when Deng Xiaoping made his Southern Tour (nanxun) in the beginning 
of 1992, a second round of economic reforms was launched.  As Koselleck has argued, 
concepts change when social conditions change. This chapter can be considered an 
example of how this new situation was reflected in the meaning allocated to the 
concepts of “conservatism” and “radicalism.” 
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In the previous chapters, Chinese intellectuals have only applied the term “neo-
conservatism” in the framework of a reform program; they have not engaged in debates 
on the meaning of the term. In this chapter, on the contrary, humanistic intellectuals 
devoted much energy to a debate on the meaning of concepts—they clearly ignored 
Karl Popper’s criticism that the tendency to focus on the meaning of terms only leads to 
“verbalism” and “scholasticism,” or empty quarrels about words.552
4.2 YÜ YING-SHIH’S THEORY OF  “RADICALIZATION”
Consequently, the 
“dialogical” and “multiaccentual” nature of the key concepts became all the more 
obvious. In the 1992 debate, more so than in the instance of the utilization of 
“radicalism” as a “counterconcept” in the formulation of a “neo-conservative” reform 
program, the terms “conservatism” and “radicalism” were used as part of a simplified 
dualist framework to revaluate a century of modern Chinese history. 
Instead of taking this reading of history at face value, here, the focus will be on 
the particular choice of this binary framework at that specific time: why did many feel 
the need to condemn “radicalism” in modern Chinese history? If we turn the question 
around: what does the debate reveal about the changes in society? Was it merely in line 
with the official reform program, or was there more to it? Given the fact that the 
reference to tradition in the service of modernization had not generated a genuine 
conservative argument, was it possible that the discussion on modern Chinese history 
reflected a shift toward conservatism? Or did intellectuals invoke Edmund Burke for 
other reasons?
To understand the 1992 debate, we first have to look into the critique of “radicalism” 
that triggered the debate. The Princeton-based historian Yü Ying-shih (b. 1930), who 
was born and raised in China but educated in Hong Kong and the United States, put 
forward the most prominent criticism of “radicalism.” 553
552 Popper, The Open Society, Vol. 2, 22-23.
553 Yü Ying-shih was born in Tianjin, but left China for Hong Kong in 1950, where he studied at 
the newly founded New Asia College. He received his Ph.D. from Harvard University; he 
taught at, among other universities, Yale, Princeton, and Harvard. 
In a lecture entitled “The 
Radicalization of China in the Twentieth Century,” which Yü Ying-shih delivered at the 
Chinese University of Hong Kong in September 1988, he proclaimed: “Since the turn of 
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the century, a radical mode of thinking has dominated the Chinese mind.” 554 This 
happened because, like the prisoners in Plato’s cave who had encountered the sunlight 
of the “real” world, Chinese intellectuals who studied abroad at the end of the 
nineteenth century “discovered that there was a new and better Way in the West,” and 
they confronted their fellow countrymen with this new truth. 555 Yü contrasted this 
“discovery” of a new moral framework since modern times with the “interpretation” of 
the existing moral framework of Confucianism before modern times.556
Yü Ying-shih discerned three stages of “radicalization,” the first one of which 
occurred between the 1890s and the revolution of 1911. It was the translator Yan Fu, 
the very same intellectual who was the first “neo-conservative” modernizer in Xiao 
Gongqin’s eyes, who had initiated the process of radicalization. Especially in his 1895 
essay “In Refutation of Han Yu,” Yan Fu had denounced the Confucian Way and had 
implied that the Western democratic system was closer to the Way.557 Whereas Yan 
Fu’s “radicalism” was still “tempered” with “evolutionary gradualism,” Kang Youwei 
and Tan Sitong (1864-1898) pushed for both wholesale and immediate change. 558
Finally, the scholars around the Journal of National Essence (Guocui xuebao), which 
circulated between 1905 and 1911, all drew on Western theories to study Chinese 
learning.559
During the first stage of radicalization, thinkers disguised “discovery” as 
“interpretation” by presenting the new truth as a reinterpretation of Chinese tradition.560
554 Yü Ying-shih, “The Radicalization of China,” 125. 
555 Ibid., 127.
556 Yü borrowed this terminology from Michael Walzer (b. 1935), a political theorist and 
Professor at the Institute for Advanced Study of Princeton University. In Interpretation and 
Social Criticism (1987), Walzer contended that there were three common approaches to moral 
philosophy, namely “the path of discovery, the path of invention, and the path of interpretation,” 
of which the last one was most suited to “our everyday experience of morality.” (Ibid., 3) 
Walzer’s claim that morality cannot be discovered is reminiscent of Edmund Burke’s statement: 
“We know that we have made no discoveries, and we think that no discoveries are to be made, 
in morality; nor many in the great principles of government, nor in the ideas of liberty, which 
were understood long before we were born (…).” Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in 
France, 73 (Turner edition).
557 Translated by Francois Houang in Les Manifestes de Yen Fou, 141-151.
558 Yü Ying-shih, “The Radicalization of China,” 129.
559 The main figures around the Journal of National Essence were Zhang Binglin (1869-1935), 
Liu Shipei (1884-1919), Huang Jie (1874-1935), Deng Shi (1877-1941), Chen Qubing (1874-
1933), and Ma Xulun (1884-1970).
560 In the case of Yan Fu, Yü Ying-shih found evidence of this “discovery disguised as 
interpretation” in Yan Fu’s translator’s notes, in which Yan frequently referred to the Laozi and 
the Zhuangzi. Kang Youwei partly drew on Yan Fu’s Social Darwinism for his “three stages 
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Chinese intellectuals had realized that China had been marginalized in Asia; the 
reinterpretation of Chinese tradition functioned as a method to bring China back to the 
center. The use of this method was also related to the fact that, until 1905, when the 
examination system was abolished, traditional scholars (shi) were still directly linked to 
politics. After 1905, the modern “intellectual” (zhishi fenzi) was separated from the 
political system, and thus, as a marginalized figure, he was more susceptible to a 
radicalization that questioned the traditional moral order of which he was no longer a 
central part.561
During the second stage of radicalization, it was “neither necessary nor possible 
to disguise discovery as interpretation.” 562 Instead of viewing the problem of the 
marginalization of China in terms of a spatial problematique of China versus the West, 
intellectuals now tried to bring China back to the center by importing the newest ideas, 
which Yü Ying-shih called “the neoterist mentality,” or, “a mentality obsessed with 
change, with what is new.” 563 Under the effect of Enlightenment rationalism, 
romanticism, utilitarianism, positivism, and Marxism, May Fourth figures such as Hu 
Shi and Chen Duxiu (1879-1942) developed an attitude of “iconoclastic 
antitraditionalism,” a concept that Yü Ying-shih borrowed from Lin Yü-sheng.564
Another lecture that Yü Ying-shih delivered in September 1988 that was of
importance for the later debate was entitled “Radicalism and Conservatism in Modern 
The 
third and highest stage of radicalization began with the ideological confrontation 
between liberalism and Marxism. Like May Fourth liberals, Marxists started from 
abstract theories instead of concrete realities; their thought also manifested “iconoclastic 
antitraditionalism.” The embodiment of “Marxist radicalism” was Mao Zedong, whose 
masterpiece of destruction was the Cultural Revolution. 
theory”; he did not only rely on the Gongyang commentary on the Spring and Autumn Annals.
As for Tan Sitong, the title of his work Renxue (A study of humanity) indicated that he was 
reinterpreting ren, one of the core virtues of Confucianism. The scholars around the Journal of 
National Essence not only insisted that Western values had originated in China; they also 
adhered to the so-called “theory of the Western origin of the Chinese race,” which had been 
coined by the Belgian Sinologist Terrien de la Couperie (1844-1894) during the 1880s.
561 See also Yü’s article “Zhongguo zhishi fenzi de bianyuanhua,” EYS 6 (August 1991), 15-25.
562 Yü Ying-shih, “The Radicalization of China,” 130.
563 Ibid., 141.
564 Yü takes these “five major schools of radical thought” from Russell Kirk’s The Conservative 
Mind from Burke to Eliot (Chicago, Ill. and Washington, D.C.: Regnery Books, 7th rev.ed., 
1986), 9.
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Chinese Intellectual History.” 565 Whereas Yü had first defined conservatism as an 
attitude toward the Confucian tradition, and radicalism as “antitraditionalism,” he now 
argued that modern China had not known conservatism because it had lacked a status 
quo. This argument is reminiscent of Clinton Rossiter’s argument that a conservatism 
that seeks to preserve the status quo is rare in rapidly modernizing societies. 566
Conservatism or radicalism, Yü explained, was neither “any (other) set of thought,” nor 
“a certain fixed faction”—it was a “disposition” (taidu) or “orientation” (qingxiang)
towards the existing status quo that often appeared in times of change. In other words, a 
“fixed point” (dingdian), standard (biaozhun) or coordinate (zuobiao) was needed to 
determine someone’s position.567 In the United States, for example, conservatism and 
radicalism were relative to a liberal status quo that functioned as their 
“commonground”—one could compare this to the “three legs of a ding vessel.”568
Here, we can discern the impact of the theory that all American “neo-
conservatives” were liberals, or that American “neo-conservatism” was in essence a 
positional ideology, as discussed in Chapter Two. In modern China, from the First 
Opium War (1839-1842) until the end of the nineteenth century, on the contrary, the 
status quo changed continuously, and the focus of intellectual conflict was on tradition 
versus modernity. During this period, the basic value was “change”— modern Chinese 
history had not witnessed any serious Burkean conservatism. Yü Ying-shih criticized 
the volume The Limits of Change that has been discussed in Chapter One because none 
of the persons dealt with where conservatives.569 Yü also referred to two debates to 
demonstrate that there had been no such thing as conservatism in modern China. Firstly, 
Zhang Junmai (1886-1969), the main opponent of “scientism” in the 1923 debate on 
“Science and Metaphysics,” was not a conservative because he subscribed to Western-
style constitutional democracy.570
565 Yü Ying-shih, “Zhongguo jindai sixiangshi shang de jijin yu baoshou,” ZFL, 1-29. The 
lecture also appeared in Qian Mu yu Zhongguo wenhua, 188-222.
566 Rossiter, Conservatism in America, 219.
567 Yü Ying-shih, “Jijin yu baoshou,” ZFL, 1-3.
568 Ibid., 4.
569 See Chapter One, 1-6.
570 The 1923 debate on “Science and Metaphysics” (also referred to as the debate on “Science 
and the Philosophy of Life” (kexue yu renshengguan)) was held between February and 
December 1923. The main participants were Zhang Junmai (Carsun Chang), Ding Wenjiang, 
Liang Qichao, Hu Shi, and Wu Zhihui (1865-1953). The geologist Ding Wenjiang was Zhang 
Junmai’s main opponent; for Ding Wenjiang, science could answer all questions, including 
those related to the philosophy of life.
Secondly, in the 1930s debate on “Democracy and 
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Dictatorship,” the faction of Ding Wenjiang (1887-1936), Jiang Tingfu (1895-1965) and 
others was not conservative because, although it adhered to dictatorship, its final aim 
was also democracy.571
Though Yü Ying-shih associated conservatism with a defense of the status quo, 
he also associated it with traditional Chinese culture and certain institutions. Yü argued 
that the destruction of the latter reached its peak under Marxism: after 1950, the CCP, 
following the Stalinist model of the Soviet Union, destroyed the private property system 
and all traditional “intermediate groups.” These included patriarchal clans, guilds, 
private schools, religious groups, and village associations. The destruction of traditional 
Chinese culture continued during the 1980s, when intellectuals returned to May Fourth 
values and embraced Western modernization. At this point in time, the first cycle of 
“radicalism” was completed, as can be seen from the six-part 1988 documentary River 
Elegy, in which the Yellow River (China) was urged to open up and learn from the Blue 
Ocean (the West).572 Yü pointed out that this discarding of tradition in the service of 
modernization was outdated and had been condemned in the West several decades 
earlier.573
Elsewhere, Yü Ying-shih rephrased the problem of “radicalization” in a Chinese 
context as an excessive stress on “renewal” (chuangxin), thereby ignoring 
“preservation” (baoshou).
In order to bring the process of “radicalization” to a close, a strong middle 
class had to be created, but a tradition of democratic thought was equally important. In 
Taiwan, then, both of these aspects were present. 
574 This was opposite to the usage of “conservatism” and 
“radicalism” in a Western context, where the two did not exclude each other: the 
“radical” Marx had continued many elements of Hegel, whereas the “conservative” 
Burke had highlighted the importance of change. Whereas in the West, the two great 
political forces were liberalism and conservatism, modern China suffered from a 
“revolution complex.”575
571 The debate on “Democracy and dictatorship” (minzhu gen ducai de zhengbian) was held 
during the early 1930s between Hu Shi, Jiang Tingfu (1895-1965), Ding Wenjiang, and others 
in the journal Duli Pinglun (Independent Critique).
572 For works on River Elegy, see Chapter Two, 44, fn. 169.
573 Yü refers to S.N. Eisenstadt, Edward Shils, and Allan Bloom in particular.
574 See Yü Ying-shih, “‘Chuangxin’ yu ‘baoshou,’” Qian Mu yu Zhongguo wenhua, 288-295.
575 Ibid., 289-292.
In some instances, then, Yü Ying-shih’s “radicalism” seems 
equal to “progressivism” in a Mannheimian sense; Yü referred to a “neoterist” 
mentality. In a Burkean manner, he defended intermediate groups in society or the 
143
importance of the traditional moral order. Elsewhere, though, he linked “conservatism” 
with a particular status quo without which it could not develop. 
Yü Ying-shih’s stance can be explained if we analyze his conception of 
Confucianism. Yü was a disciple of the historian Qian Mu (1895-1990), who is often 
associated with “New Confucianism,” a topic that will be explored in the next 
chapter. 576 In a long essay, Yü countered the claim that his teacher was a New 
Confucian and further posed that Qian Mu was against the idea of a lineage of 
transmission of the “Way” (daotong) as New Confucians had conceived it.  According 
to the latter, Chinese philosophers had transmitted the “Way” in the form of 
transcendental values. In Yü Ying-shih’s view, instead, his teacher’s transmission of the 
“Way” had been that of an intellectual historian for whom the object of transmission 
had been the Chinese cultural tradition in its totality.577 Yü Ying-shih was critical of the
discourse on Confucianism (ruxue) since the 1980s because it was devoid of the lived 
experience of Confucian culture—it had become an empty discourse, a “wandering 
soul.”578 He further disapproved of the focus on abstract philosophical topics at the 
expense of matters related to politics, society, and economics because Confucianism 
had made its way to the everyday life of Chinese people through social institutions; it 
was part and parcel of Chinese society.579
Since Confucianism was not some transcendent moral system, Yü Ying-shih 
focused precisely on this social dimension of Confucianism in his work.  This concern 
also runs through what is probably Yü’s most famous work, namely the application of 
Weber’s Protestantism thesis to Confucianism in China in The Modern Chinese 
Religious Ethic and the Spirit of Merchants.580
576 Qian Mu was born in Jiangsu province. As a renowned historian, he was affiliated with, 
among other universities, Yanjing University, Peking University, Qinghua University, and 
National Southwest Associated University. In 1949, he founded the New Asia College in Hong 
Kong. Since 1967, Qian Mu resided in Taiwan.  
577 Yü Ying-shih, “Qian Mu yu xin rujia,” Qian Mu yu Zhongguo wenhua, 30-90. Yang Zuhan, 
Luo Yijun, Li Minghui, and Zheng Jiadong have criticized Yü’s position. For an overview of 
these criticisms, see Makeham, Lost Soul, 153-166.
578 Makeham, Lost Soul, 2. 
579 Ibid., 111, 114.
580 Yü Ying-shih, Zhongguo jinshi zongjiao lunli yu shangren jingshen (Taipei: Taipei lianjing 
chubanshe, 1987).
In this book, Yü argued that, since the 
Ming dynasty (1368-1644), the Confucian ethic—and the Neo-Confucianism of Wang 
Yangming (1472-1528) in particular—had benefited the rise of commercial activities in 
China, a thesis that became influential in East Asia, but that was criticized fiercely 
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outside of East Asia. 581 During the 1980s, Yü had also been an advisor to the 
introduction of a Confucian Ethics program in Singapore’s secondary schools, the 
failure of which Yü ascribed to the lack of an institutional structure.582
4.3 LIN YÜ-SHENG: “RADICALISM” AS “TOTALISTIC ICONOCLASM”
This remark 
already indicates Yü’s direction in the debate on “radicalism” and “conservatism”: for 
Yü Ying-shih, Confucian values were tied to certain social structures, without which 
these values could not survive.
Mainland rejections of “radicalism” were also inspired by the ideas of Lin Yü-sheng (b. 
1934), a historian based at the University of Wisconsin. Already in 1979, Lin Yü-sheng 
had criticized May Fourth “radicalism” in his book The Crisis of Chinese 
Consciousness, which was translated into Chinese as early as 1983.583
Lin Yü-sheng ascribed this contrast between the first and second generations to 
two factors. Firstly, the historical element behind this change was that, from the Opium 
War onwards, the sociopolitical and cultural-moral orders had commenced to 
disintegrate, and it was the collapse of the empire in 1911, or, the breakdown of the link 
Lin Yü-sheng 
was born in Shandong province, but studied in Taiwan with the political liberal Yin 
Haiguang (1919-1969) of National Taiwan University. Lin also studied at the 
University of Chicago under Friedrich von Hayek, the famous liberal of the Austrian 
School of Economics. What Lin Yü-sheng tried to explain in his book is why May 
Fourth “antitraditionalism” was what he called “totalistic.” Contrary to intellectuals of 
the previous generation (1890s), such as Yan Fu, Kang Youwei, Tan Sitong, and Liang 
Qichao, who never denied tradition wholeheartedly, May Fourth intellectuals such as 
Chen Duxiu, Hu Shi, and Lu Xun (1881-1936) negated tradition in toto.
581 In “Confusing Confucianism With Capitalism,” Zurndorfer has outlined several criticisms of 
Yü’s thesis. Firstly, Yü oversimplified the Neo-Confucianism of the Wang Yangming school 
and excluded the history of political struggle with which it was linked. Secondly, Yü distorted 
certain traits of Confucianism, such as its denigration of profit.  Thirdly, Yü only focused on the 
Confucian ethics of the merchants, whereas other less morally laudable qualities were left out. 
Finally, “the elevation of the status of merchants came about, not in spite of Confucianism, but 
because of it” (Ibid., 8).
582 Makeham, Lost Soul, 22-24. The program had the support of both Prime Minister Lee Kwan 
Yew and the Minister of Education Goh Keng Swee, but was canceled in 1990 after less than 
eight years.
583 Lin Yü-sheng, The Crisis of Chinese Consciousness: Radical Antitraditionalism in the May 
Fourth Era (Madison: the University of Wisconsin Press, 1979).
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of “universal kingship” between the two orders that gave the final blow. Lin stated: 
“Over a long period, the gate of a dike may be eroded away; when it finally bursts, 
nothing can hinder the thrust of the flood that spreads ruin and destruction in the natural 
order beyond.”584 The disintegration of this traditional framework, then, provided the 
“structural possibility” for May Fourth intellectuals to negate Chinese tradition in its 
totality. Secondly, the political element was that iconoclasm rose against the 
background of the attempts of Yuan Shikai and Zhang Xun (1854-1923) to restore the 
monarchy. The radical iconoclasts considered Yuan’s tactics “stark manifestations of 
traditional evils,” and concluded that Confucianism was “predisposed to despotism.”585
This “wholesale antitraditionalism,” Lin further argued, was influenced by the 
Confucian way of holist thinking. Drawing on Mannheim, Lin distinguished between a 
“radical” “content of thought” and a “style of thought” that was very traditional. For Lin 
Yü-sheng, “radical” referred to a “systematic” and inflexible ideology that he described 
as “totalistic iconoclasm.” 586 In response, he coined the notion of the “creative 
transformation” of Chinese tradition, a concept that referred to both the continuation of 
the May Fourth spirit and aims—such as science, democracy, and liberty—and the 
reinvestigation of the relation between the latter and Chinese tradition.587 As discussed 
in Chapters Two and Three, proponents of Chinese “neo-conservatism” also called into 
use the notion of the “creative transformation” of Chinese tradition in the context of 
their modernization program. Yet Lin Yü-sheng applied the term in the context of the 
foundation of institutions of liberty. Unlike the previous generation of liberals such as 
Yin Haiguang, who had accused Confucianism of being despotic, Lin and others 
believed in the “creative transformation” of Confucianism, which enabled its 
reconciliation with democracy.588
584 Ibid., 17.
585 Ibid., 24.
586 Lin Yü-sheng, “Reflections,” 74. Yan Jiayan has criticized Lin’s notion of “wholesale 
antitraditionalism” in his article “Ping wusi, wenge yu chuantong wenhua de lunzheng,” EYS 42
(August 1997), 133-136. Brunhild Staiger has likewise declared that there was no such thing as 
“wholesale antitraditionalism” in the works of all May Fourth intellectuals. Only Chen Duxiu 
can be said to have been “radical” because he rejected tradition as a whole, including Buddhism 
and Daoism. See Brunhild Staiger, “Classical Heritage and May Fourth Movement,” The May 
Fourth Movement in China, 68-101.
587 Lin Yü-sheng, Zhongguo chuantong de chuangzaoxing zhuanhua (Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 
1988). See also Lin Yü-sheng, “Reflections on the ‘Creative Transformation of Chinese 
Tradition,’” 73-114.
588 Bresciani, Reinventing Confucianism, 477.
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Drawing on the anthropologist Clifford Geertz, Lin Yü-sheng first developed the 
idea of the “creative transformation” of Chinese tradition in a paper written for a 
Harvard University conference on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the May 
Fourth Movement in 1969.589
The creative transformation of Chinese tradition refers to a process in which, by 
employing a pluralistic approach, selected indigenous Chinese symbols, ideas, values, 
and modes of behavior (including political, social, and economic modes of behavior) 
are reorganized and/or reconstructed in such a way as to provide propitious seeds for 
change, while these reorganized and/or reconstructed elements received a clear sense 
of cultural identity as a result of being effectively realized in practice with great 
benefits.
As Lin defined the undertaking: 
590
Lin added that two conditions had to be fulfilled with reference to this “creative 
transformation,” namely it had to benefit the foundation of liberal institutions, thought, 
and culture, and, secondly, elements of Chinese tradition should “not only maintain 
their authenticity but also be more creatively put into practice.”591
589 Lin Yü-sheng, “Radical Iconoclasm in the May Fourth Period and the Future of Chinese 
Liberalism,” 23-58.
590 Lin Yü-sheng, “Reflections,” 78.
591 Ibid., 80.
More specifically, 
Lin wanted to transform Confucian humanism by uniting it with Western liberal 
humanism. Lin gave three examples of how this transformation could take place in 
practice. Firstly, he mentioned the enrichment of Confucian family ethics by blending 
them with a notion of natural rights. Consequently, the elements of respect for others 
and “empathetic reciprocity” in Confucian family ethics could become more prominent. 
Secondly, Lin argued that the Confucian-Mencian concept of moral autonomy could be 
linked to the Kantian defense of human rights; in self-cultivation, as in Kantian 
philosophy, man was always an end and never just a means. Finally, Lin referred to the 
creation of a “modern civil and civic society,” which should be independent of the state, 
and which should engage in political participation. 
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4.4 FROM THE 1980S TO MODERN CHINESE HISTORY
4.4.1 The 1980s and the 1990s: Continuities and Discontinuities
Both Yü Ying-shih and Lin Yü-sheng coined the term “radicalism” as part of a 
framework in which they tried to combine political liberalism with the continuity of a 
“transformed” Chinese tradition that was compatible with modernization. Since 
rejections of “radicalism” by intellectuals overseas were appropriated according to the 
mainland context of the times, the accusation of one critic that Chinese intellectuals 
were but “grass in the wind,” echoing whatever foreign trend was popular at the time, is 
overtly simplistic.592
The so-called “New Enlightenment Movement” (xin qimeng yundong) of the 
mid-to-late 1980s was, as Xu Jilin has argued, an outgrowth of the “Movement to 
Liberate Thinking” (sixiang jiefang yundong) of the late 1970s.
In order to understand how mainland intellectuals appropriated the 
theories of Yü Ying-shih and Lin Yü-sheng, we first have to look into the 
“Enlightenment” spirit of the 1980s against which the theory of “radicalism” was 
shaped on the mainland.
593 In December 1978, 
Deng Xiaoping reiterated the need to “emancipate thinking” and to move away from the 
ideological rigidity of the Mao era by “seeking truth from facts.” 594 At the Third 
Plenary Session of the Eleventh Party Congress in December 1978, the Party declared 
“socialist modernization” to be the official agenda. These changes paved the way for a 
more fundamental criticism of the utopian socialism of the Mao era during the early 
1980s. In 1983, the CCP Deputy Propaganda Director Zhou Yang and Wang Ruoshui, a 
writer for People’s Daily, argued in favor of a “socialist humanism” that did away with 
the dogmatism of the Cultural Revolution.595
An important event in the formation of the “New Enlightenment Movement” 
was the foundation of the editorial committee of Zouxiang weilai (Towards the Future) 
The controversial claim that alienation 
could also arise under socialism led to the campaign on “spiritual pollution” in late 1983 
and early 1984. After the campaign, the criticism of utopian socialism continued, this 
time in the form of a call for “Enlightenment.”
592 Zhang Zhizhong, “Shiji mo huimou,” 44. 
593 Xu Jilin, “The Fate of an Enlightenment,” 183.
594 Baum, Burying Mao, 63.
595 For an overview of the debate on “humanist Marxism,” see Jing Wang, “‘Who Am I?’: 
Questions of Voluntarism in the Paradigm of Socialist Alienation,” in idem, High Culture 
Fever, 9-36.
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in 1984. This committee, which was headed by Jin Guantao, the Director of the 
Philosophy of Science in the Research Institute of the Academy of Natural Sciences, 
introduced both scientific methodologies and the philosophy of science to China. In 
1985, the Academy of Chinese Culture (Zhongguo wenhua shuyuan) was founded, 
which, under the guidance of Tang Yijie, a Professor in the Department of Philosophy 
of Peking University, brought together a group of philosophers who had been 
influenced by overseas Confucian scholars. As Xu Jilin has argued, the Academy 
played an important role in developments of the 1990s: “their efforts provided the
bedrock on which the ‘craze for national studies’ (guoxue re) of the 1990s developed,” a 
topic that will be discussed further in the following chapter.596
The year 1985 witnessed the spread of a “culture fever” (wenhua re), or the 
obsession with comparative research on Chinese and Western cultures in the form of 
debates, lectures, and newspaper articles.597 Another important event in the movement 
was the foundation of the editorial committee of Wenhua: Zhongguo yu shijie (Culture: 
China and the World) in 1986. Under the leadership of Gan Yang, this group of writers 
introduced Western thinkers from the humanities, philosophy, and the social sciences to 
Chinese audiences via two translation series. The “culture fever” of 1985 culminated in 
the 1988 documentary Heshang (River Elegy), which has already been mentioned in 
Chapter Two and in the above section on Yü Ying-shih.598 Although the makers of the 
series upheld the liberation from tradition through modernization and Westernization, 
the documentary also reflected the “apocalyptic anxiety” of a society caught in rapid 
transformation.599
The discourse of the 1980s was utopian in nature; the overall belief in 
modernization and the optimism of the times caused intellectuals to project goals into 
the future. When the “New Enlightenment Movement” came to an abrupt end with the 
repression of the demonstrations on June fourth, 1989, the intellectual consensus of the 
1980s made room for a plurality of viewpoints, all of which were less optimistic in 
nature. Some scholars abandoned the political engagement of the previous years and 
opted for specialized academic research instead. In this climate, academic journals such 
596 Xu Jilin, “The Fate of an Enlightenment,” 194.
597 Crucial in this respect were the lecture series organized by the Academy of Chinese Culture 
in Beijing. See Wang, High Culture Fever, 49-50.
598 See Chapter Two, 44; Chapter Four, 142.
599 Wang, High Culture Fever, 119.
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as Xueren (The Scholar) and Yuandao (Original Path) were founded, both of which 
were considered to be “conservative” journals that ran articles on topics related to 
Chinese culture.600 The rise of these journals indicated that many intellectuals struggled 
with their role in Chinese society. As Wang Jing has put it succinctly, whereas during 
the 1980s, intellectuals discussed socialist alienation, now, they complained about their 
social alienation.601
Chinese intellectuals have used several explanatory models to denote the 
intellectual shift of the early 1990s: some have interpreted it as a “cyclical change,” 
whereas others have explained it as an intellectual paradigm shift, as a shift in the role 
of intellectuals, or as the consequence of the effect of Western theories.602 Nonetheless, 
the notion of a clear break between the two decades needs to be avoided for several 
reasons. Already during the second half of the 1980s, some intellectuals had turned their 
attention towards Chinese tradition in the context of the “culture fever”; the official 
support for Confucianism also goes back to the 1980s, as will be discussed in the next 
chapter. Although the main trend of the 1980s was that of antitraditionalism, it was 
certainly not the only intellectual trend.603
In addition, already during the 1980s, many intellectuals were critical of the 
May Fourth Movement and the “Enlightenment” project. The philosopher Li Zehou (b. 
1930), for example, famously argued that the “salvation” or “nationalist” (jiuwang)
element of May Fourth had repressed its “Enlightenment” (qimeng) aspect.604
600 Yuandao came out in bookform; the first volume appeared in October 1994, under the 
editorship of Chen Ming (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe). Other academic journals 
that were founded during the early 1990s included Zhongguo shehui kexue jikan (China Social 
Sciences Quarterly), Xueshu Jilin (Scholarship Collection), and Yuanxue (Original Studies). 
601 Wang, High Culture Fever, 5.
602 Ji Xianlin, for example, contended that culture is like a river; after thirty years of floating 
eastward, a new cycle of thirty years of floating westward will follow. Pang Pu explained the 
intellectual changes of the 1990s as a paradigm shift from culture criticism to national studies. 
Chen Lai interpreted the shift as a turn from the political engagement of intellectuals to 
scholarship. Zhu Xueqin referred to the importance of Tiananmen. See Liu Qingfeng, 
“Topography of Intellectual Culture,” 60.
603 Interview with Chen Lai, Beijing, August 10, 2005.
604 Li Zehou, “Qimeng jiuwang de shuangzhong bianzou,” Zhongguo xiandai sixiangshi lun
(Beijing: Dongfang chubanshe, 1987), 7-49. Originally appeared in Zouxiang weilai 1986:1. 
Similarly, Vera Schwarcz has claimed that there was a tension between the goals of 
“Enlightenment” and “salvation” in the May Fourth Movement. See Vera Schwarcz, The 
Chinese Enlightenment, 1.
As Wang 
Jing has noted, the “utopian” mood of the 1980s also suffered important setbacks before 
the 1990s. At the beginning of 1987, General Secretary Hu Yaobang was forced to 
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resign because he had failed to combat “bourgeois liberalization.” In the same year, the 
new General Secretary Zhao Ziyang stated that the country was only in the “primary 
stage of socialism.”605
As regards the critique of “radicalism,” this continuity between the 1980s and 
the 1990s was reflected in the fact that the phenomenon of “anti-radicalism” in China 
predated the events of 1989, but it only became widespread in the context of the 
questions that arose after this date. A Chinese intellectual has compared this to the 
introduction of Marxism in China: although introduced before 1917, it only spread with 
the “cannon shot” of the October Revolution—now, the “gunshots” of June Fourth 
provided the backdrop against which revaluations of “radicalism” spread.
Also in 1987, a campaign against “bourgeois liberalism” was 
launched. All these elements reveal that it is also important to keep the continuities 
between the two decades in mind.
606 1989 was 
perceived of as the deathblow to the “New Enlightenment” spirit.607
As Rana Mitter has phrased it, before 1989, different generations had passed on 
the “talismans” of May Fourth; they had put emphasis on various elements of the May 
Fourth heritage—now, the heritage itself was claimed.
Since Chinese 
intellectuals have often compared the “New Enlightenment” spirit of the 1980s to that 
of the May Fourth Movement during the 1910s, rejections of “radicalism” were 
extended to a criticism of the latter. 
608 Because of this retreat from 
the May Fourth agenda after 1989, both Wang Hui and Xu Jilin have compared the 
1990s to the period between the late 1920s and the outbreak of the Second World War 
in 1937, in which a departure from idealism and the fragmentation of the intellectual 
landscape substituted for the “explosive energies” of the May Fourth era.609
Despite this, reflections on “radicalism” did not only revolve around the year 
1989. The reinterpretation of a century of history was also induced by the decline of 
Reflections 
on the 1980s and the May Fourth Movement were finally extended to reflections on 
modern Chinese history as a whole; events such as the Revolution of 1911 and the 
Reform Movement of 1898 also became subjected to criticism and revaluation. 
605 Wang, High Culture Fever, 37.
606 Zhu Xueqin, “Chinese Liberalism,” 102.
607 Chen Xiaoming, “Fan jijin zhuyi yu dangdai zhishi fenzi de lishi jingyu,” ZFL, 310; Chen 
Baiming, “Wenhua jijin zhuyi,” 128.
608 Mitter, A Bitter Revolution, 273-274.
609 Wang, “Introduction,” 11. Xu Jilin makes this comparison in “The Fate of an Enlightenment: 
Twenty Years in the Chinese Intellectual Sphere,” 183-203.
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socialism in the international context. One Chinese author has mentioned the 
significance of both the events in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe for the 
development of reflections on “radicalism”; in 1990, for example, a conference was 
held in Madrid on the relationship between reform and revolution.610 Internally, Deng 
Xiaoping’s Southern Tour of early 1992 also triggered reflections on revolution and on 
the socialist identity of a country that had turned to reform. Since both 1989 and 1992 
were important events in the debate on “conservatism” and “radicalism,” the point that 
the politics of intellectual discourse during the 1990s were “overdetermined by how 
they simultaneously came to terms with 1989 and 1992” is more than valid.611
4.4.2 Early Revaluations of Modern Chinese History
The Hong Kong-based highbrow journal Twenty-first Century played an important role 
in the cross-fertilization of overseas and mainland scholars because it “offered a new 
kind of bridge between mainland and overseas intellectuals,” as well as between 
mainland scholars and scholars based in Hong Kong and Taiwan.612 Liu Qingfeng and 
Jin Guantao, two key figures in the cultural debates of the 1980s, had set up the journal 
in 1990 as a bimonthly publication of the Institute of Chinese Studies of the Chinese 
University of Hong Kong. Yü Ying-shih’s first criticism of the destruction of Chinese 
tradition, which was entitled “Picking up the pieces for a new start,” appeared in the 
December 1990 issue of Twenty-first Century.613 In his brief but bold statement, Yü 
predicted that the twenty-first century would not look too bright for China given the fact 
that “the wrongdoings Chinese people had inflicted upon themselves during the 
twentieth century had been too serious.”614
In the same issue of Twenty-first Century, Tu Wei-ming (b. 1940), one of the 
exponents of New Confucianism in North America, argued in favor of the dissolution of 
In the entire course of Chinese history, the 
twentieth century had been the darkest period of all; throughout its chain of revolutions, 
“the old had been destroyed in order to found the new” (pojiu lixin).
610 Chen Baiming, “Wenhua jijin zhuyi,” 129-130.
611 Zhang Xudong, “Post-Tiananmen Intellectual Field,” 9.
612 Wang, “Introduction,” 16. The highbrow character of the journal was reflected in its limited 
circulation: one source mentions a circulation of three thousand five hundred copies per issue, 
in comparison with a circulation of eighty thousand per issue for the journal Reading, which, at 
its peak—under the editorship of Wang Hui—reached a circulation of a hundred to a hundred 
and twenty thousand copies per issue. See ibid., 28, 56.
613 Yü Ying-shih, “Dai congtou, shoushi jiu shanhe,” EYS 2 (December 1990), 5-7.
614 Ibid., 6.
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what he called the “Enlightenment mentality.”615
In the next issue of Twenty-first Century, Gan Yang, formerly a major actor in 
the “New Enlightenment Movement,” now expressed criticism of “Enlightenment” in 
the form of a denunciation of the French revolutionary model in favor of the so-called 
Glorious Revolution of 1688.
This mentality was one of rational 
spirit—as manifested in the values of science and democracy—but it was also 
exemplified by the instrumental rationality of scientism. Chinese tradition, Tu argued, 
could play a positive role in dealing with the negative aspects of this mentality. 
Although the New Confucian criticism of the dominance of reason in the modern world 
was not new, the appearance of Tu’s article in Twenty-first Century in 1990 was 
important because it left an imprint on mainland intellectuals who were coming to terms 
with the “Enlightenment” of the 1980s at the time. 
616 The latter had resulted in the foundation of a 
constitutional monarchy and an English Bill of Rights; this goal had been achieved 
through minor bloodshed. Gan Yang’s appraisal of the Glorious Revolution and his 
denial of the French Revolution signified a thorough shift, for some important figures of 
the May Fourth Movement had drawn inspiration from the French Revolution. Chen 
Duxiu, for example, had based his claim that a revolution would lead to a modern 
civilization on the French model; Li Dazhao had engaged in a comparison between the 
French and Russian revolutions.617
As discussed in the previous chapter, the liberal Friedrich von Hayek had also 
discarded the French model in favor of the British model regarding liberty in his The 
Constitution of Liberty. 618
615 Tu Wei-ming, “Huajie qimeng xintai,” EYS 2 (December 1990), 12-13. Tu Wei-ming was 
born in Kunming, but received a B.A. in Chinese Studies (1961) at Tunghai University, Taiwan. 
Tu obtained both his M.A. (1963) and Ph.D. (1968) at Harvard University, where he holds a 
Professorship in the Department of East Asian Languages and Civilizations since 1981. Since 
1996, Tu also served as the Director of the Harvard-Yenching Institute. 
616 King James II was overthrown in a conspiracy between English deserters on the one hand, 
and the Dutch stadtholder William III and his wife Mary Stuart—the daughter of James II—on
the other. Mary Stuart was the lawful heir to the throne, but her father was only willing to 
accept her as an heir if she shared his pro-Catholicism. Mary refused, and a Dutch invasion of 
England followed. It was the Member of Parliament John Hampden who first used the term 
“Glorious Revolution” in 1689. 
617 See Chen Duxiu, “Falanxi ren yu jindai wenming,” Xin Qingnian 1:1, 15 September 1915. 
Reprinted in Chen Song, Wusi qianhou dongxi wenhua wenti lunzhan wenxuan, 3-6. See also Li 
Dazhao, “Fa’e geming zhi bijiaoguan,” Li Dazhao wenxuan (Beijing: renmin dabanshe, 1984), 
Vol.1, 572-575. Originally published in Yanzhi 3, July 1, 1918.
618 Friedrich A. Hayek, “Freedom, Reason, and Tradition,” in The Constitution of Liberty, 49-
62.
According to Hayek, the French tradition of liberty was 
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based on Cartesian rationalism and grand collective purposes, whereas the British 
tradition was founded on empiricism and cumulative growth; it adhered to spontaneity 
and the absence of coercion.619 The argument that the French Revolution had failed in 
the foundation of liberty was hardly new; Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859) had 
already made this claim in his two works on democracy, namely De la Démocratie en 
Amérique (1835-1840) and L’Ancien Régime et la Révolution (1856). For Tocqueville, 
the French Revolution was nothing but a continuation of the Ancien Régime; every 
attempt to destroy absolute power had resulted in “placing the head of Liberty on a 
servile body.”620
In line with these criticisms of the French Revolution, Gan Yang argued that the 
May Fourth slogan “democracy and science” should be questioned because the actions 
based on this slogan had led to results that were far removed from it.621 Gan Yang had 
already criticized this May Fourth slogan in a 1989 article in Reading, which was 
written for the eightieth anniversary of May Fourth.622 Referring to Friedrich von Hayek 
and the liberal British philosopher and historian of ideas Isaiah Berlin (1909-1997), Gan 
Yang argued that the French revolutionary model did not know liberty, as opposed to 
the Anglo-American constitutional model of “liberty and order.” Gan Yang also 
referred to Berlin’s distinction between “positive” and “negative” freedom, or the 
difference between the freedom to do what one wishes and the freedom from 
interference by others.623
619 Thinkers who belonged to the French tradition were the “Encyclopedists,” or, those around 
the Encyclopédie, ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers. The 
“Encyclopedists” included Denis Diderot (1713-1784), Jean le Rond d’Alembert (1717-1783), 
André le Breton (1708-1779), and others. Other thinkers that belonged to the French tradition 
included Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot (1727-1781), 
François Quesnay (1694-1774), and the Marquis de Condorcet (1743-1794). Those who 
belonged to the British tradition included David Hume (1711-1776), Adam Smith (1723-1790), 
Edmund Burke, Adam Ferguson (1723-1816), Josiah Tucker (1713-1799), and William Paley 
(1743-1805). Hayek adds, however, that there are exceptions to this national division: Alexis de 
Tocqueville and Benjamin Constant (1767-1830) can be said to be closer to the British tradition, 
whereas Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), William Godwin (1756-1836), Joseph Priestley (1733-
1804), Richard Price (1723-1791) and Thomas Paine (1737-1809) can be associated with the 
French tradition. 
620 de Valk, Democratie: wezen en oorsprong, 310. 
621 Gan Yang, “Yangqi ‘minzhu yu kexue,’ dianding ‘ziyou yu zhixu,’” EYS 3 (February 1991), 
7-10.
622 This article, entitled “Ziyou de linian: wusi chuantong zhi queshimian,” appeared in Dushu
5, 1989.
623 Berlin elaborated this distinction in his essay “Two Concepts of Liberty.”
Like Berlin, Gan Yang repudiated the “positive” freedom of 
the French revolutionaries and Rousseau. But liberals in socialist countries in particular 
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had based themselves on the French Revolution, possibly because the communist 
Revolution was the inheritor of the French Revolution.624
Nonetheless, early revaluations of modern Chinese history were not always a 
direct response to the events of 1989. An example of a new interpretation of the May 
Fourth period that predates June fourth, 1989, concerns an article on the scholars around 
the journal Xueheng (1922-1933) that dates from early 1989.625 Its author was the 
literary theorist Yue Daiyun, the wife of the head of the Academy of Chinese Culture, 
Tang Yijie. Whereas the scholars around this journal had long been considered 
opponents of May Fourth, Yue Daiyun argued that they had attempted to answer the 
same questions as their May Fourth contemporaries.626 The Xueheng scholars had tried 
to unite the best in Chinese and Western culture; they had adhered to a spirit of 
openness and dialogue. They had often been portrayed as “backward” because of the 
existence of different scholarly factions and under the political judgment of the CCP.627
Yue Daiyun ascribed her early revaluation of conservative figures to her experience as a 
visiting scholar at the Comparative Literature Department of Harvard University in 
1985, a department where the Xueheng scholars had studied under Irving Babbitt (1865-
1933).628
4.5 THE 1992 DEBATE 
4.5.1 Reflections on the Cultural Revolution
As can be seen from the above, Yü Ying-shih was preoccupied with the revolutionary 
tradition of the CCP and with its effect on traditional social institutions in particular, 
whereas mainland intellectuals mainly attempted to come to terms with the failure of 
the political engagement of the 1980s, or with the new reality of a second round of 
624 The liberal Gu Xin used the same models to criticize Gan Yang in his response article 
“Anggelu ziyou chuantong yu Falanxi langman jingshen,” EYS 6 (August 1991), 138-140. 
Relying on Hayek’s distinction between the English and the French traditions of liberty, Gu Xin 
described the English model as a model that relied on spontaneous growth, whereas the French 
model could be characterized by “rationalism” and not, as Gan Yang claimed, by science and 
democracy.
625 Yue Daiyun, “Chonggu ‘xueheng’: jianlun xiandai baoshou zhuyi,” in Lun chuantong yu fan 
chuantong, 415-428.
626 On the Xueheng group, see Schneider, “Bridging the Gap,” 1-33.
627 Interview with Yue Daiyun, Beijing, July 12, 2006.
628 Ibid.
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economic reforms. These different concerns would lead to a debate on “radicalism” and 
“conservatism” that moved in several directions. 
In the April 1992 issue of Twenty-first Century, the Marxist historian Jiang 
Yihua (b.1939) of Fudan University challenged Yü Ying-shih’s elitist account of 
modern Chinese history as a process of “radicalization” brought about by 
intellectuals. 629 As a Marxist, Jiang was more concerned with the fate of the vast 
majority living in poverty than with highbrow debates about ideas. As he phrased it in a 
text on Confucianism: “When scholars are indulging in high-sounding tirades in studies 
and classrooms, one should be sure not to forget the realities of life on China’s vast 
earth.”630 Jiang Yihua attacked Yü’s definition of “conservatism” and “radicalism” as 
the preservation and destruction of the status quo respectively; he invoked the English 
political writer Hugh Cecil for his definition of the former. Jiang Yihua argued that 
Hugh Cecil, in his 1912 Conservatism, had discerned three main elements of modern 
British conservatism, namely the innate adherence to old things familiar, the
safeguarding of religion and authority, and the love for the greatness of one’s 
country.631 Basing himself on both Cecil and Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in 
France (1790), Jiang concluded that conservatism obviously did not mean an opposition 
to change, or an advocacy of small change, but that change should occur “within the 
range of specific value orientations,” such as respect for tradition, authority, and 
nationalism.632
As for “cultural conservatism,” or the advocacy of change with a respect for 
tradition, Jiang Yihua referred to those who had tried to reinvigorate Confucianism or to 
investigate Chinese learning. This included the intellectuals that Yü Ying-shih had 
categorized as “radicals,” such as Kang Youwei and the scholars around the Journal for 
According to this definition, conservatives in modern China had not 
been too few, but too many in number. 
629 Jiang Yihua, “Jijin yu baoshou: yu Yü Ying-shih xiansheng shangque,” EYS 10 (April 1992), 
134-142.
630 Jiang Yihua, “Ershi shiji ruxue zai Zhongguo de chonggou,” 35.
631 What Jiang Yihua referred to was Hugh Cecil’s claim that there were three “component 
elements” of conservatism, namely “natural conservatism”, “Toryism” or “the defense of 
Church and King,” and the “reverence for religion and authority,” and finally, “imperialism,” or 
“a feeling for the greatness of the country and for that unity which makes its greatness.” Cecil, 
Conservatism, 244.
632 Jiang Yihua, “Jijin yu baoshou,” 135.
156
National Essence. 633 In another article, Jiang Yihua also dealt with eleven 
manifestations of “political conservatism.” Since Jiang defined the latter as the 
advocacy of change within the framework of respect for authority, all the manifestations 
of political conservatism he referred to in his account appeared in opposition to 
democracy and liberalism. 634 More precisely, Jiang referred to several theories of 
dictatorship in support of Yuan Shikai and Chiang Kai-shek, to the dictatorship of Mao 
Zedong, and, finally, to “neo-authoritarianism” and the rise of a “new political 
conservatism” since 1990.635
Yet the main focus of Jiang Yihua’s attack on Yü Ying-shih concerned the 
latter’s characterization of the Cultural Revolution as “radical.” For Jiang, on the 
contrary, the defining essence of the Cultural Revolution had been “all-round 
dictatorship” and political conservatism; it had continued “the harmful tradition of 
feudal despotism in thought and politics.”636
Mister Yü Ying-shih considers the ten-year period of the Cultural Revolution to be the 
peak of the modern radicalization process. In fact, this only catches sight of a couple of 
slogans that thoroughly break with feudalism, capitalism, and revisionism, and that stir 
As Jiang Yihua phrased it:
633 Before 1911, these manifestations of “cultural conservatism” included: Zhang Zhidong’s 
1898 work Quanxuepian (Exhortation to Learn), an opposition to the radical reform plans of 
Kang Youwei; Zhang Zhidong’s adage “Chinese learning for the essence, Western learning for 
application” (zhongti xiyong); Ye Dehui’s Yijiao congbian, also a criticism of the reforms of 
1898; the works of Kang Youwei; the Guocuibao (National Essence Journal). For the period 
after 1911, Jiang referred to: the spread of Confucian associations (kongjiao hui) during Yuan 
Shikai’s rule; the wholesale affirmation of Chinese traditional culture during the reign of the 
Northern Warlords; Chiang Kai-shek’s 1934 New Life Movement (xin shenghuo yundong); the 
movement to praise Confucius and to read the Classics; the 1930s movement for the 
construction of a Chinese native culture; the movement for the renaissance of Chinese culture in 
Taiwan during the 1950s and 1960s; New Confucianism; and, finally, the resurgence of national 
studies during the 1990s.
634 Jiang Yihua, “20 shiji Zhongguo sixiangshi shang de zhengzhi baoshou zhuyi,” ZFL, 57-73.
Originally published in Tansuo yu zhengming 1993:1, 47-56, 30.
635 The eleven manifestations were: Liang Qichao’s “theory of enlightened despotism” (kaiming 
zhuanzhi lun) in 1906; the “theory of constitutional monarchy for national salvation” (junzhu 
lixian jiuguolun) proposed by Yang Du, a legal advisor to Yuan Shikai, in 1915; the 1925 
nationalist movement (xingshi yundong) of Ceng Qi, Li Huang, Zuo Shunsheng, and others; 
Chiang Kai-shek’s tutelary government (xunzheng) between 1928 and 1929; the fascism of the 
Kuomintang between 1934 and 1935; the 1935 “new style despotism theory” (xinshi ducai lun)
of Ding Wenjiang and Jiang Tingfu; the New Legalist Movement (xin fajia yundong) of before 
and after 1936; the “warring states strategy” (zhanguoce) promoted by Lin Tongqi, Chen Quan, 
Lei Haizong and others at the beginning of the 1940s; Mao Zedong’s all-round dictatorship 
theory; the theory of “new authoritarianism” between 1988 and 1989; and, finally, “new 
political conservatism” (xin zhengzhi baoshou zhuyi) since 1990. 
636 Jiang Yihua, “Jijin yu baoshou,”137.
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up revolution within the depth of the soul. It has not thoroughly investigated what it 
actually is that the Cultural Revolution safeguards and upholds. Its pan-moralism, its 
pan-politicism, its egalitarianism that only serves to spread poverty, its totemization, its 
religious idolatry and its individual arbitrariness are all deeply rooted in Chinese 
tradition.637
Jiang Yihua refuted Yü Ying-shih’s argument of “radicalization” from the perspective 
of the mode of production. For Jiang, the land reforms and people’s communes were not 
“radical” because they had preserved the peasants’ original mode of production and 
mode of life; Jiang even compared them to the land system of the Taiping Rebellion.638
Mao Zedong’s choice for the peasants instead of the urban proletariat, Jiang claimed, 
had been a distortion of Marxism and a disaster for Chinese modernization. As for 
Mao’s thought, it was not “radical,” but it contained elements of idealism, “thick 
populism,” and rural socialism (nongye shehui zhuyi).639 Yü Ying-shih was unable to 
see this because he was an overseas intellectual who obtained many of his views 
through the Party journal Red Flag and the People’s Daily.640 His understanding of the 
Cultural Revolution was “too shallow” and neglected all nuances.641
637 Ibid., 137-138.
638 The land system of the Taiping, as outlined in the 1853 document Tianchao tianmu zhidu
(The land system of the Heavenly Kingdom) consisted of “economic egalitarianism, totalitarian 
communism, authoritarian hierarchy, and messianic zeal.” Therefore, it can be said that it 
“foreshadows aspects of the Chinese Communist movement of the twentieth century” as the 
authors of Sources of Chinese Tradition have formulated it. See chapter 29, 224. 
639 Interview with Jiang Yihua, Shanghai, August 8, 2006. Jiang Yihua’s criticism of Mao 
Zedong’s thought as the preservation of the old forms of life and production was in line with 
Lenin’s criticism of Russian Populism. See Maurice Meissner, “Leninism and Maoism: Some 
Populist Perspectives on Marxism-Leninism in China,” The China Quarterly 45 (Jan-March, 
1971), 2-36.
640 Jiang Yihua and Chen Yan, “Jijin yu baoshou: yiduan shangwei wanjie de duihua,” ZFL 30-
36. Quote from 32-33. Originally published in Kaifang shidai 1997:1, 37-41.
641 Interview with Jiang Yihua, Shanghai, August 8, 2006.
Jiang clearly gave 
“radicalism” a positive connotation; it was associated with progress and modernization. 
“Radicalism” had been weak in modern Chinese history because the modernization 
forces had been weak. Moreover, instead of being part of a “radicalization” process 
without any direction, Jiang argued that changes in modern China had taken place 
within the framework of economic modernization, the creation of modern values, and 
the distribution of wealth. For Jiang, it was not a matter of more or less “radicalism,” 
but a matter of different choices regarding modernization.
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In the same issue of Twenty-first Century, Yü Ying-shih attacked Jiang Yihua 
for focusing on politics, society, and economics, whereas his main concern had been the 
intellectual radicalization of modern China.642 In spite of this, Jiang’s argument of the 
predominance of conservative social forces in modern Chinese history, Yü claimed, did 
not contradict his thesis, for Jiang’s text demonstrated that radicals could not but rely on 
traditional resources. Here, Yü’s rooting of “radicalism” in tradition is reminiscent of 
Lin Yü-sheng’s thesis that the May Fourth generation’s “content of thought” was 
“radical,” whereas its “style of thought” was nevertheless very traditional. For Yü Ying-
shih, Jiang Yihua’s text revealed “the paradox of revolution”: a revolution’s radical 
elements always desired to wipe out tradition in its entirety, but in reality, they ended up 
employing the very traditional elements they had attempted to eradicate. The “paradox 
of conservatism,” on the other hand, implied that renewal was indispensable for 
preservation. As Edmund Burke formulated it in Reflections on the Revolution in 
France: “If a country does not have the ability to change, it can also not have the ability 
to preserve.”643
Yü Ying-shih further argued that 1949 was a very important line of demarcation 
for modern Chinese history, since it signified the start of the destruction of Chinese 
popular society (minjian shehui) through the eradication of private property rights. Yü’s 
main target of attack was the CCP, which he described as a group of marginal elements 
that had grabbed power amidst revolutionary violence.644 Their monopolization of all 
resources, military backing, and absolutist despotic power was nothing but Stalinism in 
disguise. Yü referred to Richard Pipes’ The Russian Revolution, and to the chapter on 
“The Red Terror” in particular, the implication being that for Mao, as for Lenin, terror 
had been “an indispensable instrument of revolutionary government.”645
642 Yü Ying-shih, “Zailun Zhongguo xiandai sixiang zhong de jijin yu baoshou: da Jiang Yihua 
xiansheng,” EYS 10 (April 1992), 143-149.
643 Ibid., 145. In Reflections, Burke stated: “A state without the means of some change is 
without the means of its conservation. Without such means it might even risk the loss of that 
part of the Constitution which it wished the most religiously to preserve.” Kramnick, The 
Portable Edmund Burke, 424.  
644 Yü has elaborated this point further in “Zhongguo zhishi fenzi de bianyuanhua,” EYS 6
(August 1991), 15-25.
645 See Richard Pipes, “The Red Terror,” in The Russian Revolution (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1990), 789-840. Quote from 790. Lenin’s Red Terror consisted of the invalidation of the 
legal system, the establishment of Revolutionary Tribunals, and the institution of mass 
executions by the cheka—the “Extraordinary Commission to Fight the Counterrevolution and 
Sabotage”— an organ that was also responsible for the creation of the concentration camp in its 
modern form.
Yet the biggest 
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characteristic of communism for Yü was what Milovan Djilas, a critic of Stalinism, had 
called the “New Class.”646 This class was “new” because of its power composition of 
“owners and exploiters” in the name of collective ownership, which in fact meant 
totalitarianism and monopoly.647 In line with Djilas account, Yü stated elsewhere that 
the CCP was “a big landlord, a big capitalist, and a big slaveholder.”648
Although Jiang Yihua’s verdict on modern Chinese history was opposite to that 
of Yü Ying-shih, he also argued in favor of economic development and a strong middle 
class; the primary focus on the peasants and the struggle against Western capitalism in 
the Comintern during the 1920s had caused the neglect of economic development.649
Elsewhere, Jiang described the period in China since the late 1970s as a “peaceful 
revolution towards modernization and ‘new rationalism.’”650 Jiang used this term to 
refer to the development of the market economy, urbanization, the rise of the middle 
class, globalization, and, finally, a change in values, social structures, and the political 
system. However, since Jiang associated Confucianism with “small peasant 
civilization” and the obstruction of modernization, for him, the shortcomings of 
modernization could only be solved with more modernization. 651 Jiang fiercely 
criticized what he referred to as the  “Confucianization of Marxism.”652
Whereas Jiang Yihua, as a Marxist historian, stressed the importance of 
economic development as such and did not engage with issues related to superstructure, 
646 Djilas (1911-1995) was a proponent of “socialism with a human face”; his works have often 
been utilized to attack the Stalinist version of the communist state. Djilas was born in 
Montenegro and had supported Tito before becoming one of the fiercest critics of both 
Yugoslav communism and the Soviet Union, which resulted in his expulsion from the Party and 
prison sentences.
647 Milovan Djilas, The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System (New York, 
Washington: Praeger Publishers, 1971 (1957)), 52.
648 Jin Zhong, “Pulinsitun lun ‘bian,’” 43-44.
649 In an article on nationalism in modern China, Jiang Yihua stated that the result of the focus 
on race, politics, and culture instead of on the development of a national economy in modern 
Chinese nationalism had been “exclusionism” and “backwardness.” See Jiang Yihua, 
“Zhongguo minzu zhuyi de tedian ji xin jieduan,” EYS 15 (February 1993), 60-64.
650 Jiang Yihua, “Zhongguo zouxiang xiandaihua de heping geming yu xin lixing zhuyi,” ZFL,
493-506. Originally published in Wenshizhe 1996:3, 3-11.
651 See Jiang Yihua, “Ershi shiji ruxue zai Zhongguo de chonggou,” EYS 1 (October 1990), 28-
35.
652 Jiang Yihua’s argument is in line with some Western interpretations of Chinese Marxism as 
the continuation of Chinese tradition. The Mao specialist Stuart Schram was the first person to 
point out the Chinese and traditional elements in Mao’s thought, but he criticized an 
interpretation of Mao’s leadership primarily in those terms, because it overlooked the 
importance of Leninist and Stalinist elements. See Stuart S. Schram, “Mao Zedong a Hundred 
Years On: The Legacy of a Ruler,” The China Quarterly 137 (March 1994), 125-143.
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Yü’s biggest concern relating to modernization was that it had to be continuous with 
Chinese tradition. As Michael Quirin has argued, Yü wanted to secure nothing less than 
“the future of Chinese culture and society.”653 In Yü’s view, the theme of culture was 
closely connected with the suppression of intellectuals, since the intellectual was the 
guardian of Chinese culture. For Quirin, Yü’s political stance could be defined as a 
conservative position because Yü defended historical continuity; nevertheless, his 
preoccupation with intellectuals was not aimed at restoring their political and social 
privileges—it was about restoring their cultural hegemony. 654 Yü’s criticism of 
“radicalization” served to reveal the cultural identity crisis of modern China: for Yü, it 
was the identification with Western culture that had led to the denial of Chinese cultural 
identity. 655
Apart from their different concerns, Yü Ying-shih and Jiang Yihua also had a 
different conception of what constituted China. For Yü, “China” was a cultural entity 
that went beyond the geographical boundaries of the Chinese nation-state. Since Yü did 
not accept the political legitimacy of the CCP, he also challenged its Party-centered 
notion of “Chineseness.” For Jiang, on the contrary, “China” was a mere geographical 
concept that was associated with a politically defined territory. Consequently, 
intellectuals of Chinese descent who resided outside Chinese borders had no right to 
represent China, which explains why Jiang attacked Yü’s “shallow” conception of 
events such as the Cultural Revolution. Yü’s cultural conception of “Chineseness,” on 
the contrary, was reminiscent of Tu Wei-ming’s “cultural China thesis.”
Although this claim is reductionist, as will be disclosed throughout this 
chapter and the following chapters, Yü was indeed preoccupied with Chinese culture.
656
According to Tu Wei-ming’s thesis, “cultural China” consisted of the interaction 
between intellectuals of three symbolic universes. The first symbolic universe was 
composed of mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, whereas the second 
and third universes consisted of overseas Chinese and individuals of non-Chinese 
descent who attempted to understand China. Tu Wei-ming upheld the view that 
members of these three universes could “assume an effective role in creatively 
constructing a new vision of Chineseness that is more in tune with Chinese history and 
653 Quirin, “Yü Yingshi, das Politische und die Politik,” 54. 
654 Ibid., 55-57.
655 Yü Ying-shih, “Zixu,” 1-6.
656 Tu Wei-Ming, “Cultural China: The Periphery as the Center,” 1-34.
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in sympathetic resonance with Chinese culture.”657 As Paul Cohen has noted, this vision 
was highly elitist and very much a concern of intellectuals; the culture referred to was 
mostly intellectual culture.658 The notion of “cultural China,” Cohen argued, contained 
both a substantive and a strategic side. The substantive side was that it proposed “a 
cluster of values, behavior patterns, ideas, and traditions” that people identified as 
“Chinese.” The strategic element was that it enabled members of the three universes to 
take part in the definition of “Chineseness” “without inhabiting the geographical or 
political space known as Zhongguo.”659
Despite Yü’s concern with Chinese culture, his fierce criticism of the CCP, and 
his politically liberal sympathies, he did not come up with a concrete political program. 
The foundation of Yü’s political stand was what Quirin has termed “Machtferne,” or, a 
discrepancy between Yü’s utopian political desires and his limited interest in 
mechanisms and institutions that could crystallize these political hopes. Yü approached 
political responsibility in the form of a moral call; his primary concern was not a 
concrete political program, but an accusation of those in power.660
4.5.2 Criticizing the CCP and Affirming Gradual Reform
Yü’s criticism of 
“radicalism” in modern Chinese history thus reveals that he considered Chinese 
intellectuals to be the carriers of the moral qualities that could rescue China from 
“radicalization”—the CCP had caused China to stray from the moral order of Confucian 
times, and it was up to the Chinese intellectual to restore this lost moral order.
Whereas Jiang Yihua’s criticism already deviated from Yü Ying-shih’s central concern 
of the preservation of Chinese culture, other intellectuals from outside mainland China 
who joined the debate not only moved further away from Yü’s cultural agenda; they 
also devoted less energy to the discussion of the nature of modern Chinese history. 
Instead, they used the debate to discuss a variety of other issues, such as the policy of 
the CCP or the economic reform program of Deng Xiaoping.  Like Jiang Yihua, most 
discussants focused on political, social, and economic factors rather than on intellectual 
history; although they differed from Jiang in their definition of “conservatism” and 
“radicalism,” they also turned to the issue of modernization. For many, “conservatism” 
657 Ibid., 34.
658 Cohen, “Cultural China: Some Definitional Issues,” 557.
659 Ibid.
660 Quirin, “Yü Yingshi, das Politische und die Politik,” 60-64.
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in this respect was but the preservation of interests or the status quo, whereas 
“radicalism” was connected with revolution and the destruction of the status quo. 
An example of the criticism of “radicalism” as part of a defense of gradual 
economic reform concerns an article by Wang Rongzu (b. 1940), a Professor in the 
History Department of Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University who had been 
educated in Taiwan and the United States. 661 Wang Rongzu argued that Deng 
Xiaoping’s economic reform program was the perfect way to balance conservatism and 
radicalism. As Wang Rongzu put it: “Reform is neither blindly conservative, nor blindly 
radical—it seems to be the middle road between the two.”662
The modern meaning of the word ‘revolution’ is nothing but violence and destruction. 
However, those with lofty ideals in modern China often considered revolution the most 
sacred aim—revolution was a synonym for progress; opposing the revolution became a 
charge of guilt of the most heinous crimes.
Instead of focusing on 
intellectual history proper, Wang Rongzu included conservative social forces in his 
analysis. Although he agreed with Yü Ying-shih that modern Chinese history had 
indeed witnessed several waves of radicalization—namely 1898, 1911, and May 
Fourth—Wang added that each wave had also faced a conservative backlash. The 
reforms of 1898 had failed because of conservative adversaries; the revolution of 1911 
had likewise been weakened by the conservative opposition of the gentry, of 
landowners, and of merchants. Wang Rongzu’s “conservatism” was obviously not about 
the preservation of cultural continuity; for Wang, conservative forces attempted to 
preserve their interests against the “radicalism” of revolutionary elements. Wang 
Rongzu’s sociohistorical approach to the topic, then, did not contain any Burkean 
traits—his argument was that economic reform was the best way to avoid the extremes 
of both social “conservative” and “radical” revolutionary forces. 
In another article, Wang Rongzu explicitly criticized the permanent 
revolutionary movement of modern China for having destroyed the material basis of 
liberalism and democratic rule in China. Wang Rongzu wrote: 
663
661 Wang Rongzu, “Jijin yu baoshou zhuiyan,” EYS 11 (June 1992), 133-136.
662 Ibid., 135.
663 Wang Rongzu, “Ziyou zhuyi yu Zhongguo,” EYS 2 (December 1990), 33-37. Quote from 34-
35.
163
The revolution of 1911 destroyed the constitutional basis, whereas the Second 
Revolution of 1913 established the military dictatorship of Yuan Shikai.664
Like Yü Ying-shih, other mainland intellectuals who took part in the 1992 
debate launched an assault on the CCP in particular. But whereas Yü’s criticism of the 
CCP had been related to his conservative advocacy of intermediate institutions—which 
the CCP had destroyed since 1949—these intellectuals only criticized the CCP for 
political reasons. Being intellectuals based outside of mainland China, they criticized 
the repressive political climate on the mainland. Sun Guodong, a Professor in the 
History Department of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, attacked Jiang Yihua’s 
negative portrayal of conservatism, his views on the Cultural Revolution, and his praise 
of the CCP’s policies.
The May 
Fourth Movement paved the way for yet another revolution that eradicated the basis for 
democracy and founded a dictatorial government. From this, we can see that Wang 
Rongzu associated reform with the conditions for the creation of liberalism and 
democratic rule. The debate on “conservatism” and “radicalism,” then, was reduced to 
the century-old debate on the question of reform versus “revolution.” What was new, 
though, was that reform was now considered a prerequisite for liberalism—the latter 
could not be obtained through revolution.  
665
Sun Guodong further criticized Jiang Yihua for his argument that the errors of 
the Cultural Revolution could be ascribed to Chinese tradition, and for his positive 
portrayal of the changes that had occurred in modern China. Since 1949 in particular, 
the creation of a modern economy, a modern value system, and the equal distribution of 
wealth was highly questionable. The CCP had always pursued an economic policy 
under strong political force, and only recently had there been some openness. Given the 
Although both Yü Ying-shih and Jiang Yihua had referred to 
Edmund Burke in their discussion, Sun Guodong only reproached Jiang for his 
uncritical application of both Edmund Burke and Hugh Cecil to China, which ignored 
differences in context. As American conservatism had demonstrated, Sun Guodong 
argued, it was mistaken to associate conservatism with authority and nationalism: 
American conservatism took issue with authority and contained no nationalist traits.
664 In July 1913, discontentment among the military and revolutionaries led to a rebellion 
against Yuan Shikai, the Provisional President of the Republic of China. Yuan Shikai managed 
to suppress the rebellion and was formally elected President of the Republic in October of the 
same year. 
665 Sun Guodong, “Du Jiang Yihua ‘jijin yu baoshou’ shu hou,” EYS 11 (June 1992), 141-143.
164
repression of intellectuals, a modern value system that acknowledged autonomy and 
liberty was also non-existent. Since the CCP was, following Djilas, a “New Class,” its 
concern with social justice could also be doubted. In Sun Guodong’s account, then, the 
preoccupation with Chinese culture and with intermediate groups in Chinese society 
was absent; his argument was a liberal criticism of the CCP. 
Wang Shaoguang, who has been discussed in Chapter Two as one of the 
persons generally associated with “neo-conservatism” because of his defense of a 
centralized state, did not engage with modern Chinese history either in his contribution 
to the debate. Instead, Wang argued in favor of gradual reform, a viewpoint that was 
congruent with the economic gradualism defended by “neo-conservatives.”666 Like Yü 
Ying-shih, Wang Shaoguang emphasized that conservatism did promote change; it was 
not an attitude towards tradition, ultimate aims, the status quo, or the future, but “an 
attitude of people towards how to change the condition they are in.” 667
In Wang Shaoguang’s opinion, the debate between Yü Ying-shih and Jiang 
Yihua was not about a “conservatism” in which the “ism” referred to a “systematic 
theory and advocacy.”
Wang 
Shaoguang also followed Yü in his reference to Burke’s dictum that preservation 
required change. Conservatism, then, was an attitude towards the speed of changing the 
status quo. 
668 The debate only dealt with “conservative trends” (baoshou 
sichao), or with a widespread embrace of what Wang called a “conservative tendency” 
(baoshou qingxiang), which was “an inclination towards gradualism on a personal 
level.” 669 The debate also considered “conservative actions” (baoshou xingwei), but 
these were not necessarily linked to “conservative tendencies.” 670 Wang Shaoguang 
concluded from the debate that both “conservative trends” and “conservative actions” 
had been prominent in modern Chinese history, but conservatism as a theoretical system 
had nevertheless been rare. Wang explained that conservatives pressed for gradualism 
because they were convinced that gradualism was  “a principle that must be abided by 
in all historical processes.”671
666 Wang Shaoguang, “‘Baoshou’ yu  ‘baoshou zhuyi,’” EYS 12 (August 1992), 135-138.
667 Ibid., 135.
668 Ibid., 136.
669 Ibid.
670 Ibid., 137.
671 Ibid.
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In this sense, Yü Ying-shih was not a serious conservative for Wang Shaoguang, 
since he proposed radical measures to reverse the CCP. A true conservative would opt 
for gradualism in all circumstances; he considered society to be an organic whole and 
he acknowledged the limits of human knowledge. Although this argument was based on 
conservative grounds, Wang Shaoguang employed it in the service of his plea for social 
reform based on Popper’s “piecemeal engineering” and on Oakeshott’s concept of 
“practical knowledge.” 672 Wang Shaoguang’s embrace of a procedural gradualism 
concerning economic reform, then, was in line with his statement that “neo-
conservatism” opposed a “radicalism” of pace (buzhou), and a “radicalism” of strategy 
(shouduan).673
4.5.3 “Piecemeal Engineering” and Conservative Liberalism 
Economically and politically, this “radicalism” attempted to reach goals 
in one step. Like Xiao Gongqin, Wang Shaoguang further argued that “neo-
conservatism” did not argue against a “radicalism” of aims (mubiao), namely the 
establishment of political democracy and a market economy. Like Yü Ying-shih, Wang 
Shaoguang’s goal of the establishment of a market economy also involved the creation 
of a middle class, but as distinct from Yü Ying-shih’s combination of an economic and 
political liberalism with a promotion of the Chinese cultural tradition, Wang Shaoguang 
only underscored economic liberalism; Yü’s concern with cultural identity and 
intermediate groups in society was nowhere to be found. 
Mainland intellectuals who joined the debate also confirmed gradual economic reform, 
but like Gan Yang, they embedded this argument in a criticism of the French 
revolutionary model. Although they also invoked Burke, this was not done to argue that 
change was needed for the preservation of Chinese tradition; instead, Burke was 
referred to in order to justify the importance of gradual economic and political reform. 
Since this criticism of “radicalism” amounted to the defense of a liberalism that was to 
be achieved gradually, it might be considered an advocacy of “conservative liberalism.” 
However, as will be discussed, its “conservative” aspect was rather procedural than 
substantive in nature; the concern with the community was absent from the debate. 
Another significant difference between Yü Ying-shih’s argument of “radicalization” 
672 Oakeshott coined this concept in his Rationalism in Politics. See Chapter One, 12, fn. 53.
673 Wang Shaoguang, “Qiubian paluan de xin baoshou zhuyi sichao,” China Times Weekly,
March 8, 1992, 76-77.
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and mainland uses of the concept of “radicalism” was that “radicalism” was now only 
conceived of as revolution and French-style liberalism, whereas British gradual 
liberalism was related to “conservatism.” Since Yü Ying-shih had applied the term 
“radicalism” to refer to an attitude toward Chinese tradition, in his conception, both 
Marxists and liberals had been “radicals.” Conversely, in the context of the intensified 
economic reform since 1992, mainland intellectuals disconnected gradual forms of 
liberalism from the notion of “radicalism.” 
The perceived link between liberalism and gradualism was already present in an 
article on “radicalism” in modern Chinese history that dates from February 1991. In the 
pages of Twenty-first Century, Lin Gang (b. 1957), an associate researcher in literature 
at CASS, argued that liberalism was a form of gradualism, whereas “radicalism” 
believed in “basic solutions.”674 The latter took a stand against tradition in the cultural 
realm and advocated violence and revolution in the political realm; it drew on Rousseau 
and the French Revolution.675 “Radicalism” could not be disconnected from revolution: 
“‘Basic solutions,’ ‘ultimate solutions,’ ‘thorough solutions’ and other popular 
predicates of the late ‘May Fourth’ period are but synonyms of violent revolution.”676
Like Lin Gang, other mainland intellectuals who took part in the 1992 debate 
did not connect liberalism with “radicalism,” as both Yü Ying-shih and Xiao Gongqin 
had done. Liberalism was now associated with gradualism, and Popper’s notion of 
“piecemeal engineering” was often invoked to speak for gradual reform. The reference 
to Popper was not strange in the early 1990s, a time when Popper’s popularity in China 
rose.
Here, Lin Gang associated “radicalism” both with its initial meaning of “that what goes 
to the root” and with the concrete political content of revolution. 
677
674 Lin Gang, “Jijin zhuyi zai Zhongguo,” EYS 3 (February 1991), 17-27.
675 Ibid., 20. According to Lin Gang, both the late-Qing reformer Liang Qichao and Zou Rong, 
the writer of the anti-Manchu tract Revolutionary Army (1903), had based themselves on 
Rousseau and the French Revolution.
676 Ibid., 23. 
677 Some of Popper’s works were translated into Chinese as early as 1986. See Popu’er, 
Caixiang yu fanbo (Conjectures and refutations), trans. Fu Jichong et al. (Shanghai: Shanghai 
yiwen chubanshe, 1986); Babai, Ka’er, Kaifang shehui ji qi diren (The open society and its 
enemies), trans. and eds. Zhuang Wenrui and Li Yingming (Taipei: Guiguan tushu gongsi), 
1986.
Already in 1987, a seminar on Popper was organized in Wuhan, at which the 
researcher Fan Dainian (CASS) argued that Chinese modernization should take place 
according to Popper’s “piecemeal social engineering,” and not according to “utopian 
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social engineering,” a lesson the CCP had already put into practice. Fan Dainian 
phrased it as follows:
In the past seven or eight years, Chinese Communists, having learned from the heavy 
losses caused by Utopian social engineering, have emphasized that we should be 
“practical and realistic” and “grope our own way” (through trial and error) from now 
on, that is, implement what Popper called piecemeal social engineering.678
The accent on Popper’s “piecemeal engineering” was in accordance with the 
pragmatism and realism of the official reform policy, as expressed in, for example, the 
slogan “crossing the river by stepping the stones” (mozhe shitou guohe). The “new era” 
(xin shiqi), which had began with the policy of reform and opening up in 1978, was 
marked by the formation of what Xu Jilin has referred to as a “secular socialism” that 
intended to move away from the “idealism of utopian socialism” of the previous era.679
Another Chinese participant of the Wuhan conference on Popper considered 
Popper’s “fallibilism” to be an “antidote to some eternal dogmas which were said to be 
absolutely right and absolutely immune to criticism.”
The reference to Popper’s criticism of “utopian social engineering” reflected this new 
economic context.
680
It is the conviction that one has to go to the very root of the social evil, that nothing 
short of a complete eradication of the offending social system will do if we wish to 
“bring any decency into the world” (as Du Gard says). It is, in short, its 
uncompromising radicalism. (The reader will notice that I am using this term in its 
original and literal sense—not in the now customary sense of a “liberal progressivism”, 
but in order to characterize an attitude of “going to the root of the matter”).
Even though Popper was 
invoked for the promotion of gradual instead of “utopian” reform, he was also quoted to 
condemn the ideological rigidity of the Mao era. Popper also suited the debate on 
“conservatism” and “radicalism” in particular, since Popper himself had used the term 
“radicalism” in a reference to utopianism in his The Open Society and Its Enemies. On 
utopianism, Popper wrote:
681
678 Fan Dainian, “Science, Open Society and China,” 19.
679 Xu Jilin, “The Fate of an Enlightenment,” 184.
680 Ji Shu-li, “The Worlds of Cultures and World 3,” 111.
681 Popper, The Open Society, Vol. 1, 164. 
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Contrary to the “utopian engineering” of ultimate ends and blueprints for the reform of 
society as a whole, Popper argued, “piecemeal engineering” was about reforming 
particular institutions based on reason instead of passion; it concentrated on the struggle 
against existing evils. The “piecemeal engineer” could thus avoid the problems of 
“utopian engineering,” such as the lack of a rational method to define ultimate goals, the 
changing of goals in the process of accomplishment, and the risk of dictatorship.
One of the participants in the 1992 debate who promoted Popper’s “piecemeal 
engineering” was Xu Jilin (1957), a Professor at the History Department of East China 
Normal University in Shanghai.682 In the June 1992 issue of Twenty-first Century, Xu 
Jilin argued that, in the absence of a status quo that could function as a coordinate, 
Popper’s concepts of “piecemeal engineering” and “utopian engineering” should replace 
the terms of “conservatism” and “radicalism” as yardsticks to discuss modern Chinese 
history. 683 Both “radicalism” and “conservatism” belonged to the “utopia social 
engineering” type. In the cultural and academic realm, both were monistic and lacked an 
open attitude. In the political layer, Chinese conservatism was even more radical 
because it monopolized resources, it used holism to solve problems, it created 
“authoritative and self-contained ideological myths,” and it turned down demands from 
the lower layers of society. 684 In twentieth-century China, both “radicalism” and 
“conservatism” had been too strong, whereas the “piecemeal social engineering” of 
liberalism had been too weak. From this, it can be seen that Xu Jilin, like Lin Gang, 
attached liberalism to gradual reform. Nonetheless, in spite of Xu Jilin’s embrace of 
gradualism, he was not in favor of Hayekian liberalism because it could not solve 
problems of social inequality. In its place, Xu Jilin upheld a liberalism that also 
incorporated John Rawls’ concern with social justice.685
Other intellectuals did not only support gradual liberalism, but they explicitly 
associated liberalism with conservatism. Fu Keng (b. 1959), a graduate of Fudan’s 
682 Xu Jilin, “Jijin yu baoshou de mihuo,” EYS 11 (June 1992), 137-140. Reprinted in ZFL, 37-
41 as “Jijin yu baoshou zhijian de dongdang.”
683 Ibid., 139.
684 Ibid., 140.
685 Ibid. Xu Jilin contended that this form of liberalism had been dominant during the May 
Fourth era through the influence of the American “democratic liberalism” of John Dewey, Hu 
Shi’s teacher, and through the English “social democracy” of the Fabianist Harold Laski. See 
Xu Jilin, “Zhongguo zhishi fenzi de ziyou zhuyi chuantong,” Xu Jilin zixuanji, 98-109. 
Originally appeared in EYS 42 (August 1997), 27-35.
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History Department and a researcher at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences 
(SASS), tied the tradition of French rationalism to socialism; he upheld a conservative 
liberalism in the spirit of Hayek, Burke, and de Tocqueville.686 Fu Keng argued that 
Chinese intellectuals had wrongly based themselves on the French Revolution and 
Rousseau because they believed it broke with feudal tradition, whereas they treated the 
Glorious Revolution as a continuation of feudalism. Fu Keng compared the harm 
caused by the Cultural Revolution with the “idealist romantic political delusions” of the 
French Enlightenment thinkers.687 Both manifested a “spirit of utopian saviorism”; both 
adhered to Max Weber’s “ethic of ultimate ends” or “ethic of intentions.” Lin Yü-sheng 
had also made this reference to Weber; he had explained it as follows: those with an 
“ethic of ultimate ends” were often convinced that it was permitted to make use of 
unjust strategies to achieve ultimate targets, since the rightness of intentions was more 
important than the results. The same could not be said of those who adhered to the 
“ethic of responsibility”; they tried to foresee the consequences of their actions.688
For his criticism of socialism and French rationalism, Fu Keng drew on the 
liberal French sociologist Raymond Aron (1905-1983) and his book L’Opium des 
Intellectuels (1955). In the latter, Aron had established a link between modern politics 
and the ideal of the “rational kingdom” of the French Revolutionaries.689
686 Fu Keng, “Dalu zhishi fenzi de jijin zhuyi shenhua,” EYS 11 (June 1992), 144-147.
687 Ibid., 145.
688 Lin Yü-sheng elaborated the relation between the two types of ethics in his “Ruhe zuo ge 
zhengzhijia?,” Zhongguo chuantong de chuangzaoxing zhuanhua, 373-382. For Max Weber, the 
“ethic of ultimate ends” (Gesinnungsethik) did not take the possible effects of an action into 
account, whereas the “ethic of responsibility” (Verantwortungsethik) did look at causality. 
Hence, the question of action became the question of which means to choose. Although the two 
seemed irreconcilable because the former was deontological in nature, whereas the latter was 
consequentialist, Weber declared in his lecture “Politics as a Vocation” (1919) that only a 
person who could foster a character that combined these two ethics was capable of a “vocation 
for politics.” Liu Junning has also referred to these two Weberian terms in his critique of 
rationalism. See Liu Junning, Baoshou zhuyi, 56-58.
689 The book was translated into Chinese as Along, Zhishifenzi de yapian, transl. Cai Yingwen 
(Taipei: Lianjiang chubanshe gongsi, 1990).
For Fu Keng, 
intellectual radicalism—be it the radicalism of the socialist tradition or that of the 
French Revolution—and liberty could not go together, because the former harmed 
individual liberty and the system of property rights. Hayek, Burke, and de Tocqueville 
were cultural conservatives with liberal inclinations; they were convinced that tradition 
was relevant for freedom. Elsewhere, basing himself on Isaiah Berlin’s distinction 
between two types of liberty, Fu Keng added that the “negative freedom” of the British 
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Enlightenment guaranteed the protection of civil society, whereas the “positive 
freedom” of the French Revolution assured political participation, but not the protection 
of civil society.690
4.5.4 Other Manifestations of Conservative Liberalism
The established link between liberalism, gradualism, and conservatism in the 1992 
debate was continued in later years in the advocacy of conservative liberalism. A clear 
example of this can be found in the works of Liu Junning, a researcher at the Political 
Science Department of CASS, and the editor of the liberal journal Gonggong luncong
(Res Publica). In a 1998 volume entitled Conservatism, Liu Junning argued that the 
“Burke of the Whigs is the Burke of liberty.” 691 Chinese supporters of “neo-
conservatism” and “neo-authoritarianism” had distorted conservatism by subscribing to 
centralized power. For Liu Junning, conservatism without liberalism led to political 
authoritarianism, whereas liberalism without conservatism brought about rationalism 
and radicalism.692 Modern China had only witnessed the rise of “conservative factions” 
(baoshoupai or shoujiupai) that had tried to preserve either tradition or the old system; 
it had not known a true Burkean conservatism that aimed at the preservation of liberty 
and that upheld gradual change.693
Liu Junning argued that “constructivist rationalist” liberalism, a term that he 
borrowed from Hayek—who applied it to describe the belief that man could shape the 
world according to his desires—was furthest away from conservatism.694
690 Fu Keng, “Langman lixiang yu shigong jingshen,” Dushu 1992:1, 30-37.
691 Liu Junning, Baoshou zhuyi (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chuban, 1998). Quote from 
page 9.
692 Ibid., 14, 264. 
693 Ibid., 255-257. However, Liu Junning did recognize some “conservative elements” in 
Chinese history, such as Confucius’ philosophy of the Golden Mean; the Five Virtues; Laozi’s 
non-action (wuwei) and his opposition to powerful government; and Yang Zhu’s thought of 
nobility by birth (guisheng). For the twentieth century, Liu Junning mentioned the thought of 
Yan Fu, Liang Qichao, Chen Yinque, Xu Fuguan, and Gu Zhun as examples of a “healthy 
conservatism” (Ibid., 263).
694 Ibid., 27. Hayek first used the term “constructivist rationalism” in Economic Freedom and 
Representative Government (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1973), but he also 
elaborated on the concept in The Fatal Conceit (London: Routledge, 1988). See The Fatal 
Conceit, 8, 22, and 60-62 in particular.
Liu Junning 
clearly followed the interpretation that Hayek was a conservative liberal (although 
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Hayek himself had underlined that he did not want to be related to conservatism).695 For 
Liu Junning, rationalism and radicalism were two sides of the same coin—both adhered 
to abstract ideals, wholesale change, and meliorism.696 Like participants in the 1992 
debate, Liu affirmed the American and English revolutions as “realistic revolutions,” 
whereas the French revolution had been “utopian” in nature.697 With the embrace of the 
economic reforms, Liu argued, political radicalism had been denounced.698
The embrace of conservative liberalism also marked the writings of other 
scholars in the humanities who were by no means political scientists of a liberal bent. 
An example concerns some writings by Tao Dongfeng, a Professor in Literary Studies 
at the Chinese Department of Capital Normal University in Beijing. Tao Dongfeng 
argued that, in 1990s China, a tension still existed between conservatism and liberalism; 
yet thinkers such as Burke, de Tocqueville, and Hayek had supported a conservative 
liberalism.699
Why did Chinese intellectuals match liberalism to gradual reform; why did 
many embrace the British tradition of liberalism? Xu Jilin has connected the rise of 
interest in gradual reform during the 1990s in China with several influential books and 
articles.
In China, conservatism had often joined hands with cultural nationalism, 
whereas liberalism had merged with “radicalism” and antitraditionalism because 
Chinese intellectuals had been affected by the tradition of radical individualism and
direct democracy of French liberalism. The conservative liberalism that Tao Dongfeng 
had in mind stressed continuity and gradual reform, it recognized the limits of reason, 
and it envisioned the union of order and liberty. 
700
695 See his “Postscript: Why I am not a Conservative,” The Constitution of Liberty, 343-355.
The sociologist Anthony Giddens has separated “neoconservatism” from “neoliberalism” 
because of the latter’s emphasis on economic individualism, which is incompatible with the 
conservative stress on community and social solidarity. Hence, for Giddens, Friedrich von 
Hayek was by no means a “conservative liberal.” See Giddens, Beyond Left and Right, 39-41.
696 Liu Junning, Baoshou zhuyi, 49, 51, 70.
697 Ibid., 97.
698 Ibid., 263.
699 Tao Dongfeng, “Baoshou ziyou zhuyi: Zhongguo wenhua jiangou de disantiao daolu,” ZFL,
475-485. Originally published in Kaifang shidai 1997:5, 32-37; Tao Dongfeng, “Ershi shiji 
Zhongguo de baoshou zhuyi: jianlun ziyou yu chuantong zhi guanxi,” 217-261.
700 Xu Jilin, “The Fate of an Enlightenment,” 198.
One of them was the above-mentioned 1989 article by Gan Yang on English 
and French liberalism, which explains why liberalism was already paired with 
gradualism before the mid-1990s. In 1994, the collected works of Gu Zhun (1915-
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1974), a critic of the Cultural Revolution, were published posthumously.701 Gu Zhun’s 
stance has often been defined as liberal and individualist. 702 Some of Gu Zhun’s 
arguments appealed to intellectuals of the 1990s. For example, the argument that direct 
democracy was only feasible in the Greek city-state, not in a country such as China; the 
argument that the utopianism of the revolution had been mistaken: “on earth, it is 
impossible to found a Heavenly Kingdom”; or the argument that ultimate goals were to 
be renounced—the only ultimate goal was progress.703
The explicit connection between conservatism and a form of liberalism in the 
1992 debate and after clearly differed from the use of the concept of “neo-
conservatism” in the years before 1992, during which it had been coined as part of the 
advocacy of a strong state. Whereas the embracement of conservative liberalism only 
became widespread since the mid-1990s, there was already a clear movement in this 
direction in the 1992 debate. The New Left intellectual Wang Hui has described the 
shift in the use of the term “conservatism” as a label as follows:
Another important source of 
inspiration was Friedrich von Hayek, whose The Road to Serfdom and The Constitution 
of Liberty were translated into Chinese in 1997. As mentioned earlier, Hayek had been 
translated into Chinese before that time, but the translations had not been as widely 
available as during the late 1990s. 
In the mid-nineties, the group around Liu Junning argued publicly, claiming that true 
liberalism is a form of conservatism, because of its belief in order. This is a very 
revealing shift of terms, since in the eighties and early nineties conservatism was 
always used as a pejorative term to describe anyone who was regarded as insufficiently 
enthusiastic about the market, or too willing to envisage a positive role for the state—
the label was applied to people like Hu Angang or Cui Zhiyuan.704
Though Wang Hui’s comment is not entirely correct—already during the early 1990s, 
as shown in the previous chapters, some intellectuals consciously used the term 
“conservatism” to denote their point of view—it is true that the term had first been 
701 Gu Zhun, Gu Zhun wenji (Guiyang: Guizhou renmin chubanshe, 1994). The collected works 
included Wang Yuanhua’s introduction to Gu Zhun’s From Idealism to Empiricism, which also 
appeared in Wang Yuanhua, Sibianlu, 185-187; Gu Zhun, Gu Zhun riji, eds. Chen Minzhi and 
Ding Dong (Beijing: Jingji ribao chubanshe, 1997).
702 Davies, Worrying about China, 157.
703 Gu Zhun, Gu Zhun wenji, 370.
704 Wang Hui, “The New Criticism,” 68.
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associated with the defense of a strong state, whereas now, it entered the framework of 
meaning of liberalism and gradualism. The negative connotation that had previously 
been ascribed to “conservatism” was now reserved for “radicalism,” which was 
explicitly tied to socialism and revolution. Nonetheless, despite the marriage between 
“conservatism” and gradual reform, the term was rarely applied in this context to 
uphold the preservation of customs, institutions, or habits. 
4.6 ON REFORM AND REVOLUTION
4.6.1 Radicalism, Revolution, and Progressivism
The 1992 debate reveals that the advocacy of gradualism was clearly not based on a 
denial of abstract rationalism as a style of thought; rationalism was only rejected in the 
concrete political form of socialism and revolution. Since “radicalism” was now 
coupled to revolution, whereas liberalism was linked to gradual reform, at an academic 
forum in 2003, Xu Jilin argued that the model of “conservatism” versus “radicalism” 
was but a replacement of the model of reform versus revolution.705
In spite of this, in some criticisms of “radicalism” that date from after 1992, 
intellectuals did attach “radicalism” to a certain style of thought that approached Yü 
Ying-shih’s “neoterism.” As such, the reference to the pair of “isms” of “conservatism” 
and “radicalism” during the 1990s also reached further than a discussion on reform 
versus revolution; it cannot be denounced as a mere imitation of the official 
preoccupation with reform. The literary critic Wang Yuanhua (b. 1920), for example, 
argued that both the positive connotation of “radicalism” and the obsession with new 
things in China could be attributed to the impact of evolution theory in particular.
For the 1992 debate, 
this claim was mostly true; denunciations of “radicalism” were not related to Yü Ying-
shih’s criticism of “progressivism” as a conception of how to bring about change. 
706
Elsewhere, Wang Yuanhua stated that he used to write under the guidance of “fixed 
concepts,” which led him to affirm reform, revolution, and progress.707
705 For an outline, see “‘Zhongguo jindai sixiangshi shang de baoshou yu jijin’ xueshu taolunhui 
zongshu,” Jindaishi yanjiu 2004:2, 291-301.
706 Wang Yuanhua, “Guanyu jinnian de fansi dawen,” Wenyi lilun yanjiu 1995:1, 2-8.
707 Wang Yuanhua, “Ji wo de sanci fansi licheng,” Qingyuan jinzuoji, 10-22. Reference from 
19.
Wang Yuanhua 
did not only denounce revolution; he attacked the entire intellectual framework of 
which it was a part.
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In a 1995 article, Ji Guangmao argued that it was the linear concept of time in 
particular that had formed the basis of all manifestations of “radicalism.”708 In China, 
this concept of time had not only brought about nihilism with regard to the Chinese 
past, it had also led to to the embrace of progressivism and “only ‘new’-ism” (weixin 
zhuyi), or the belief that only new things were valuable. According to progressivism, Ji 
Guangmao explained, societies permanently moved into ever better directions, and 
positive value was placed on the future. Ji discerned two kinds of progressivism, 
namely “gradualism” (jianjin zhuyi) and “radicalism.” Both adhered to a linear concept 
of time and a positive view of the future, but gradualists were convinced that change 
should occur in an orderly and slow manner. “Radicalism,” on the other hand, perceived 
of permanent revolution as a progressive force. In this sense, Ji Guangmao argued, “one 
could also call all forms of ‘radicalism’ ‘revolutionism.’”709
Similarly, although Chang Hao also thought of “radicalism” and revolution 
together, his “radicalism” was a historical view of linear development in which the 
present formed the historical turning point on the road towards a bright and ideal 
Conservatism, on the other 
hand, envisioned the preservation of the blood tie between the present and the past. 
Nevertheless, Ji Guangmao argued, conservatism in China had not left the linearity of 
“radicalism”: like “radicalism,” it had a nationalist spirit; its goal remained Chinese 
development, progress, and prosperity.
Although Ji Guangmao coupled “radicalism” to revolution, his conception of 
“radicalism” nevertheless surpassed a concrete political program. “Radicalism” referred 
to a certain time consciousness and a conception of change that is reminiscent of 
Mannheim’s notion of “progressivism.” Moreover, since Ji Guangmao also conceived 
of Chinese conservatism as subjected to this very time consciousness, his account 
outdid the simplistic dualism that dominated most articles on the topic. Moreover, Ji 
Guangmao’s description revealed the problematic use of the concept of “conservatism” 
in the context of the obsession with modernization, prosperity, and development. Could 
a true conservatism arise in this type of environment? Could it ever go beyond the 
“linearity” that Ji Guangmao discerned? 
708 Ji Guangmao, “Nanyuan yu beizhe zhijian: cong liangpian wenzhang lüekui baoshou zhuyi 
yu jijin zhuyi de xunxi,” Wenyi zhengming 1995:4, 12-20.
709 Ibid., 14.
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future.710
These authors surpassed a political criticism of revolution; they took issue with 
the meaning that the word revolution had acquired in the modern period. As Koselleck 
has noted, originally, the word revolution involved the notion of a return or 
circulation.
This linear view, Chang Hao argued, had been the product of both Chinese 
tradition and Western evolution theory. For Chang Hao, “radical idealism” consisted of 
two trends of thought, namely a “group consciousness” and an “individual 
consciousness.” The former manifested itself in the belief in nationalism, utopianism, 
and a populist concept of direct democracy—as in Rousseau’s “General Will”—
whereas the latter was epitomized by the faith in man’s moral integrity and his ability to 
transform the world, a trait that had been inherited from the moral idealism of 
Confucianism. This “radical idealism,” then, constituted the main element of 
revolutionary thought: it adhered to utopianism and the deification of man. 
Consequently, Chang Hao found fault with both conceptions of linear development and 
the neglect of the limits of man’s abilities. 
711 More precisely, the term had a naturalistic and transhistorical connotation 
because it had entered politics via astronomy. In astronomy, the concept had been 
applied to describe the “circular movement of celestial bodies,” as expressed in the title 
of Copernicus’ De revolutionibus orbium caelestium (1543). Since the time of the 
French Revolution, however, the concept of revolution had been stripped of this 
connotation of the return to things familiar; revolution “led forward into an unknown 
future.”712
In this modern sense, “revolution” became a metahistorical concept that stood 
for social revolution, or the emancipation of mankind; revolution was perceived of as 
global and permanent. Also, in contradistinction to the original meaning, it was believed 
that men could make revolutions.  In On Revolution, Hannah Arendt has also pointed 
out the distinction between the initial meaning of the astronomic term revolution as the
“regular, lawfully revolving motion of the stars” and its association with elements such 
as “novelty” and “beginning” in the modern age.713
710 Chang Hao, “Zhongguo jinbainian lai de geming sixiang daolu,” ZFL, 42-56. Originally 
published in Kaifang shidai 1999:1, 39-47.
711 See Koselleck’s chapter on “Historical Criteria of the Modern Concept of Revolution,” in 
Futures Past, 43-57.
712 Ibid., 49.
713 Arendt, On Revolution, 32, 37. 
It was the emphasis on “novelty,” 
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the projection of goals into the future, and the linear conception of change in particular 
that intellectuals tackled in the abovementioned articles.   
4.6.2 Farewell to Revolution: A Controversial Volume
Rejections of revolution based on a criticism of a progressivist time consciousness were 
nevertheless rare. As in the 1992 debate, other criticisms of revolution mostly took the 
errors of the Chinese socialist experience as a point of departure, on the basis of which a 
more gradual and rational approach to social change was recommended. One important 
manifestation of the explicit denunciation of revolution in favor of reform concerns the 
controversial 1995 volume Farewell to Revolution, the account of a dialogue between 
the philosopher Li Zehou and the literary critic Liu Zaifu (b. 1941), the former head of 
the Research Institute of Literature at CASS, both of whom resided in the United States 
at the time.714
In his writings on literature between 1984 and 1986, Liu Zaifu had denounced a 
historical materialism in which the human subject had practically been obliterated. This 
criticism, as Wang Jing has noted, was a clear echo of the 1983 debate on “humanist 
Marxism.”715
714 Li Zehou, Liu Zaifu, Gaobie geming: huiwang ershi shiji Zhongguo (Hong Kong: Tiandi 
tushu youxian gongsi, 1995). Li Zehou arrived in the United States on January Fourth, 1992. He 
was based at Colorado College; Liu Zaifu was affiliated with the University of Colorado at 
Boulder. 
715 Wang, High Culture Fever, 202. On Liu Zaifu’s concern with subjectivity, see ibid., 201-
206.
Li Zehou had played an important role in the “Enlightenment” movement 
of the 1980s as a spokesperson for liberty, democracy, and subjectivity; many of the 
themes expressed in Farewell to Revolution were a continuation of concerns that Li 
Zehou had expressed in earlier writings. As Woei-Lien Chong has argued, the core 
argument that ran through all Li Zehou’s writings was that Maoism was not related to 
Marxism; it was a continuation of traditional Chinese philosophy. When Marxism was 
received in China, it had not been understood as the product of a European philosophy 
in which the subject wanted to conquer nature; it had been interpreted according to 
traditional frameworks in which nature could be transformed according to the human 
will. Li Zehou attacked Mao Zedong’s emphasis on “consciousness” and the moral will 
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in particular, because this ignored the fact that the crux of development lay in changing 
the mode of production.716
In the controversial 1995 volume, the revolution that the authors bade farewell 
to, they explained, referred to “fierce actions by which the existing system and authority 
are reversed with mass violence and drastic methods”; it did not involve the national 
revolution against foreign invasion.717 The authors parted with Lenin, Stalin, and Mao 
Zedong, all of whom had been preoccupied with class struggle, revolution, dialectical 
materialism and the dictatorship of the proletariat. In brief, they had focused too much
on ideology, “isms,” and the superstructure. Instead, Li Zehou and Liu Zaifu proposed, 
among other things, economy as the basis, historical materialism, class cooperation, 
gradual reform, and the separation of society and government.718
Several years before the book appeared, Li Zehou had already explicitly argued 
that China did not need revolution, but reform, and that the revolution of 1911 had 
neither been necessary nor unavoidable.719 In a 1992 article, Li Zehou claimed to be in 
favor of pluralism, tolerance, rationality, and the rule of law; he mentioned John Locke 
(1632-1704), Karl Popper, Edmund Burke, Alexis de Tocqueville, and Friedrich von 
Hayek as inspiration sources. 720 Two years later, in two 1994 issues of Orient
(Dongfang), Li explicitly linked the reform practice of “crossing the river by touching 
the stones” to Hayek’s opposition to an excessive belief in rationality and to Popper’s 
“piecemeal engineering.”721
716 Chong, “Mankind and Nature in Chinese Thought,” 139, 147, 151, 154-167; idem, 
“Philosophy in an Age of Crisis,” 218-219.
717 Li Zehou, Liu Zaifu, Gaobie geming, 4.
718 Ibid., 10, 14-15.
719 Li Zehou, “Heping jinhua, fuxing Zhonghua (shang),” 42-43. Li Zehou had already made the 
comparison between English liberalism and reform, on the one hand, and between French 
liberalism and revolution, on the other hand, in his Zhongguo jindai sixiangshi lun (Beijing: 
Renmin chubanshe, 1979). In Farewell to Revolution, Li Zehou stated that his division between 
the French and the English model went back to 1978. See ibid., 66.
720 Li Zehou, “Heping jinhua, fuxing Zhonghua (shang),” 44.
721 Li Zehou, Wang Desheng, “Guanyu wenhua xianzhuang, daode chongjian de duihua,” ZFL,
74-83. Originally appeared in Dongfang 1994:5, 69-73, and in Dongfang 1994:6, 85-87.
Li stated that liberty was the product of the accumulation of 
experience and that the rule of law was a gradual process—the door to Chinese 
democracy had to be opened slowly. Li Zehou also argued that a true moral 
reconstruction process could only take place after the unity between religion, ethics, and 
politics, as in the  “pan-moralism” of both Confucianism and Mao Zedong, had been 
destroyed.
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In the 1995 volume, the authors further condemned Mao’s “philosophy of 
struggle” and the “irrationality” of the Mao era; they proposed to supplant it with a 
“philosophy of eating,” “economics as the basis,” and “constructive rationality.”722 For 
this purpose, Hayek and Popper, so the authors claimed, had more to offer than Mao 
Zedong, whose politics of “you die, I live” (nisi wohuo) had caused a lot of “radical 
sentiments.”723 Li Zehou and Liu Zaifu praised the “pragmatic rationality” of Deng 
Xiaoping’s reforms: they were based on common sense and reason, and they were 
congruous with classical Marxism.724
The authors traced the origins of “radicalism” back to the late Qing intellectual 
Tan Sitong, who had attacked the core of the Confucian order, namely the theory of the 
“three bonds” (sangang) between ruler and official, father and son, and husband and 
wife.
As to political democracy, the authors conceived 
of it as a process of four stages, namely economic development, individual liberty, 
social justice, and, finally, political democracy. 
725 They further stated that the constitutionalism of Kang Youwei and Liang 
Qichao would have been preferable to the Revolution of 1911. Although the Qing 
dynasty was rotten, it could still have fulfilled a stabilizing function, whereas its sudden 
collapse only led to warlordism and chaos. The English model of the Glorious 
Revolution was preferable to that of the French Revolution, as exemplified in the Meiji 
restoration (1868), a topic to which the authors devoted an entire chapter.726 The authors 
compared a republic with a nominal emperor to the English model, whereas the violent 
overthrow of the emperor resembled the French model. Like Hayek, the authors further 
equated the English and the French model with two different traditions of individualism 
and liberty.727
Liu Zaifu later described the book as having given a “new acknowledgment” 
and a “new understanding” of hundred years of Chinese history, an understanding that 
did away with “the adoration of revolution, the adoration of necessity and other 
mentalities.”728
722 Li Zehou, Liu Zaifu, Gaobie geming, 2-3.
723 Ibid., 66.
724 Ibid., 18.
725 Ibid., 80-81.
726 See the chapter on “Geming yu gailiang: shijixing de tongku xuanze” (Revolution and 
reform: the painful choice of a century), ibid., 65-78.
727 Ibid., 141.
728 Liu Zaifu, “Lixing chongping bainian Zhongguo,” EYS 31 (October 1995), 38-39. Quote 
from page 38.
What Liu Zaifu meant by this was that the authors had argued in favor 
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of an attitude that would replace determinism with the recognition that there were 
different sides to each story. This attitude, then, was in line with the “antinomy” (erlü 
beifan) of the historical process itself. As Li Zehou explained it, “history always 
advanced amidst contradictions”—each side had its value; it was difficult to say which 
side was right and which side was wrong.729
Although Li Zehou and Liu Zaifu had not explicitly denounced the revolution of 
1949, they had openly relinquished the idea that revolution was the main narrative of 
modern Chinese history. In a section on the “philosophy of struggle,” the authors 
disapproved of the works of the famous historians of modern China Hu Sheng and Liu 
Danian, who had depicted the history of modern China as a history driven by revolution 
and struggle. 730 It is no surprise, then, that Marxist historians such as Jiang Yihua 
criticized the thesis that the Revolution of 1911 had not been the product of radical 
intellectuals. In response, Jiang Yihua argued that history was not driven by the 
individual will; the problem with the revolution of 1911 was precisely that it had not 
been thorough enough.731 Similarly, Li Jinquan argued in response that the failure of 
constitutional reform at the end of the Qing had been decided by the objective 
circumstances of a semi-colonized and semi-feudal society.732
The authors were attacked from one side for having abandoned historical 
determinism. Paradoxically, from another side, critics argued that the four-stage theory 
to democracy that they had proposed in the 1995 volume amounted to historical 
determinism. The political scientist Tang Tsou (Zou Dang) from the University of
California argued that the relationship between economic development and democracy 
was one of probability, not one of necessity. Moreover, the four-stage model ignored 
the crucial aspect of the choice of the political actors.733
729 Li Zehou, Liu Zaifu, Gaobie geming, 152.
730 Instead, the authors sympathized with the view of Li Yimang that the main events in modern 
Chinese history were the Self-strengthening Movement, the Reform Movement of 1898, and the 
Revolution of 1911. Although Li Yimang was very influential in the Party, his views were 
nevertheless criticized and repressed. Ibid., 180.
731 Jiang Yihua, Chen Yan, “Jijin yu baoshou: yiduan shangwei wanjie de duihua,” 35.
732 Li Jinquan, “Zhongguo jindaishi jige wenti pingjia de zai pingjia,” ZFL, 84-92. Originally 
published in Zhexue yanjiu 1995:10, 3-7.
733 Zou Dang (Tsou Tsang), “Du ‘gaobie geming’: zhi Li Zehou, Liu Zaifu,” EYS 33 (February 
1996), 62-67.
Chang Jiang noted that the 
“four steps” to democracy corresponded to the very historical determinism that Li 
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Zehou had criticized so fiercely before. 734
4.7 CRITICISMS OF “ANTI-RADICALISM”
From a liberal point of view, then, like 
mainland intellectuals, Li Zehou and Liu Zaifu merely emphasized the primacy of 
economic reform. 
Nevertheless, despite the similarities between Farewell to Revolution and the 
advocacy of gradual economic reform in the 1992 debate, there were also some crucial 
differences. Although in both cases, intellectuals adhered to a belief in the “rhetorics of 
transition”—economic reform would lead to political reform in the future—and 
although both tied “radicalism” with socialism and the French model of liberty, 
Farewell to Revolution argued in favor of a return to orthodox Marxism. Whereas many 
mainland intellectuals had invoked Hayek and Popper in the context of a framework of 
conservative liberalism, Li Zehou and Liu Zaifu quoted these thinkers because they had 
emphasized the significance of experience. Following the princelings in Chapter Two, 
Hayek and Popper were put into use as critics of utopian socialism and advocates of 
realism and reason rather than as spokesmen for economic liberalism. Although Li 
Zehou and Liu Zaifu underscored the value of the rule of law, they subscribed to 
economic reform not as part of an economic liberalism, but as part of a healthy 
socialism. 
4.7.1 Marxist and Other Criticisms
As the harsh treatment of both socialism and revolution in modern Chinese history 
reveals, history was more than a vehicle in the debate on “conservatism” and 
“radicalism”; as already argued in Chapter Three, history also constituted the very 
object of revision. Because Farewell to Revolution went further than other rejections of 
“radicalism” in its explicit condemnation of revolution, it became the main object of 
attack in official media such as Guangming ribao (Enlightenment Daily), Renmin ribao
(People’s Daily), Beijing ribao (Beijing Daily), and the Party journal Hongqi (Red 
Flag). In Guangming ribao of March 12, 1996, for example, an article on the “correct” 
assessment of modern Chinese history appeared.735
734 Chang Jiang, “Shehui zhuanxingqi de yizhong wenhua xianxiang: ping ‘Gaobie geming,’” 
EYS 33 (February 1996), 68-71.
735 “Zhengque renshi Zhongguo jindaishi shang de geming yu gailiang,” Guangming ribao,
March 12, 1996, 5.  
According to the article, “without 
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the armed revolution led by the CCP, there would be no talk of today’s socialist 
modernization construction.”736 Other points made in the article were that the 1911 
Revolution and the failure of peaceful construction afterwards had to be ascribed to the 
historical conditions of imperialism and feudalism; the “soft reformism” of the English 
model reform had been based on violent struggle no less than the revolution had 
been. 737 In brief, the claim that reform was better than revolution amounted to 
“historical idealism.”738
Marxist responses to these revaluations of history also appeared in the pages of 
journals such as Gaoxiao lilun zhanxian (Theoretical Front in Higher Education), 
Zhexue yanjiu (Philosophy Research), and Qiushi (Seeking Truth), as well as in the 
form of several volumes that discussed crucial events in modern Chinese history.739 In 
the latter, the “correct” view of modern Chinese history, namely dialectical materialism, 
was exposed, and the “cultural view of history” (wenhua shiguan) was fiercely attacked. 
Two famous volumes in this respect were History’s Response (Lishi de huida) and 
Which Way to Go (Zou shenme lu), both of which dealt with modern Chinese history in 
toto.740 In the journal Theoretical Front in Higher Education, the Marxist Confucian 
Fang Keli argued that attacks on “radicalism” were part of a “cultural conservative 
trend” that denied revolution and that took a stand against Marxist ideology. 741
736 Ibid. 
737 Ibid. In the article, it was argued that the bourgeoisie had used armed force to reverse king 
Stewart during the revolution of 1642-1649. This revolution had not been “soft” at all; in 
essence, it was not different from the French Revolution. Without the violent revolution of 
1642-1649, the peaceful reform of 1688 could not have taken place. Similarly, the Meiji 
reformers first had to reverse the old government before they were able to push forward their 
“peaceful” reform. 
738 Ibid. 
739 See, for example, Zhang Lin, Wang Yinhuan, Jing Jianbin et al., “Qingnian xuesheng shiye 
zhong de Zhongguo yilai de lishi daolu,” Gaoxiao lilun zhanxian 1997:6, 31-40; Gong Shuduo, 
Li Wenhai, Zhang Haipeng et al., “Wusi yundong yu ershi shiji Zhongguo de daolu,” in ibid., 
1996: 6, 16-25; Kong Lingzhao, “Ba lishi de neirong huangei lishi: ping yizhong guannianlun 
de wenhua shiguan,” Zhexue yanjiu 1995:4, 3-7.
740 Gong Shuduo, Jin Chongji, and Song Xiaoqing, Lishi de Huida: Zhongguo jindaishi yanjiu 
zhong de jige yuanze lunzheng (Beijing: Beijing shifan daxue chubanshe, 2001); Sha Jiansun 
and Gong Shuduo, eds.,  Zou shenme lu: yu Zhongguo jinxiandai lishi shang de ruogan zhongda 
shifei wenti (Jinan: Shandong renmin chubanshe, 1997).
741 Fang Keli, “Yao zhuyi yanjiu 90 niandai chuxian de wenhua baoshou zhuyi sichao,” 
Gaoxiao lilun zhanxian 1996:2, 30-36.
Elsewhere, Fang Keli also warned against this “culturalist” and “idealist” view of 
history that was part of an international attempt to bring down socialism in the context
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of the end of the Cold War. 742 For Marxist theorists, the rise of rejections of 
“radicalism” in a Marxist climate was therefore not coincidental; it obviously served an 
ideological purpose. 743
Similarly, in a Ph.D. thesis on the topic of the “value characteristics” of “cultural 
conservatism” during the 1990s, author Jiang Xudong mentioned the denial of 
revolution in the critique of “radicalism” as one trait of this trend, the other traits being 
the return to tradition and the opposition to modernization.
In this context, then, the label “cultural conservatism” was 
applied to target what was perceived of as a dangerous and anti-socialist trend that took 
culture instead of matter as the starting point of analysis. 
744 As Jiang Xudong phrased 
it, the only right choice to wealth and power was to walk the road of “socialism with 
Chinese characteristics” under the guidance of Marxism.745 In a chapter on the denial of 
revolution, Jiang Xudong fiercely criticized the idealist historical perspective of 
“cultural conservatism.” Jiang referred to Deng Xiaoping’s comment that Mao Zedong 
Thought could not be discarded; that would mean a denial of the Party’s history.746
In the abovementioned Ph.D. thesis, Jiang Xudong also referred to a book by Li 
Yi on the relation between Chinese Marxism and “cultural conservatism.” In the book, 
Li Yi argued that, during the 1990s, “cultural conservatism,” or the attempt to rescue 
China through culture, had acquired some new features. The revival of Confucianism 
had been instigated by Confucian scholars abroad; it made use of the criticism of 
“cultural radicalism” to attack the “political radicalism” of the Cultural Revolution and 
utopian socialism. Consequently, its criticism of “cultural radicalism” coincided with a 
denial of revolution and with a reversal of verdicts on “traitors” (hanjian) in modern 
Chinese history. 747
In academic journals, Marxist scholars also perceived of the discarding of 
“radicalism” as part of a “conservative trend” that aimed at the reversal of socialism. 
Xie Wujun, for example, divided this “conservative trend” into “neo-conservatism,” 
This was opposite to the practice of “cultural conservatives” of 
previous generations, such as the so-called New Confucians, who had never deployed 
cultural criticism to attack revolution in this manner.
742 Fang Keli, “Lüelun jiushi niandai de wenhua baoshou zhuyi sichao,” 145-161.
743 Fang Keli, “Yao zhuyi wenhua baoshou zhuyi, ” 35.
744 Jiang Xudong, Lun dangdai Zhongguo wenhua baoshou zhuyi de jiazhi tezheng, Ph.D. diss., 
Zhongguo renmin daxue, 2003. 
745 Ibid., 4.
746 Ibid., 95-138. Reference from 138.
747 Li Yi, Zhongguo makesi zhuyi yu dangdai wenhua baoshou zhuyi sichao yanjiu, 13-14.
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“cultural conservatism,” and “conservative liberalism.” 748
Whereas Marxist critics thus considered denunciations of “radicalism” to be a 
denial of socialism and revolution, from another angle, critics argued that rejections of 
“radicalism” were a blind confirmation of the official reform policy. For Wang Hui—
who has been labeled a “New Leftist” since the late 1990s—the fact that criticism was 
only directed at socialism and not at “modernity” in a general sense meant that capitalist 
modernity remained unchallenged. Therefore, for Wang Hui, there was no difference 
between liberals and conservatives during the 1990s—both embraced a “neoliberalism” 
that advocated the expansion of the market without including social guarantees.
Xie Wujun considered 
“conservative liberalism” the greatest challenge to socialism, because those who 
adhered to it praised Edmund Burke’s attack on the French Revolution and Friedrich 
von Hayek’s denial of socialism and the planned economy. “Cultural conservatism,” on 
the contrary, could be used for the construction of “socialism with Chinese 
characteristics,” and “neo-conservatism,” Xie Wujun argued, also included the socialist 
tradition in its conception of tradition. 
749
Similarly, Zhang Xudong argued that mainland debates on Edmund Burke were debates 
on democracy that were held in a “coded language,” partly because of political 
repression, but also because Western thought was used to claim legitimacy. 750 The 
“radicalism” of May Fourth was erased, and its liberal heritage was drawn into a 
neoliberal modernization ideology.751
Zhang Xudong also added that mainland intellectuals had distorted Yü Ying-
shih’s political liberalism by only advocating gradual economic reform without 
highlighting the crucial factor of political reform. 752 Zhang Xudong’s claim that 
mainland criticisms of “radicalism” neglected the aspect of political reform was not 
unique. Gan Yang, who had earlier inspired mainland intellectuals with his rejection of 
the French Revolution in favor of the Glorious Revolution, now denounced mainland 
references to the English model that served the denial of both democracy and liberty.753
748 Xie Wujun, “Ping Zhongguo dangdai de baoshou zhuyi sichao,” Dangdai sichao 2001: 4, 
13-29.
749 Wang Hui, China’s New Order, 144.
750 Zhang Xudong, “Intellectual Politics,” 5.
751 Zhang Xudong, “Post-Tiananmen Intellectual Field,” 31.
752 Ibid., 18.
753 Gan Yang, “Debating Liberalism and Democracy in China in the 1990s,” 79-101. A different 
version of this article is Gan Yang’s “A Critique of Chinese Conservatism in the 1990s,” 45-66.
The discarding of “radicalism” on mainland China implied a historical rejection of the 
184
revolutionary path, a cultural rejection of May Fourth, a political conservatism 
disguised as liberalism, and an economic liberalism.754 Gan Yang reiterated that his 
previous criticism of science and democracy in favor of liberty and order had been a 
necessity after the events of 1989, but in retrospect, he questioned the “intellectual 
quality” and “ideological inclination” of this stance.755 Edmund Burke’s position had 
been one of “old European aristocratic liberalism”; the advocacy of mainland Chinese 
intellectuals thus amounted to a pre-democratic liberalism.756
Gan Yang’s conclusion was too farfetched; the fact that the advocacy of 
“science and democracy” was supplanted with an advocacy of “liberalism” did not 
mean that all intellectuals relinquished the ideals of science and democracy tout court.
In a 1997 article in Twenty-First Century, Ye Wen phrased the matter as follows: “Of 
course we love democracy, but what we need more is liberty.”757
According to the political liberal Xu Ben, the pair “conservatism/radicalism” 
was nothing but a “pseudo-binary.”
For Ye Wen, liberty 
was “the soul of democracy”; de Tocqueville was a liberal first, and a democrat second. 
Instead of an outright anti-democratic stance, the embrace of economic liberalism can 
also be interpreted as a shift in terms of strategy. Whereas before, intellectuals had 
opted for the strategy of direct confrontation, now, it was generally believed that 
gradual economic reform was a better way to reach the goal of democracy. Intellectuals 
like Li Zehou and Wang Yuanhua, for example, by no means abandoned the ideals they 
had cherished during the 1980s; they merely made a case for a more realistic and 
pragmatic approach given the fact that the strategy of the 1980s had failed.
758
754 Gan Yang, “Debating Liberalism and Democracy,” 79-81. For Gan Yang’s argument that 
mainland Chinese liberalism of the 1990s was anti-democratic, see also his “Fan minzhu ziyou 
zhuyi haishi minzhu ziyou zhuyi,” EYS 39 (February 1997), 4-17.
755 Gan Yang, “Debating Liberalism and Democracy,” 89.  
756 For his criticism of Burke, Gan Yang based himself on Isaiah Berlin, for whom Burke was a 
reactionary inspired by de Maistre. Gan Yang referred to Berlin’s article “Maistre and the 
Origins of Fascism.” For another criticism of Maistre, see Isaiah Berlin, “The Romantic 
Revolution: A Crisis in the History of Modern Thought,” 168-193.
757 Ye Wen, “Zhengzhi de baoshou zhuyi he wenhua de baoshou zhuyi,” 137.
758 Xu Ben, Disenchanted Democracy, 182.
Xu Ben attributed the choice for “radicalism” 
instead of “liberalism” as the opposite of “conservatism” to the fact that liberalism was 
low-key and that the meaning of “radicalism” could be stretched to include anything 
that went against the status quo. Furthermore, the concept of “antiradicalism” provided 
Chinese conservatives with several advantages: it granted the discourse an indigenous 
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touch, it allowed intellectuals to distance themselves from anti-liberal rhetorics, and it 
enabled liberals to embrace conservative ideas.759
4.7.2 Manifestations of “Cultural Conservatism”?
The fact that Yü Ying-shih, who did 
not have to hide his liberal aspirations, also availed himself of the terms “conservatism” 
and “radicalism” shows that Xu Ben’s criticism was overtly simplistic and that it 
overstated the role of liberalism in the debate. The reason why intellectuals adhered to a 
simplistic dualist framework had nothing to do with the place of liberalism in Chinese 
society. Rather, the use of the asymmetric “counterconcept” of “radicalism” enforced 
the reader to identify with “conservatism,” whatever content it was granted. 
Apart from the employment of the label “conservatism” for ideological purposes by 
Marxist critics, as discussed above, non-Marxist Chinese intellectuals have also 
carelessly applied the idea of a “conservative” trend to criticism of “radicalism” in 
general. For example, Chen Xiaoming, a researcher at the Institute of Literature at 
CASS, has argued that, since “radicalism” formed one side of a “dual antagonistic 
model,” the rejection of “radicalism” naturally led to “a value position of praising 
conservatism.”760 For Yang Chunshi, a Professor at the Chinese Department of Hainan 
Normal College, criticisms of “radicalism” were part of a “cultural conservative” trend, 
together with national studies (guoxue) and New Confucianism—which will be 
explored in the next chapter—and advocacies of postcolonialism and postmodernism, 
the subject of Chapter Six.761 For Meng Fanhua, also a researcher at the Institute of 
Literature of CASS, the “cultural conservatism” of the 1990s contained three traits: a 
critical spirit that denied “radicalism” to realize a moderate and stable discourse, a move 
from collective to personal concerns, and the repudiation of ultimate goals and values in 
favor of a focus on concrete problems.762
759 Ibid.
760 Chen Xiaoming, “Fan jijin zhuyi yu dangdai zhishi fenzi de lishi jingyu,” ZFL, 309-320.
Reference from 314. 
761 Yang Chunshi, “Xin baoshou zhuyi yu xin lixing zhuyi,” ZFL, 486-492. Originally published 
in Hainan shifan xueyuan xuebao 1996: 2.
762 Meng Fanhua, “Wenhua bengkui shidai de taowang yu guiyi: jiushi niandai wenhua de xin 
baoshou zhuyi jingshen,” ZFL 287-292. Reference from 289. Originally published in Zhongguo 
wenhua yanjiu 1994: 2.
But what was “culturally conservative” about 
these three traits? Was anything “conservative” at all about these three traits? It appears 
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that critics echoed arguments from the Marxist camp without being able to justify their 
preference for the terms “cultural” and “conservative.”
As demonstrated in this chapter, the reference to Edmund Burke in criticisms of 
“radicalism” was rarely part of an argument in which conservative goals were defended 
on conservative grounds. It has been exposed that “radicalism” was a nebulous concept 
that intellectuals appropriated for their own purposes. There was not only a considerable 
difference between the way criticisms of “radicalism” were appropriated by the 
princelings, by Xiao Gongqin, and by the intellectuals discussed in this chapter; there 
was also no consistent use of the concepts of “radicalism” and “conservatism” within
the 1992 debate. In line with the “multiaccentual” nature of the counterconcept of 
“radicalism,” then, the notion of a “conservative trend” needs to be treated with caution. 
As Wang Hui has rightly argued, “anti-radicalism” was a distinct historical 
phenomenon between 1989 and 1993 that was not a “unified intellectual trend” based 
on a “comprehensive conservative theory.”763 Instead, much energy in the debate was 
devoted to the analysis of “radicalism” as a political strategy; not all participants gave 
up “radical” goals and identified with “conservatism.” As Chen Shaoming, a Professor 
in the Philosophy Department of Zhongshan University, has formulated it, there was 
“low-key” criticism of “radicalism,” which negated its means, but not its social goals, 
and “high-key” criticism that negated both means and goals.764
763 Wang Hui, China’s New Order, 81.
764 Chen Shaoming, “Didiao yixie: xiang wenhua baoshou zhuyi jinyan,” ZFL, 507-513. 
Reference from 509. Originally published in Dongfang 1996: 3. 
The general applicability of the term “cultural conservatism” to the critique of 
“radicalism” is even more questionable. It can be derived from the debate that the 
criticism of “radicalism” was not necessarily part of the promotion of Chinese culture. 
Whereas Yü Ying-shih was concerned with the continuity of Chinese tradition, other 
intellectuals were more interested in gradual economic reform than in Chinese tradition. 
Although the notion of gradual reform based on evolutionary instead of revolutionary 
change implied historical continuity, the advocacy of gradual reform was not a 
manifestation of “cultural conservatism,” for the goal was not the safeguarding of 
Chinese culture as such. In brief, then, there was a big contrast between Yü Ying-shih’s 
cultural concerns and the preoccupation with procedural gradualism of some 
intellectuals in the 1992 debate. 
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Many Chinese intellectuals have also contrasted this “cultural” form of 
conservatism as an attitude toward Chinese tradition with a “political” conservatism that 
was set on preserving the political status quo. Wang Yuechuan, for example, has linked 
“political radicalism” with the myth of power, politics, and ideology, whereas “cultural 
radicalism” denied the value of cultural tradition.765 In a text by Ye Wen, “cultural 
conservatism” was used to denote both the “national studies” of the 1990s and the 
revival of postcolonialism in China. “Political conservatism,” on the other hand, 
consisted of both “old conservatism” and “neo-conservatism.”766
In addition, the cultural variant has often been aligned with something referred 
to as “cultural nationalism.” As discussed in Chapter One, this notion implied that the 
focus of loyalty was not the Party, the state, or the country, but a cultural conception of 
the Chinese nation; the essence of the Chinese nation was primarily located in Chinese 
culture. Implicit in this notion of “cultural nationalism” was the concern with the 
relation between Chinese and Western culture, which is why it has often been reduced 
Given the fact that Chinese intellectuals have interpreted “radicalism” both as 
“antitraditionalism” and as “revolution” or “socialism,” the simplistic distinction 
between a “cultural” and a “political” conservatism does not reflect the complexity of 
the issues at hand. Whereas Furth and Schwartz had initially applied the concept of 
“cultural conservatism” to Republican China because, they argued, a Burkean 
preservation of the political status quo had been absent—and the political and cultural 
orders had been separated after the fall of the empire—it is harder to apply the concept 
to 1990s China. For it can hardly be upheld that the cultural and the political orders 
were separated. Both in the “neo-conservatism” of the princelings and Xiao Gongqin, 
and in the 1992 debate, politics played a prominent role. Even Yü Ying-shih tied his 
cultural concerns to a political criticism of the CCP. “Cultural conservatism” was 
political because it challenged Marxist conceptions of “Chineseness”; “political 
conservatism” was also cultural in that it accorded a role to traditional elements in the 
modernization program. The main distinction between the two, then, was the role
attributed to tradition: whereas “political conservatism” envisioned a largely 
instrumental or procedural role for tradition, “cultural conservatives” promoted tradition 
because of its intrinsic value. 
765 Wang Yuechuan, “Jijin yu baoshou zhiwei,” ZFL, 423-425.
766 Ye Wen, “Ying qubie zhengzhi de baoshou zhuyi he wenhua de baoshou zhuyi,” EYS 40
(April 1997), 137-138.
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to an emotional reaction of Chinese intellectuals to “Western” culture. For Wang 
Yuechuan, for example, “cultural conservatism” was part of a global reaction against 
modernity; it often aligned with cultural nationalism.767 Zheng Dahua, a researcher at 
the Department of Intellectual History of the Institute of Modern History at CASS, also 
discerned strong nationalist traits in “cultural conservatism,” since it dealt with the 
problem of the relation between foreign and Chinese culture. 768
4.8 CONCLUDING REMARKS
The notion that 
“cultural conservatism” was somehow linked to a viewpoint of “cultural nationalism” 
and that it was a global reaction against modernity was too reductionist. Although 
figures such as Yü Ying-shih were certainly concerned with the preservation of Chinese 
cultural identity, the main problematique they discerned was not spatial but temporal in 
nature. Although both Marxism and liberalism were Western products, Yü did not 
attack them because they were Western, but because they had destroyed historical 
continuity. As Yü has remarked, since May Fourth, Chinese intellectuals did not focus 
on the fact that concepts were Western, but that they were new. Yü Ying-shih advocated 
Confucian values not primarily because they represented Chinese culture, but because 
they glued the community together; they were good first, and Chinese second. Other 
intellectuals attempted to reconcile conservatism with liberalism; they relied on Western 
conceptions of these theories in order to pursue gradual reform, which shows that the 
debate cannot simply be perceived of as a resistance against modernization along 
Western lines. In the next chapter, the association of Chinese conservatism with 
“cultural nationalism” will be criticized from a different angle.
According to the historian Yü Ying-shih, who triggered the first public debate on 
“conservatism” and “radicalism” in 1992, modern Chinese intellectual history had 
witnessed three stages of “radicalization,” namely the use of Western theories to 
reinterpret Chinese tradition between the 1890s and 1911, the rejection of Chinese 
tradition during the May Fourth era, and, finally, the arrival of Marxism to China. Yü’s 
“radicalism” entailed an attitude toward the Confucian tradition, but it also implied the 
lack of a political status quo, and, in a Burkean fashion, the eradication of intermediate 
767 Wang Yuechuan, “Jijin yu baoshou zhiwei,” ZFL, 423-425.
768 Zheng Dahua, “Wenhua baoshou zhuyi,” 440.
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groups in society. Yü’s shifting perception of “radicalism” has been explained through 
his interpretation of Confucianism as manifested in social institutions—the 
safeguarding of Chinese tradition for Yü meant that social institutions had to be 
preserved, and this was more feasible under a stable political status quo. 
Yü’s account of “radicalism” was influenced by traditional Chinese 
historiography in the sense that for Yü, the history of modern China was the history of 
the loss of the Confucian moral order. For this reason, implicit in Yü’s account was the 
notion that this order should be restored. Moreover, Yü’s elitist conception of Chinese 
society meant that only the intellectual was capable of undoing the consequences of 
“radicalism.” In addition, Yü’s narrative implied that the CCP had no legitimacy; the 
history of “radicalization” was at the same time a political criticism of the CCP. 
Nevertheless, Yü’s criticism was not tied to a political program for action, as Quirin has 
rightly argued; it was a moral accusation of the power holders. 
Another source of inspiration for mainland critics of “radicalism” was the 
historian Lin Yü-sheng, a student of Friedrich van Hayek, who described May Fourth 
“radicalism” as “wholesale antitraditionalism.” Like Yü Ying-shih, Lin Yü-sheng also 
discerned a move toward more radicalism with the May Fourth generation; he also 
found traces of this antitraditionalism in Maoism. Whereas both Lin Yü-sheng and Yü 
Ying-shih can be considered political liberals, Yü’s stance was unique in that it 
combined this political liberalism with a conservatism that upheld historical continuity 
on conservative grounds and for conservative goals. 
Mainland intellectuals appropriated the accounts of “radicalism” of both Lin Yü-
sheng and Yü Ying-shih in the context of both the repression of the demonstrations on 
June fourth, 1989, and the intensification of economic reform since the start of 1992. It 
has been argued that denunciations of “radicalism” predated 1989—the “culture heat” 
of the 1980s had already brought about a renewed attention on Chinese culture and a 
critical view of the May Fourth Movement—but the events of 1989 brought these 
criticisms to the surface. The intellectual climate of the 1990s needs to be understood in 
relation to the  “New Enlightenment Movement” of the 1980s, of which it was the 
logical consequence. Despite this continuity, the year 1989 occupied a central place in 
rejections of “radicalism.” 
Yü Ying-shih’s highly elitist and hierarchical view of Chinese society, as well as 
his cultural conception of “Chineseness,” diverged radically from the views of his main 
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opponent in the debate, the Marxist historian Jiang Yihua. The main point of discussion 
between Yü and Jiang Yihua concerned the nature of the Cultural Revolution, which 
was either considered the peak of “radicalism,” or the continuation of a feudal tradition. 
As a Marxist historian, Jiang approached the discussion from the angle of economic 
production and modernization, which meant that Yü’s cultural concerns became 
overshadowed by a discussion on history, society, and politics.
Other intellectuals in the 1992 debate either focused on a political criticism of 
the CCP or on a defense of gradual economic reform, but none of them engaged with 
Yü’s conservative argument of the preservation of intermediate groups in society. It has 
been argued that there was no consistent conservative position behind the use of the 
terms “conservatism” and “radicalism” in the 1992 debate. Although some made their 
argument for gradual reform on conservative grounds and referred to the notion of the 
social organism, the limits of reason, and historical growth, none of the participants 
argued in favor of gradual reform to defend conservative goals, such as the preservation 
of intermediate groups or other elements that could safeguard the community. Instead, 
the notion of gradual reform was incorporated in a liberal framework that was based on 
a selective interpretation of Karl Popper and Friedrich von Hayek. 
Whereas Yü Ying-shih had invoked Edmund Burke’s criticism of the French 
Revolution to highlight that there could be no preservation without change, other 
intellectuals in the debate relied on the French Revolution as part of a liberal 
framework: following Hayek, they argued that the French Revolution represented a 
tradition of liberty based on abstract rationalism and grand social designs, whereas the 
Glorious Revolution of 1688 epitomized a tradition of liberty based on empiricism and 
concrete experience. As Gan Yang has summarized this shift, it was a move away from 
“science and democracy” toward “order and liberty.” As regards Popper, the most 
common reference concerned his notion of “piecemeal engineering,” which was merely 
quoted to speak for gradual economic reform. The core concerns of Popper, namely 
individualism, the security of freedom by the state, the institutional control of rulers, 
and a humanitarian concept of justice, were absent from the debate.769
A significant shift in the meaning ascribed to the concepts of “radicalism” and 
“conservatism” was that “radicalism” was now mostly connected with socialism and 
769 Popper, The Open Society, Vol. 1, 102. On the institutional control of rulers and the proper 
understanding of justice, see ibid., chapters six and seven respectively.
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revolution, or with the liberalism of the French model, whereas “conservatism” was 
linked with British liberalism. Xiao Gongqin had already moved in this direction by 
linking “radicalism” with rationalist philosophy and “conservatism” with the tradition 
of empiricism, but he had not explicity interpreted British liberalism as a form of 
conservative liberalism. This shift can be ascribed to the change in context: by 1992, 
economic reform had been affirmed as the status quo; the political intermezzo between 
1989 and 1991 had ended. Instead of an argument for centralized rule, participants used 
a “rhetorics of transition” according to which economic reform was sufficient to reach 
the goal of democracy.770 Those who argued in favor of a conservative liberalism did 
not invoke the notion of the social organism. For liberals such as Popper, the social 
organism was a form of “tribalism”; it could only be connected with the closed society 
he opposed.771
In addition, Li Zehou and Liu Zaifu also defined the revolution of 1911 as a 
failure; it was this denial of revolution in modern Chinese history especially that evoked 
official criticism. As argued before, from an official point of view, economic reform 
was deemed necessary in the present, but revolution was nevertheless still the basic 
thread of modern Chinese history. When “radicalism” was understood as revolution, 
Some intellectuals who interpreted “radicalism” as revolution criticized the 
notion of progressivism, or, the linear conception of time according to which future 
development justified the eradication of tradition. As such, their outlook did contain 
some Mannheimian traits in that it did not merely provided “radicalism” with a concrete 
political content, but also with a more abstract “style of thought.” The question has been 
raised whether a conservative criticism of progressivism was possible at all in the 
context of the widespread obsession with modernization. Most criticisms of revolution 
were still based on the realities of the Chinese revolutionary experience rather than on a 
criticism of a mode of thought associated with progressivism or abstract reason. The 
controversial 1995 volume Farewell to Revolution, for example, reacted against the 
utopian socialism of the Mao era in particular. Referring to Popper and Hayek, the 
authors Li Zehou and Liu Zaifu presented economic reform as a return to orthodox 
Marxism after the aberrations of the Mao era, during which the primacy of economic 
development had been ignored. 
770 Term from Latham, “Rethinking Chinese Consumption,” 217.
771 Popper, The Open Society, Vol. 1, 80, 173.
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Marxist critics perceived this as a manifestation of a “cultural conservative trend” that 
challenged socialism. From another angle, those who were skeptical of the official 
economic reform policy because it marked a move away from socialism regarded 
rejections of “radicalism” as but another embrace of “neo-liberalism.” A truly critical 
investigation of modernity, so it went, would not only involve a scrutiny of socialism, 
but a scrutiny of modernity as a general construct. 
Concerning non-Marxist intellectuals’ application of the label “cultural 
conservatism” to the discarding of “radicalism,” it has been contended that this label did 
not reflect the “multiaccentual” nature of Chinese interpretations of the concept of 
“conservatism.” Most intellectuals were concerned with gradual economic reform, not 
with the preservation of Chinese culture in particular. Moreover, it has been asserted 
that a distinction between a “cultural” and a “political” conservatism cannot be upheld 
because the two realms were united during the 1990s. The difference between a 
“cultural” and a “political” conservatism did not concern a difference in advocacy, but 
rather a difference in the nature of the reference to tradition. Whereas “cultural 
conservatism” promoted tradition because of its intrinsic value, “political conservatism” 
attempted to incorporate tradition in a modernization program. In addition, the claim 
that “cultural conservatism” often joined hands with “cultural nationalism” has been 
criticized because the advocacy of the Chinese nation in cultural terms was not 
primarily posited against a “Western” cultural dominance. Chinese tradition was not 
necessarily upheld because it was Chinese; it was also upheld because its moral values 
were conceived of as good.
Despite the divergence between Yü Ying-shih’s advocacy of a cultural 
conservatism based on the intrinsic value of tradition and the defense of a procedural 
gradualism on behalf of mainland intellectuals, the 1992 debate did indicate a crucial 
shift in perception in the intellectual world. The fact that revolutionary breaks and 
“progressivism” were repudiated in favor of a gradualist approach that ensured 
historical continuity paved the way for the revival of tradition that would peak several 
years later. In 1994, the “national studies fever” (guoxue re) broke out, and the 1992 
debate provides an understanding as to why this happened. 
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5.
“RADICALISM” AS  “INSTRUMENTALISM”
CHEN LAI’S MORAL QUEST
Past events do not fade like smoke.
CHEN LAI
5.1 INTRODUCTION: “RADICALISM” AND CONFUCIAN VALUES 
Apart from the historian Yü Ying-shih, another person who concerned himself with the 
role of Confucianism in the modern world was the mainland philosopher Chen Lai (b. 
1952), a so-called New Confucian based at Peking University. Chen Lai’s solicitude for 
Confucianism led him to engage in an investigation of “radicalism,” which he, like Yü 
Ying-shih, interpreted as an attitude of “antitraditionalism.” Because Chen Lai 
approached the issue of “radicalism” from a New Confucian perspective, this chapter 
examplifies how the topic of “radicalism” became entwined with other discourses; it 
reveals once again that the concept of “radicalism” was versatile and multifaceted in 
essence.
Like the historian Lin Yü-sheng, Chen Lai focused on the “radicalism” of May 
Fourth intellectuals in particular. As such, unlike in the previous chapter, Chen Lai’s 
main focus was neither modern Chinese history in toto, nor the violence of revolution in 
twentieth-century China; the debates on Eastern and Western cultures during the May 
Fourth era constituted his main object of research. Chen Lai’s criticism of “radicalism” 
was closely connected to the events of 1989, as well as to the “New Enlightenment 
Movement” of the 1980s. Nonetheless, the reason why Chen Lai and others returned to 
May Fourth at this point in time can also be understood in the context of both the end of 
the Cold War and the end of Maoism. As Mitter has phrased it: “Under these 
circumstances, the idea that Communist China was the logical endpoint of the country’s 
early twentieth-century quest for modernity is less convincing than it might have been 
in the 1950s or 1960s.”772
772 Mitter, A Bitter Revolution, 21. 
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Unlike Yü Ying-shih, Chen Lai did not perceive of “cultural radicalism” in 
modern Chinese history as a specifically Chinese phenomenon—he understood the 
problematique of “radicalism” as part of the overall problem of modernization-as-
rationalization. This understanding was in line with New Confucian criticism of what 
the sociologist Max Weber has termed the “instrumental rationality” inherent in the 
modernization process. In the previous chapter, the New Confucian Tu Wei-ming’s 
critique of “instrumental rationality” and the quest for world-mastery that underlay the 
“Enlightenment mentality” have already briefly been mentioned.773
5.2 REVISITING THE MAY FOURTH MOVEMENT (1917-1921)
In this chapter, both 
the New Confucian condemnation of “instrumental rationality” and Chen Lai’s attempt 
to incorporate “radicalism” into to this framework of interpretation will be explored 
further. 
Given the fact that the debate on “radicalism” overlapped with Chen Lai’s 
advocacy of Confucian values, we need to investigate how he reconciled his 
understanding of the former as part of a global process of modernization with his 
Confucian agenda. In addition, the question arises of how he employed the term 
“conservatism” in this framework; was his defense of Confucian values rooted in a 
concern for the community and did he base his argument on conservative grounds? Or, 
did he, like some intellectuals in the previous chapters, blend a conservative rhetoric 
with a defense of goals that were everything but conservative? To answer these 
questions, this chapter will look into Chen Lai’s understanding of “cultural radicalism” 
as “instrumental reason” and the notion of “cultural conservatism” that he coined in 
response. These issues will be addressed within the broader framework of the New 
Confucian debate and its relation to the official revaluation of Confucianism on 
mainland China. 
In order to understand Chen Lai’s argument, it is necessary to first look into what the 
May Fourth Movement entailed, and how other intellectuals have evaluated the 
movement since the late 1980s. As both Li Zehou and Chow Tse-tsung have noted, the 
term “May Fourth Movement” (wusi yundong) was first used in May 1919, in which 
sense it referred strictly to the protests of May Fourth, 1919. This date is also known as 
773 Tu Wei-ming, “Huajie qimeng xintai,” EYS 2 (December 1990), 12-13.
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the May Fourth Incident, which took place in response to the Shandong Resolution of 
the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, in which the German rights to Shandong would be 
transferred to Japan.774 Later, the term was used in a broader sense, and it is in this 
sense that Chow Tse-tsung applied the term to the events between 1917—the year in 
which the New Literature and New Thought Movements were launched—and 1921, 
when social and intellectual reform were exchanged for political action.775
A crucial article in the evaluation of the May Fourth Movement since the late 
1980s concerns a 1986 piece by Li Zehou that has already been mentioned in the 
previous chapter. The latter criticized May Fourth because its element of “saving the 
nation” or “nationalism” (jiuguo) had repressed “Enlightenment” (qimeng). 776 The 
central question that Li Zehou addressed in the article was the relationship between the 
so-called New Culture Movement (xin wenhua yundong) that had commenced in 1917, 
and the patriotic anti-imperialist movement that had culminated in the protests of May 
Fourth, 1919. Li Zehou argued that the national crisis had repressed the pursuit of 
liberty, democracy, equality, and human rights; because of this crisis, the revolutionary 
struggle of “basic solutions” had been substituted for gradual action.777
Although Li Zehou, like Lin Yü-sheng before him, favored the continuation of 
May Fourth, he denounced its rejection of tradition. Tradition was a “cultural-
psychological structure” (wenhua xinli jiegou) that was “sedimented” (jidian) in 
people’s modes of action, ways of thinking, and emotional attitudes, which is why the 
abstract denial or confirmation of tradition was impossible. 778
774 Li Zehou, “Qimeng yu jiuwang,” 1; Chow, The May Fourth Movement, 1-2.
775 Nevertheless, Chow Tse-tsung added that some developments preceded 1917 and that there 
were also outgrowths after 1921. In 1915, for example, there was an outburst of nationalist 
sentiment in response to Japan’s so-called “Twenty-one Demands,” which included the 
Japanese colonization of Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, Shandong, the southeastern coastal 
region, and the Yangzi Valley, as well as the employment of Japanese advisors and joint police 
forces.  Some consider 1915 the start of the New Culture Movement because the journal Xin 
qingnian (New Youth) was launched in that year. As for the ending of May Fourth, some refer 
to 1923, when the debate on “Science and Metaphysics” was held, whereas others hold that it 
stretched until 1925, when the “May Thirtieth Incident” took place. 
776 The term jiuguo was first used after the defeat of China in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-
1895), but it was also widely used during the May Fourth period.
777 Li Zehou, “Qimeng yu jiuwang,” 36.
778 Ibid., 37.
Instead, Li Zehou 
subscribed to the “transformational creation” (zhuanzaoxing de chuangzao) of 
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tradition.779
The denial of tradition that Li Zehou addressed in 1986 became a prominent 
theme of discussion since 1989. Already during the first months of 1989, in the context 
of the approaching seventieth anniversary of the May Fourth Incident, the May Fourth 
legacy was scrutinized. In 1990, Peking University Press published a collection of 
articles on this very occasion.
This included the continuation of some elements in tradition in combination 
with the foundation of legal institutions and the separation of powers. 
780 Questions addressed in the volume were: What 
constituted the “essence” or “spirit” of the May Fourth Movement? Could it be defined 
as “wholesale antitraditionalism”? How should the relation between tradition and 
modernity be conceived? A well-known contribution to the volume was an article by Ji 
Xianlin (b. 1911), the famous scholar of Indian languages and culture, in which the 
latter compared the relation between Eastern and Western culture to a river: “For thirty 
years the river flows East; for thirty years the river flows West.” 781 Ji Xianlin’s 
argument that it was time for Chinese culture to flow westward was in accordance with 
the rise of a more critical awareness of the antitraditionalism of May Fourth. Similarly, 
in volumes that appeared in Hong Kong and Taiwan, questions of wholesale 
antitraditionalism, wholesale Westernization, and the break with the past were 
addressed.782
Apart from these collections of articles on May Fourth, debates on the topic 
were also conducted in academic journals such as Orient (Dongfang), Wenxue pinglun 
(Literary Review), Xueren (Scholar), and Yuandao (Original Path). In the January 1994 
issue of Yuandao, for example, both Wang Shuren and Han Demin discussed the 
cultural crisis, the “cultural nihilism,” and the thorough antitraditionalism that had 
779 Ibid., 36.
780 Beijing daxue shehui kexuechu, ed., Beijing daxue jinian wusi yundong qishi zhounian 
lunwenji (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 1990).
781 Ji Xianlin, “Cong hongguan shang kan Zhongguo wenhua,” 4. 
782 The revaluation of May Fourth is such a broad topic that it would require a separate study. 
Some of the main volumes include: Zhou Yangshan, ed., Cong wusi dao xin wusi (Taipei: 
Shibao wenhua chuban qiye youxian gongsi, 1989); Tang Yijie, ed., Lun chuantong yu fan 
chuantong: wusi qishi zhounian jinian wenxuan (Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiye gongsi, 1989); 
Lin Yü-sheng et al., Wusi: duoyuan de fansi (Xianggang: Sanlian shudian youxian gongsi, 
1989; Li Zehou, Lin Yü-sheng et al., Wusi: duoyuan de fansi (Taipei: Fengyun shidai chuban 
gongsi, 1989); Liu Guisheng and Zhang Buzhou, eds., Taigang ji haiwai wusi yanjiu lunzhu 
xieyao (Beijing: Jiaoyu kexue chubanshe, 1989); Ding Xiaoqiang and Xu Zi, eds., Wusi yu 
xiandai Zhongguo: wusi xinlun (Taiyuan: Shanxi renmin chubanshe, 1989). 
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resulted from May Fourth.783 In articles that appeared in the literary journal Wenxue 
pinglun in 1993 and 1994, the Literary Revolution of 1917 in particular was debated, a 
topic that will be analyzed in detail in the next chapter. In 1993, in the first issue of 
Dongfang, an article by Chen Lai on “cultural radicalism” appeared, which will be 
analyzed further below. One year later, Liu Dong criticized the May Fourth Movement 
in the same journal; he pointed out both the tolerant, liberal spirit of May Fourth in the 
intellectual sphere and the negative consequences of “cultural radicalism” and “political 
radicalism” with regard to modernization, morality, and culture.784
As already noted in the previous chapter, some intellectuals who had been 
staunch defenders of the Enlightenment spirit during the 1980s became critics of 
“radicalism” during the early 1990s. A good example of this trend can be found in the 
person of the literary critic Wang Yuanhua, a former Professor at Fudan University who 
had also been a proponent of “socialist humanism” during the early 1980s.785 During 
the late 1980s, Wang Yuanhua had criticized the notion of the “wholesale 
antitraditionalism” of May Fourth because it was not based on historical reality, but 
driven by the will of some intellectuals to revive Confucianism.786
Notwithstanding the widespread critical evaluation of the May Fourth 
Movement, the terms “conservatism” and “radicalism” were rarely used. Only two 
articles in the Peking University Press volume contained the term “conservatism”; in 
both instances, the hitherto common interpretation of the dichotomy between the 
“progressive” intellectuals of the New Culture Movement and their “conservative” 
opponents was challenged. In one of these articles, the literary critic Yue Daiyun 
reconsidered the widely held belief that the scholars around the journal Xueheng
(Critical Review) had been opponents of the New Culture Movement. She argued 
Yet in 1994, after 
having read the works of Du Yaquan (1873-1933)—the founder and editor of the 
journal Dongfang zazhi (Eastern Miscellany)—Wang Yuanhua criticized the “intention 
ethics” (yitu lunli), utilitarianism, radical mood, and evolutionism of the May Fourth 
spirit. 
783 Wang Shuren, “Wenhua de weiji, ronghe yu chongjian,” Yuandao 1 (1994), 95-114; Han 
Demin, “Chuantong wenhua de weiji yu ershi shiji fanwenhua sichao,” in ibid., 311-340.
784 Liu Dong, “Beida xuetong yu ‘wusi’ chuantong,” Dongfang 1994:4, 12-17. Reprinted in 
ZFL, 241-251.
785 Together with Wang Ruoshui, Wang Yuanhua had drafted the speech that Zhou Yang 
delivered at the official symposium that was held at the occasion of the centenary of Karl 
Marx’s death in 1983. See Xu Jilin, “The Fate of an Enlightenment,” 186.
786 Wang Yuanhua, “Lun chuantong yu fan chuantong,” 13-38.
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instead that all intellectuals of that period had sought answers to the question of 
modernization. This article was a revised edition of Yue Daiyun’s article on Xueheng
that had appeared in the Hong Kong and Taiwan volumes on May Fourth as described 
in the previous chapter.787 In a similar vein, in an article on the May Fourth debates on 
Eastern and Western cultures that will be analyzed below, Chen Lai presented the 
“conservatives” of the May Fourth era as modernizers.788
5.2.1 “Cultural Radicalism” and the Politicization of Culture
Chen Lai’s participation in the debate on “radicalism” took the form of a denunciation 
of “cultural radicalism” in particular. Chen Lai had initially written an article on 
“cultural radicalism” for a conference that was held in Hawaii in February 1991—at 
which Yü Ying-shih, Lin Yü-sheng, and Tu Wei-ming were present—but an extended 
version of this article later appeared in the journal Orient in 1993.789
Chen Lai explained that for him, the term “cultural movements” referred to 
relatively influential movements that were especially composed of the cultural activities 
of intellectuals. Although this would exclude the political mass movement that was the 
Cultural Revolution, Chen Lai argued that the latter still qualified as a “cultural 
movement” because of its aspect of “cultural criticism.”
Chen Lai singled 
out three “cultural movements” of twentieth-century China, namely the May Fourth 
Movement, the Cultural Revolution, and the 1980s, all of which had “radicalism,” or, 
the “totalistic” denial of tradition, as a core trait. 
790
787 See Chapter Four, 154. Yue Daiyun, “Shijie wenhua duihua zhong de Zhongguo xiandai 
baoshou zhuyi: jianlun ‘Xueheng’ zazhi” Beijing daxue jinian wusi yundong, 56-67. The article 
also appeared in Zhongguo wenhua 1989:1, 132-136.
788 Chen Lai, “‘Wusi’ dongxi wenhua lunzheng de fansi,” Beijing daxue jinian wusi yundong, 
157-174.
789 Chen Lai, “Ershi shiji wenhua yundong zhong de jijin zhuyi,” Dongfang 1 (1993), 38-44. 
The article was reprinted in ZFL 293-308, and in CYX, 68-83. An adapted version of the article 
appeared in Zhexue zazhi 1992: 2. Translated in Contemporary Chinese Thought 29:4 (Summer 
1998), 5-28. For more writings by Chen Lai on the topic of “cultural radicalism,” see Chongxin 
renshi bainian Zhongguo, Vol. 2, 451-466.
790 Chen Lai, “Ershi shiji wenhua yundong,” ZFL, 294. 
The basic mode of thought 
of “radicalism” was what Chen Lai termed “straightening the crooked to excess,” 
“overcorrection” (jiaowang guozheng), or, going to extremes to rectify perceived 
wrongs. According to this logic, the solution to a feudal old culture was the abolishment 
of characters; the response to too much softness had to be “barbarity”; too much stress 
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on chastity could only be solved by promiscuous sexual behavior. In brief, then, the 
three “movements of cultural criticism” by far exceeded the “movement of the 
reconstitution of Confucianism” (ruxue chonggou yundong).791
Regarding the May Fourth Movement, Chen Lai pointed out some of its 
problematic core characteristics. Firstly, the movement had reduced political problems 
since the reforms of 1898 to cultural problems: “May Fourth leaders regarded political 
contingency as cultural necessity.”792 Chen Lai also called this “culturalism directed at 
political action” (zhixiang zhengzhi xingwei de wenhua zhuyi), or “pan-politicism” (fan 
zhengzhi zhuyi), an attitude that could be traced back to the impact of the political 
orientation of traditional scholars. 793
As for the Cultural Revolution, it had not been the direct product of May Fourth; 
it was also related to international changes, inner CCP struggles, and Mao Zedong’s 
personal authority. Nonetheless, the heritage of May Fourth also played a role in the 
participation of the masses, since the Cultural Revolution continued the resolute 
separation of “new” and “old” of the May Fourth era, as epitomized in slogans such as 
“there is no making without breaking” (bupo buli) and “destroy the old and establish the 
new” (pojiu lixin). From the Cultural Revolution, it could be seen that the May Fourth 
Movement had turned criticism of Confucius and Confucianism into a positive value 
that intellectuals with different political orientations acknowledged. The third “radical” 
“cultural movement” was that of the 1980s, during which the lack of democracy was 
criticized through Confucianism, and during which scientism flourished.
Here, we can discern some similarities with Li 
Zehou’s thesis that changes in the cultural realm served political purposes. Secondly, 
May Fourth intellectuals desired to make China rich and strong after a history of 
humiliation, which made them resort to utilitarianism. Finally, May Fourth intellectuals 
were obsessed with science and democracy; these values were mistakenly used as a 
yardstick to judge all other values. 
794
791 Chen Lai referred to a text on Confucianism by Jiang Yihua in which the latter discerned five 
“peaks” of Confucianism, as part of his narrative that twentieth-century Chinese intellectual 
history was predominantly “conservative,” and not “radical.” See Jiang Yihua, “Ershi shiji 
ruxue zai Zhongguo de chonggou,” 28-35.
791 Chen Lai, “Ershi shiji wenhua yundong,” ZFL, 295.
792 Ibid. 
793 Ibid., 305, 307. 
794 Three theories were popular at the time, namely systems theory, information theory, and 
cybernetics. Apart from that, there was a great interest in scientific methods and the philosophy 
of science, as already mentioned in the previous chapter. 
During the 
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1980s, then, the politicization of culture and the adoration of science were prevalent, but 
now, modernization had become the core issue of debate.  
If we compare Chen Lai’s account with that of Yü Ying-shih and Lin Yü-sheng, 
several things can be noted. Firstly, Chen Lai referred to two of the three “stages” of 
“radicalism” mentioned by Yü Ying-shih, namely the May Fourth Movement and the 
Cultural Revolution, but he added the “culture craze” of the 1980s as a third stage. Chen 
Lai criticized Yü Ying-shih for not including this last stage, when “antitraditionalism” 
was consciously present in the minds of Chinese intellectuals.795 Secondly, like Lin Yü-
sheng, Chen Lai believed that the “antitraditionalism” of the May Fourth intellectuals 
had been wholesale; Chen Lai described his critique of “radicalism” as “anti-
antitraditionalism” (fan fanchuantong zhuyi).796
The perceived link between the May Fourth Movement and the Cultural 
Revolution that can be discerned in Chen Lai’s article, in Yü Ying-shih’s theory of 
“radicalization,” and in Lin Yü-sheng’s connection between May Fourth 
antitraditionalism and Maoism was fiercely attacked by some intellectuals. One critic 
argued that the May Fourth Movement disapproved of the very feudal despotism and 
superstition that the Cultural Revolution embodied.
Chen Lai also followed Lin Yü-sheng 
in his attack on the reduction of all political problems to culture, and he likewise argued 
in favor of the separation of the cultural and political realms. 
797 Another critic claimed that both 
movements had different ideals; the disasters of the Cultural Revolution had to be 
ascribed to its ideals rather than to its “cultural radicalism.” 798
795 Interview with Chen Lai, Beijing, August 10, 2005. Although Yü Ying-shih had not included 
the 1980s in his three stages, he had criticized it as part of the start of a new “cycle” of 
“radicalism,” which is why Chen Lai’s criticism is not entirely correct.
796 Ibid. Although Chen Lai would not go as far as Lin Yü-sheng, who claimed that May Fourth 
was in terms of its method a conservative movement in which “tradition was fought with 
tradition,” Chen Lai also discerned a traditional influence in the “totalistic” or “wholesale” anti-
traditionalism of May Fourth: “if it had not been for the influence of the Confucian thought that 
considers national and social concerns as the highest moral duty, their criticism of 
Confucianism could not have been so fierce.” See Chen Lai, “Zhongguo jindai sixiang de huigu 
yu qianzhan,” CYX, 13-30. Reference from 19. This was an adapted version of an article that 
was originally published in Tianjin shehui kexue 1989:5, 3-8.
797 Yan Jiayan, “Ping wusi, wenge yu chuantong wenhua de lunzheng,” 134. 
798 Chen Shaoming, “Didiao yixie,” 509.
These criticisms 
demonstrate that scholars took Chen Lai’s equation at face value, whereas Chen Lai and 
others only intended to compare the movements with reference to their mode of 
thought. Moreover, as in the previous chapters, the term “radicalism” was employed as 
an asymmetric counterconcept in order to convince other scholars of the destructive 
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force of the cultural movements. Rather than engaging in a scholarly exercise, Chen Lai 
aimed to prove that the harm inflicted upon tradition had been mistaken. The question, 
then, should not be whether or not the May Fourth Movement was essentially different 
from the Cultural Revolution, but why and how Chen Lai used this framework of 
“radicalism” in connection with May Fourth. 
5.2.2 The “Instrumental Rationality” of May Fourth “Radicals”
Chen Lai contrasted the concept of “cultural radicalism” with what he referred to as 
“cultural conservatism”; he used these terms in a discussion of the debates on Eastern 
and Western cultures during the May Fourth era. “Cultural conservatives” used “value 
rationality” (jiazhi lixing) as a yardstick to measure cultural values, whereas “cultural 
radicals” made use of “instrumental rationality” (gongju lixing).799
For Max Weber, “instrumental rationality” was a type of rational action in 
which the actor calculated how to reach a certain end; this type of action was present in 
modern capitalism and in the bureaucracy. “Value rationality,” on the contrary, referred 
to an action that was not a means to an end, but that was “determined by a conscious 
belief in the value for its own sake,” as for example a religious calling or some higher 
cause.
For this division, 
Chen Lai drew on Max Weber’s distinction between “substantive-value rationality” 
(Wertrationalität) and “formal-procedural rationality” (Zweckrationalität), two types of 
social action that Weber had outlined in his Economy and Society (1922). 
800 Weber added that these ideal types were heuristic devices; in practice, it was 
hard to find action that could be reduced to one type of rational action only.801
799 Chen Lai also used the term “functional rationality” (gongyong lixing) instead of 
“instrumental rationality” (gongju lixing). See, for example, Chen Lai, “Huajie jinzhang,” Chen 
Lai zixuanji, 377.  In other articles, Chen Lai also employed the terms “jiazhi helixing” and 
“gongju helixing,” as well as “shizhi lixing” (essence rationality) and “xingshi lixing” (form 
rationality). See, for example, Chen Lai, “Xin lixue yu xiandaixing siwei de fansi,” CYX, 174.
800 Weber, Economy and Society, 24-25. Weber discerned two other types of action, namely 
“affectual” and “traditional” action. Both of these were situated on a lower level, since they 
were actions based on habit instead of on worldview or choice. However, since Weber relied on 
ideal types, he added that the line between meaningful and reactive action was hard to draw. See 
ibid., 4-5.
801 Ibid., 26.
In an 
article in which Chen Lai sought ways to dissolve the tension between tradition and 
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modernity, he applied the terms somewhat differently. 802
The standard of functional rationality refers to taking the efficiency of politics or 
economics of a certain society as a starting point. The standard of value rationality is 
taking ethical and cultural values in itself as a yardstick.
Chen Lai explained the 
distinction between the two types of rationality as follows: 
803
In other words, Chen Lai employed Weber’s distinction to support his criticism of the 
politicization or instrumentalization of culture and to argue for cultural autonomy 
instead. In Chen Lai’s view, the main representative of this “radical utilitarianism” (jijin 
gongli zhuyi) had been Chen Duxiu; his articles in New Youth (Xin qingnian) in 
particular were typified by this trend. Although Chen Duxiu had not been aware of the 
fact that he used different standards to judge values, he had discerned a contrast 
between “value rationality” and “scientific and technological rationality” (keji lixing) in 
his text “The French and Modern Civilization.” In this article, Chen Duxiu praised the 
French for having given mankind the ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity; he 
contrasted this with the German orientation towards technological inventions and a 
strong country.804
Nevertheless, Chen Lai argued, in general, Chen Duxiu used both standards 
interchangeably. For example, when he promoted Western individualism, he applied the 
standard of “value rationality,” but when he supported the elimination of feelings in 
favor of the rule of law, and the replacement of the Eastern love of peace with war—
which “nearly turned him into an admirer of war and blood”—he did so on the grounds 
of “instrumental rationality.” 805
802 Chen Lai, “Huajie chuantong yu xiandai de jinzhang: wusi wenhua sichao de fansi,” Chen 
Lai zixuanji, 373-398. Originally appeared in Lin Yü-sheng, ed., Wusi: duoyuan de fansi, 151-
185. Part of the text was published in Dushu 1989:5 under the title “Wusi dongxi wenhua 
lunzheng de fansi,” another part was published in Guowen Tiandi 1989:5 under the title “Wusi 
dui rujia de piping.” Finally, in Beijing daxue xuebao 1989:3, part of the article appeared under 
the title “Xiaojie chuantong yu xiandai de jinzhang.” 
803 Chen Lai, “Huajie jinzhang,” Chen Lai zixuanji, 377. 
804 Chen Lai referred to Chen Duxiu, “Falanxi yu jinshi wenming” (The French and modern 
civilization), Xin Qingnian 1:1 (September 1915). Reprinted in Chen Song, ed., Wusi qianhou 
dongxi wenhua wenti lunzhan wenxuan (henceforth: Dongxi wenxuan), 3-6.
805 Chen Lai, “Huajie jinzhang,” Chen Lai zixuanji, 378. Chen Lai referred to Chen Duxiu, 
“Dongxi minzu genben sixiang zhi chayi” (The differences in basic thought between Eastern 
and Western nations), Qingnian zazhi 1:4 (December 1915). Reprinted in Dongxi wenxuan,12-
15.
For Chen Lai, the danger of drawing “instrumental 
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rationality” into the realm of values, then, was that core values, such as virtue, religion, 
aesthetics, peace, justice, and harmony, could be abandoned in order to reach political 
goals, which in turn could bring about imperialism and militarism. 
The “radicalism” in New Youth was countered with what Chen Lai referred to as 
the “cultural conservatism” of those around the journal Dongfang zazhi (Eastern 
Miscellany), who used “value rationality” as a yardstick to judge values. Against the 
background of the First World War, the success of the Russian Revolution, and the 
Marxist critique of capitalism, “cultural conservatives” were critical of the West and 
demanded the continuity with Chinese tradition. From the fact that Chen Lai discerned a 
connection between Chinese “cultural conservatives” and global developments, it can 
be seen that he conceived of Chinese conservatism as more than just a reaction to May 
Fourth thought; it was “created by complex dynamics in the global political-cultural 
process.”806
Because May Fourth conservatives had a wider knowledge about both the West 
and the ills of capitalism, and because they had been exposed to Marxism, Chen Lai 
would later state that it was better to describe them as “cultural pluralists.”807 Other 
Chinese intellectuals have also argued that modern Chinese conservatism bore the 
stamp of Western critics of capitalism, and that Chinese conservatism was hence more 
concerned with socialist themes, such as inequality.808 Elsewhere, Chen Lai argued that, 
in order to grasp the positions of “conservatives” and “radicals” correctly, one should 
make use of a “pluralistic progress concept” (duoyuan de jinbu guannian): a positive 
evaluation of progress should not only contain the “radicalism” of cultural criticism, but 
also the “conservatism” of cultural identity. Despite their different views about culture, 
both groups shared the same views on political progress and economic reform.809
Contrary to “cultural radicals” such as Chen Duxiu, for whom the “old” and the 
“new” were irreconcilable opposites, “cultural conservatives” such as Zhang Shizhao 
806 Chen Lai, “Dui xin wenhua yundong de zai sikao: cong ‘wusi’ houqi de Liang Shuming 
shuoqi,” Nanchang daxue xuebao, 31:1 (January 2000), 1-5. Quote from page 3. Chen Lai also 
made this point in “Bayu: shiji zhi jiao hua chuantong,” CYX, 287-288.
807 Chen Lai, “Dui xin wenhua yundong de zai sikao,” 4.
808 Tao Dongfeng, “Baoshou ziyou zhuyi,” ZFL, 478-480.
809 Chen Lai, “Bayu,” CYX, 288. Bresciani has also challenged the dichotomy between 
conservatives and modernizers: “since the beginning of this century, all Chinese intellectuals 
have thought of the best way to modernize their country.” See Bresciani, Reinventing 
Confucianism, 467.
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(1881-1973) spoke on behalf of cultural continuity. 810 In addition, cultural 
conservatives criticized the overall presence of “instrumental rationality” in the service 
of struggle and war. Du Yaquan, the founder of Dongfang zazhi, for example, 
condemned the resort to force as a yardstick for morality because it could only lead to 
the rule of power and to war.811 Liang Qichao, in his Impressions of a Trip to Europe 
(Ouyou xinying lu, 1919), complained about the reign of the “survival of the fittest,” 
about the adoration of power and money, and about militarism and imperialism.812
Chen Lai also made use of Weber’s two types of rationality to read the 1923 
debate on “Science and Metaphysics,” in which the main participants had been Zhang 
Junmai, Ding Wenjiang, Liang Qichao, Hu Shi, and Wu Zhihui. Yü Ying-shih had 
referred to this 1923 debate in his 1988 lecture to illustrate the view that modern China 
had not known conservatism.813
Chang Yansheng was remarkable for Chen Lai because, in the debates over the 
differences between Eastern and Western cultures, he had supplanted the emphasis on 
geographical disparities between East and West (dongxi shuo) with a stress on the 
Conversely, for Chen Lai, those participants in the 
debate who argued against scientism, such as Zhang Junmai, were conservatives who 
stood on the side of “value rationality.” Advocates of scientism, such as Ding Wenjiang, 
on the other hand, were “radicals” who reduced modern civilization to “instrumental 
rationality.” Chen Lai drew on the same framework to criticize the views of Chang 
Yansheng (1898-1947), the editor of the journal Guomin zazhi (Citizen Magazine), and 
a Professor of History at Peking University. Like Hu Shi and Chen Duxiu, Chang 
Yansheng had also taken part in the repudiation of feudalism and the promotion of 
science and democracy, but his stance on Confucianism had been much more moderate 
than that of Hu Shi and Chen Duxiu. 
810 Zhang Shizhao is mostly known for having founded the Tiger Magazine (Jiayin zazhi) in 
1914. In 1925, he published The Tiger Weekly (Jiayin zhoukan), a magazine in which he 
criticized May Fourth intellectuals. Zhang Shizhao recommended a blending of old and new 
culture; he was in favor of the development of existing institutions instead of the imitation of 
Western institutions. Since China was an agricultural nation, Zhang Shizhao claimed that a 
political system different from the West was needed.
811 Chen Lai, “Huajie jinzhang,” Chen Lai zixuanji, 380. Chen Lai referred to Cang Fu (Du 
Yaquan), “Miluan zhi xiandai renxin” (The confused modern feeling), Dongxi wenxuan, 41-47; 
Cang Fu, “Zhanhou dongxi wenming zhi tiaohe” (The blending of Eastern and Western 
civilizations after the war), Dongxi wenxuan, 25-32.
812 Chen Lai, “Huajie jinzhang,” Chen Lai zixuanji, 381. Quote from Liang Qichao, “Ouyou 
xinying lu” (Impressions on a trip to Europe), Dongxi wenxuan, 333-374 (excerpts).
813 See Chapter Four, 141.
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temporal contrast between both civilizations (gujin shuo).814
In a way, Chen Lai’s thesis is reminiscent of the plea of those in the 1923 debate 
on “Science and Metaphysics” who, as Furth described it, “defended the autonomy of 
value—and by implication Confucianism—with arguments drawn from the European 
Kulturkampf between science and Christianity.”
Despite Chang Yansheng’s 
insight, Chen Lai attacked the latter’s classification of religion under the denominator 
“ancient,” because modern civilization still needed “value rationality.” Western 
civilization, for example, had never abandoned Christianity, in spite of the challenges 
posed by the Enlightenment and several centuries of scientific development. For Chen 
Lai, “value rationality” did not lend itself to an opposition between “old” and “new”—it
was continuous. 
815 Then again, what negatively 
influenced the credibility of Chen Lai’s argument was the all too simplistic application 
of a dualist framework of “value rationality” versus “instrumental rationality” to what 
was in essence a complex era. In addition, the sharp distinction that Chen Lai made 
between the two types of rationality had also not been present in Max Weber. As Franco 
Crespi has argued, the point of Weber’s distinction between “goal-rational” and “value-
rational” was not the importance of the distinction between “goals” and “values”—
Weber recognized that they were interchangeable. In response to positivists, Weber 
wanted to show that “to act in the name of values (religious, ethical, aesthetical, etc.) 
can also be rational.”816
If we base ourselves on Weber’s typology, then both Chinese “conservatives” 
and “radicals” of the May Fourth era manifested “value rationality”: both groups upheld 
a certain value, planned to realize this value, and acted accordingly, regardless of the 
result.817
814 See Chang Yansheng (Chang Naihui) “Dongfang wenming yu xifang wenming” (Eastern 
civilization and Western civilization), Guomin 2:3 (October 1920). Reprinted in Dongxi 
wenxuan, 266-278.
815 Furth, “Culture and Politics,” 37.
816 Crespi, “Book Review,” 250-251.
817 Swedberg, The Max Weber Dictionary, 246-247.
“Radicals” did not uphold science and democracy merely to obtain a strong 
China; they also believed in their intrinsic value. And as for the goal of 
“modernization,” as Chen Lai himself has also argued, “cultural conservatives” all 
adhered to it. The simplistic dualism in Chen Lai’s argument revealed the 
“ideologization” of the concept of “radicalism”: in order to make his argument 
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convincing, Chen Lai resorted to a black-and-white picture. “Radicalism” was portrayed 
negatively as the embodiment of “utilitarianism” and the politicization of culture.
Yet if Chen Lai really intended to demonstrate that Chinese conservatives were 
progressives who were on the side of modernization, then this interpretation of the 
Weberian distinction between “value rationality” and “instrumental rationality” did not 
suit this purpose. Instead of giving the impression that both conservatives and radicals 
operated within the same framework and dealt with the same questions, Chen Lai 
suggested that the two groups adhered to a different logic. Paradoxically, Chen Lai’s 
effort to obliterate the simplistic distinction between tradition and modernity and 
between the spokespersons for Western culture and the exponents of a blending of both 
Chinese and Western culture resulted in the replacement of existing dichotomies with 
an even more reductionist dualist framework. Could this really rescue “cultural 
conservatives” from mistaken historical judgments?
5.3 CONFUCIANISM AS TRANSCENDENTAL VALUES
5.3.1 The Influence of Tu Wei-ming
Chen Lai’s revaluation of the May Fourth era and his characterization of “cultural 
conservatives” as those who adhered to “value rationality” was in line with his overall 
argument that morality, and Confucianism in particular, was very much needed in 
modern society. Chen Lai’s “cultural radicalism” did not imply the denial of Chinese 
culture in toto, but the negative attitude towards Confucianism. According to Chen Lai, 
Confucianism was in crisis, a concern the he first expressed in an article entitled “A 
Propitious New Start,” which was written for Twenty-first Century during the winter of 
1992. Chen Lai described how, after decades of denial, the situation had started to 
improve—“Confucianism has already passed the hardest time; it has already left the low 
ebb.”818
In other articles, Chen Lai also addressed the issue of the crisis of Confucianism, 
which he conceived of as both a cultural crisis and a crisis of the belief in values.819
818 Chen Lai, “Zhenxia qiyuan,” EYS 10 (April 1992), 10-11. Reprinted in CYX, 290-292.
819 Chen Lai, “Ershi shiji Zhongguo wenhua zhong de ruxue kunjing,” Zhejiang shehui kexue
1998:3 (May 1998), 26-32. Reference from 30.
Before May Fourth, although Confucianism had been erased from politics and 
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education, it still stood firm in the ethical and spiritual realms.820 With May Fourth, it 
also disappeared from these realms; “tearing down the shop of Confucius” became one 
of the main May Fourth slogans.821 Although the marginalization of Confucianism was 
temporarily halted in the decades that followed the May Fourth Movement, since 1949, 
its position was damaged fiercely, this time not by liberals, but by dogmatism and 
“extreme leftist false Marxism.”822
For both Lin Yü-sheng and Yü Ying-shih, as discussed in the previous chapter, 
Confucianism was tied to concrete “social referents,” and it was very much intertwined 
with social institutions. Yü Ying-shih’s argument for the preservation of intermediate 
organizations was driven by the very fact that he considered these institutions to be 
embodiments of Confucian culture as a living culture. For Chen Lai, on the contrary, 
Confucianism could not be reduced to its amalgamation with society, which harmed its 
transcendental values.823
Chen Lai criticized Chen Duxiu, for example, who had reduced Confucian 
ethics to the “three bonds” (sangang)—the bond between ruler and official, father and 
son, and husband and wife—and who had claimed that “advocating respect for 
Confucius must necessarily lead to an emperor ascending the throne.”
Since “cultural radicalism” for Chen was the politicization and 
instrumentalization of Confucianism, he argued in favor of a conception of 
Confucianism detached from sociopolitical reality.
824
820 Chen Lai mentioned the abolition of the “eight-legged essay” in 1899, the Imperial Edict of 
1901 to found Western-style academies, the elimination of the examination system in 1905, and 
Cai Yuanpei’s decrees as a Minister of Education (1912) in which he proposed the eradication 
of the Classics and the reverence for Confucius.  See ibid., 27.
821 Yan Jiayan has asserted that the slogan “tear down the shop of Confucius” was never a true 
May Fourth slogan in the sense that “democracy,” “science,” and the “Literary Revolution” had 
been. Hu Shi first jokingly used the phrase as a literary expression in his preface to the writings 
of Wu Yu in 1921: Wu Yu was “an old hero who single-handedly reversed the shop of 
Confucius in Sichuan province” (Sichuan sheng zhishou da kongjiadian de lao yingxiong). See 
Yan Jiayan, “Ping wusi, wenge yu chuantong wenhua de lunzheng,” 132.
822 Chen Lai, “Ershi shiji Zhongguo wenhua zhong de ruxue kunjing,” 31.
823 Ibid., 28.; Chen Lai, “Wusi sichao yu xiandaixing,” CYX, 60-67. Reference from 62-63.
824 Chen Lai, “Ershi shiji Zhongguo wenhua zhong de ruxue kunjing,” 27. Chen Lai referred to 
Chen Duxiu’s text “Fubi yu zunkong” (Restoration and revering Confucius), Xin qingnian (New 
Youth) 3:6. 
Chen Duxiu’s 
fierce attack on Confucianism had been directly related to the restoration movements of 
Yuan Shikai and Zhang Xun, who had both invoked Confucianism in their political 
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maneuvers. 825 “Radicals” such as Chen Duxiu embraced the logic of “replacing the 
whole with one side” (yipian gaiquan): in their assault on Confucianism, they focused 
on political ethics (zhong), family ethics (xiao), and sexual ethics (zhenjie); on the basis 
of this, they discarded Confucianism as a whole.826
The argument that Confucianism had been distorted in the process of its 
practical usage in political and social life was not unique to Chen Lai; other New 
Confucians had uttered similar criticism. The argument was popular in particular with 
Tu Wei-ming, one of the main exponents of New Confucianism (xiandai xin rujia or 
dangdai xin rujia) in North America whom Chen Lai considered his teacher.827
During his time in China, Tu Wei-ming lectured throughout the country on what 
he termed “the third epoch of Confucianism,” a theory that some consider to have 
triggered the New Confucian revival on mainland China.
Tu Wei-
ming had spent six months as a lecturer in the Philosophy Department of Peking 
University in 1985. Between 1986 and 1988, Chen Lai was a visiting scholar at Harvard 
University, where Tu Wei-ming was a Professor in the Department of East Asian 
Languages and Civilizations. In addition, in the intellectual context of the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, mainland scholars and overseas scholars interacted through an 
increasing number of international conferences.
828 It was not Tu Wei-ming 
who coined the notion of “three epochs” of Confucianism; the philosopher and New 
Confucian Mou Zongsan (1909-1995) had first come up with this idea. According to 
Mou Zongsan, the first epoch had been that of Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi, whereas 
the second epoch referred to the Neo-Confucianism of the Song (907-1279) and Ming 
(1368-1644) dynasties. The third era, then, was contemporary Confucianism. Whereas 
Mou Zongsan had used the theory to refer to China, Tu Wei-ming expanded the theory 
to a model of development for humanity as a whole: it was the revival of Confucianism 
in the periphery that would restore the damage done to Confucianism on mainland 
China. 829
825 In “Radicalism in Twentieth-Century Cultural Movements,” Chen Lai quoted from Chen 
Duxiu’s “Baoshou zhuyi yu qinlüe zhuyi” (Conservatism and aggressionism), when touching 
upon this point. See ZFL, 295.
826 Chen Lai, “Huajie jinzhang,” Chen Lai zixuanji, 388.
827 Bresciani, Reinventing Confucianism, 411.
828 Ibid., 423. Tu Wei-ming had already visited China in 1978; in 1980, he spent nine months at 
Beijing Normal University. 
829 See Tu Wei-ming, Ruxue disanqi fazhan de qianjing wenti: dalu jiangxue, wennan, he taolun
(Taipei: lianjing chubanshi gongsi), 1989. 
Tu Wei-ming’s interpretation of Mou Zongsan’s theory, then, was in 
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accordance with his idea of a “cultural China,” which granted scholars outside mainland 
China a vital part in the re-conceptualization of Chinese identity, as discussed in the 
previous chapter.
For Tu Wei-ming, Confucianism had a religious dimension—it was a “religio-
philosophy”—and its core element was ren (humaneness), which Tu also translated as 
“human-relatedness.” 830 As the title of Chen Lai’s collection of cultural writings, 
Tradition and Modernity: The Scope of Humanism (Chuantong yu xiandai: renwen 
zhuyi de shijie), shows, humanism (renwen zhuyi) was also a focal concern for Chen.831
Chen Lai applied this concept in response to “cultural radicalism”; the original title of 
the book even contained the subtitle “A Critique of Cultural Radicalism.”832 In this 
context, humanism needs to be understood as Yue Daiyun described it in her article on 
the Xueheng (Critical Review) group, namely as those virtues that make man human.833
For Chen Lai, the virtues that made man human were the Confucian values of
benevolence (ren) and harmony (he), values that New Confucians also identified as the 
kernel of Confucianism.834
5.3.2 New Confucianism
New Confucianism, as its literal translation “contemporary neo-Confucianism” 
indicates, was a reinterpretation of the Neo-Confucianism that flourished during the 
Song (907-1279) and Ming (1368-1644) dynasties, but opinions on its scope and 
definition vary.  In a broad sense, it includes those twentieth-century Chinese 
830 Neville, Boston Confucianism, 56-57; Makeham, Lost Soul, 280.
831 Chen Lai, Chuantong yu xiandai: renwen zhuyi de shijie (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 
2006). This book was a revised edition of Renwen zhuyi de shijie (Nanning: Guangxi jiaoyu 
chubanshe, 1997). The latter was a collection of Chen’s writings on culture between 1988 and 
1997.
832 In Chinese: wenhua jijin zhuyi pipan. Interview with Chen Lai, Beijing, August 10, 2005.
833 Yue Daiyun, “Zhongguo xiandai baoshou zhuyi,” 59.
834 As Gloria Davies has noted, the term “humanism” (renwen zhuyi) as it was applied during 
the 1990s was not unrelated to the use of the term “humanism” (rendao zhuyi) during the 1980s. 
However, whereas the latter was a response to an inhuman and irrational Maoism, the 1990s 
term intended to restore traditional values. In the debate on the “humanist spirit” (renwen 
jingshen), the term was a response to commercialism in particular. Davies, Worrying about 
China, 121. Although Chen Lai indicated that there were some overlaps between the debate on 
the “humanist spirit” and his advocacy of humanism, his term included much more than a mere 
opposition to commercialism. 
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intellectuals who supported the Confucian tradition.835 In a narrow sense, it refers to the 
philosophical school of Xiong Shili (1885-1968) and his students Tang Junyi (1909-
1978), Xu Fuguan (1903-1982) and Mou Zongsan.836 Yü Ying-shih upholds a three-fold 
distinction and adds the criterion of those who created a philosophical system based on 
Confucianism and Western philosophy, which would also include the mainland 
philosophers Feng Youlan (1895-1990), who based his philosophical system on Zhu Xi, 
and He Lin (1902-1992), who combined Wang Yangming’s thought with Hegelian 
idealism.837
There were two schools in Song and Ming Neo-Confucianism: the “heart-mind 
centered learning” (xinxue) of Lu Xiangshan (1139-1192) and Wang Yangming, and the 
“principled-centered learning” (lixue) of Cheng Yi (1033-1107) and Zhu Xi (1130-
1200). According to the Lu-Wang school, the universe was identical with the mind, and 
it was through the development of the innate knowledge of the good and the native 
ability to do good that the unity between man and heaven was to be realized. For the 
Cheng-Zhu school, the principles of the universe had to be grasped through the 
“investigation of things,” which would in turn enabled the realization of one’s good 
nature. Xiong Shili, then, was a twentieth-century representative of the Lu-Wang 
school, whose central work was entitled Xin weishi lun (A New Theory on 
Consciousness-Only), whereas the famous philosopher Feng Youlan (1895-1990) 
developed the ideas of the Cheng-Zhu school in his Xin lixue (A New Philosophy of 
Principle).838
A core concept from Neo-Confucianism that has been elaborated by twentieth-
century New Confucians is the so-called doctrine of “the study of mind and nature” 
835 Using the broad definition and basing himself on Tu Wei-ming’s distinction between three 
“generations” of New Confucians, Bresciani named Liang Shuming, Ma Yifu, Xiong Shili, 
Zhang Junmai, Feng Youlan, He Lin, and Qian Mu as members of the first generation (1921-
1949) of New Confucians. The second generation (1950-1979) included Fang Dongmei, Tang 
Junyi, Xu Fuguan, and Mou Zongsan. Finally, the third generation (1980-) consisted of Cheng 
Zhongying, Liu Shu-hsien, Tu Wei-ming, and Yü Ying-shih, out of which only Liu Shu-hsien 
and Tu Wei-ming belonged to the Xiong Shili lineage. Bresciani, Reinventing Confucianism,
23.
836 Ibid., iv-v.
837 Yü Ying-shih’s definition excluded, among others, his teacher Qian Mu. See Yü Ying-shih, 
“Qian Mu yu xin rujia,” in idem, Qian Mu yu Zhongguo wenhua (Shanghai: Shanghai yuandong 
chubanshe, 1994), 30-90.
838 For a brief overview of Xiong Shili’s elaboration of the idealistic school and Feng Youlan’s 
reworking of the rationalistic school, see Wing-tsit Chan, “What Is Living and What Is Dead in 
Confucianism,” 3-53, and 30-53 in particular. 
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(xinxing zhi xue). As Chang Hao explains, for New Confucians, nature (xing) has to be 
understood in a metaphysical sense; it implies the belief in inner transcendence. This 
inner transcendence is connected with the outer transcendence of heaven (tian); together 
they constitute the “unity between man and heaven” (tianren heyi). Another critical 
concept is ren (benevolence), which is actualized through self-cultivation. Once “inner 
sage” (neisheng), one has to rise above this moral cultivation by taking part in the outer 
world and by becoming “outer king” (waiwang).839
In the 1958 document that has generally been treated as the “manifesto” of New 
Confucianism, the “Declaration on Behalf of Chinese Culture Respectfully Announced 
to the People of the World” (Wei Zhongguo wenhua jinggao shijie renshi xuanyan),
Mou Zongsan, Tang Junyi, Xu Fuguan, and Zhang Junmai made use of the Neo-
Confucian concepts mentioned above to put forward a “correct” understanding of the 
true nature of Chinese culture against mistaken Western understandings that had failed 
to grasp Chinese culture as the “expression of the spiritual life of mankind.”840 The core
of Chinese culture, the authors argued, was the doctrine of xinxing, or, the “conformity 
of heaven and man in virtue.” 841 The authors disapproved of the use of external 
standards to evaluate Chinese culture and criticized the “feverish pursuit of progress” of 
the West.842
In line with the New Confucian agenda, then, for Chen Lai, the problem of the 
renunciation of Confucian values was part of the general problem of the rationalization 
process inherent in modernity, which had led to the repression of morality. 
Confucianism could cure the ailments of modernity and exist in a positive tension with 
rationalization. The core of Confucianism revolved around two concepts: ren
(benevolence) and he (harmony). Chen Lai explained that he contained five layers of 
meaning: harmony between heaven and man and man and nature; harmony between 
The authors envisioned a modernization that included both science and 
democracy and Confucian ethics.
839 Chang Hao, “Intellectual Crisis,” 289-296.
840 For an English version of the manifest, see Zhang Junmai, “A Manifesto for a Re-appraisal 
of Sinology and Reconstruction of Chinese Culture,” 455-483. Reference from 460. The 
Declaration was published in the journals Zaisheng (Renaissance) and Minzhu pinglun
(Democratic Tribune) in the New Year issues of 1958. Tang Junyi, the Dean of the New Asia 
College in Hong Kong, provided the initial draft of the document, and the idea came from 
Zhang Junmai, who was living in the United States at the time. The declaration was reprinted in 
Feng Zusheng, ed., Dangdai xin rujia (New Confucianism) (Beijing: Shenghuo dushu xinzhi 
sanlian shudian chubanshe, 1989), 1-52.
841 Zhang Junmai, “Manifesto,” 464.
842 Ibid., 476.
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countries; harmony between people; harmony within the individual spirit; and harmony 
between cultures and civilizations. On the basis of these five meanings, Chen Lai 
claimed that he could form an antidote to the exploitation of nature, Huntington’s theory 
of the “clash of civilizations,” the distance between people, the anxiety of the 
individual, and the lack of tolerance and peaceful coexistence between different 
cultures. Nonetheless, although he formed the basic orientation of Confucian culture, it 
was not its ultimate principle; that was ren. Consequently, Chen Lai considered ren to 
be the “substance,” whereas he was the “function” of Confucian culture (yi ren wei ti, yi 
he wei yong).843 The meaning of ren could be stretched to include many meanings of he,
such as the love for nature and universal love. As Chen Lai phrased it: “One could say 
that “ren” is the representation of Confucian value rationality and the concentrated 
manifestation of substantive tradition.”844
As will be discussed further, despite Chen Lai’s claim that the core Confucian 
values he embraced were universal, he did not tie them to the restoration of a moral 
order that was universal in nature. As Chen Lai explained, the universal values 
As in Yü Ying-shih’s account of modern Chinese history, in Chen Lai’s 
historiography of the May Fourth era, history was not just an object of debate; it was a 
channel to discuss broader ethical issues. Chen Lai’s account of “radicalism” also 
implied that modern China had deviated from the ideal moral Confucian order—
although Chen Lai did not accuse the CCP of this process, as Yü Ying-shih had done—
and it was the Confucian sage who could restore this moral order through self-
cultivation. The political implications of Chen Lai’s view were that the CCP, despite of 
its reference to Chinese traditional culture, was unable to restore the connection with the 
Chinese past. Like Yü Ying-shih, Chen Lai’s view of what it meant to be Chinese was 
highly elitist; it focused on the moral qualities of intellectuals in particular. As has 
already been discussed, whereas Yü Ying-shih conceived of the existence of 
intermediate groups and institutions as crucial elements for the restoration of the 
Confucian moral order, Chen Lai, in the tradition of Neo-Confucianism, highlighted the 
significance of transhistorical Confucian values. 
843 Gloria Davies has translated this as “humanity as the foundation and synthesis for 
application.” See Tang Yijie, “Some Reflections on New Confucianism,” 125. 
844 Chen Lai, “Rujia sixiang yu xiandai dongya shijie,” CYX, 179-187. Reference from 186. 
Originally published in Dongfang 1994:3, 10-13. Chen Lai also mentioned the concept of 
“harmony that differs from mere conformity” (he er butong), a notion taken from the Analects,
book 13, section 23.
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manifested themselves in particular cultures; Chen Lai shunned any absolutist claims as 
regards a moral Confucian civilization. Chen Lai’s engagement with “radicalism” in 
modern Chinese history, then, was not connected with a call for political action; on the 
contrary, for Chen Lai, the Confucian scholar was a mere guardian of cultural values. 
Any engagement in politics was to be avoided, because it would endanger the autonomy 
of the cultural and value spheres. As such, Chen Lai can be regarded as an example of 
those scholars who subscribed to a pure scholarship during the 1990s.
5.4 “DIALECTICAL DENIAL” AND “CULTURAL CONSERVATISM”
Whereas most participants in the 1992 debate had avoided the topic of Chinese 
tradition, and whereas Chinese “neo-conservatives” had attempted to incorporate 
Chinese tradition into their modernization project, Chen Lai supported historical 
continuity based on the intrinsic value of tradition. For this purpose, Chen Lai outlined a 
Hegelian model of “dialectical denial” in an article written for a symposium on the
commemoration of the seventieth anniversary of May Fourth in April 1989.845 Chen’s 
Hegelian framework of “dialectical denial” was not only politically acceptable for a 
Marxist audience—Hegel had continued to exist in the margin of Marx since 1949—but 
it was also in accordance with the popularity of Hegel at the time.846 In the article, Chen 
Lai expressed support for the “dialectical attitudes” of “critical inheritance” (pipan de 
jicheng), “creative development” (chuangzao de fazhan), “developing what is useful
and discarding what is not” (yangqi), and “transformation” (zhuanhua), all of which did 
not carve up historical continuity.847
Referring to Hegel’s Logic, Chen Lai explained that “dialectical denial” only 
denied the concrete content, the concrete fixedness (guiding) of a thing, but not the 
overall abstract thing—it was not wholesale denial. Since it was both affirmation and 
denial, or the unity of opposites, it resulted in more richness. “Dialectical denial” did 
not cut off the development of history, but was connected to it in a continuous and 
845 Chen Lai, “Huajie chuantong yu xiandai de jinzhang: wusi wenhua sichao de fansi,” in Lin 
Yü-sheng, Wusi: duoyuan de fansi, 151-185. Reprinted in Chen Lai zixuanji, 373-398.
846 German idealism was popular on mainland China during the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
Between 1987 and 1992, between 3500 and 3800 Chinese translations and other works on 
Western philosophy were published, half of which dealt with German idealism. Meissner, “New 
Intellectual Currents,” 7. 
847 Chen Lai, “Huajie jinzhang,” Chen Lai zixuanji, 393. In a Hegelian sense, the term “yangqi” 
could also be translated as “Aufhebung.” 
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organic manner. It was based on a law of development of ethico-religious traditions that 
distinguished between “particular content” (teshu neirong) and  “active model” 
(huodong yangshi) on the one hand, and “universal essence” (pubian benzhi) and 
“guiding spirit” (zhudao jingshen) on the other. 848
Based on this Hegelian scheme, Chen Lai presented certain core values of 
Confucianism as “basic inner laws” that were universal. As an example of “dialectical 
denial,” Chen mentioned Wu Mi, the former editor of the journal Critical Review 
(Xueheng). Wu Mi had made a distinction between basic inner laws of religious virtue 
that were identical in all religions and in all countries, and outer forms that differed per 
religion and per country.
Notwithstanding the abundant 
presence of philosophical terminology, Chen Lai did not really explain how this process 
worked in practice. He did add that, in the instance of Confucian ethics, this basic 
content or “substance” (ti) was the belief in self-realization through knowledge, self-
cultivation and practice. As to the social ideals of Confucian ethics, they included 
benevolence and righteousness (renyi), universal love, equality, and justice. 
849 Wu Mi belonged to what Axel Schneider has called the 
group of “Neo-humanists” around the journal Xueheng.850 This group of scholars had 
studied under Irving Babbitt in the United States. In line with Babbitt’s criticism of the 
materialist and utilitarian aspects of modernity, Schneider argued, scholars like Wu Mi 
promoted a universal humanist civilization based on Greek philosophy, Indian 
Buddhism, and Chinese Confucianism. Schneider has further contended that the “neo-
Humanists,” unlike Liang Shuming, did not perceive of Confucianism as a “Chinese
cure to the Western illness of modernity,” but as “one part of a classicist answer to the 
problems of modernity.”851
From the above, it can already be seen that Chen Lai’s advocacy of Confucian 
values was not based on a Burkean belief in the historical growth of tradition. Neither 
In accordance with this argument, one could hold that Chen 
Lai invoked Wu Mi because he conceived of Confucian values as universal values that 
could solve universal problems. 
848 Ibid., 395-396.
849 Ibid., 396. Chen Lai referred to Wu Mi’s “Lun xin wenhua yundong” (On the New Culture 
movement), Dongxi wenxuan, 528-542. The text originally appeared in Xueheng 4 (April 1922). 
850 Schneider, “Bridging the Gap,”13-21. The “Neo-Humanists” included Wu Mi, Mei Guangdi 
and Hu Xiansu. Schneider discerned two other groups around Xueheng, namely the “School of 
historical geography,” which included Liu Yizheng, Miao Fenglin, Zheng Hesheng, and Zhang 
Qiyun, and a group of historians, among them Wang Guowei, Chen Yinke, Tang Yongtong, and 
Zhang Yinlin. 
851 Ibid., 14.
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did Chen Lai criticize “radicalism” as abstract thought or universalism from the angle of 
the particularity of Chinese tradition. Instead, Chen Lai’s promotion of universal values 
resembled the quest for a normative order of some American “neo-conservatives.” Leo 
Strauss, for example, had intended to fight moral relativism with the advocacy of an 
absolute and universal moral order, for which he found inspiration in Greek philosophy. 
Axel Schneider has called this type of conservatism “classicist conservatism”; he has 
included Strauss, Voegelin, and Babbitt as its representatives.852
As already mentioned above, Chen Lai applied the term “cultural conservatism” 
(wenhua baoshou zhuyi) to the stance of those who upheld Confucianism based on its 
inherent value. As also noted, Benjamin Schwartz and Charlotte Furth had coined the 
term “cultural conservatism” in their 1976 book The Limits of Change.853 The authors 
applied the term to Republican China because the cultural and political realms had been 
separated, which caused Chinese intellectuals to either combine a stance of “political 
radicalism” with “cultural nativism” or to defend the autonomy of the cultural realm.854
Schwartz had identified “cultural conservatism” as one of the traits of modern Chinese 
conservatism: a “Burkean” conservatism in defense of the sociopolitical status quo had 
been rare at the time.855
Chinese scholars also made use of the term “cultural conservatism” to describe a 
stance that was distinct from sociopolitical conservatism, but Chen Lai discerned some 
problems relating to the concept. 856
852 Schneider, “The One and the Many,” unpublished paper for AAS, 2005.
853 See Chapter One, 4; Chapter Four, 187.
854 Furth, “Culture and Politics,” 27. 
855 Ibid., 20.
856 Chen Lai referred to Fang Keli, a professor in the Philosophy Department of Nankai 
University, and to Feng Tianyu, a member of the so-called “Enlightenment School” of the 
1980s. This school had maintained that the origins of the Chinese Enlightenment could be 
traced back to the late sixteenth century.
Firstly, since radicalism, conservatism, and 
liberalism were categories from Western political philosophy and political thought, it 
was troublesome to simply add “culture” to these three categories to transform them 
into analytical tools for cultural perspectives. Moreover, in a Chinese context, the word 
“conservative” (baoshou) had a negative connotation, which is why Western specialists 
on China had avoided the term. Instead, they had relied on terms such as “maintaining 
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the achievements of one’s predecessors” (shoucheng), as demonstrated in, for example, 
Guy Alitto’s book on the topic.857
For Chen Lai, “cultural conservatism” was a “moral conservatism” (daode 
baoshou zhuyi).
Chen Lai’s conception of “cultural conservatism” differed from that of Alitto in 
several essential respects. Firstly, for Alitto, “cultural conservatism” was an “anti-
modernization theory,” whereas for Chen Lai, it only took issue with the negative 
consequences of modernization, such as the destruction of spiritual life and national 
culture. Chen Lai reiterated that a conservative stance was not tantamount to hostility 
towards social reform or revolution; in the previous section, Chen Lai’s argument that 
“cultural conservatives” were progressives has already been analyzed. Secondly, 
whereas both Schwartz and Alitto had claimed that “cultural conservatism” lined up 
with nationalism, a statement that was also echoed by Chinese intellectuals, Chen Lai 
argued that the advocacy of Confucianism was not mainly based on the demands of 
national identity. 
858 “Cultural conservatives” believed that science, democracy, or the 
market economy could not automatically create public virtue or ethical order; they were 
convinced that the individualism and utilitarianism of modern society harmed 
community life.859 In this context, Chen also referred to the American neo-conservative 
Daniel Bell’s criticism of late industrial societies. Chen Lai asserted that this criticism 
could also be applied to China because it addressed the question of “how to establish a 
humanist environment suited to the modernization project.”860 In a Western context, the 
concept of “cultural conservatism” did not have negative connotations; it implied the 
opposition to the destruction of culture in the modernization process and the 
safeguarding of humanist values in a commercialized society. Apart from “anti-
antitraditionalism” (fan fanchuantong zhuyi), Chen Lai also described “cultural 
conservatism” as “anti-pan-utilitarianism”   (fan pangongli zhuyi).”861
857 Ai Kai (Guy S. Alitto), Shijie fanwei nei de fan xiandaihua sichao: lun wenhua shoucheng 
zhuyi (Guiyang: Guizhou renmin chubanshe, 1999 (1991)), 4-5.
858 Chen Lai, “Renwen zhuyi de shijie,” 18. 
859 Chen Lai, “Ershi shiji Zhongguo wenhua zhong de ruxue kunjing,” 31.
860 Chen Lai, “Renwen zhuyi de shijie,” 16. Daniel Bell’s The Cultural Contradictions of 
Capitalism had been translated into Chinese in 1989 as Bei’er, Ziben zhuyi de wenhua maodun,
trans. Zhao Yifan et al. (Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 1989).
861 Chen Lai, “Renwen zhuyi de shijie,” 16.
Although Chen 
Lai sympathized with this viewpoint, he added that he resisted to be labeled a “cultural 
conservative” or to impose the label on others. 
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Since Chen Lai’s “cultural conservatism” was a response to the rationalization 
process inherent in modernization, it had certain traits in common with Marxist 
criticisms of capitalism. As Jing Wang has noted, none of the Chinese critics made 
mention of this Marxist criticism, but there were certain similarities. Both Theodor 
Adorno (1903-1969) and Max Horkheimer (1895-1973) had criticized rationalism and 
capitalism; both had noticed the humanizing effect of substantive rationality. Both had 
also maintained that late capitalist modernity signified the disappearance of the public 
in favor of the private. Jing Wang has contended that Chinese intellectuals did not draw 
on these Marxist criticisms because they were a “radical critique of reason” that 
“inevitably leads to the critique of the sovereign rational subject, and, by extension, to a 
frontal attack on the whole tradition of humanism itself.”862 Chinese New Confucians, 
on the contrary, were strong defenders of humanism—their criticism was directed more 
at the rationalization process of modernity than at the rational subject. Because New 
Confucians still affirmed the modernization process, Jing Wang has argued that they 
failed to grasp the contradictions inherent in this process, a criticism that is reminiscent 
of Wang Hui’s argument that rejections of “radicalism” did not truly reflect on 
modernity.863
Chen Lai’s “cultural conservatism,” then, was far removed from a Burkean or 
Hayekian defense of liberty and order; its focus was not on individual liberty, but, in 
line with Chinese tradition and with the Weberian criticism of “instrumental 
rationality,” on the importance of community in times of rationalization. Chen Lai’s 
reference to universal values was based on the belief in the inherent value of tradition, 
which was a far cry from the defense of a conservative liberalism or a “neo-
conservatism” in which culture was employed in the service of modernization. 
Nevertheless, Chen Lai did not put forward this conservative goal on Burkean grounds, 
but on moral grounds, as in some forms of American neo-conservatism. 
Notwithstanding the different form that Chen Lai’s conservatism took, it was also a 
defense of historical continuity. 
862 Wang, High Culture Fever, 76-77.
863 Ibid., 78.
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5.5 HISTORICAL CONTINUITY, THE PARTICULAR, AND THE UNIVERSAL
5.5.1 Liang Shuming: Modernizer beyond Instrumental Rationality
Given the fact that Chen Lai’s “cultural conservatism” was a moral conservatism that 
identified Confucianism with certain core universal values, how could this guarantee the 
continuity of Chinese tradition? Chen Lai was rather vague on this topic, since he 
considered it a given that Chinese culture was a concrete manifestation of the universal 
values he had in mind. Although Chen Lai did not suggest that Chinese culture was the 
only manifestation of these universals, he nevertheless did not refer to other 
manifestations and, perhaps not surprisingly, he took Chinese culture as his point of 
departure. To discuss the issue of historical continuity, as well as Chen Lai’s 
interpretation of the relation between universal values and Chinese tradition, some of 
Chen’s writings on the mainland philosophers Liang Shuming and Feng Youlan will be 
analyzed. 
Mainland scholars often identify Feng Youlan, He Lin, and Ma Yifu as New 
Confucians, whereas overseas New Confucians exclude them from their ranks.864 Both 
Liang Shuming and Feng Youlan were attacked on mainland China in the decades 
between 1949 and 1979, and they were also the first to be treated positively by the end 
of the 1970s.865 As Alitto has summarized Liang Shuming’s image under communist 
China, he was seen as a “subjective idealist who tried to anesthetize the revolutionary 
rural masses with feudal morality,” as an opponent of industrialization, and as an ally of 
Western imperialism.866
864 Makeham, “Retrospective Creation,” 30. Whether Feng Youlan was a New Confucian 
remains highly debated. The mainland New Confucian Zheng Jiadong has identified him as 
such, but Lauren Pfister has argued that Feng’s Xin lixue was “forward looking,” unlike the 
conservative and “backward looking” bent of those who signed the 1958 Manifesto. See Lauren 
F. Pfister, “A Modern Chinese Philosophy Built upon Critically Received Traditions: Feng 
Youlan’s New Principle-Centered Learning and the Question of Its Relationship to 
Contemporary New Ruist (“Confucian”) Philosophies,” in Makeham, New Confucianism, 165-
184. Similarly, although Alitto has portrayed Liang as “the last Confucian,” John Hanafin has 
challenged this notion by referring to him as the “last Buddhist.” See John J. Hanafin, “The 
“Last Buddhist”: The Philosophy of Liang Shuming,” in Makeham, New Confucianism, 188-
218.
865 Whereas Liang Shuming’s books were burnt and Liang was re-educated, Feng Youlan had to 
write over a hundred self-criticisms and his Xin lixue was abolished on the mainland during the 
1950s. Liang Shuming was further urged to criticize himself after a row with Mao Zedong in 
1953. In 1955, Liang became the subject of a campaign in the press, after which he made a 
formal self-criticism in 1956.
866 Alitto, The Last Confucian, 5.
Liang Shuming is most famous for his 1921 book Eastern and 
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Western Cultures and Their Philosophies (Dongxi wenhua ji qi zhexue).867 In the book, 
Liang Shuming asserted that all forms of life, including culture, were a manifestation of 
a general Will, an idea he borrowed from the German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer 
(1788-1860).868
More specifically, Liang Shuming distinguished between three different cultural 
ideal types, which reflected different solutions to the contradictions posed by the Will 
and by obstacles in the environment. Western culture was a manifestation of a Will 
aimed at conquering the environment; Chinese culture reflected a Will that sought 
harmony with its environment; Indian culture, finally, epitomized a Will that envisioned 
the annihilation of the self. Although Liang perceived the relation between the three 
types of culture to be one of successive stages, he also interpreted the three culture types 
as different roads towards modernization. This meant that China was on a track 
different from the West; it also meant that, since culture was the holistic reflection of an 
underlying direction, cultural blending was impossible. As Alitto has claimed, the 
solution Liang proposed to China’s cultural dilemma contracted his theory of the Will, 
because it amounted to a combination of the critical acceptance of Western culture and 
the reappraisal of China’s cultural attitude. 869 Alitto has also held that the gist of 
Liang’s book was that “Chinese culture was both on a higher spiritual level than 
Western culture and compatible with modernization.”870
Chen Lai praised Liang Shuming because, in contrast with the “wholesale 
modernizers,” Liang discerned value in Chinese tradition. Although the “Westernizers” 
had often presented Liang as a conservative who resisted modernization, Chen Lai 
depicted Liang as a proponent of Western culture who avoided the fallacies that Chen 
Duxiu and the ilk had fallen prone to.871
867 Liang Shuming, Dongxi wenhua ji qi zhexue (Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1922).
868 Schopenhauer’s main work was Die Welt als Wille und Vorstelling (The World as Will and 
Representation). The first part of this work appeared in 1819, the second part was published in 
1844.
869 Alitto, The Last Confucian, 121.
870 Ibid.
871 Ibid., 129; Chen Lai, “Liang Shuming zaoqi de dongxi wenhuaguan,” CYX, 97-129. See also 
Chen Lai, “Dui xin wenhua yundong de zai sikao,” 3-4.
Referring to Liang’s 1921 book, Chen Lai 
insisted that Liang confirmed the value of Western culture for the present—now, all had 
to embark on the “first road”—but he also acknowledged the value of Chinese and 
Indian culture for the future. Like the Westernizers, Liang criticized the backwardness 
of ancient China in the field of “civilization,” but he did not denounce the “attitude 
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towards life” (rensheng taidu) of Chinese culture as backward. In fact, the revival of 
Chinese culture that he predicted for the future would occur in the realm of “attitude 
towards life.”872
By repudiating the image of Liang Shuming as a conservative who resisted 
modernization, Chen Lai followed Guy Alitto’s revaluation of Liang in The Last 
Confucian.873 Alitto had argued that Liang’s advocacy of Confucian values, instead of
being a marker of an anti-modern traditionalism, or just another manifestation of 
“cultural conservatism,” was not only modern, but it also shared certain aspects with 
Marxist thought.874 For Alitto, Liang Shuming’s criticism was part of a global critique 
of modernity that was also expressed in, for example, the philosophy of Vitalism in 
France at the time.875
In his promotion of “value rationality,” Chen Lai invoked Liang Shuming’s 
concept of lixing. Although the concept is generally translated as “reason,” Liang’s use 
of the concept differed somewhat from its modern meaning. According to Alitto, in 
Liang Shuming’s cultural writings between 1930 and 1949, the concept of lixing took 
the place of the concepts of ren (benevolence) and zhijue (intuition) in his earlier 
writings. Furthermore, Liang Shuming’s interpretation of the latter was based on the 
As already noted in the previous chapter, Alitto maintained that 
Chinese conservatism, as a reaction against modernization, contained cultural 
nationalist traits. Alitto agreed with Levenson’s argument that the perception that 
modernization was a foreign product had resulted in the tension between “history” and 
“value”—the emotional response to modernization had initiated the separation between 
“spirit” and “matter.” But for Chen Lai, Liang Shuming was not just a cultural 
nationalist; Chen Lai referred to Liang Shuming in the context of his argument that 
Confucian values could cure the ailments of the modern world. 
872 Chen Lai, “Liang Shuming zaoqi de dongxi wenhuaguan,” 111-112.
873 Guy Alitto, The Last Confucian: Liang Shu-ming and the Chinese Dilemma of Modernity
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979).
874 As to the resemblances with the Chinese Communist Party, Alitto mentioned Liang 
Shuming’s rural reconstruction program, which combined moral mobilization with economic 
cooperation. Both in the voluntarism of Chinese Marxism and in the idealism of Neo-
Confucianism, on which Liang based himself, the emphasis had been on the transformation of 
members of society through teaching. The greatest difference between Liang Shuming and Mao 
Zedong was that Liang denounced class struggle.  See Frederic Wakeman, Jr., “Foreword” in 
The Last Confucian, ix-xiv.
875 In France, the most famous proponent of Vitalism was the philosopher Henri Bergson (1859-
1941), who countered mechanistic philosophies of the time with a Philosophy of Life based on 
intuition. Bergson criticized Darwinist evolution theory and insisted that evolution was driven 
by a struggle between what he called the élan vital and matter.
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French philosopher Henri Bergson’s (1859-1841) understanding of intuition as put 
forward in L’évolution créatrice (1907).876 In Bergson’s view, “intuition” offered a way 
to understand life because it was close to experience, unlike the abstractions of reason. 
Alitto held that Liang used the term lixing on par with lizhi (intellect), the faculty of 
reasoning. Lixing transcended lizhi because it was for Liang “the normative sense that 
directs moral action… the sense of right and wrong which makes man human.”877
If lixing was accredited with a normative sense, it becomes clear why Chen Lai, 
in his quest for morality, referred to this concept especially. For Chen Lai, Liang 
Shuming’s concept of lixing in some aspects resembled Habermas’ concept of 
“communicative rationality,” because it was a “manner of interaction,” a “mutual 
understanding,” or a “mentality of mutual connection”—this, Chen Lai noted, was like 
benevolence (ren).878 Whereas Habermas’ theory of “communicative rationality” had 
accorded a central role to communication in the establishment of rationality, Chen Lai 
interpreted this communication as a moral concept that connected people and that 
offered normative guidance—communi-cation was essential in the formation of a 
communi-ty. Chen Lai was not the only intellectual who united Liang Shuming’s 
concept of lixing with Habermas’ “communicative rationality”; in his book on 
Habermas and the Chinese modernization discourse, Tong Shijun made the same 
connection; he added that Liang Shuming’s concept of lizhi resembled “instrumental 
rationality.” 879
5.5.2 Feng Youlan: The Question of “Particulars” and “Universals”
For Tong Shijun, “communicative rationality” was socialist and 
communitarian in nature; it could offer an antidote to instrumental rationality. For Chen 
Lai, on the contrary, “communicative rationality” had Confucian rather than socialist 
traits, but it was nevertheless also oriented towards the community.
Chen Lai also utilized the writings of the Chinese philosopher Feng Youlan in order to 
support his argument that our conception of modernization should include “value 
rationality.” Feng Youlan had studied at Columbia University between 1920 and 1923 
and is most famous for his History of Chinese Philosophy (Zhongguo zhexueshi, 1934). 
Feng Youlan was noteworthy for Chen Lai because he had addressed the issue of 
876 Alitto, The Last Confucian, 177. 
877 Ibid., 184. 
878 Chen Lai, “Rujia sixiang yu xiandai dongya shijie,” 186.  
879 Tong Shijun, Dialectics of Modernization, 104-105.
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modernization in his works. As Luo Rongqu has noted, the concept of modernization 
was first used in Chinese political and cultural debates in the 1930s; both the 
philosophers Feng Youlan and He Lin had discussed the concept during the 1940s.880
Chen Lai drew on Feng Youlan’s discussion of the relation between 
“particulars” and “universals” in both Feng’s metaphysical and cultural writings 
specifically. The problem of “universals” versus “particulars” constituted the basis of 
Feng Youlan’s later work A New Philosophy of Principle (Xin lixue).881 An example of 
the metaphysical discussion can be found in “New Dialogues,” a series of articles 
published in the supplement Currents of Thought of the Tianjin newspaper Dagong Bao
in 1931. In these articles, Feng Youlan discussed the relation between “particulars” and 
“universals” in the form of fictive dialogues between historical figures. Chen Lai made 
mention of two “dialogues” in particular, namely the first one and the last one.882
In the first dialogue, the Neo-Confucian scholar Zhi Xu told the Qing scholar 
Dai Zhen (1724-1777), a critic of Neo-Confucianism, that morality could not be divided 
into “new” and “old.”  Moreover, Zhu Xi distinguished between some basic “invariant 
morals” (bubiande daode) and “changeable morals” (kebiande daode) Basic virtues, 
including “benevolence,” were a necessary condition for the existence of humanity.883
In the last “dialogue” between Zhu Xi and Chen Tongfu (1143-1194), a contemporary 
of Zhu Xi who criticized idealism, Zhu Xi noted that there were different types of social 
organization, but all types contained the same basic and invariant moral principles.884
In Feng Youlan’s cultural writings, the topic of the relation between 
“particulars” and “universals” was explored in the form of a discussion on the relation 
between Chinese and Western cultures. For Feng Youlan, the problem with the debates 
over “wholesale Westernization” versus “native culture” was that they had been too 
vague. Therefore, in a text from 1936, Feng Youlan proposed a distinction between 
“particular” (geti) and “type” (leixing) in order to deal with culture. If culture was 
treated as a “type,” the relevant aspects of culture that also belonged to other cultures of 
the same “type” could be discerned; if, on the other hand, culture was treated as a 
880 Luo Rongqu, Cong “xihua” dao xiandaihua, 100.
881 Feng Youlan, The Hall of Three Pines, 255. Four parts of the series can be found in Feng 
Youlan, Sansongtang quanji (Zhengzhou: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1986), Vol. 5, 275-317.
882 Chen Lai, “Feng Youlan wenhuaguan de jianli yu fazhan,” CYX, 130-162, and 156 in 
particular. Originally published as “Feng Youlan wenhuaguan shuping,” Xueren 4, 129-164.
883 Feng Youlan, “Xin duihua (yi),” Sansongtang quanji, Vol. 5, 275-282.
884 Feng Youlan, “Xin duihua (si),” Sansongtang quanji, Vol. 5, 300-305.
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“particular,” it was more difficult to notice the relevant aspects of that culture. 885
Logically, there is the difference between the so-called particular and the type. A 
particular can represent many types; Confucius, for example, can represent many types, 
such as a man from the Spring and Autumn period, a man from Shandong, a man who 
has lived seventy years, a wise man, and so on. (…) What is called the West is a 
particular; culturally, it represents many types, such as Protestant culture, scientific 
culture, industrial culture, and so on. When we talk about studying the West, in reality, 
we study a certain culture type or several culture types it represents, such as scientific 
culture or industrial culture. Those elements within original Chinese culture that are 
not in conflict with this should of course not be altered.
Moreover, since Western culture represented the “type” of “industrial culture,” only 
those elements related to that specific type should be preserved:
886
Feng Youlan developed his argument for the treatment of Western culture as a “culture 
type” instead of a “particular” in his later work Xinshilun (A New Discourse on Events, 
1940), in which the methodology of A New Philosophy of Principle was applied to 
practical problems.887 In the first chapter of Xinshilun, Feng made use of the terms 
“universal” (gongxiang) and “particular” (shuxiang) instead of “type” and “particular,” 
but the approach remained the same. Since the “universal” of Western culture was 
industrialization, those elements in Western culture related to industrialization had to be 
studied. As such, for Feng Youlan, the dilemma between “native culture” and 
“wholesale Westernization” could be resolved: both groups could agree with 
industrialization.888
885 Chen Lai, “Feng Youlan wenhuaguan de jianli yu fazhan,”143-144. The 1936 text that Chen 
Lai referred to was Feng Youlan’s “Zhongguo xiandai minzu yundong zhi zong dongxiang” 
(General trends in nationalist movements of modern China), Sansongtang quanji, Vol. 11, 308-
316.
886 Chen Lai, “Feng Youlan wenhuaguan de jianli yu fazhan,” CYX, 144-145. From Feng 
Youlan, “Cong Zhongguo zhexuehui shuodao zhexue de yongchu,” Shenbao, January 24th,
1937. Sansongtang Quanji, Vol. 5, 356-359. Quote from 359.  
887 Feng Youlan, Xin shilun (A new discourse on events) (Changsha: Shangwu yinshuguan, 
1940). Feng Youlan’s Xin lixue—in which Feng elaborated the methodology that he later 
applied to Xin shilun—drew on Plato, Zhu Xi, and New Realism. Feng was drawn toward the 
Platonist school of New Realism in particular, which “argued not only that truth was objective, 
but that all ideas and concepts have their objective referents.” See Feng Youlan, The Hall of 
Three Pines, 219. 
888 Chen Lai, “Xin lixue yu xiandaixing siwei de fansi,” CYX, 163-179. Reference from 165. 
Originally published in Beijing daxue xuebao, 1995: 1.
According to the logic of A New Rational Philosophy, Chen Lai 
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explained, a thing contained the principles of things of its kind, but it also contained the 
principles of things beyond its kind; any individual culture also contained the principles 
of “society.”889
Regarding existence, the reason why modern societies can exist, is because they not 
only have to be at par with the principles of modern societies different from tradition 
(instrumental rationality), they must also be at par with the principles of all societies 
(including value rationality).
Thus, traditional Chinese culture also included the principles of general 
societies; it was, to use a Hegelian notion, a “concrete universal” (yi juti de gongxiang).
Basing himself on Feng Youlan, Chen Lai discarded a “particularist” approach 
in which the focus was on the difference between the modern and the traditional. 
Instead, along the lines of Feng Youlan’s usage of “general types,” Chen Lai posited an 
approach that brought the connections between traditional and modern societies to the 
surface. As Feng Youlan wrote: 
890
By treating societies primarily as “universals,” the “value rationality” of tradition could 
be included in modern society; the historical continuity of tradition could hence be 
assured. According to Chen Lai, this historical continuity between present and past was 
not only expressed in Weber’s concept of “value rationality,” but also in Edward Shils’ 
concept of “substantive tradition.” Shils explained the latter as “the appreciation of the 
accomplishments and wisdom of the past and of the institutions especially impregnated 
with tradition,” and “the desirability of regarding patterns inherited from the past as 
valid guides.” 891
5.6 A CULTURAL NATIONALISM?
From this, it can be seen that Chen Lai’s defense of historical 
continuity was rooted in a belief in the inherent value of tradition—Chen Lai cherished 
the wisdom of the past.
Whereas for Chen Lai, the focus on the universal nature of cultures and societies was 
beneficial rather than detrimental to the historical continuity of Chinese tradition, for 
Lin Yü-sheng—who had formulated his own solution of the “creative transformation” 
889 Chen Lai, “Feng Youlan wenhuaguan de jianli yu fazhan,” CYX, 155.
890 Chen Lai, “Xin lixue yu xiandaixing siwei de fansi,” CYX, 177.
891 Shils, Tradition, 21.
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of tradition in response to the “totalistic antitraditionalism” of May Fourth 
intellectuals—the New Confucian solution to the predicament of Confucianism was not 
a true solution. Lin Yü-sheng’s main objection was that, in Chinese tradition, the 
universal values that New Confucians promoted had been tied to concrete “social 
referents,” namely family ethics. As such, the moral and sociopolitical orders had been 
integrated. Nevertheless, New Confucians abandoned these referents and championed 
universal values to preserve Chinese tradition. However, as Lin Yü-sheng posed the 
question: “If Chinese moral tradition contains nothing but the universally human, what 
is particularly Chinese about it?”892
To call conservative those who have continued to use Confucian symbols to allude to 
their meaning is to say that the historical specificity of the religious form is inseparable 
from the timeless truth being expressed, and that this embodiment of the eternal in the
historically conditioned human is seen by the believer as both necessary and right.
For Charlotte Furth, on the other hand, there was no 
contradiction between the advocacy of Chinese cultural continuity and the identification 
of Confucianism with universal values:
893
For Furth, the New Confucian advocacy of universal values was a form of “universal” 
conservatism that manifested the same “style of thought” as the “nativist” conservatism 
that perceived of Chinese culture as a particular culture. As noted before, Axel 
Schneider has also distinguished between a “historicist” or “romantic” conservatism 
that based itself on particularity and a “classicist” conservatism that intended to revive 
universal values drawing on classical philosophy.894
Other scholars did not pose the question of how universal values could be 
reconciled with the promotion of the historical continuity of Chinese tradition, since 
they did not consider New Confucianism a “universal” conservatism that defended a 
moral order, as in some manifestations of American “neo-conservatism.” Instead, they 
interpreted New Confucianism as the promotion of a Chinese tradition that was 
According to this scheme, New 
Confucianism could be interpreted as an expression of a “universal” conservatism that 
was similar to certain forms of American “neo-conservatism” in which the Burkean 
emphasis on tradition was complemented with the reference to a normative order. 
892 Lin Yü-sheng, “The Suicide of Liang Chi,” LOC, 165.
893 Ibid., 50-51.
894 Schneider, “The One and the Many,” unpublished Paper for AAS, 2005.
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particularistic in essence. Inspired by John Hutchinson’s The Dynamics of Cultural 
Nationalism, scholars such as Guo Yingjie linked the rise of New Confucianism during 
the 1990s to a trend of cultural nationalism. 895 As already noted in Chapter One, 
cultural nationalists regarded the nation as their primary focus of loyalty. Moreover, 
they turned down class conceptions of Chinese identity and attempted to “renationalize” 
the state’s conception of “Chineseness,” which they considered illegitimate.896 For Guo 
Yingjie, New Confucianism, historiographical revisionism, debates on linguistic reform, 
and Chinese appropriations of postcolonial theory during the 1990s were all typified by 
cultural nationalist traits.897 In her study of academic nationalism in China, Margaret 
Sleeboom has also treated “globalist group markers,” or the reference to universal 
categories in Chinese and Japanese discourses, as but a manifestation of nationalism.898
John Makeham has applied the concept of “cultural nationalism” to the New 
Confucian discourse because it avoided the problems related to the distinction between 
“culturalism” and “nationalism.” These problems had surfaced in the works of the 
historian Joseph Levenson.
According to this scheme, Chen Lai’s universalistic interpretation of Chinese values 
could be perfectly in accordance with a nationalist argument; universalism was but a 
disguised form of particularism. 
899 Levenson had asserted that “culturalism,” or, taking 
Chinese culture as the object of loyalty, had set apart traditional Chinese thought; it was 
only under the impact of Western imperialism, between 1895 and 1919, that this mode 
of identification had given way to nationalism. Both Prasenjit Duara and James 
Townsend attacked Levenson’s “culturalism-to-nationalism thesis”; they asserted that 
the distinction between the two forms was not as clear-cut as Levenson had imagined 
it.900
895 John Hutchinson, The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism: The Gaelic Revival and the 
Creation of the Irish Nation State (London, Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1987).
896 Guo, Cultural Nationalism, 19. 
897 Guo Yingjie, “Reconstructing a Confucian Nation: the Confucian Revival,” in idem, 
Cultural Nationalism, 72-90. 
898 See Margaret Sleeboom, Academic Nations in China and Japan: Framed in Concepts of 
Nature, Culture and the Universal (London, New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004).
899 See Joseph R. Levenson, Liang Ch’i-ch’ao and the Mind of Modern China (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1953), 108-122 in particular; Joseph R. Levenson, Confucian China 
and Its Modern Fate: A Trilogy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), Vol. 1, 98-104
in particular.
900 James Townsend, “Chinese Nationalism,” 1-30; Prasenjit Duara, “De-constructing the 
Chinese Nation,” 31-55.
Taking these criticisms into account, Makeham coined the term “ruxue-centered 
Chinese cultural nationalism” for the discourse on New Confucianism, a term which he 
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described as “a movement based on the ideological conviction that ruxue is a cultural 
formation fundamental to the identity consciousness of the Chinese (Zhonghua)
nation.”901
Makeham nevertheless also recognized the limits of “cultural nationalism” as a 
framework for the analysis of the New Confucian discourse, since not all “ruxue-
centered cultural nationalists” had backed the recreation of Chinese civilization. Li 
Zehou, for example, although his thesis that ruxue was a “cultural-psychological 
formation” (wenhua xinli jiegou), sedimentation (jidian) or deep structure (shenceng 
jiegou) was very influential, had not insisted that ruxue had to be promoted. Since 
Confucianism was such a fundamental part of the Chinese character, there was no need 
to revive or advocate it.902 In addition, scholars such as Tu Wei-ming only wanted to 
revive the Confucian tradition, not Confucian society as such. Another objection to the 
framework of “cultural nationalism” concerns the existence of notions such as “East 
Asian ruxue” and the “Han cultural circle,” both of which pointed in the direction of an 
identification with a cultural sphere that exceeded the scope of the nation.903
Given these objections, one might ask whether the fact that New Confucians 
treated Confucianism as “the core of Chinese culture” was sufficient to treat New 
Confucianism as a manifestation of “cultural nationalism.” New Confucians would very 
much argue against the “cultural nationalism” thesis, since it suggested an emotional 
identification with tradition. For Tu Wei-ming, the New Confucian project was very 
much an intellectual project. Tu Wei-ming declared that Xiong Shili’s thought 
contained nationalist elements, but Xiong had nevertheless consciously chosen self-
realization as the means to cultural continuity. Tu added that one could not treat 
Xiong’s thought as a form of “particularism” just because he “made a conscious attempt 
to philosophize from a specific point of view.”904
To use a Mencian analogy, the search for the spring of wisdom commences with 
digging the ground of one’s true self. Yet the intention is to assert neither the strength 
In the words of Tu Wei-ming: 
901 Makeham, Lost Soul, 15. 
902 Li Zehou, “Chu ni ruxue shenceng jiegou jiangshuo,” 59-78. Although this article dates from 
1990, Li Zehou also expressed this idea in various writings before 1990. For the role of the 
theory of sedimentation in Li Zehou’s thought, see Chong, “Mankind and Nature in Chinese 
Thought,” 147-153.
903 Makeham, Lost Soul, 16.
904 Ibid., 262-264.
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of one’s ethnicity nor the power of one’s cultural heritage, but the universal relevance 
of “authentic existence”.905
Whereas Tu Wei-ming disapproved of the “cultural nationalism” interpretation, he did 
not object to the use of the term “cultural conservatism” for New Confucianism. New 
Confucians were removed from political power; Confucianism in the New Confucian 
scheme was not a “political ideology,” but a “tradition of religious philosophy.”906
Although the New Confucian Chang Hao did not respond to the “cultural 
nationalism” thesis, his comments on the notion of “cultural identity” as an explanatory 
concept for the rise of New Confucianism also expose his attitude toward “cultural 
nationalism.” According to Chang Hao, the notion of “cultural identity” implied that 
New Confucianism was a response to rapid change that abolished the continuity with 
the past, an explanation that was at the same time too broad and too narrow. It was too 
broad because it did not explain why New Confucians identified with Confucian values 
in particular; it was too narrow because it overlooked the universalistic elements of 
New Confucianism. Instead, Chang Hao claimed that New Confucianism was a 
response to an intellectual crisis, which he interpreted as a crisis of meaning under the 
supremacy of scientism. This spiritual crisis could not be understood as an intellectual 
crisis of modernization, but it was nevertheless related to this intellectual crisis.
This 
view largely corresponded to Chen Lai’s attempt to separate Confucianism from the 
political realm.
907
The resort to universal Confucian values, then, was more complicated than 
Makeham has presented it. Since New Confucians were concerned not only with the 
negative aspects of modernity in all societies, but also with the fate of Confucianism in 
Chinese society in particular, it is no wonder that their focus of interest was Chinese 
tradition. Moreover, as New Confucians, in the tradition of the Confucian scholar-
official, they conceived of the fate of China as their personal responsibility, which 
explains why their advocacy also contained some nationalistic traits. Nevertheless, 
although the resort to Confucian values could not be reduced to a manifestation of 
“cultural nationalism,” the New Confucian presentation of the choice for Confucian 
values as a purely intellectual undertaking was also too simplistic. Not only are there 
905 Ibid., 273.
906 Ibid., 246.
907 Chang Hao, “New Confucianism,” LOC, 302.
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unconscious and irrational elements at work in every choice, but the idea of a purely 
intellectual choice also neglects the political implications of the New Confucian project. 
The very insistence of New Confucians on the purely “cultural” and “intellectual” 
nature of the project—and their very embrace of the term “cultural conservatism”—
illustrates the political implications of the project. If the project had not been political, 
there would have been no need to reiterate its apolitical nature in the first place. 
5.7 MARXISM, CONFUCIANISM, AND “NATIONAL STUDIES”
5.7.1 The Integration of New Confucianism into the Socialist Modernization Project 
As Guo Yingjie has noted, Marxism and New Confucianism differed considerably with 
regard to their views of nature and historical change. For New Confucians, nature was
an organic whole with interdependent parts, and change was gradual. For Marxists, on 
the other hand, the dualist structure of reality in which opposites united could only be 
temporary; in the end, struggle would prevail and make room for a new social reality. 
The ideological implications of the Confucian worldview were obvious: revolution and 
struggle only led to destruction and deviation from the Way; gradual change and social 
harmony, on the other hand, were in accordance with the Way.908
These theoretical differences reveal why the CCP and New Confucians had a 
different attitude towards Chinese culture. Whereas New Confucians identified with 
cultural values, the CCP only intended to use them instrumentally, as also explained in 
Chapter Two. The Party had discovered the potential of culture as a means of cohesion; 
it attempted to complement its class-based identity with culture instead of replacing it 
with cultural notions of identity. As the Marxist historian Xie Wujun put it, the CCP 
could use New Confucianism for the construction of “socialism with Chinese 
characteristics,” but New Confucianism could constitute only one aspect of it; it could 
not function as its basis.909
908 Guo, Cultural Nationalism, 75, 79.
909 Xie Wujun, “Ping Zhongguo dangdai de baoshou zhuyi sichao,” 20.
The New Confucian identification with Chinese culture in 
the form of Confucian values, on the other hand, implicitly supplanted class-based 
notions of identity. The religious identity of New Confucians was based on “alignments 
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of culture and its elements,” such as “values, symbols, myths, and traditions,” as 
Anthony Smith has phrased it.910
Whereas New Confucians accentuated the universality of Confucian values, the 
official Marxist interpretation was that New Confucianism was a part of Chinese 
culture. Officially, New Confucianism was understood in a broad sense, namely as a 
representative element of “Chinese culture.” In this sense, it was not very different from 
Confucianism. The assignment of New Confucianism as one of the seventy-five 
“national research topics” in 1986 was a landmark in what Song Xianlin has called “the 
transformation of Confucianism in the shape of New Confucianism in mainland 
China.” 911 A research committee consisting of forty-seven scholars from sixteen 
institutions, among them Guo Qiyong, Zheng Jiadong, and Luo Yijun, was set up under 
the heading of Fang Keli from Nankai University and Li Jinquan from Guangzhou 
University, two Marxist Confucians who supported a dialogue between Confucianism 
and Marxism. In the book New Confucianism and Chinese Modernization (Xiandai xin 
ruxue yu Zhongguo xiandaihua), Fang Keli defined New Confucianism as follows: 
The New Confucian Movement was born in the 1920s. Its program has been to reclaim 
for Confucian thought a leading role in Chinese society, to rebuild the Confucian value 
system, and on the foundation of it to absorb and master, and finally to amalgamate 
with Western learning, in order to pursue the modernization of Chinese culture and 
society.912
As can be seen from the above, this definition was remarkably broad. In the 
introduction to the first volume of the Collected Essays on New Confucian Studies 
(Xiandai xin ruxue yanjiu lunji), Fang Keli mentioned two scholarly reasons for the 
research on Confucianism, namely to define the position of New Confucianism in the 
history of modern Chinese thought and to map out the movement. There were also two 
political reasons, namely to make sure that it would not go against Marxism—as had 
occurred in Taiwan and Hong Kong—and, secondly, to understand it because it was a 
910 Smith, National Identity, 6.
911 Song, “The Confucian Ideal,” 86. 
912 Bresciani, Reinventing Confucianism, iv. From Fang Keli, Xiandai xin ruxue yu Zhongguo
xiandaihua (Tianjin: Renmin chubanshe, 1997), 453.
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phase in China’s modernization process. 913 Fang Keli further criticized “Confucian 
capitalism,” claimed adherence to the “Four Cardinal Principles,” and stressed that the 
study of Confucianism was part of socialist modernization.914
On mainland China, then, attempts were made to incorporate Confucianism into 
the Chinese modernization project, partly because this was a way to control what was 
perceived of as a threat, and partly to fill the ideological vacuum as discussed in 
Chapter Two. For Fang Keli, the excessive stress on concepts and the spiritual in New 
Confucianism amounted to an “idealist” view of history and cultural determinism, 
accusations that were reminiscent of Marxist criticism of rejections of “radicalism” as 
discussed in the previous chapter.915 Intellectually, Fang Keli noted, New Confucianism 
was a positive phenomenon, but politically, it was mistaken in its denial of the 
revolutionary struggle against imperialism and feudalism. 916 Not all mainland New 
Confucians were interested in the dialogue proposed by Marxist Confucians. Jiang 
Qing, Chen Kejian, and Luo Yijun, for example, identified with New Confucians 
outside mainland China. Luo Yijun even left the research project of Fang Keli and Li 
Jinquan because he disapproved of its Marxist approach.917
5.7.2 The Official Revaluation of Traditional Chinese Culture
The incorporation of New Confucianism into the socialist modernization project was a 
continuation of the official revaluation of Confucianism that had taken place since the 
beginning of the reform era. As early as August 12th, 1978, the word “Confucius” was 
first mentioned positively and said to be in need of revaluation in the official 
Guangming Daily; in the same year, a symposium on Confucianism was held in 
913 Bresciani, Reinventing Confucianism, 426-427. See Fang Keli, “Guanyu xiandai xin rujia 
yanjiu de jige wenti,” 1-13. Other examples of the work of the Research Committee include 
Fang Keli and Zheng Jiadong, eds., Xiandai xin rujia renwu yu zhuzuo (Tianjin: Nankai daxue 
chubanshe, 1995); and Fang Keli and Li Jinquan, eds., Xiandai xin Rujia xue’an (Beijing: 
Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1995). 
914 Song, “The Confucian Ideal,” 95. 
915 Fang Keli, “Lüelun jiushi niandai de wenhua baoshou zhuyi sichao,” 153. For Marxist 
criticism of rejections of “radicalism,” see Chapter Four, 180-183.
916 Fang Keli, “Lüelun jiushi niandai de wenhua baoshou zhuyi sichao,” 157-161.
917 The 1994 book Rationality and Life by Luo Yijun and Chen Kejian has been referred to as 
“the mainland New Confucian Manifesto.” See Chen Kejian, ed., Lixing yu shengming: dangdai 
xin ruxue wencui (Shanghai: Shanghai shudian chubanshe, 1993); Luo Yijun, ed., Lixing yu 
shengming: dangdai xin ruxue wencui (Shanghai: Shanghai shudian chubanshe, 1994).
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Shandong.918 In 1984, at a conference in Qufu for the 2535th birthday of Confucius, 
symbolically, a statue of Confucius was disclosed. In the same year, the China 
Confucius Foundation was established in Qufu, with economist Gu Mu—the Vice-
Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference and former Vice-premier of the State Council—as honorary president.919
In 1985, in the heat of the “culture fever,” both the Academy of Chinese Culture 
(Zhongguo wenhua shuyuan) and the Chinese Confucius Research Institute (Zhonghua 
Kongzi yanjiusuo) were founded. In 1987, Gu Mu gave a speech at the first international 
conference on Confucianism, also in Qufu, in which he stated that Confucianism was 
part of Chinese culture and that both the “critical inheritance” of traditional Chinese 
culture as well as a “critical assimilation” of elements of other cultures were needed. 
Two years later, at the conference that marked the 2540th birthday of Confucius, Gu Mu 
went further: he explicitly praised Confucianism and pointed out its relevance for 
contemporary China.920 In 1994, the International Confucian Association (Guoji Ruxue 
lianhehui) was founded; in the same year, the opening ceremony of the conference that 
marked the 2545th birthday of Confucius was attended by, among others, high officials 
such as Gu Mu and Li Ruihuan. The most famous attendant was Lee Kuan Yew, the 
former prime minister of Singapore.921 Jean Philippe Béja has referred to this “artificial 
repacking” of Confucianism and Chinese culture for political goals as “national-
Confucianism.”922
Since 1993, the official revival of traditional Chinese culture occurred not only 
in the shape of the promotion of Confucianism, but also in the form of the advocacy of 
“national studies” (guoxue). As Axel Schneider has pointed out, the renewed interest in 
“national studies” during the 1990s was “neither a clearly defined intellectual position, 
nor a clear-cut academic current.”923
918 Wang, High Culture Fever, 68.
919 De Bary, “The New Confucianism,” 180.
920 Song, “The Confucian Ideal,” 86-87.
921 De Bary, “The New Confucianism,” 175.
922 Béja, “National-Confucianism,”10.
923 Schneider, “Bridging the Gap,” 9.
“National studies” denoted the revival of interest 
in academics and journalists from the Republican period and their non-Marxist, non-
liberal approaches, which entailed continuity with tradition instead of a break with 
tradition. This “new guoxue” included research on National Essence scholars, on the 
debates on Eastern and Western culture and the 1923 debate on “Science and 
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Metaphysics,” on Yan Fu and Liang Qichao, on the Xueheng group, and on New 
Confucianism between the 1920s and 1940s.924
On August 16, 1993, an article appeared in the People’s Daily at the occasion of 
the publication of the first volume of “national studies research” by the Traditional 
Chinese Culture Research Center of Peking University.925 This was remarkable, since it 
was not only the first long article to report on Peking University in People’s Daily since 
the repression of the Tiananmen uprising, but it was also entirely devoted to the topic of 
“national studies.” 926 In the article, “national studies” were praised as part of the 
construction of a socialist spiritual civilization; mention was also made of the Marxist 
approach in “national studies” research. Two days later, the same newspaper devoted a 
front-page article to “national studies.”927 In 1994, a third long article on the same topic 
came out, also in People’s Daily.928 Apart from other articles in official newspapers, 
several broadcasting stations in Beijing had special programs on “national studies.”929
When, in December 1992, Peking University and Central China Television 
signed a contract to shoot a series of a hundred-and-fifty lectures on traditional Chinese 
culture, the agreement said: “The aim is to promote the excellent traditional culture of 
the Chinese nation so as to boost the people’s self-confidence, self-respect, and patriotic 
thought.”930
924 Ibid., 10. 
925 Bi Quanzhong, “Guoxue, zai yanyuan you qiaoran xingqi,” Renmin ribao, August 16, 1993, 
3.
926 Liu Qingfeng, “Topography,” 54.
927 “Jiuyuan le, guoxue!,” Renmin ribao, August 18, 1993, 1. 
928 “Chuantong wenhua nengfou zaixie huihuang,” Renmin ribao, December 6, 1994, 11. 
929 Chen Lai reported that the appearance of the August 16 article was mentioned in the news on 
the Central People’s Broadcasting Station. On October 14, Guangming Daily had an article on 
“National Studies and the Charm of National Studies Masters.” During the same month, 
students of Peking University organized a “National Studies Month.” On November 14, the 
Central Broadcasting Station had an item on “The Enlightenment of Peking University’s 
‘National Studies Craze,’” and China Youth Daily of November 30 contained an article entitled 
“National Studies: Amidst Sudden Recollections.” In December, the Beijing broadcasting 
station invited Peking University Professors to answer questions from the audience on “national 
studies.” Interview with Chen Lai, Beijing, August 10, 2005.
930 Makeham, Lost Soul, 68.
Consequently, from an official point of view, both “national studies” and 
“Confucianism” were synonymous with Chinese culture, and their “Chineseness” was 
more significant than their actual content. Chen Lai has criticized this “ideologization” 
of “national studies” in which “traditional culture” was mistaken for “national 
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studies.” 931 For Chen Lai, the latter stood for a certain academic tradition of early 
twentieth-century China, a tradition that was above all “scientific, objective, and 
historical.”932 The “national studies craze” was nothing but a propaganda strategy, a 
rhetorical twist, which was guided by the media for commercial benefits—the only real 
craze at the time was not that of “national studies,” but that of “talking about national 
studies” (shuo guoxue re de re).933
Chen Lai’s criticism of the “national studies fever” was in accordance with the 
criticism of other scholars. Those behind the journal Yuandao (Original Path), for 
example, maintained that its foundation in 1994 had two objectives: it responded to the 
simplistic portrayal of tradition in the Enlightenment discourse, and it reacted against 
the “intellectualization” of tradition under the “national studies fever.” 934
This change in the intellectual climate was exemplified by the popularity of a 
work by Lu Jiandong, entitled The Last Twenty Years of Chen Yinke (Chen Yinke de 
zuihou ershi nian).
For the 
scholars behind the journal, tradition was not just an object of research; it had a living 
spirit. In spite of these criticisms of “national studies,” the fact remains that there was a 
change of attitude concerning traditional Chinese culture in intellectual circles. As 
argued in the previous chapter, the 1992 debate and the influence of overseas scholars 
played a key role in this shift in perception in the intellectual world. From 1993 
onwards, there was a wide interest in traditional Chinese culture that went beyond 
concerns of procedural gradualism; Yü Ying-shih’s cultural conception of Chinese 
identity became widespread in the form of a revival of interest in non-liberal and non-
Marxist views. 
935 Chen Yinke (1890-1969) was a historian who had been loosely 
associated with the Critical Review journal, and whose research had focused on the 
development of the Chinese “national spirit” between the third and tenth century AD.936
931 Chen Lai, “Jiushi niandai bulü weijian de ‘guoxue yanjiu,’” Dongfang 1995:2, 24-28.
Reference from 24-25. Translated in Contemporary Chinese Thought 29:4 (Summer 1998), 35-
49.
932 Chen Lai, “Guoxue yanjiu,” 26, 28.
933 Chen Lai, “‘Guoxue re’ yu chuantong wenhua yanjiu de wenti,” Kongzi Yanjiu 1995:2, 4-6.
Reference from 5. 
934 Yuandao bianweihui, “Yuandao shinian zishu,” 98.
935 Lu Jiandong, Chen Yinke de zuihou ershi nian (Beijing: xinhua shudian, 1995).
936 On Ranke, Chen Yinke, and Fu Sinian (1896-1950), see Axel Schneider, “Reconciling 
History With the Nation?: Historicity, National Particularity, and the Question of Universals,” 
117-136. For an outline of Chen Yinke’s historiography and its relationship to Chen Yinke’s 
political detachment, as well as to his conception of Chinese identity, see Axel Schneider, 
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Because the heroes of the 1990s were scholars such as Chen Yinke, Wang Guowei, and 
Wu Mi instead of thinkers such as Hu Shi, Lu Xun, or Chen Duxiu, the philosopher Li 
Zehou has coined the phrase “thinkers fade out, scholars protrude” (sixiangjia danchu, 
xueshujia tuxian).937 The popularity of scholars like Chen Yinke and the promotion of 
“national studies” was part of a general commitment to the establishment of academic 
norms (xueshu guifan). During the 1990s, as Gloria Davies has noted, those in scholarly 
circles identified themselves as scholars (xuezhe) instead of intellectuals (zhishi fenzi), 
the latter of which had the more “radical” connotation of political engagement. 
Nonetheless, Davies also noted that that the advocacy of autonomy was by no means 
apolitical: political reform was strived for through scholarly excellence instead of 
through direct political action.938 For this reason, the term “intellectuals” has still been 
applied in this research; although the tactics had changed, the public concern of Chinese 
intellectuals was nevertheless still present, as revealed in the fact that many non-
specialists suddenly engaged in discussions on modern Chinese history. 
5.8 THE “EAST ASIAN DEVELOPMENT MODEL”
As already mentioned above, Makeham has noted that one of the objections to the 
“cultural nationalism” interpretation of New Confucianism was the advocacy of an 
“East Asian development model.” However, from a different angle, it can also be 
contended that this notion contradicted both the stress on universal and transcendental 
values and the advocacy of “value rationality” of New Confucians. The notion of an 
“East Asian development model” tied Confucianism to the very socio-economic factors 
that New Confucians, given the history of the politicization of Confucianism, wanted to 
avoid. The question of the role of Confucianism in economic development was in itself 
a question of “instrumental rationality.” How did New Confucians deal with these 
contradictions? 
In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Weber had held that the 
Calvinist doctrine of predestination had affected the formation of capitalism because 
mystical contemplation was exchanged for ascetic and this-worldly action. Ascetic 
“Between Dao and History: Two Chinese Historians in Search of a Modern Identity for China,” 
54-73.
937 Yuandao (Original Path) 1 (1994), 1.
938 Davies, Worrying about China, 65-68.
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Protestantism in particular provided a “systematic rational ordering of moral life as a 
whole.”939 It was this “spirit” of rational conduct, duty, and discipline on the basis of 
the idea of the calling that gave rise to modern rational capitalism. 940 In his The 
Religion of China: Confucianism and Daoism, Weber further asserted that “Protestant 
rationalism” was marked by its “disenchantment” with the world; there was a tension 
between the rational ethical imperatives of Protestantism and this-worldly 
irrationalities.941
Firstly, the tension between the ethical demands of Confucianism and this-
worldly realities was minimal; for Confucians, “the world was the best of all possible 
worlds; human nature was disposed to the ethically good.”
Confucianism, on the contrary, had not benefited the rise of capitalism 
in China because it differed from Protestantism in three critical respects. 
942 Confucian ethics aimed at 
an affirmation of and adjustment to the world, and although both Confucianism and 
Protestantism demanded self-control, the former aimed at the moral perfection of the 
“man of the world,” whereas the latter’s goal was to enable man to focus on God’s 
will.943 Furthermore, contrary to Protestants, Confucians were not ascetics; they exalted 
material wealth instead. 944 Like Protestants, they were sober and thrifty, but they 
invested their savings in education, not in business.945 Finally, relations between people 
were personalized instead of rationalized; they were based on tradition, custom, and 
personal favors.946
939 Weber, The Protestant Ethic, 126.
940 Weber’s rational bourgeois or industrial capitalism contained the following features: (1) it 
had profit-making as its sole goal; (2) this was done through rationality and moral restraint; (3) 
the labor force was legally free, wage-earning, and separated from the ownership of the means 
of production; (4) labor was organized under the bureaucracy; and (5) it made use of modern 
technology. As for the “spirit” of capitalism: (1) it had money acquisition as an end; (2) it 
pursued gain without limits; (3) the means and traditional modes of operation were not sacred; 
(4) hard work was a duty and an obligation; (5) it was marked by discipline and control. Yang, 
“Introduction,” in Max Weber, The Religion of China, xv-xvi.
941 Weber, The Religion of China, 226-227. The Religion of China was part of a series that 
would contain six parts, but Weber only lived to finish three, namely The Religion of China
(1916), The Religion of India (1916-1917), and Ancient Judaism (1917-1919). The other three 
planned works would deal with early Christianity, medieval Christianity, and Islam, 
respectively.
942 Ibid., 227. Elsewhere, Weber has formulated it as follows: “Completely absent in Confucian 
ethic was any tension between nature and deity, between ethical demand and human 
shortcoming, consciousness of sin and need for salvation, conduct on earth and compensation in 
the beyond, religious duty and sociopolitical reality.” Ibid., 235-236.
943 Ibid., 240.
944 Ibid., 242.
945 Ibid., 247.
946 Ibid., 229, 236-237, 241.
Although the Chinese social structure had consisted of elements both 
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suitable and not suitable to capitalism, Weber claimed that the “spirit” of capitalism was 
lacking in China because of the above-mentioned factors.947
Although Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism was only 
translated into Chinese in 1986, mainland scholars had eagerly studied Weber before 
that year, and Weber had also appeared in the translation series of the editorial 
committee Culture: China and the World. 948 The topic of the relation between 
Confucianism and modernization was taken up during the mid-1980s, when many 
mainland intellectuals went to the United States, where the discussion on Weber and 
Parsons was all the rage at the time. Already in 1985, Chen Lai recalls, a Ph.D. on 
Weber appeared in China. 949 After the interest in Weber peaked in 1986, the New 
Confucian discourse changed from a revaluation of Confucianism in China to a debate 
on the existence of an East Asian development model.950
By applying Weber’s “Protestantism thesis” to Confucianism, Chinese scholars 
refuted Weber’s verdict on Confucianism in The Religion of China. Like Tu Wei-ming, 
Chen Lai held that the economic miracle of East Asia formed a serious challenge to 
Weber’s theories on Confucianism. Then again, Chen Lai added that his stance differed 
from Tu Wei-ming’s political position, which was based on a criticism of the Cultural 
Revolution.951 Not surprisingly, Tu Wei-ming’s cultural agenda was highly political, for 
it downplayed the role of the Party in social and cultural life, it criticized the Party’s 
response to the spring 1989 protest movement, and it predicted the rise of democracy.952
Chen Lai further argued that the debate on Confucian ethics and East Asian 
modernization did not focus on the “coming into being” (chansheng) of capitalism, but 
rather on the “assimilation” (tonghua) of it; some Chinese authors had made distinctions 
Chen Lai was much less explicit; although, like other New Confucians, he upheld 
science, democracy, and pluralism, he did not criticize the CCP outright. 
947 Negative structural factors were: the lack of an effective monetary system, the lack of 
politically and military autonomous cities, the lack of legal foundations for guilds, and a 
patrimonial bureaucracy. Other obstacles were: the kinship system and the existence of 
substantive ethical law instead of a rational legal system. Positive elements were: the lack of 
status restriction by birth, free migration and freedom of choice with regard to occupation, the 
lack of compulsory military service and schooling, and the lack of restraints on trade. Yang, 
“Introduction,” in Weber, The Religion of China, xx-xxviii.
948 Wang, High Culture Fever, 66.
949 Interview with Chen Lai, Beijing, August 10, 2005.
950 Wang, High Culture Fever, 68.
951 Interview with Chen Lai, Beijing, August 10, 2005.
952 Tu Wei-ming, “Introduction: Cultural Perspectives,” xi-xxvii.
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in that direction.953 Following Tu Wei-ming, Chen Lai stated that Weber himself had 
made the distinction between “creation” and “assimilation”; he had stated in his last 
chapter of The Religion of China that “the Chinese in all probability would be quite 
capable, probably more capable than the Japanese, of assimilating capitalism.” 954
Although Weber did not specify whether Confucian ethics could play a role in this 
“assimilation,” for Chen Lai, it was clear that, at least in an initial stage, they could. It 
was in this context that Chen Lai referred to the Boston sociologist Peter Berger’s term 
“vulgar Confucianism” (shisuhua de rujia lunli).955 Whereas Weber had focused on the 
ethics of Chinese imperial ideology, Berger had analyzed the daily ethics of the 
commoners. He had concluded from this that daily ethics had indeed played a role in 
economic development; the existence of an “East Asian development model” could be 
confirmed. 956 This, Chen Lai posited elsewhere, was in fact a revision of the non-
consistency in Weber, who had looked at ethical beliefs and attitudes in daily life in the 
case of Protestantism, but who had analyzed religion instead of beliefs and attitudes in 
daily life in the case of Confucianism.957
Chen Lai admitted that a cultural explanation of East Asian development was 
too simplistic. Modernization could not be reduced to economic function, and even if 
Confucian values had nothing to do with the coming into being and assimilation of 
capitalism, this did not mean that they lost value in a modern society. Precisely because 
Confucianism exceeded the issue of economic development proper, Confucian values 
could exist in a positive tension with “instrumental rationality.” Therefore, Chen Lai 
distinguished between his own advocacy of Confucian values as part of a moral debate 
953 Chen Lai mentioned that Jin Yueji opened the Weber debate in China in 1983; in 1986, Fu 
Yongjian coined the difference between “inner development” (neifa) and “learning from 
abroad” (waixue); in 1988, Lao Siguang reiterated the division between “coming into being” 
(chuangsheng) and “imitation” (moni); he asserted that Confucianism might have a function in 
the “imitation” of capitalism. See Chen Lai, “Shisu rujia lunli yu houfa xiandaihua,” EYS 22
(April 1994), 112-120. Reference from 113. Chen Lai also mentioned the difference between 
the debate on the “coming into being” of capitalism and the relation between Confucian ethics 
and modernization in “Rujia lilun yu Zhongguo xiandaihua,” CYX, 188-206. See 194-195 and 
198-201 in particular. Originally published in EYS 21 (February 1994).
954 Weber, The Religion of China, 248. Tu Wei-ming had also referred to this statement by 
Weber in his “Introduction” to Confucian Traditions in East Asian Modernity, 4.
955 Chen Lai, “Shisu rujia lunli yu houfa xiandaihua,”112-120.
956 See Berger, “An East Asian Development Model,” 3-11.
957 Chen Lai, “Rujia lilun yu Zhongguo xiandaihua,” 195.
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and the sociopolitical debate on “Asian values,” in which these values were reconciled 
with “instrumental rationality” rather than existing in tension with it.958
Chen Lai further separated the debates on East Asian development and 
Confucianism from New Confucianism by pointing out that the issue of the relation 
between Confucian ethics and the economic modernization of East Asia had not been 
raised by New Confucians, but by political scientists.959 Chen Lai defended Tu Wei-
ming in this respect, who supported the idea of the relationship between Confucianism 
and Industrial East Asia, but who would not propagate it overall. As Tu Wei-ming 
explained, applying Weber to China “must be subsumed under Weber’s general 
comparative civilizational perspective”: “what can the Confucian influence in industrial 
East Asia tell us about the relation between tradition and modernity?” 960 Another 
implication of the discussion was the question of alternative modernities. Tu Wei-ming, 
for example, made mention of some distinct characteristics of the East Asian model, 
such as the lack of distinction between the public and the private, the importance of the 
family, duty, and the community spirit, but he also mentioned the universal aspects of 
modernity, such as democracy, the market economy, and Enlightenment values.961
Although Chen Lai attempted to interpret the Weberian debate in a broader 
sense, as a debate on the meaning of tradition in the modern world, critics have 
understood the engagement of New Confucians with the debate on Weber as a defense 
of “Asianism” or some Oriental “essence” that was not successful in its attack on 
instrumental rationality. Arif Dirlik has criticized the revival of Confucianism during 
the 1990s for joining forces with Global Capitalism, and for being a “manifestation in 
East Asia of a global postcolonial discourse,” which led to the “self-Orientalization of 
the ‘Orientals’ themselves.”962
958 Chen Lai, “Rujia sixiang yu xiandai dongya shijie,” CYX, 179-187; Interview with Chen Lai, 
Beijing, August 10, 2005. Zhang Haiyun has traced the concept of “Asian values” back to a 
Singapore white paper of 1991. President Lee Kwan Yew of Singapore reportedly summarized 
it as the priority of society over the individual. See Moody, Conservative Thought, 95.
959 Chen Lai, “Rujia lilun yu Zhongguo xiandaihua,” CYX, 188-206. Chen Lai mentioned, 
among others, Ezra Vogel and Robert Bellah, a student of Talcott Parsons, who explained 
Japan’s economic success in structural terms. Chen Lai also referred to the Japanese economist 
Michio Morishima, who coined the concept of “Confucian capitalism.” Furthermore, Chen Lai 
included Kahn, MacFarquhar and Berger, who applied Weber’s theory to East Asia.
960 Tu Wei-ming, “Introduction,” in Confucian Traditions in East Asian Modernity, 6.
961 Ibid., 6-9.
962 Dirlik, “Confucius in the Borderlands,” 230, 273.
Tu Wei-ming’s resort to Confucianism to resolve the ills 
of capitalism did not lead to serious criticism, because it confirmed the utility of 
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Confucianism for capitalism; the alleged challengers ended up “Weberizing 
Confucianism,” or “modernizing tradition.” The final result was that “Confucius has 
been moved from the museum to the theme park.”963
The irony of calling up Confucianism for present service is that both sides can appeal 
to this tradition as a source for constructing narratives of meaning: those who resist 
capitulation to an amoral capitalism as much as those who seek to install the labor 
discipline and consumption patterns needed to maintain profitable linkages to the 
global economy.
Timothy Brook made a similar 
point when he insisted that Confucianism was both utilized as an antidote against the 
ills of capitalism and employed in the very service of capitalism:
964
On a similar note, Jing Wang has used the term “pan-East-Asianism” and has claimed 
that the alliance between Confucianism and capitalism de-legitimated its claim of value 
rationality, for “Confucianism is no less susceptible to instrumental reason and 
materialistic motivation on which capitalism is based than capitalism itself.” 965
Similarly, Zhang Xudong has maintained that the New Confucian resort to culture was 
simply a way to revive national politics in the face of the universalism of global capital. 
The Confucian resort to humanity was a matter of emphasizing “Chineseness.”966 Liu 
Kang has added “regional anticommunism” to “global capitalism” as the ideological 
and political implications of New Confucianism.967
Whether or not Chen Lai’s critics were right, the fact remains that Chen Lai’s 
advocacy of universal Confucian values was in tension with the Weberian debate, in 
which an East Asian development model was discerned. Moreover, since the Weberian 
debate focused on the question of the usefulness of Confucianism for modernization, it 
resulted in questions of instrumentality, questions that New Confucians attempted to 
overcome. The debate did not suit Chen Lai’s advocacy of “cultural conservatism” as 
“value rationality,” because the stress in the debate was more on modernization than on 
tradition, which carried the danger of, as critics called it, “Weberizing Confucianism,” 
or, “modernizing tradition.” The question of the moral role that tradition could play in 
963 Ibid., 267, 273.
964 Brook, “Profit and Righteousness in Chinese Economic Culture,” 44. 
965 Wang, High Culture Fever, 66, 67.
966 Zhang Xudong, “Post-Tiananmen Intellectual Field,” 44.  
967 Liu Kang, “Debate about Modernity,” 206. 
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the modern world was transformed into the question of how tradition could be used in 
the modernization process.
5.9 CONCLUDING REMARKS
The mainland New Confucian Chen Lai launched an attack on the “radicalism” of the 
May Fourth Movement, a standpoint that needs to be situated in the context of the 
overall revaluation of the “antitraditionalism” of May Fourth since the late 1980s. 
However, Chen Lai also linked the “cultural radicalism” of May Fourth with that of the 
Cultural Revolution and the “culture craze” of the 1980s. As such, his account shared 
similarities with both the theory of the “stages” of “radicalism” of Yü Ying-shih and 
Lin Yü-sheng’s argument that May Fourth was typified by “wholesale 
antitraditionalism.” Although Chen Lai’s interpretation of the term “radicalism” 
resembled Yü Ying-shih’s conception of “radicalism” as “antitraditionalism,” for Chen 
Lai, an extra element was that “radicalism” also referred to utilitarianism, or the 
instrumental use of culture in the service of politics.
To interpret the May Fourth debates on Eastern and Western culture, Chen Lai 
made use of Max Weber’s concepts of “instrumental rationality” and “value 
rationality.” Whereas Weber had contended that these were heuristic ideal types, Chen 
Lai nevertheless utilized them to make a dualist distinction between “cultural radicals” 
and “cultural conservatives.” According to Chen Lai’s definition, the “radicals” took 
politics and economics as an outer standard to evaluate morality, whereas the 
“conservatives” started from the inherent value of tradition. It has been argued that 
Chen Lai’s framework was a clear manifestation of the employment of “radicalism” as 
an asymmetric counterconcept: a simplistic dualist framework served to invoke the 
reader’s identification with “conservatism.” In reality, both the “conservatives” and the 
“radicals” of the May Fourth era had made use of the two types of rationality: both 
cherished ideals, and both adhered to the outer goal of modernization. The clear-cut 
distinction Chen Lai made between “conservatives” and “radicals” did not serve his 
argument that “conservatives” had also been progressives who pursued modernization. 
Chen Lai’s framework reinforced rather than eliminated the dichotomies that he 
intended to eradicate. 
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As for “cultural conservatism” during the May Fourth era, Chen Lai asserted 
that it was not only a response to Chinese “radicalism,” but that it was also related to 
global developments such as World War One, the Russian Revolution, and Marxist 
criticism of capitalism. “Cultural conservatives” advocated the historical continuity of 
Chinese tradition, and of Confucianism in particular. As a New Confucian who 
regarded himself as the student of Tu Wei-ming, one of the main spokesmen for New 
Confucianism in the United States, Chen Lai understood Confucianism as the core 
values of ren (benevolence) and he (harmony). Contrary to the perception of Yü Ying-
shih and Lin Yü-sheng, for whom Confucianism was entrenched in society and tied to 
“social referents,” New Confucians held that its sociopolitical attachment had distorted 
Confucianism. Instead, they identified Confucianism with certain transhistorical, 
universal values. For both Tu Wei-ming and Chen Lai, Confucianism was a “religio-
philosophy.”
Whereas other intellectuals had employed the concept of “radicalism” to answer 
a set of historical questions relating to China in particular, Chen Lai incorporated the 
term in the New Confucian criticism of modernization-as-rationalization. Modern 
societies, Chen Lai claimed, still needed “value rationality.” In order to ensure the 
historical continuity of Confucianism, Chen Lai outlined a Hegelian model of 
“dialectical denial” that only denied the concrete content of a thing, but not its universal 
essence. Chen Lai’s understanding of Confucianism as universal moral values revealed 
that his conservatism was not a Burkean conservatism that upheld a particular Chinese 
tradition based on the fact that it had been historically grown. His advocacy of moral 
values was clearly also not based on a critique of abstract universalism. It has been put 
forward that Chen Lai’s “cultural conservatism” resembled the moral conservatism of 
those American “neo-conservatives” who, inspired by Greek philosophy, promoted 
universal values. Chen Lai presented the “radicalism” in modern Chinese history, and 
the “radicalism” of the May Fourth era in particular, as a process of the repression of 
“value rationality” by “instrumental rationality.” Like Yü Ying-shih, Chen Lai was 
convinced that only the intellectual was capable of the restoration of the moral order. 
Although Chen Lai did not engage in a criticism of the CCP, he clearly opposed the 
political interference in cultural matters that had dominated previous decades. Instead, 
Chen Lai opted for a position of pure scholarship. 
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As distinct from a definition of conservatism as the advocacy of historical 
continuity or the belief in the limits of change, as Furth would have it, Chen Lai’s 
outlook has been identified with conservatism because it promoted conservative goals 
on conservative grounds. Unlike the conservative liberalism upheld in the previous 
chapter, which focused on economic liberty instead of on Chinese tradition, Chen Lai’s 
goal was the preservation of Confucian values and the fostering of community in times 
of individualism and alienation. Moreover, in contradistinction to the instrumentalist 
reference to tradition in Chapters Two and Three, Chen Lai’s support for tradition was 
rooted in his belief in its inherent value. Chen’s moral quest shows the “multi-
accentualism” of the debate on “radicalism” and the various faces of the “conservatism” 
proposed in response. Although Chen Lai was one of the few intellectuals who did not 
refer to Edmund Burke in his critique of “radicalism,” his viewpoint was at the same 
time one of the rare mainland positions based on a genuine concern with tradition and 
morality.
Scholars like Lin Yü-sheng conceived of a contradiction between the 
safeguarding of the historical continuity of Chinese tradition and the advocacy of 
universal values, but for Chen Lai, the two could be combined. In his view, Chinese 
tradition was but a concrete manifestation of transcendental values. As Chen Lai put it, 
“respecting tradition is respecting the universality of historical development.”968
968 Chen Lai, “Jiazhi, quanwei, chuantong yu Zhongguo zhexue,” CYX, 254-266. Reference 
from 262. Originally published in Zhexue yanjiu 1989:10, 26-32.
Chen 
Lai’s articles on the philosophers Liang Shuming and Feng Youlan have been analyzed 
in order to grasp how Chen Lai envisioned the relation between the historical continuity 
of Chinese culture and the identification of Confucian values as universal values. 
Concerning Liang Shuming, Chen Lai referred to the concept of lixing in particular, 
which Chen Lai associated with a normative sense, with benevolence, and with 
Habermas’ notion of “communicative rationality.” As for Feng Youlan, Chen Lai made 
reference to those writings in which Feng discussed the relation between “particulars” 
and universals.” As regards morality, Chen mentioned Feng’s distinction between 
“changeable” and “invariable” morals. With regard to the relation between Chinese and 
Western culture, Chen invoked Feng Youlan’s distinction between “particulars” and 
“types” in the latter’s writings on culture. Whereas a “particular” denoted the 
characteristics of one specific culture, a “type” included those characteristics of a 
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culture that were also present in other cultures. Chen Lai declared that it was the 
conception of culture as a general “type” that enabled the preservation of the historical 
continuity between the traditional and the modern.
In contradistinction to scholars such as Furth, who have treated New 
Confucianism as a manifestation of a universal conservatism that was not in tension 
with Burkean notions of particularity and historical growth, others, including Guo 
Yingjie and John Makeham, have contended that New Confucianism was a 
manifestation of “cultural nationalism.” Yet Makeham has also noted the limits of this 
concept with regard to New Confucianism: New Confucians did not attempt to revive a 
Confucian civilization; the idea of an “East Asian Confucianism” or a “Han cultural 
circle” also went against the idea of narrow nationalism. Moreover, for New 
Confucians, the notion of “cultural nationalism” implied a reduction of their project to a 
mere emotional reaction, whereas they conceived of it as an intellectual undertaking. 
The theory that New Confucianism was purely a matter of intellectual choice was 
nonetheless also too simplistic, for the New Confucian project had clear political 
implications. 
These political implications were that the Confucian emphasis on gradual 
change and harmony posed a challenge to the Marxist conception of the struggle of 
opposites. The CCP attempted to co-opt Confucianism into the Chinese modernization 
project, but the goal behind this move was to complement the notion of class struggle 
and to seek new legitimating devices. The official conception of Confucianism was that 
it was quintessentially Chinese, which is why it could be utilized in the construction of a 
modern Chinese civilization. From an official point of view, as Levenson phrased it, 
Confucianism was valid because it belonged to China (meum), whereas for New 
Confucians, it represented truth (verum).969 Those who discerned truth in Confucianism 
had a “philosophical attachment” to Confucianism, whereas the adherence to 
Confucianism of nationalist modernizers was merely “a belief in the need to profess 
belief.”970
969 Levenson, “‘History’ and ‘Value,’” 150.
970 Ibid., 172.
This official co-optation took place both in the form of the study of New 
Confucianism and in the form of the promotion of “national studies,” both of which 
were used to promote Chinese tradition in a broad sense. Despite this 
instrumentalization that scholars like Chen Lai objected to, the revival of “national 
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studies” also reflected a renewed interest in non-liberal and non-Marxist thinkers. This 
shift had been shaped by rejections of “radicalism” as discussed in the previous chapter, 
and by the popularity of overseas scholars such as Yü Ying-shih.
Finally, it has been argued that the New Confucian engagement in the debate on 
Weber in China and on the existence of an “East Asian development model” 
contradicted the New Confucian stress on universal values. Although New Confucians 
attempted to present the debate as a broad debate on the role of tradition in the modern 
world, the focus in the debate on the usefulness of Confucianism, “Asian values,” and 
the merger of Confucianism with socio-economic realities was a deviation from the 
defense of transhistorical values. In addition, on the basis of the debates on Weber, 
critics maintained that the New Confucian attitude amounted to a defense of capitalism. 
It remains to be seen, then, how efficient Chen Lai’s moral quest really was—for a 
scholar who disapproved of  “instrumental rationality,” however, that issue was not of 
crucial importance.
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6.
ON LANGUAGE AND “POST-ISMS”
REFLECTIONS ON THE LITERARY REVOLUTION
How can one love without a heart?
ZHENG MIN on the simplified Chinese character for “love”
6.1 INTRODUCTION: “ANTI-RADICALISM” AND POSTMODERNISM
Another revaluation of the May Fourth Movement occurred in the form of a debate on 
the so-called New Literature Movement of 1917. As part of the latter, Hu Shi and Chen 
Duxiu had promoted a “living language expressed in a free form” to replace “the dead 
language bound by classical poetry and prose.” 971
Zheng Min’s main criticism of the Literary Revolution was that it had distorted 
the historical continuity of the Chinese language, and of Chinese poetry in particular. 
Some critics have applied the label “conservative” to Zheng Min’s standpoint, but, as 
argued throughout this study, a defense of historical continuity as such does not amount 
to a conservative stance. One should ask the question of what it was that Zheng Min 
intended to preserve and on which grounds she championed its preservation. Whereas 
the previous chapter has documented how the discourse on New Confucianism shaped 
interpretations of “radicalism,” this chapter will investigate how the merger of the 
debates on “radicalism” and postmodernism affected conceptions of “radicalism” and 
“neo-conservatism.” Moreover, the question will be posed of why Zheng Min resorted 
In 1993, the Chinese mainland 
poetess Zheng Min (b. 1920) launched an attack on this literary movement in the 
journal Wenxue pinglun (Literary Review), which triggered the first debate on 
“radicalism” and “conservatism” in mainland journals. Whereas Chen Lai’s 
denouncement of May Fourth “radicalism” had been rooted in a New Confucian 
preoccupation with universal values, Zheng Min’s criticism of the May Fourth 
Movement was embedded in an argument that drew on the theories of structuralism and 
poststructuralism. This caused the debate on “radicalism” to merge with the debate on 
postmodernism in China. 
971 Yeh, Modern Chinese Poetry, 11. 
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to postmodernism in particular to promote the historical continuity of the Chinese
language. 
Michelle Yeh has asserted that Zheng Min’s condemnation of May Fourth 
language reform went much further than a criticism of language proper; it dealt with 
issues of cultural identity and “Chineseness,” or the tension between China’s 
dependence on the West, and its attempt to resist the West.972
6.2 REVALUATING THE NEW LITERATURE MOVEMENT OF 1917
If the main focus in 
Zheng Min’s argument and in the debate that followed was indeed on the relation 
between China and the West, as well as on Chinese identity vis-à-vis Western identity, 
then there was a possibility that Zheng Min’s resort to Chinese tradition was not based 
on the inherent value of tradition, but on emotional needs instead. On the other hand, 
the question of “Chineseness” would still imply a concern with the relation between the 
Chinese past, present, and future, as well as with questions of historical change. Just 
how conservative was Zheng Min’s postmodernist escapade? In brief, points of 
discussion will involve the nature of Zheng Min’s argument and the debate that 
followed, the “creative transformation” of postmodernism in a Chinese context, and the 
question of whether mainland postmodernism was indeed part of a “neo-conservative” 
trend.
6.2.1 Zheng Min’s Postmodern Twist 
The poetess Zheng Min, formerly a Professor in the English department of Peking 
Normal University, gained fame during the 1940s as a modernist poetess who belonged 
to the so-called “Nine Leaves Poets” (jiuye shipai), a group of nine poets associated 
with journals such as Poetic Creation and Modern Chinese Poetry.973 This group of 
modernists dealt with the theme of alienation under industrial modernity; they deployed 
avant-garde techniques and psychoanalytical critique in their poetry. 974
972 Yeh, “Chinese Postmodernism,” 103. 
973 During the 1940s, the “Nine Leaves Poets” were based at the National Southwest Associated 
University (Xinan lianhe daxue), where Zheng Min graduated from the Philosophy Department 
in 1943. Other poets who belonged to this group were Chen Jingrong, Du Yunxie, Mu Dan, and 
Xin Di. 
974 Lee, Troubadours, Trumpeters, Troubled Makers, 65, fn. 4.
Apart from 
being a successful poetess, Zheng Min also obtained a Ph.D. in English Literature from 
Brown University in 1952, after which she became a researcher in the Institute of 
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Literature of CASS.975 During the 1980s, in the context of the revival of modernism, the 
interest in Zheng Min’s poetry increased.976
The New Literature Movement, in which it was upheld that vernacular language 
(baihua) should take the place of literary language (wenyan), was born when Hu Shi’s 
article “Some Tentative Suggestions for the Reform of Chinese Literature” was 
published in New Youth in January 1917.
Given her reputation as a modernist and 
avant-garde poetess, it came as a surprise that in 1993, Zheng Min fulminated against 
the protagonists of the New Literature Movement (Xin wenxue yundong) of 1917. 
977 In this article, Hu Shi put forward eight 
principles as a basis for the reform of literature, including the use of vernacular 
language.978 Given the strong opposition to his article at the time, Hu Shi still referred 
to the movement as a reform movement; he did not call it a revolution. Chen Duxiu’s 
article in New Youth of February 1917, on the contrary, was entitled “On the Literary 
Revolution.”979 In this article, Chen Duxiu praised European revolutions for having 
realized a radical break between the old and the new, whereas Chinese revolutions had 
never been carried out thoroughly. A true revolution, Chen Duxiu claimed, should not 
only focus on the political realm, but also on the realms of ethics, literature, and arts.980
In the field of literature, Chen Duxiu supported the creation of a plain and popular 
literature of realism.981
In an article that appeared in the literary journal Wenxue pinglun (Literary 
Review) in 1993, Zheng Min began her inquiry of modern Chinese poetry with a 
question raised in “international Sinological circles”: Why was it that contemporary 
Chinese literature, with its history of several millennia of poetry, had not produced any 
975 Zhongguo dangdai mingrenlu, 612.
976 Idema en Haft, Chinese letterkunde: een inleiding, 285. Another member of the Nine Leaves 
group whose popularity rose at that time was Chen Jingrong (1917-1989).
977 Hu Shi, “Wenxue gailiang chuyi” (Some tentative suggestions for the reform of Chinese 
literature), reprinted in Wang Zhongjiang and Yuan Shuya, Xin qingnian: minzhu yu kexue de 
huhuan, 146-155.
978 In full, the eight principles were: (1) avoid classical allusions; (2) discard stale literary 
phrases; (3) discard parallel constructions; (4) do not avoid using vernacular words and speech; 
(5) follow literary grammar; (6) do not write that you are sick or sad when you are not sick or 
sad; (7) do not imitate the writings of the ancients; (8) writing should have meaning or 
substance. From Chow, The May Fourth Movement, 274.
979 Chen Duxiu, “Wenxue geminglun” (On the Literary Revolution), reprinted in Wang 
Zhongjiang and Yuan Shuya, Xin qingnian: minzhu yu kexue de huhuan, 164-167.
980 Chow, The May Fourth Movement, 275.
981 For an overview of the Literary Revolution, see Chow, “Chapter XI: The Literary 
Revolution” in idem, The May Fourth Movement, 269-288.
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internationally recognized masterpieces or renowned poets? 982 Michelle Yeh has 
suggested that the “international Sinological circles” Zheng Min referred to in her 
article were the Sinologists William Jenner of the Australian National University and 
Stephen Owen of Harvard University. Both of them had disparaged modern Chinese 
poetry in their review articles of Bei Dao’s The August Sleepwalker several years 
before. 983 Jenner had contended that “no really memorable Chinese verse has been 
written for the last forty years,” whereas Owen had discerned a lack of “Chineseness” in 
modern Chinese poetry.984
Zheng Min echoed the Sinologists’ “nostalgia for Chinese tradition,” as Gregory 
Lee has phrased it, and insisted that modern Chinese poetry had lost its “authenticity” 
and “Chineseness” because it had been cut off from tradition.985 For Zheng Min, the 
answer to why this had happened lay with Chen Duxiu and Hu Shi, the architects of the 
New Literature Movement of 1917. Chen Duxiu and Hu Shi had applied the “logic of 
dual oppositions” with respect to language—namely, the renewal versus the 
preservation of tradition, vernacular versus literary Chinese, and colloquial versus 
written Chinese—and they had attempted to construct a “new” language through 
rational design. In sum, they had “denied continuity” with ancient literature, from its 
language to its content, by taking baihua novels from the Yuan dynasty (1260-1368) as 
the point of departure for the reform of language.986
Following other intellectuals at the time, Zheng Min further condemned the 
mode of thought of “over-straightening the crooked” (jiaowang guozheng), or the 
excessive correction of perceived wrongdoings. Whereas Chen Lai had targeted the 
Both Hu Shi and Chen Duxiu had 
neglected the rule that theory comes from practice; they had discarded the accumulated 
cultural essence in Chinese language. Whereas in England, seven centuries had 
separated Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales from twentieth-century modernism, in China, a 
modern language was created overnight. 
982 Zheng Min, “Shiji mo de huigu: Hanyu yuyan biange yu Zhongguo xinshi chuangzao,” ZFL,
158-186. Originally published in Wenxue pinglun 1993:3, 5-20.
983 See William J.F. Jenner, review of The August Sleepwalker by Bei Dao, trans. Bonnie 
McDougall  (New York: New Directions Press, 1989), in the Australian Journal of Chinese 
Affairs 23 (January 1990), 193-195; Stephen Owen, “What is World Poetry?: Poets Who Write 
to be Read in Translation are a Curious Breed, as Bei Dao Shows,” The New Republic, 19 
November 1990, 28-32.
984 Jenner, “Review,” 193-194. Quoted in Lee, Troubadours, Trumpeters, Troubled Makers,
104; Owen, “World Poetry,” 31. Quoted in ibid., 99.
985 Lee, Troubadours, Trumpeters, Troubled Makers, 99.
986 Zheng Min, “Shiji mo de huigu,” ZFL, 158. 
250
politicization of Confucianism, Zheng Min criticized the politicization of art and 
literature in particular, both during the May Fourth and Mao eras. Consequently, 
decisions on language reform had not been based on the value of language, but on 
political efficacy. Between 1950 and 1979, a whole new baihua language was created; 
although the clarity of language peaked, its richness had nevertheless declined.987 It was 
only after 1979, when young poets came across works that dated from before 1949, that 
language was reformed amidst the rediscovery of tradition, and that practice became the 
root of change.988
In her argument, Zheng Min did not literally employ the terms “conservatism” 
and “radicalism,” but she did refer to the struggle of “renewal” (ge) versus 
“preservation” (bao); in addition, as will be discussed below, other intellectuals who 
reacted to Zheng Min’s text availed themselves of the terms “radicalism,” 
“conservatism” and “neo-conservatism” in the discussion.989 What was unique in Zheng 
Min’s advocacy of historical continuity was her resort to structuralism and 
poststructuralism. As for structuralism, Zheng Min invoked the theories of the Swiss 
linguist Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913). In his Course in General Linguistics
(1916),990 De Saussure had understood language as a system of signs, in which each 
sign consisted of a “signifier” (“a sound-image, or its graphical equivalent”) and a
“signified” (“the concept or meaning”). De Saussure had contended that meaning was 
created by the contrast between signifiers, and that the relation between “signifier” and 
“signified” was arbitrary and merely based on convention.991
According to structuralism, meaning was constructed instead of natural. 
Language was not merely the product of the individual; the individual was also the 
product of language. For this reason, in her criticism of the Literary Revolution, Zheng 
Min based herself on de Saussure’s claim that a language could not be chosen by its 
people, because it always inherited elements from a previous historical stage; language 
was the product of historical growth. Moreover, for Zheng Min, the classical Chinese 
language contained the characteristics of what de Saussure had defined as a “mother 
tongue”: it was a social action in which all members of the community participated. 
987 Ibid., 173-175.
988 Ibid., 176-177.
989 Ibid., 162.
990 The book was published posthumously on the basis of de Saussure’s lectures between 1907 
and 1911. 
991 Eagleton, Literary Theory, 84.
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From this respect, May Fourth intellectuals had “killed their own mother.”992 Zheng 
Min gave a special twist to de Saussure’s argument that linguistics should not be 
concerned with actual speech (parole) but with the objective structure of signs, with 
language as a system (langue), by equating the vernacular language pressed for in the 
Literary Revolution with de Saussure’s “parole.” The advocacies of the protagonists of 
the Literary Revolution, Zheng Min claimed, showed signs of “vernacular centralism” 
and “phonocentrism,” or the preoccupation with colloquial instead of written 
language. 993
Furthermore, Zheng Min drew on the poststructuralism of the French 
philosopher Jacques Derrida (1930-2004) and the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan 
(1901-1981). Poststructuralism went further than structuralism in that it treated the text 
as an endless “play of signifiers” that contained no definite meaning.
Although Anglo-American modernist poetry had found inspiration in 
Chinese characters—Zheng Min referred to Ernest Fenollosa (1853-1908), Ezra Pound 
(1885-1972), and T.S. Eliot (1888-1965)—when modernism came to China in the 1930s 
and 1940s, it was resisted.
994 According to 
Lacan, there was always a gap between “signifier” and “signified”; Derrida conceived 
of language as an unlimited exchange of “traces,” which implied that no “new” 
language could ever be created ex nihilo. Therefore, the theories of both Derrida and 
Lacan proved for Zheng Min that the design of a clear vernacular language—which was 
expressed in May Fourth slogans such as  “my hand writes what my mouth says”—was 
but an illusion.995
6.2.2 Some Reactions to Zheng Min’s Article
Zheng Min’s text provoked a debate on the Literary Revolution in the pages of the 
literary journal Wenxue pinglun (Literary Review). Although Michelle Yeh has 
992 Interview with Zheng Min, Beijing, July 6, 2006. 
993 According to post-structuralists, Western philosophy in general was “phonocentric” because 
it preferred colloquial to written language. Western philosophy was also “logocentric” because 
it believed in, as Eagleton put it, “some ultimate ‘word,’ presence, essence, truth or reality 
which will act as the foundation of all our thought, language and experience.” See Eagleton, 
Literary Theory, 113.
994 Ibid., 120.
995 Huang Zunxian (1848-1905), who is often considered the predecessor of the movement for 
modern Chinese poetry, coined the slogan “My hand writes what my mouth says, how can 
antiquity restrain me?” (Wo shou xie wu kou. Gu qi neng ju qian). At the same time, 
intellectuals like Tan Sitong and Liang Qichao launched a “revolution in poetry” (shijie 
geming). 
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certainly been right in her assertion that the debate exceeded the issue of language 
proper, as will be discussed below, a considerable part of the reactions to Zheng Min’s 
text did address her views on language proper. An example concerns a response to 
Zheng Min’s argument by Fan Qinlin, an Associate Professor in the Chinese 
Department of Nanjing University.996 Fan Qinlin refuted Zheng Min’s accusation of 
“logocentrism” with respect to vernacular language: since the Song (907-1279) and 
Yuan (1260-1368) dynasties, both written literary Chinese (wenyanwen) and written 
vernacular Chinese (baihuawen) had existed. Moreover, Fan Qinlin claimed, the true 
“mother tongue” in a Saussurian sense was the vernacular: “Only the vernacular is the 
sole social action in which all social members participate, and only the vernacular can 
fully identify with social life.”997
Yet the rejoinder to Fan Qinlin revealed that Zheng Min’s concerns rose far 
above language. Zheng Min reiterated that for her, both vernacular and literary Chinese 
were the “mother tongue” of China—her point was to overcome the “logic of dual 
oppositions,” and to demonstrate that they were complementary.
Zheng Min had simply misunderstood what Hu Shi 
and Chen Duxiu meant by vernacular language; their modern vernacular was based on 
vernacular language in the written form (baihua shumianyu), to which elements from 
the vernacular language in the colloquial form (baihua kouyu) and from classical 
Chinese were to be added. Nevertheless, Fan Qinlin also briefly addressed the issue of 
the broader meaning of language reform by arguing that the transition to vernacular 
language had been necessary from the perspective of the modernization of Chinese 
culture. 
998
996 Fan Qinlin, “Ruhe pingjia ‘wusi’ baihuawen yundong?: yu Zheng Min xiansheng shangque,” 
ZFL, 187-197. Originally published in Wenxue pinglun 1994:2, 112-117.
997 Ibid., 188.
998 Zheng Min, “Guanyu ‘ruhe pingjia “wusi” baihuawen yundong?’: shangque zhi shangque,” 
ZFL, 198-206. Originally published in Wenxue pinglun 1994:2, 118-122.
Whereas written 
Chinese was closer to the “subtext,” colloquial Chinese was closer to life. Colloquial 
language provided written language with vitality; written language provided colloquial 
language with depth. Zheng Min further declared that language was the expression of a 
historical spirit, and that the Chinese language was a superior language. Referring to 
Heidegger’s views on language as the “home of Being,” Zheng Min claimed that 
language symbolized the existence of a country and its people. Since the superiority of 
the Chinese language was situated in its pictographic traits, it was all the more 
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necessary to move away from the “phonocentrism” that Hu Shi and Chen Duxiu had 
recommended. Here, we can already see that Zheng Min’s argument contained 
nationalist traits; the issue of language was crucial for her because she considered 
language to be the embodiment of a historical Chinese essence or spirit, an issue that we 
will return to later. 
The notion of “radicalism” entered the debate when Xu Ming, a researcher in 
literature at CASS, asserted that the crux of the discussion between Zheng Min and Fan 
Qinlin concerned the question of “cultural radicalism.”999
Two other authors who engaged with Zheng Min’s criticism of May Fourth 
instead of with language proper were Chen Feng and Zhi Zhong.
Whereas Zheng Min treated it 
as problematic, Fan Qinlin considered it a progressive force for Chinese modernization. 
Xu Ming lined up with Fan Qinlin: the movement for vernacular Chinese had not been 
the concoction of some intellectuals—it had been the rational choice of history. In 
accordance with his location of the discussion on language reform within the broader 
framework of “cultural radicalism,” Xu Ming further held that the language reforms had 
been valuable because they constituted but one aspect of a larger process of ideological 
change. Xu Ming also engaged with Zheng Min’s language theories proper; he argued 
that Zheng Min had confused some radical slogans with reality. In practice, the writing 
style of May Fourth intellectuals had still been immersed with traditional elements. 
1000 The authors not 
only disapproved of Zheng Min’s siding with traditional culture, but they also accused 
her of a lack of originality in her treatment of May Fourth. A decade earlier, the authors 
A Cheng and Zheng Yi had also raised the question of why Chinese literature had not 
been able to reach the first rows of world literature. A Cheng had attributed this to the 
cultural nihilism of May Fourth, which had caused a rupture with traditional culture.1001
999 Xu Ming, “Wenhua jijin zhuyi de lishi weidu: cong Zheng Min, Fan Qinlin de zhenglun 
kaiqu,” ZFL, 207-218. Originally published in Wenxue pinglun, 1994:4, 114-120.
1000 Chen Feng, Zhi Zhong, “Kua shiji zhi jiao: wenxue de kunhuo yu xuanze,” ZFL, 219-230.
Originally published in Wenxue pinglun 1994:6, 121-126, 34. 
1001 The authors quoted from A Cheng, “Wenhua zhiyuezhe renlei,” Wenyibao, July 9, 1985.
Another influence that Chen Feng and Zhi Zhong discerned in Zheng Min’s argument 
was that of Lin Yü-sheng’s book The Crisis of Chinese Consciousness, which has been 
discussed in Chapter Four. Zheng Min’s notion of the “absolute denial” of tradition, so 
the authors claimed, was reminiscent of Lin Yü-sheng’s “totalistic antitraditionalism,” 
and, like Lin Yü-sheng, Zheng Min also drew an imaginary line between May Fourth 
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and the Cultural Revolution. Both points were invalid for Chen Feng and Zhi Zhong: 
May Fourth had not been aimed at a total destruction of traditional culture; the Cultural 
Revolution and the May Fourth Movement could by no means be thought of together. 
Whereas May Fourth stood for science, democracy, and liberty, the Cultural Revolution 
represented feudal despotism, hierarchy, and traditional virtues.1002 We have already 
encountered similar criticism of the perceived link between the two movements in 
Chapter Five.1003
Whereas Zheng Min’s reliance on postmodernism already marked the coming 
together of post-theories and revaluations of May Fourth, this interconnection reached a 
higher level when Zhang Yiwu, a literary critic from Peking University, joined the 
debate. Zhang Yiwu, who has been dubbed “post-master Zhang” (Zhang houzhu) for 
being one of the main post-theorists on mainland China, read the debate as a debate on 
Chinese culture since May Fourth, or, more generally, as a debate on “modernity.” The 
creation of a modern Chinese language, Zhang Yiwu maintained, had been a core issue 
in the creation of a modern Chinese nation and a modern Chinese identity.1004
Zhang Yiwu insisted that the relationship between literary and vernacular 
Chinese had already been discussed during the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s—once more, 
Zheng Min was stripped of originality claims. Zheng Min’s “deconstructionist” 
approach was novel, but it did not enable her to look at the issue in a broader cultural 
setting— the black-and-white approach of the debate was a mere reproduction of the 
“binary opposition” under attack. Zhang Yiwu claimed that his new point of departure, 
“modernity,” allowed him to understand the replacement of “classical” with 
“vernacular” language as the replacement of the “classical” with “modernity.”
Zhang 
Yiwu strengthened the cultural identity claims implicit in Zheng Min’s argument for the 
continuity between classical and modern Chinese language by invoking the theory of 
postcolonialism. Whereas Zheng Min’s argument had been rooted in aesthetic concerns, 
Zhang Yiwu’s reference to the concept of “Chineseness” was based on the belief that
modernity along Western lines had been tantamount to cultural colonization. 
1005
1002 Chen Feng, Zhi Zhong, “Kua shiji zhi jiao,” ZFL, 224.
1003 See Chapter Five, 200.
1004 Zhang Yiwu, “Chonggu ‘xiandaixing’ yu Hanyu shumianyu lunzheng,” Wenxue pinglun
1994:4, 107-113, 120; Interview with Zhang Yiwu, Beijing, July 26, 2006.
1005 Zhang Yiwu, “Chonggu ‘xiandaixing,’” 109.
Zhang Yiwu explained that his notion of “modernity” was both indebted to Habermas’ 
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understanding of the term as the unlimited progress in the field of knowledge and to 
Lyotard’s notion of “modernity” as a “master narrative” of rationality. “Modernity” in 
this sense had been the goal of the vernacular movement, because the latter had clearly 
been aimed at Enlightenment, education, liberty, subjectivity, and “knowledge 
transformation.” 
The dilemma that May Fourth intellectuals faced was that a radical denial of 
native culture—which Zhang called “Otherization” (tazhehua)—could fail because it 
could bring about the obliteration of all traces of subjectivity, whereas the preservation 
of too many traditional elements could blunt the meaning of “modernity” and prohibit 
the development of tradition. For “post-master” Zhang, it was obvious that Third World 
intellectuals were often caught in this dilemma of “Otherization,” of which the “binary 
opposition” of classical and vernacular language was a characteristic. 1006 Although 
Zheng Min believed to have abolished this dichotomy, she rather confirmed one side of 
it—tradition—and hence still fell prone to “Otherization.” To overcome “Otherization,” 
Zhang Yiwu argued instead for a dialogue between multiple culture and language fields, 
and for the creation of what he called a “post-vernacular,” which would dialectically 
unite the classical and the vernacular, and which would enable the “double continuation 
and double transcendence of the binary opposition of the classical and the 
vernacular.”1007
6.3 IMPLICATIONS OF THE DEBATE: THE QUESTION OF  “CHINESENESS”
However, Zhang Yiwu remained vague on the practical realization of 
this “post-vernacular.” 
What, then, were the real issues at stake in the debate? In a long criticism of Zheng 
Min’s article, Michelle Yeh, a specialist on Chinese poetry based at the University of 
California, Davis, addressed both Zheng Min’s argument and the wider implications of 
her views on language. As for the argument proper, Yeh argued against the notion that 
Hu Shi and Chen Duxiu had engaged in “absolute denial”; they had only employed a 
“strategic iconoclasm” that was by no means present in their actions.1008
1006 Ibid., 111.
1007 Ibid., 113.
1008 Yeh, “Chinese Postmodernism,” 108.
Practice has 
revealed that those in favor of modern poetry were still branded by tradition; they were 
also very conscious of this, as for example Hu Shi’s mockery of his own poetry as 
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“bound feet unbound” demonstrates. 1009 Moreover, Zheng Min’s equation of the 
vernacular with colloquial language was mistaken; the vernacular Hu Shi had in mind 
did not only include spoken language, but it also consisted of vernacular poetry and 
prose. In her refutation of this argument, Yeh also quoted Wang Hui, who had likewise 
argued against the application of “logocentrism” to the Literary Revolution.1010
Concerning the reference to postmodernism, in general, Yeh claimed, Zheng 
Min’s application of the theories of de Saussure, Lacan, and Derrida was uncritical and 
her reading of them simplistic. A case in point was Zheng Min’s reference to Lacan’s 
theory of the “gap” between “signified” and “signifier”: whereas Zheng Min invoked 
this theory to contend that clear meaning was non-existent, Lacan’s point had by no 
means been that no meaning could ever be reached. In addition, Zheng Min’s reference 
to Derrida’s “traces” led to a contradiction: if there were indeed “traces” of classical 
Chinese in the vernacular, “Why then worry about classical Chinese not being part of 
modern Chinese if it is always already there?” 1011 Instead of deconstructing the 
“logocentrism” she so criticized, Zheng Min upheld it and merely supplanted modern
Chinese with classical Chinese. As Yeh put it: “Tradition—with a capital T—is upheld 
as if it were a self-contained, stable, unchanging entity.”1012
The implications of Zheng Min’s argument were, according to Michelle Yeh, 
that her “reification of Chineseness” reinforced the dual structures of China versus the 
West rather than eliminating them.
Zheng Min envisioned a 
return to tradition to solve the problem of the lack of “Chineseness” of modern Chinese 
poetry, but since tradition had been cut off from modern poetry, her argument was a 
vicious cycle. Yeh further criticized Zheng Min for equating modern Chinese poetry 
with modern mainland Chinese poetry, thereby excluding poetry from Taiwan, Hong 
Kong, and other Chinese communities that resided outside of China. 
1013
1009 Ibid., 107.
1010 Ibid., 110. Yeh’s reference to Wang Hui can be found in Wang Hui zixuanji (Self-selected 
works of Wang Hui) (Guangxi: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, 1997), 342.  
1011 Yeh, “Chinese Postmodernism,” 112.
1012 Ibid.
1013 Ibid., 119-120.
Zheng Min’s defense of “Chineseness” against 
“Westernness,” Yeh claimed, was in fact a reversed “Orientalism.” As such, the real 
issues at stake in Zheng Min’s criticism of the Literary Revolution included the relation 
between China and the West, Chinese cultural identity, and the question of what 
constituted “Chineseness.” Although Zheng Min never used the term “Chineseness” in 
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her argument, implicitly, her concern was indeed that modern Chinese poetry had lost 
its “Chineseness,” which is why Yeh’s analysis is fruitful for a more thorough 
investigation of Zheng Min’s argument. Nevertheless, as will be argued further, there 
was more to Zheng Min’s argument than a concern with the relation between China and 
the West. But first, we have to explore the advocacy of “Chineseness” in Zheng Min’s 
thesis.
6.3.1 Cultural Nationalism and the Paradox of “Chineseness”
Because of her concern with the “authenticity” and “Chineseness” of Chinese poetry 
and her claim that Chinese language was somehow superior, the cultural identity 
question might be taken further: one might conceive of Zheng Min’s cry as a 
manifestation of cultural nationalism. Zheng Min’s goal was clearly the “rediscovery of 
cultural authenticity” and the “activation of the historical community.” In addition, she 
took issue with state nationalism and the political nationalism of May Fourth. 1014
Whereas Guo Yingjie’s identification of a variety of intellectual trends of the 1990s 
with cultural nationalism in his book on the topic has been criticized in the previous 
chapter for its reductionism, with regard to the debate on language reform and its 
interaction with the discourse on postmodernism, the notion of cultural nationalism can 
be applied. As Guo Yingjie has noted, for most nationalists, “language is a component 
of national identity and a significant means of ensuring its continuation.”1015 Guo has 
referred to Herder and Fichte, as well as to Stalin and Sun Yat-sen, in this respect, 
because all of them regarded language as an essential element of the nation.1016
Nevertheless, as Guo Yingjie has also noted, language can be utilized both as a 
medium for nationalism, and as an element of nationalism. In the case of China, 
political nationalism considers the baihua language since May Fourth as a medium, 
whereas cultural nationalism “finds in language a link between present generations of 
Chinese and their ancestors and a repository of ‘national essence,’ which constitutes the 
heart of national identity.”1017
1014 Guo, Cultural Nationalism, 133.
1015 Ibid., 92.
1016 Ibid.
1017 Ibid., 93.
In the discussion above, some critics of Zheng Min have 
objected to her argument from the standpoint of political nationalism: the modernization 
of Chinese language suited progress and education. Zheng Min disapproved of language 
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as a medium for nationalism from the point of view of a cultural nationalism in which
language constituted the core of “Chineseness.”
The cultural nationalism argument is even more applicable to Zhang Yiwu’s 
contribution to the debate, which turned the implicit issue of the relation between China 
and the West into the main theme. Since Zhang Yiwu mainly drew on postcolonialism, 
his case demonstrated that Guo Yingjie’s use of the concept of cultural nationalism for 
the discourse on postcolonialism in China was certainly valid. 1018 In an article that 
Zhang Yiwu co-authored with Zhang Fa and Wang Yichuan, the authors put forward 
the thesis that China had moved from “modernity” to “Chineseness” 
(Zhonghuaxing).1019 The authors defined “modernity” as a “knowledge model” used by 
Chinese culture to define itself since the 1840s. Ever since the end of the First Opium 
War, China had aimed at reconstructing its center location, but the reference system it 
had employed remained the West; Chinese modernity was a form of “Otherization” 
(tazhehua). In other words, the process of “self-discovery” was at the same time a 
process of “self-loss.”1020
This process of the loss of subjectivity ended after 1989, in the new 
circumstances of the growing internationalization and marketization of mainland 
culture. In the cultural realm, the authors claimed that the “new era” had made room for 
the “post-new era,” an era of new discourse methods and cultural practices that was 
typified by challenge, revolt, and transcendence.1021 The authors coined the term “being 
fairly well-off” (xiaokang) as both an economic and cultural model that surpassed 
modernity. This model was concerned with “the extension and transformation of 
national cultural particularity and a unique civilization.”1022
1018 Guo Yingjie, “Reclaiming the ‘Othered’ China: Nationalist Appropriations of 
Postcolonialism” in idem, Cultural Nationalism, 109-132.
1019 Zhang Fa, Zhang Yiwu, and Wang Yichuan, “Cong ‘xiandaixing’ dao ‘Zhonghuaxing’: xin 
zhishixing de tanxun,” Wenyi zhengming 1994:2, 10-20.
1020 Ibid., 10-14; Interview with Zhang Yiwu, Beijing, July 26, 2006.
1021 For Zhang Yiwu’s view of the concept of the “new era,” see Xie Mian, Zhang Yiwu, Da 
zhuanxing: hou xin shiqi wenhua yanjiu (The big transformation: post-new era culture research) 
(Ha’erbin: Heilongjiang jiaoyu chubanshe, 1995).
1022 Zhang Fa, Zhang Yiwu, and Wang Yichuan, “Cong ‘xiandaixing’ dao ‘Zhonghuaxing,’” 14.
The new knowledge model 
of “Chineseness,” the authors explained, did not deny modernity, but rather continued 
both “classicism” and “modernity.” It did not adhere to a Western linear view of 
development, but argued in favor of multiple differences: each nation could follow its 
own road of development. For the model of “Chineseness,” the issue of “sinification”
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versus “Westernization” or whether the “essence” (ti) and “function” (yong) were 
Chinese or Western did not exist. 
In a final part, the authors proposed the foundation of a “Chinese Culture Rim” 
(Zhonghua wenhuajuan), which, apart from East Asia, might also include South East 
Asia. China would most probably be the center, not only because of its size and 
cohesive force, but also, and most importantly, because its profound traditional culture 
could function as a centripetal force. The authors also reiterated the prediction of 
economists that the twenty-first century would be the “Pacific century,” which implied 
the possible rise of a particular cultural-economic rim. The cultural rim would both suit 
“Chineseness” and variety, but the authors nevertheless perceived of China as the 
center. 1023
When the authors discussed the need for a new vernacular language as part of a 
new identity pattern, they invoked Zheng Min and claimed that “the Chinese language 
could best reflect the national spirit of the Chinese nation.”
In a fashion reminiscent of Tu Wei-ming’s “cultural China” theory, the 
authors distinguished between four different layers in this rim. Mainland China would 
be the core, followed by Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau. The third and fourth layers 
would consist of overseas Chinese and countries in East Asia and Southeast Asia that 
had received Chinese influence. 
1024 The authors pointed at 
the vitality of the Chinese language and, like Zheng Min, disapproved of a baihua that 
denied wenyan. The “new baihua” would unite baihua and wenyan, as well as 
simplified and traditional Chinese characters, but its concrete form should still be 
investigated. Apart from language, the authors reiterated the importance of economics, 
and the reform of the political and legal systems. Once more, the authors emphasized 
the plurality of politics, economics, and culture, as well as the need to overcome the 
opposition between Western and Chinese thought.1025
In an interview, Zhang Yiwu further noted that the distinction between the 
cultural stance of the 1990s and the cultural conservatism since May Fourth was that the 
former revolved around the question of globalization, whereas the latter had focused on 
the issue of modernity. During the 1990s, China was a part of the global knowledge 
1023 Ibid., 14-20.
1024 Ibid., 19. 
1025 Elsewhere, Zhang Yiwu expanded on the specific meaning and form of the modernity 
discourse in China, as well as on the central position of intellectuals in this discourse. See 
Zhang Yiwu, “‘Xiandaixing’ de zhongjie: yige wufa huibi de keti,” ZYG 1994:3, 104-109.
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production; the cultural characteristics that intellectual phenomena such as “national 
studies”—which Zhang Yiwu referred to as “post-national studies” (hou guoxue)—
addressed were not particularism or essentialism, but pluralism and variety. Zhang 
Yiwu also read nationalist pamphlets such as China Can Say No, which has been 
mentioned in Chapter Two in the context of the growing anti-Americanism after 1992,
as manifestations of pluralism instead of as markers of the ideological opposition 
between China and the West.1026
Regardless of all the postmodern rhetoric of pluralism and variety with reference 
to “Chineseness,” critics have interpreted this quest for pluralism as a disguised form of 
essentialism. Guo Yingjie has insisted that the relativism for which postcolonialists 
argued was a “defense tactic rather than a genuine conviction”; for them, Chinese 
culture was “unique,” but at the same time it was “absolute” and “universal.” 1027
Moreover, since postcolonialists like Zhang Yiwu maintained that Chinese culture was
superior, critics uttered that this “latent Greater China complex” and “Sinocentrism” 
could set in motion a new “self-imposed isolation” that prevented all forms of 
dialogue. 1028 Likewise, Rey Chow has interpreted notions of “Chineseness” as 
expressions of the rise of cultural essentialism in response to a history of humiliation, 
the result of which was the other extreme of narcissism and arrogance.1029
The notion of “Chineseness,” then, was at least a paradoxical one. In an article 
on the concept, Ien Ang has explained this paradoxical nature in connection with Tu 
Wei-ming’s diasporical notion of “Chineseness,” which has been addressed in Chapter 
Three.  Tu Weiming’s pluralization of “Chineseness” intended to break with standard 
definitions of what it meant to be Chinese, such as “belonging to the Han race, being 
born in China proper, speaking Mandarin, and observing the “patriotic” code of 
ethics.”1030
1026 Interview with Zhang Yiwu, Beijing, July 26, 2006.
1027 Guo, Cultural Nationalism, 110.
1028 Ibid., 115.
1029 Chow, “Introduction,” 1-25.
1030 Tu Wei-ming, “Preface,” in The Living Tree, vii. Quoted in Ien Ang, “Chineseness,” 285.
Although this cultural conception challenged essentialist interpretations of 
“Chineseness” on the surface, Ang declared that it paradoxically ended up confirming 
them. For the aim of the periphery was to become a new center, a cultural China. 
Whereas the meaning of “Chineseness” was questioned, the category itself was 
certainly not; on the contrary, it served to enlarge the global significance of 
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“Chineseness.”1031
Although both Zheng Min and Zhang Yiwu presented their understanding of 
“Chineseness” as “pluralism,” their nationalist concerns turned this “pluralism” into a 
Chinese particularism. For Zheng Min, the classical Chinese language was somehow 
superior to the modern Chinese language; the Chinese language was also superior to 
other languages. Zhang Yiwu’s “Chineseness” implied the repudiation of a universal 
model of modernity that was by and large Western. The recovery of subjectivity 
inherent in the notion of “Chineseness” was a move toward particularity rather than a 
manifestation of pluralism. If the model was truly marked by pluralism, then why name 
it “Chineseness” in the first place? As one critic phrased the issue, the “unwieldy new 
language of universal significance” only served to “prolong and fortify” old 
contradictions.
This paradox can also be invoked to explain why both Zhang Yiwu’s 
and Zheng Min’s concern with “Chineseness,” though aimed at the deconstruction of 
binary structures, ended up confirming them. Like Tu Wei-ming, both Zheng Min and 
Zhang Yiwu merely redefined what it meant to be Chinese, but the very fact that 
“Chineseness” somehow had to be recovered was considered self-evident. 
1032
6.3.2 Language and Anti-rationalism: Zheng Min’s Argument Unraveled
How, then, did an argument for “Chineseness” become entangled with postmodernism? 
At first sight, it seems rather paradoxical that Zheng Min turned to structuralism and 
poststructuralism to defend the historical continuity of Chinese language. As Eagleton 
has noted, the method of structuralism was not only based on universalism, it was also 
“hair-raisingly unhistorical,” clinical, analytical and “anti-humanist”—it was “quite 
indifferent to the cultural value of its object.”1033 Zheng Min’s plea, on the contrary, 
was a plea in favor of historical continuity that was all but “clinical” or indifferent to the 
value of the Chinese language. Zheng Min’s advocacy of continuity was based on her 
conviction that Chinese language was superior and unique. Her argument was also 
rooted in humanist concerns: as a scholar, she felt responsible for the fate of the Chinese 
language—it was the mission of intellectuals to rescue a buried cultural tradition.1034
1031 Ang, “Chineseness,” 288.
1032 Tang Xiaobing, “New Theory,” 281.
1033 Eagleton, Literary Theory, 83, 94-95, 98.
1034 Zheng Min, “Wenhua, zhengzhi, yuyan sanzhe guanxi zhi wo jian,” EYS 29 (June 1995), 
120-124. Reference from 123.
As 
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already put forward in Chapter One, revaluations of modern Chinese history were 
closely connected to the question of the role of intellectuals in Chinese society. 
Intellectuals considered themselves to be endowed both with a moral authority to judge 
the past and with a cultural baggage that enabled them to lead others out of the 
predicament of “cultural radicalism.” 
Given the fact that Zheng Min had both humanistic and historical concerns, at 
first sight, her resort to structuralism and poststructuralism appears to be a postmodern 
heterotopia, or a juxtaposition of irreconcilable fragmentary worlds.1035 As Saussy has 
also noted, it is indeed “idiomatic” to invoke Derrida and Lacan to argue that “the more 
traditional a language is, the more deeply it is connected with the unconscious.”1036 Or, 
why point at the “correct rules” of language reform to make the point that a language is 
in fact above its users? Zheng Min’s reference to structuralism and poststructuralism in 
an argument for the continuity of language was, however, not entirely without grounds.  
According to Eagleton, the historical conditions under which modernists wrote had 
brought the problem of language to the foreground. In the environment of industrial 
society, commerce, and the reign of science, language had been in crisis, and 
structuralism and poststructuralism offered the extreme solution of focusing on 
language itself to deal with problems in social reality; it was an escape from history to 
language.1037
Still, there was a more substantial reason why Zheng Min called upon 
structuralism and poststructuralism in an argument for the continuity of language. 
Zheng Min’s seemingly odd move can be explained if we invoke an article by Brian 
Whitton in which the latter has compared the attitude toward language of the 
eighteenth-century German philosopher Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744-1803) to 
that of postmodernists such as Michel Foucault (1926-1984), Jean-François Lyotard 
(1924-1998), and Jacques Derrida.
Given the fact that Zheng Min was a modernist poetess, her turn to these 
two theories was therefore not particularly strange. 
1038 The reason why Whitton made this comparison 
was, as he put it: 
1035 Brian McHale applied Foucault’s term heterotopia to refer to “incommensurable spaces that 
are juxtaposed or superimposed upon each other.” See Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity,
48.
1036 Saussy, “Postmodernism in China,” 137.
1037 Eagleton, Literary Theory, 121-122.
1038 On Herder, see Isaiah Berlin, “Herder and the Enlightenment,” 143-186.
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Their special sensitivity to language, and their shared belief in the infinite creative 
potential of human linguistic activity, led these thinkers to attack such “totalizing” 
rationalist discourses as legitimating forms for exclusionary practices which repress the 
full diversity of discursive interpretations of the real implicit in human linguistic 
activity in favor of one, repressive discourse.1039
As Whitton has noted, both Lyotard and Herder highlighted the particularism of the 
cultural community and placed this against the universality of the Enlightenment and its 
rationalist conception of history. What Herder and Lyotard had in common was the idea 
that the “hegemonic status” of modern discourse could only be upheld through the 
suppression of “its own contingent, culture-relative nature,” which amounted to “an act 
of denial.”1040
In line with Whitton’s argument, the communality between Herder and Lyotard 
can be exchanged here for the communality between Zheng Min—whose standpoint in 
some ways echoes Herder’s—and the postmodernism on which Zheng Min based 
herself. Both for postmodernists and for Zheng Min, modern language was marked by a 
lack of diversity. For this reason, the former argued in favor of a return to the plurality 
of language games and a renunciation of grand narratives. An important element in 
Zheng Min that was also prevalent in Herder was the idea that the contingent elements 
in history were in need of preservation. 1041 Consequently, Zheng Min invoked 
postmodernism as a way to support her critique of Enlightenment reason from the point 
of view of linguistic creativity. Zheng Min, like Herder, understood the development of
language as a social process; language embedded people in a cultural community. For 
Zheng Min, as for Herder, the national language transmitted the cultural spirit of a 
people and connected, in a Burkean fashion, past, present, and future generations.1042
However, Whitton has also discerned some important dissimilarities between 
Herder and Lyotard, which concern us here insofar as they affect the credibility of 
Zheng Min’s argument. Herder intended to undo the Enlightenment bifurcation between 
Thus, when abstract and rationalist rules were applied to transform this language that 
had grown organically, both the particularity and the national spirit were harmed. 
1039 Whitton, “Herder’s Critique,” 146.
1040 Ibid., 158.
1041 Ibid., 148-150.
1042 Ibid., 151-152.
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reason and emotions; he identified with the cultural community in order to preserve it, 
for he considered it to be the source of diversity and creativity. For Lyotard, on the 
contrary, this return to the cultural community was not an objective, because both 
traditional and modern societies were devoid of the cultural pluralism of the postmodern 
era. The information revolution and the commodification of information enabled the 
flourishing of linguistic creativity: 
Whereas, for Herder, the flourishing of the diversity of national cultural forms was 
reliant upon the preservation of the integral connection between the creative human 
spirit and those naturally evolving traditions of the past through the organic medium of 
the Volk language, Lyotard’s postmodern order presupposes the direct opposite—the 
radical separation of the process of cultural creativity from traditional sociocultural life 
forms. The maximization of cultural diversity here presupposes the unrestricted 
proliferation of artificial, scientific language games, manifold local narratives 
formulated within a technological discourse cut free from all constraining influences 
deriving from the reified traditional perspectives and beliefs pervading modern 
society.1043
Zheng Min’s choice of poststructuralism to secure the union of modern Chinese 
language and Chinese tradition, then, was paradoxical: in line with Herder, Zheng Min 
envisaged a reunion with or a continuation of the traditional community, but for post-
structuralists, the “natural” was dead and could not be returned to. For post-
structuralists, as Whitton has noted, language games were artificial; they were the very 
product of modernity. For Zheng Min, on the contrary, language was “the direct 
expression of the historical life of societies and peoples.” 1044 Poststructuralism, like 
postmodernism in a general sense, was a theory that denied all sense of historical 
continuity and that conceived of history as a mere “continuum of portable 
accessories.”1045
1043 Ibid., 161. Emphasis in original.
1044 Berlin, “The Counter-Enlightenment,” 252.
1045 Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity, 95.
However, as Whitton’s argument shows, both the cultural nationalism 
of Herder and the postmodernism of Lyotard discarded abstract reason. From this 
perspective, it is understandable why Zheng Min opted for postmodernism to recover 
“Chineseness”: both sided with the particular against universality. 
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It is here that the conservative aspect of Zheng Min’s argument lies: Zheng Min 
defended the contingency of language and the importance of linguistic practice against 
the Enlightenment notion of abstract and rational design. Moreover, she argued in favor 
of the historical continuity of Chinese language on the grounds that linguistic evolution 
was beyond the control of the individual; it always inherited elements from previous 
generations. Zheng Min declined a repressive and “rationalist” discourse and 
“blueprint” aspirations in favor of a particular, contingent, and organically grown 
language that constituted the soul of the cultural community. 
Nonetheless, although Zheng Min made her argument on conservative grounds, 
it is questionable whether her goal as such was conservative. Her main concern was the 
aesthetic value of language, and of modern Chinese poetry in particular. The crucial 
issue for Zheng Min was that modern Chinese poetry had somehow lost its 
“authenticity”; her praise of tradition was part of an attempt to recover this 
“authenticity.” Zheng Min was not concerned with the values and norms of Chinese 
tradition as such; her main point of focus was the “Chineseness” of Chinese tradition—
the Truth of tradition was subordinated to the fact that it belonged to the Chinese past. 
More than an intellectual and philosophical engagement with tradition, Zheng Min’s 
goal was the recovery of a “national spirit” that had been eroded by language reforms. 
In contradistinction to Chen Lai and Yü Ying-shih, Zheng Min’s preoccupation with 
modern Chinese history did not serve to restore a moral Confucian order that had been 
destroyed by “radicalism.”
Following Yü Ying-shih and Chen Lai, Zheng Min’s conception of Chinese 
cultural identity was highly elitist; it envisioned a leading role for the scholar-poet in the 
transmission of the traditional Chinese language. The nation was embodied in high 
culture, and the poet was the carrier par excellence of this culture; mass and proletarian 
conceptions of culture had threatened elitist and aristocratic aesthetic values. The 
political implications of Zheng Min’s conception of Chinese identity were that those 
who had subscribed to a radical break with the past, including Chinese Marxists, had 
destroyed Chinese culture. It also implied that the liberal and socialist form that Chinese 
modernity had taken in the twentieth century had somehow been a deviation from 
“Chineseness”; “authenticity” could only be recovered through a reconnection with 
Chinese tradition.
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6.4 USING “ISMS” TO DISCUSS PROBLEMS: POSTMODERNISM IN CHINA
6.4.1 Postmodernism: A Non-definition
The above explains to some extent why Zheng Min put postmodernism into use to make 
a case for the continuity of the Chinese language. However, other intellectuals who 
applied postmodernism had other objectives. Zhang Yiwu, for example, drew on 
postcolonialism in his advocacy of “Chineseness,” which was mostly a spatial concept 
that was coined to re-conceptualize the relation between China and the West. Although 
Zhang Yiwu also dealt with the relation between tradition and modernity, the topic of 
historical continuity was more implicit in his notion of “Chineseness.” Nevertheless, 
both in the instance of Zhang Yiwu and Zheng Min, the appropriation of 
postmodernism in a Chinese setting meant that the latter obtained clear nationalist traits. 
In order to answer the question of why Chinese intellectuals like Zhang Yiwu 
and Zheng Min employed postmodernism to speak for an essentialist and particularist 
stance, we have to investigate how the theory was utilized within its original frame of 
reference, an analysis that is complicated by the fact that postmodernists, like 
conservatives, denounce systematization. As several theorists have noted, it would be 
contradictory to map the disappearance of master narratives into a master narrative.1046
Günter Wohlfart phrased it succinctly when he wrote: “Well, don’t ask me the modern 
question: What is postmodern?” 1047 Because of the problem of definition, Fredric 
Jameson has denounced the use of catchphrases such as “the loss of historicity” or “the 
end of ‘master narratives’” (grand récits)—as the French philosopher Jean-François 
Lyotard put it—to define postmodernism. Instead, Jameson has identified some traits of 
postmodernism, such as the preoccupation with representation instead of with reality, 
the transformation of all the “zones of nature” into “culture,” the commodification of 
culture, the replacement of the temporal with the spatial, a new “depthlessness,” the 
weakening of historicity, and, finally, the death of the subject.1048
If we do ask the question of what postmodernism entails, it is important to 
understand the relation between its two main components, namely “post” and 
“modernism.” Although the “modernism” in “postmodernism”—which denotes the 
aesthetic revolt against convention that arose during the late nineteenth century—
1046 Jameson, Postmodernism, xi-xii; Eagleton, Illusions of Postmodernism, 21-22.
1047 Wohlfart, “Modernity and Postmodernism,” 18.
1048 Jameson, Postmodernism, ix, x, 6,15, 25.
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applies to literature and the arts, it is undoubtedly connected to “modernity” in a more 
general historical and philosophical sense. David Harvey has rightly claimed that 
postmodernism should not be understood as a mere reaction to modernism that was 
distinct from it, but as a continuation of certain elements present in modernism. As 
McHale put it, the “post” in “postmodernism” contains “an element of logical and 
historical consequence rather than sheer temporal posteriority.” 1049 Although 
postmodernists have criticized the Enlightenment reason inherent in the modernity 
project, they have also picked up its fragmented, discontinuous, and rapidly changing 
nature, since modernity also involved a “maelstrom of social change in space and 
time.”1050
Fredric Jameson has asserted that postmodernism is the “cultural logic” of “late 
capitalism,” a stage he has also referred to as “multinational capitalism.” The division 
of labor on an international scale and a new media landscape were some of the 
characteristics of this new stage of capitalism.1051 “Postmodernism is what you have 
when the modernization process is complete and nature is gone for good,” wrote Fredric 
Jameson in the early 1980s.1052 Analysts like Daniel Bell have also located postmodern 
culture within a certain type of social organization, which Bell has termed the “post-
industrial society.” Lyotard and others have linked postmodernism to new forms of 
communication in particular; they have coined the terms “spectacle or image society,” 
or “media capitalism.”1053
Given the fact that the exhaustion of modernism and the completion of 
modernization were not present in 1980s or 1990s China, some have objected to the use 
of the term postmodernism in a Chinese setting. In response, several theorists have 
invoked Ernst Bloch’s notion of “the synchronicity of the nonsynchronous” 
1049 McHale, “Change of Dominant,” 5. Emphasis in original.
1050 Ibid., 11.
1051 Fredric Jameson built his postmodernism theory on Mandel’s “three stages” theory of 
capitalism, namely “classical capitalism,” “monopoly capitalism” (Lenin’s imperialist stage), 
and “late capitalism” or “multinational capitalism.” Jameson’s usage of the term “late 
capitalism” differed from Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s application of the term. They had derived 
the concept from Grossman and Pollock, who had understood it as bureaucratic control, 
government and big business. In Jameson’s view, this was a more “Weberian” understanding of 
the term. In addition, Jameson added, the members of the Frankfurt School lived during the age 
of the “monopoly stage” of capitalism, whereas he, following Mandel, also discerned a third 
stage of capitalism, namely “multinational capitalism.”
1052Quoted in Lu, “Global POSTmodernIZATION: The Intellectual, the Artist, and China’s 
Condition,” 145-146. From Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, iv.
1053 Jameson, Postmodernism, 49.
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(Gleichzeitigkeit des Ungleichzeitigen), or the coexistence of the premodern, the 
modern, and the postmodern, to justify the usage of the theory in a Chinese 
environment. 1054 Dirlik and Zhang have claimed that it is precisely this “temporal 
desynchronization,” together with “spatial fracturing,” that justifies the use of 
postmodernism in China, a claim that has been echoed by Chinese theorists. 1055 A
Chinese analyst has vindicated the applicability of postmodernism to China with the
statement that “anything can happen at any time; so why not postmodernism?”1056
6.4.2 Postmodernism in China:  A Practical and Nationalist Edge
Regardless of whether or not the cultural logic of postmodernism corresponded to the 
Chinese socio-economic structure of the early 1990s, what can be said is that Chinese 
intellectuals used the theory to interpret social and economic changes. As such, the way 
the theory was applied in a Chinese context differed considerably from its usage in 
American and European settings. As Gloria Davies put it, whereas Western critical 
discourse “reflects on the philosophical implications of contemporary modes of 
theorizing in relation to universal ‘truths’ whose authority has been greatly 
undermined,” Chinese critical discourse focuses on “applying general formulations 
derived from these Western modes of theorizing to the resolution of practical issues 
within the mainland Chinese socio-political context.”1057 Zhang Yiwu has noted the 
reciprocity of the process: Chinese postmodernists applied theory to explain reality, and 
if the theory did not suit reality, then reality was utilized to reflect on theory.1058
With regard to Zheng Min’s argument, Davies has noted that Derrida’s 
deconstruction became “deconstructionism” (jiegou zhuyi) in a Chinese context, which 
shows that it was perceived of as a methodology and a theory. It became a “system” of 
thinking that could expose the errors of existing truth-claims and replace them with “a 
better and more rational narrative.” 1059
1054 Ibid., 307. See Ernst Bloch, “Nonsynchronism and Dialectics,” 22-38.
1055 Dirlik and Zhang, “Introduction,” 3; Lu, “Global POSTmodernIZATION,” 146.
1056 Wang Ning, “Chinese Postmodernity,” 34-35.
1057 Davies, “Chinese Intellectual Praxis,” 3. Emphasis in original.
1058 Interview with Zhang Yiwu, Beijing, July 26, 2006.
1059 Davies, Worrying about China, 22.
Whereas Derrida had employed 
“deconstruction” to question the very notion of Truth, for Zheng Min, 
“deconstructionism” was a method that could be applied to discover a different 
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Truth.1060 Western thinkers such as Derrida, de Saussure, and Lacan—although all of 
them had questioned the notion of Truth—were now invoked as spokesmen for an 
absolute Truth in the service of the critique of the Literary Revolution.1061
Whereas Zheng Min invoked postmodernism to discard the Literary Revolution, 
other Chinese intellectuals drew on the theory to explain social changes. Given the 
socialist background against which the market reforms had taken place in China, it is no 
wonder that they were perceived of as a thorough shift that required new explanatory 
models. The commercialization of Chinese society increased after Deng Xiaoping’s 
Southern Tour (nanxun) in early 1992 and after the Fourteenth Party Congress of 
October 1992, at which economic reform was designated as the focus of policy. Several 
Chinese theorists have ascribed the acceptance and popularity of postmodernism in 
China to this climate of commercialization.
Davies has 
attributed Chinese intellectuals’ quest for absolute truth both to their feeling of moral 
responsibility and to the inheritance of the Marxist-Leninist framework of discussion. 
1062 The mainland intellectual Wang 
Yuechuan has further declared that in China, postmodernism was conceived of as being 
related to abrupt political, economic, and cultural transitions. Therefore, Wang 
Yuechuan thinks it is more suitable to regard the Chinese postmodern as a “problem 
aggregate” than to treat it as an “ism,” a faction, or a fad.1063
Although postmodernism was highly popular in China during the 1990s because 
of the social transformations described above, it had already been discussed during the 
early 1980s, against the background of a modernist revival in literature. An important 
vehicle for the introduction of postmodern theories during the 1980s was the journal 
Culture: China and the World, which featured articles on Michel Foucault, Jacques 
Derrida, Fredric Jameson, and others.
What all these elements 
indicate, then, is that postmodernism in China was put into use to discuss practical 
problems and to interpret changing social realities.
1064 In spite of this, the theory only gained clarity 
when Fredric Jameson delivered a series of lectures on postmodernism at Peking 
University and Shenzhen University in 1985.1065
1060 Ibid., 22, 29, 31.
1061 Ibid., 52-53.
1062 Wang Ning, “Chinese Postmodernity,” 33; Fan Xing, “Fulu,” 282.
1063 Wang Yuechuan, “Xuyan,” 1-3, 6-8.
1064 Xu Jilin, “The Fate of an Enlightenment,” 193.
In these lectures, Jameson explained 
1065 Jameson’s lectures appeared under the title Hou xiandai zhuyi yu wenhua lilun 
(Postmodernism and cultural theory) (Xi’an: Shaanxi shifan daxue chubanshe, 1987). Fokkema 
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his thesis that postmodernism was a manifestation of the “cultural logic” of “late 
capitalism.” To an audience that was familiar with Marxism and that was caught up in a 
large social transition, Jameson’s analysis sparked interest. After that, lectures by other 
famous scholars followed, and the main works of important theorists of 
postmodernism—among them Jürgen Habermas, Ihab Hassan, Jean-François Lyotard, 
Linda Hutcheon, and William Spanos—were translated into Chinese.1066 Some Chinese 
thinkers have pointed out that the characteristics of relativism and language games of 
postmodernism resembled the Daoism of Laozi and Zhuangzi, which facilitated its 
reception. 1067 Yue Daiyun has further noted that postmodernism in China was also 
associated with a resistance to authority and with the embrace of a plurality of 
viewpoints.1068
As already mentioned in Zhang Yiwu’s contribution to the debate on language 
reform, in China, the debate on postmodernism became intertwined with the debate on 
postcolonialism. Wang Hui has noted that this happened when Edward Said’s notion of 
“Orientalism” reached Chinese audiences in 1993.1069 Samuel Huntington’s 1993 article 
“The Clash of Civilizations?” also triggered debates on Chinese cultural identity vis-à-
vis the West. Between 1994 and 1995, Huntington’s article provoked debates on 
postcolonialism, nationalism, and globalization in journals such as Dushu (Reading) and 
Tianya (Horizon). 1070
and Bertens’ Approaching Postmodernism was translated into Chinese in 1991 as Zouxiang hou 
xiandai zhuyi, trans. Wang Ning  (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 1991). 
1066 Douwe Fokkema gave lectures at Nanjing University and Nanjing Normal University in 
1987; in 1993, he held lectures at Peking University. Also in 1993, Jameson lectured in Beijing 
and Shanghai, and Hans Bertens spoke at a conference on postmodernism in Beijing.
1067 Yue Daiyun, “Western Literary Theory,” 113. In an interview, when talking about the 
persons who had inspired her, the poetess Zheng Min mentioned Derrida, Laozi and Zhuangzi 
in the same breath. Interview with Zheng Min, Beijing, July 6, 2006.
1068 Interview with Yue Daiyun, Beijing, July 12, 2006.
1069 Wang Hui, China’s New Order, 190, fn. 10. See Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1978). For some discussions on Edward Said, see Dushu 9 (1993), Dushu 10
(1994), Tianya 2 (1996), Tianya 4 (1996), and Dushu 8 (1996). Although the interest in Said 
only became widespread in 1993, some had discussed the concept of “Orientalism” before that 
time. Fan Xing, for example, has noted that the concept occurred in a text by Zhang Jingyuan in 
the first issue of Wenxue pinglun in 1990. See Fan Xing, “Fulu,” 297-298.
1070 Wang Hui, China’s New Order, 94. For some reactions on Huntington’s theory between 
1994 and 1998, see Margaret Sleeboom, Academic Nationalism, 33, fn. 43.
Other Chinese analysts have also claimed that in China, 
postmodernism was related to the issue of the “‘decolonization’ of Asian indigenous 
cultures and literary discourses” or to “the question of Chineseness in relation to the 
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Eurocentric narrative of history, modernization, and capital.”1071 In Yue Daiyun’s view, 
postcolonialism became entangled with a debate on cultural identity in which race, 
language and history formed the basis of “cultural clusters.”1072
Why, then, did postmodernism and postcolonialism become entwined with 
nationalism in a Chinese context? Part of the explanation is that in China, 
postmodernism was not a reflection on modernity as such, but on modernity as a 
Western product. Some authors have also made this argument for Chinese conservatism: 
Chinese conservatism was not just a criticism of Enlightenment or modernity as a 
general construct; it criticized a Western modernity. This is why Alitto has insisted that 
conservatism in China obtained nationalist traits, as discussed in the previous chapter. 
As Haun Saussy has pointed out, Chinese postmodernists denounced “modernist, 
cosmopolitan legitimation-devices”; “the rejection of existing modes of legitimation is 
doubled with the identification of these modes as specifically Western.” 1073 The 
Chinese encounter with modernity was a double-edged sword: from the beginning, it 
was at the same time a project of anti-modernity—Wang Hui has referred to modern 
Chinese thought as marked by an “antimodern theory of modernization”—since 
modernity was perceived as belonging to the West.1074 A similar point was made by 
Arif Dirlik and Zhang Xudong, who raised the question of the experience of modernity 
for those “who were compelled into modernity by Euro-American coercion.” 1075
6.4.3 Beyond Cultural Nationalism: Reflections on Chinese Modernity
Although China was never colonized, the experience of the Opium Wars and the influx 
of Western ideas explain why some expressed feelings of cultural colonization. 
As with manifestations of Chinese conservatism, there was more to postmodernism than 
nationalist and anti-Western elements. Although the nationalist element was certainly 
present in Zheng Min’s argument, the fact that she engaged with a revaluation of May 
Fourth also meant that she tackled the problem of Chinese modernity and its break with 
the past. As Gloria Davies has rightly noted, Chinese discourse was nationalistic 
1071 Wang Ning, “Chinese Postmodernity,” 34; Lu, “Global POSTmodernIZATION,” 151.
1072 Yue Daiyun, “Western Literary Theory,” 114.
1073 Saussy, “Postmodernism in China,” 130, 131.
1074 Wang Hui, China’s New Order, 150.
1075 Dirlik and Zhang, “Introduction,” 2.
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because it dealt with core issues related to the national well-being.1076
Chinese postmodernism also reflected on a Chinese modernity that had been 
both liberal and socialist. Concerning liberal modernity, as explained throughout the 
previous chapters, the 1980s had witnessed a revival of the May Fourth spirit and the 
quest for science and democracy. After the failure of the “second Enlightenment” in 
1989, intellectuals turned to new modes of discourse; they questioned the strategy of 
direct confrontation of the late 1980s. Consequently, the discourse on postmodernism in 
1990s China also needs to be understood as a reaction against the “Chinese 
Enlightenment” of the 1980s and of the May Fourth era. In his introduction to a 
collection of debates on postmodernism in 1990s China, Wang Hui has included the 
response to 1989 as one of the four characteristics of postmodernism in a Chinese 
context. The other traits were that postmodernism in China was not really concerned 
with the theory in a Western context, that it was not restricted to mainland China, and 
that there was no consensus on what it entailed, neither among advocates nor among 
critics.
This, however, 
did not mean that the only interest of Chinese intellectuals was the relation between 
China and the West; their concern with the national well-being translated itself into 
ruminations that surpassed the topic of cultural nationalism proper. 
1077
Especially the fact that postmodernism in China was a response to 1989 needs to 
be taken into consideration here, because it links the debates on postmodernism to 
rejections of “radicalism”: both started as reflections on the events of June fourth, 1989, 
but they also questioned the May Fourth legacy as a whole. For liberal critics, 
postmodernism abandoned the modernity project of human rights, liberty, and 
democracy of the 1980s. Nevertheless, reflections on Chinese modernity also partially 
overlapped with the critique of Western modernity, since the ideals of science and 
democracy were perceived of as Western ideals. As Liu Kang put it, postmodernist 
critics accused 1980s intellectuals of “blindly subscribing to the Western Enlightenment 
discourse of the ‘grand narratives’ about ‘modernity’ and ‘nation-state.’”1078
Both reflections on “radicalism” and the discourse on postmodernism in China 
also engaged with a Chinese modernity that had been thoroughly revolutionary. As 
Dirlik and Zhang have noted, “postmodern” also meant “postsocialist” and 
1076 Davies, Worrying about China, 32.
1077 Sheng, “Traveling Theory,” 122-123. From Wang Hui, “Bianzhe qianyan,” v-vii. 
1078 Liu Kang, “Debate About Modernity,” 212. 
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“postrevolutionary.” As argued above, since the “post” also entailed the inheritance of 
and the connection with modernity, when applied to China, postmodernism was both 
anti-revolutionary and the inheritor of socialist traces. Consequently, “postmodernity 
itself may serve as a site of struggle between the legacy of the past and the forces of the 
present.”1079 Zhang Yiwu has not labeled postmodernism “anti-revolutionary,” but he 
has applied the term “de-revolution” (jie geming) instead. He has further contended that 
Chinese postmodernists put the theory into use to reflect on Chinese modernity as a 
whole; revolution and socialism constituted an important aspect of this whole.1080 From 
a socialist perspective, both reflections on “radicalism” and postmodernism can be said 
to have moved away from topics such as revolution, class, and state; they were 
“culturalist” and “idealist” currents of thought. A good example of the engagement with 
“revolution” in the discourse on postmodernism was an article by the U.S.-based 
scholar Guo Jian in which the latter reminded Chinese “post-ists” that Jameson had 
been inspired by the nightmarish Cultural Revolution. 1081
The debate on postmodernism in China challenged the socialist monopoly on 
what constituted “Chineseness.” As Dirlik and Zhang have asserted, postmodernism 
was based on the notion of a global market that challenged the socialist state; different 
“temporalities” and regional groups threatened this notion of the nation-state further.
For this reason, like the 
debate on “radicalism,” postmodernism in China also engaged in a dialogue with 
socialism and revolution. 
1082
As Sheng Anfeng has noted, in the debate on postmodernism, “the eager involvement of 
the overseas Chinese scholars betrayed the tension caused by a different context.”1083
Both Dirlik and Pickowicz have made use of the term “postsocialism” in relation 
to postmodernism. Whereas Dirlik has applied the term to denote the official policy of 
As discussed in the previous chapters, critics of “radicalism,” such as the overseas 
intellectual Yü Ying-shih, also confronted socialist and geographically based notions of 
“Chineseness” by redefining identity in cultural terms. 
1079 Dirlik and Zhang, “Introduction,” 7-8.
1080 Interview with Zhang Yiwu, Beijing, July 26, 2006.
1081 Guo Jian, “Wenge sichao yu ‘houxue,’” EYS 35 (June 1996), 116-122.
1082 Dirlik and Zhang, “Introduction,” 3.
1083 Sheng, “Traveling Theory,” 123. 
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“socialism with Chinese characteristics,” Pickowicz understood it as a loss of faith in 
socialism on behalf of the masses.1084
The postsocialist condition exists only in cultures that have functioned for significant 
periods of time as traditional socialist societies. That is, postsocialism presupposes 
socialism. (…) Postsocialism involves a perception among ordinary people at the 
bottom that socialism has failed, that it is not the solution to what ails society, but 
rather the very cause. The general sense is that Leninist parties that have been in power 
for decades are inherently incapable of reforming society. Postsocialism, in brief, 
involves a massive loss of faith.
According to Pickowicz,
1085
As Wang Chaohua has noted, in China, postmodernism did not so much direct 
itself against capitalism as it had done in Jameson’s account of the “cultural logic” of 
“late capitalism.” Seen against the backdrop of Chinese socialism, postmodernist 
culture was perceived of as a “new space of popular freedom.”
What the embrace of commercial culture signified, then, was not a lack of criticism on 
behalf of intellectuals—as some Leftist critics have suggested—but a way to convey the 
loss of faith in socialism. Postmodernism, like rejections of “radicalism,” was also a 
“goodbye to revolution.” Although the official embrace of “socialism with Chinese 
characteristics” was also a farewell to revolution in practice, as official reactions to 
rejections of “radicalism” in the previous chapters have demonstrated, there were limits 
to the official notion of “postsocialism”; revolution was relegated to the past, but it was 
not banned altogether. “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” was a reworking of 
socialism, not a denial of it. The embrace of commercial culture by postmodernists, on 
the other hand, was an implicit criticism of a socialist modernity that was branded by 
revolution.
1086
1084 Arif Dirlik first used the term in “Postsocialism?: Reflections on ‘Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics,’” 362-384. Pickowicz applied the term to analyze three movies of the 1980s by 
director Huang Jianxin in “Huang Jianxin and the Notion of Postsocialism,” 57-87.
1085 Pickowicz, “Postsocialism,” 63.
1086 Wang, “Introduction,” 21.
In a similar vein, Yue 
Daiyun has stated that some promoted the multiple perspectives in postmodernism on 
the ground that it was better suited to explain the chaos of the last decades. After the
ideological rigidity of the Cultural Revolution especially, it was no wonder that some 
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turned to a more flexible approach. Especially those who had grown up during the 
Cultural Revolution were drawn to deconstructionism.1087
All this goes to show that both postmodernism and conservatism in China were 
not merely united in their “anti-Western” stance, as scholars such as the German 
political scientist Gunter Schubert have claimed. For Schubert, postmodernism 
challenged a unilinear Western modernity, and this is how it was connected with the 
“nationalist conservatism” of the 1990s. 1088 Other critics have also related 
postmodernism to a “neo-conservatism” that was understood as “anti-Westernism” and 
“nationalism.” 1089
6.5 “NEO-CONSERVATISM” AND POSTMODERNISM
Nevertheless, as indicated above, implicit in the debate on 
postmodernism was an engagement with both 1989 and the revolutionary identity of 
twentieth-century China. This engagement connected postmodernism in China with the 
debates on “radicalism,” debates that also constituted a dialogue with both 1989 and
with socialism. 
6.5.1 Zhao Yiheng and Mainland “Post-isms”
In the debate on postmodernism that followed from the arguments as put forward by 
Zheng Min and Zhang Yiwu, overseas Chinese critics also applied the term “neo-
conservatism” as a label to refer to an uncritical outlook that amounted to a 
confirmation of the cultural and political status quo. 1090
Zhao Yiheng (b. 1943), also known as Henry Zhao, a senior lecturer in modern 
Chinese literature at the University of London, launched an assault on the paradox of 
“post-isms” (houxue)—postcolonialism, postmodernism, and poststructuralism—in the 
service of what he termed the “neo-conservative trend” in Chinese intellectual 
In this “commonsense” 
approach to the concept, none of the participants considered the fact that the theory did 
engage with Chinese modernity and socialism; participants argued instead that the 
theory merely suited official interests and ignored Chinese problems.
1087 Yue Daiyun, “Western Literary Theory,” 112-113.
1088 Schubert, “Neokonservativismus,” 67.
1089 See Yang Chunshi, “Xin baoshou zhuyi yu xin lixing zhuyi,” ZFL, 487.
1090 The main texts of the debate were collected in Wang Hui and Yu Guoliang, eds., Jiushi 
niandai de houxue lunzheng (Xianggang: Xianggang Zhongwen daxue, 1998).
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circles.1091 Zhao Yiheng presented his argument at the 1995 International Conference 
on Cultural Studies: China and the West in Dalian, at which scholars such as Terry 
Eagleton and Jonathan Arac were present; his contribution to the conference appeared 
in the February 1995 issue of Twenty-first Century. 1092 The “neo-conservative” 
appropriation of postmodernism in a Chinese environment was an oddity for Zhao 
Yiheng because in the West, critics had accused postmodernism of being “too radical.” 
Zhao raised the question of whether this reconfiguration in a Chinese context had 
occurred because the discussants randomly used whatever theories came their way, or 
whether it could be attributed to some particular traits of postmodern theories. 1093
In his condemnation of “neo-conservatism,” Zhao Yiheng targeted Zheng Min 
for having made use of “new theories” to strengthen an “old perspective on an old 
problem,” namely conservative criticism of May Fourth.
Although Zhao Yiheng was critical of “post-isms” in general, his fierce critique of the 
specific circumstances under which mainland critics operated seemed to suggest that the 
answer contained both aspects.
1094 Zhao also considered 
“national studies” and the affirmation of popular commercial culture by mainland 
intellectuals to be aspects of a “neo-conservative trend.”1095 Like other liberals, Zhao 
Yiheng used the label “neo-conservatism” in an overtly negative sense, although he 
insisted that the term did not have a negative connotation—“conservatism” was merely 
the opposite of “critique” (pipan). 1096 Mainland intellectuals’ abandonment of their 
elitist stance and the responsibilities it entailed—the concern for the state, the nation, 
and humanity—Zhao claimed, constituted the main characteristic of “neo-
conservatism.” Stated differently, Zhao Yiheng conceived of elite culture as a 
progressive and “radical” or “critical” force, whereas the embrace of mass culture only 
signified the decline of culture.1097
1091 Zhao Yiheng, “‘Houxue’ yu Zhongguo xin baoshou zhuyi,” EYS 27 (February 1995), 4-15.
A slightly different version of the article appeared in ZFL, 343-356, under the title “‘Houxue,’ 
xin baoshou zhuyi yu wenhua pipan.”
1092 The papers presented at the conference appeared in New Literary History 28:1 (Winter 
1997).
1093 Zhao Yiheng, “‘Houxue’ yu Zhongguo xin baoshou zhuyi,” 5.
1094 Ibid.
1095 See the conversation between Chen Xiaoming, Zhang Yiwu, Dai Jinhua, and Zhu Wei, 
“Dongfang zhuyi he houzhimin zhuyi,” Zhongshan 88 (1994:1), 126-148.
1096 Zhao Yiheng, “‘Houxue,’ xin baoshou zhuyi yu wenhua piping,” ZFL, 344. 
1097 Davies, Worrying about China, 97-98.
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In this context of the criticism of commercialization and the praise of the elitist 
position of intellectuals of the 1980s, Zhao Yiheng referred to the debate on the “loss of 
the humanist spirit” that was conducted in journals such as Shanghai wenxue (Shanghai 
Literature) and Dushu (Reading) in 1993 and 1994.1098 In this debate, one group of 
intellectuals, whose main representatives were the literary historian Wang Xiaoming 
and the literary scholar Chen Sihe, asserted that the 1990s had witnessed the loss of 
what they called the “humanist spirit” (renwen jingshen), or the embrace of “ultimate 
concerns” (zhongji guanhuai) that Zhao Yiheng had lauded in his criticism of “neo-
conservatism.”1099 Wang Xiaoming summarized the debate as a debate on the crisis in 
culture and the loss of existential meaning; the advocacy of the “humanist spirit” or 
ultimate concerns was thus nothing less than “the self-saving action of intellectuals.”1100
These intellectuals fiercely opposed the commercialization of society and argued in 
favor of the continuation of the ultimate ideals of the 1980s. The works of the “two 
Zhangs,” the authors Zhang Wei and Zhang Chengzhi, have also been read as 
expressions of this preoccupation with the “humanist spirit,” although neither of them 
took part in the debate in Dushu.1101
The opposite standpoint in the debate, that of an embrace of the liberating 
effects of the market and mass culture, was reflected in the writings of the “two 
Wangs,” the former Minister of Culture Wang Meng, and the novelist Wang Shuo.1102
1098 For an overview of the key articles in the “humanist spirit” debate, which, apart from the 
journals mentioned above, also appeared in the journals Dongfang, Shanghai wenhua, Tansuo 
yu zhengming, Xiandai yu chuantong, and Wenyi zhengming, see Wang Xiaoming, Renwen 
jingshen xunsi lu (Shanghai: Wenhui chubanshe, 1996).
1099 Barmé, In the Red, 284.
1100 Wang Xiaoming, Renwen jingshen xunsi lu, 272, 273.
1101 Both Zhang Wei and Zhang Chengzhi have often been identified as proponents of a 
“cultural conservatism,” which in this case signified moral idealism and aesthetic romanticism. 
For an example of the analysis of these authors’ and others’ works as manifestations of “cultural 
conservatism,” see Ye Fang, Lun jiushi niandai wenxue zhong de wenhua baoshou zhuyi,
Wuhan daxue, MA thesis, 2001; Lan Aiguo, “Shijimo wenxue: wenhua baoshou zhuyi sichao,” 
Wenyi zhengming 1994:6, 34-37.
1102 In 1993, Wang Meng’s article “Shunning the Sublime” was published in Reading. In this 
article, Wang lauded the arrival of the market and the cultural pluralism it had brought. See 
Wang Meng, “Duobi chonggao,” Dushu 1993:1, 10-17. For a collection of the main articles in 
the debate surrounding Wang Meng’s article, see Ding Dong and Sun Min, eds., Shiji zhi jiao de 
chongzhuang: Wang Meng xianxiang zhengminglu (Beijing: Guangming ribao chubanshe, 
1995). On Wang Meng, see Barmé, In the Red, 287-296. On the “humanist spirit” debate, see 
ibid., 283-286, 296-297.
For these intellectuals, consumer society was good because it meant a departure from 
the political authoritarianism of the Mao era; it was a move toward economic prosperity 
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and cultural pluralism. The works of the novelist Wang Shuo showed traits of cynicism, 
a criticism of authoritarianism, and a repudiation of ideology and ideals; the flawless 
exemplary figures of the revolutionary era were exchanged for the liumang, a term that 
included “everything from hooligans to alienated youth, individualists, and 
unscrupulous entrepreneurs.”1103
In another article in Twenty-first Century, Zhao Yiheng also elaborated on the 
conformist and non-critical aspect of postmodernism: it preferred quantity to quality 
and confirmed contemporary culture.
The stand of Zhang Yiwu and others, then, according 
to which the commercialization of Chinese society was part of a move toward a “post-
new era,” overlapped with that of intellectuals like the “two Wangs” because it also 
praised the liberating effects of mass culture. 
1104 In this text, Zhao Yiheng also clarified that his 
point was not to label some people “conservatives,” but to demonstrate that there was a
“neo-conservative” trend in 1990s China. Still elsewhere, Zhao explained that 
poststructuralism for him signified the end of the 1980s’ narrative; postmodernism 
implied the reign of commercialization, and postcolonialism was a resistance to 
Western-style discourse. 1105 Given Zhao Yiheng’s broad conception of “neo-
conservatism,” Zhang Yiwu criticized the former because his understanding of “post-
isms” in fact covered all cultural phenomena of the 1990s.1106
6.5.2 Postmodernism and Conservatism: Friends or Foes?
According to Zhao Yiheng’s interpretation, postmodernism was a “radical” theory that 
had miraculously turned “conservative” in Chinese circumstances. Zhao Yiheng’s 
argument revealed that the tactic of simplistic dualisms was employed once again in 
order to portray the “neo-conservative” trend, including postmodernism, as a negative 
phenomenon. Just like Chen Lai had made a simplistic distinction between the “value 
rationality” of “conservatives” and the “instrumental rationality” of “radicals,” Zhao 
Yiheng portrayed Chinese postmodernism as a manifestation of an uncritical “neo-
1103 Barmé, In the Red, 63-98. Reference from 73.
1104 Zhao Yiheng, “Wenhua pipan yu houxiandai zhuyi lilun,” EYS 31 (October 1995), 148-151. 
See 149 in particular.
1105 Zhao Yiheng, “Ruhe miandui dangjin Zhongguo wenhua xianzhuang: haineiwai dalu 
xuezhe de yichang bianlun,” ZFL, 357-367. See 359-361 in particular. Originally published in 
Wenyi zhengming, 1996: 5.
1106 Zhang Yiwu, “Chaoyue wenhua lunzhan: fansi jiushi niandai wenhua de xin shidian,” 98-
103. See 100, fn. 3 in particular.
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conservatism,” and he opposed this to the “radical” nature of the theory in a Western 
setting. Yet Zhao Yiheng’s simplification overlooked the fact that, in its initial context, 
postmodernism had contained both critical and uncritical aspects; what happened in the 
Chinese environment was a continuation of these two tendencies. 
In its initial context, the critical and radical element of postmodernism had been 
that it deconstructed meta-narratives and made room for the petites histoires, whether in 
the form of differences in gender, sexuality, or race. But at the same time, this is where 
its “conservative” aspect was situated: if all that was left was a myriad of variations, 
there was no room for political engagement, which is why both Marxists and liberals 
have denounced postmodernism for its political quietism and its rejection of political 
ideals. In a Chinese context, then, the critical aspect of postmodernism was translated 
into reflections on both the 1980s and socialism; the main narrative of twentieth-century 
Chinese history was questioned because it had led to a break with Chinese tradition. 
Conversely, this made room for the uncritical element of postmodernism, namely the 
end of political engagement and the conversion of the stress on particularity into an 
essentialist defense of “Chineseness.” 
In the sense of “preserving the status quo,” Marxist critics had applied the label 
“conservative” to postmodernism long before Zhao Yiheng made use of it to blame 
mainland Chinese intellectuals in particular. Terry Eagleton, for example, had 
maintained that postmodernism ended up being conformist, because instead of 
struggling against the inherent contradictions of modernity, it merely affirmed them and 
gave them free reign. A “radical epistemology” could result in “conservative politics,” 
for postmodernists engaged in discourses that had no concrete or direct political 
results.1107 Or, as Harvey has phrased it: “The rhetoric of postmodernism is dangerous 
for it avoids confronting the realities of political economy and the circumstances of 
global power.”1108 Fredric Jameson has also noted that the “critical distance” needed in 
cultural politics might have been abolished under postmodernism. Both cultural 
criticism and political resistance seemed to have become “secretly disarmed and 
reabsorbed by a system of which they themselves might well be considered a part, since 
they can achieve no distance from it.”1109
1107 Eagleton, Illusions of Postmodernism, 14.
1108 Harvey, Condition of Postmodernity, 117.
1109 Jameson, Postmodernism, 48-49.
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Arif Dirlik has questioned the “radical” nature of postcolonial criticism in 
particular; it was “antirevolutionary” for several reasons. Firstly, the “post” relegated 
both colonialism and its structures to the past, which concealed both its origins and the 
struggles against it. Secondly, in accordance with the criticism by Eagleton and 
Jameson, postcolonialism ended up replacing the metararratives it wanted to abolish 
with a new metanarrative because it erased structures and therefore differences. Third, 
by attacking “Eurocentrism” rather than “capitalism” it in fact lined up with the global 
forces of capitalism. Lastly, Third World postcolonial critics had themselves become 
part of centers of power.1110
Whereas these assessments focused on the lack of political engagement and the 
confirmation of the status quo inherent in postmodernism, some authors have also 
pointed out the philosophical communalities between postmodernism and conservatism 
as a “style of thought.” As already indicated above, like conservatism, postmodernism 
found fault with Enlightenment reason and abstract thought, which is why Zheng Min 
opted for postmodernism in her plea for the continuity of the Chinese language. In 
1980, Jürgen Habermas dismissed both Derrida and Foucault as “young conservatives” 
because of their disapproval of modernity. In his lectures on modernity, which were 
published in 1985 as The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, Habermas held that 
both “neo-conservatives” and postmodernists had abandoned the “tradition of reason in 
which European modernity once understood itself.”1111
Habermas’ point that conservatism and postmodernism shared a common 
enemy—namely, Enlightenment rationalism—has also been made by Bruce 
Pilbeam.
The distinction between the two 
was that postmodernists discarded both social and cultural modernity, whereas “neo-
conservatives” only rejected cultural modernity. 
1112
1110 Dirlik, “Reversals,” 274-275. See also Dirlik, “The Postcolonial Aura,” 328-356.
1111 Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, 4. 
1112 Pilbeam, “Conservatism and Postmodernism,” 42-43.
In postmodernism, Pilbeam explained, the attack on Cartesian rationalism 
and its “blueprint aspirations” manifested itself in what Lyotard has termed the  
“incredulity towards metanarratives”; the relative and the contingent were preferred to 
the absolute and the universal. Conservative critics from Edmund Burke onwards had 
also attacked the Cartesian subject as the architect of the ideal society, thereby ignoring 
the limits of man’s reason and his moral imperfection. Because of this theoretical 
affinity, it was paradoxical that postmodernism and conservatism denounced each other 
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in practice. The reason why they refused to join forces despite theoretical similarities 
was, according to Pilbeam, that practically, conservatives regarded postmodern theories 
as a challenge to traditional values and institutions. Nevertheless, Pilbeam concluded 
that “postmodern conservatism” was not an oxymoronic project. 
Some China specialists have echoed these claims on the common anti-
Enlightenment stance of conservatism and postmodernism. Torbjörn Lodén, a Professor 
of Chinese at Stockholm University, for example, has similarly questioned the “radical” 
nature of postmodernism in a Western context. Western postmodernism took a stand 
against the concept of “progress”; it was a response to the Leftist radicalism of the 
1960s and 1970s. Authorities such as Heidegger and Lyotard were conservative rather 
than radical because they stood up to Enlightenment rationalism.1113 Guy Alitto, the 
author of the book on Liang Shuming who has been discussed in the previous chapter, 
has also contended that postmodernism and conservatism were both anti-modernity 
theories. After World War Two, the criticism of the Enlightenment spirit of 
rationalization that conservatives had expressed since the eighteenth century was 
continued in the form of postmodernism.1114
The “paradox” of a Chinese postmodernism in the service of “neo-
conservatism” is less great than Zhao Yiheng presents it; rather than a 
“misappropriation” of a theory that was essentially “radical,” the Chinese case can be 
interpreted as a development of certain tendencies that were inherent in the 
contradictory nature of postmodernism. In fact, Zhao Yiheng has partly admitted that 
postmodernism was a conservative theory in se:  Zhao called cultural theory a form of 
“tribalism” (buzuhua) because it safeguarded group interests.1115 According to Jonathan 
Arac, for Zhao Yiheng, postcolonial criticism was an attempt to create a non-Western 
world that was specified by an “indigenous discourse and values, and a ‘pretourist’ 
culture in its uncontaminated, fundamental state.”1116
As to why postmodernism and conservatism managed to join forces at that 
particular point in time, Pilbeam has remarked that, in a post-communist order, the 
demise of the Left might arouse more congeniality of conservatives toward 
1113 Wan Zhi, “‘Houxue’ pipan de pipan,” EYS 31 (October 1995), 144-146. Reference from 
146.
1114 Alitto, lecture on “Postmodernism,” Peking University, June 27, 2006. 
1115 Zhao Yiheng, “‘Houxue’ yu Zhongguo xin baoshou zhuyi,” 11.
1116 Arac, “Postmodernism and Postmodernity in China,” 140.
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postmodernism. The old demarcation lines have been eradicated, and conservatism 
might, in a new strain of self-confidence, feel less threatened by the practical 
implications of postmodernism.1117
6.5.3 Postmodernism and Official Ideology
Against the background of “de-revolution,” it was 
easier for the theories to merge. As regards Zheng Min, she certainly did not feel 
threatened by the implications of postmodernism. On the contrary, she perceived of her 
own stance as pluralist instead of conservative. 
As Saussy has rightly noted, Zhao Yiheng’s evaluation of Zheng Min’s text overlooked 
the “revisionary force” of her argument. 1118
Likewise, postmodernism in China was not an uncritical confirmation of 
commercialism; it was also an expression of “de-revolution,” as Zhang Yiwu has 
phrased it. Given this state of affairs, the fusion between postmodernism and 
nationalism in China did not always suit official interests, although there were some 
elements that came in handy from an official point of view. An example mentioned by 
both Guo Yingjie and Yue Daiyun concerns the stress on “colonization” in 
postmodernism, a term that was also utilized in official propaganda.
By interpreting conservatism as a mere 
defense of the cultural status quo, Zhao Yiheng ignored the fact that Zheng Min’s 
argument for cultural continuity and her location of Chinese identity in Chinese culture 
was a move away from a revolutionary identity based on breaks with the past. The focal 
point of the nature of postmodern theories distracted attention from Zheng Min’s 
revaluation of the May Fourth Movement and of Chinese modernity in general. Given 
this revisionist element in Zheng Min’s argument, pace Zhao Yiheng, it cannot simply 
be dismissed as a manifestation of an uncritical “neo-conservatism” that merely 
confirmed the status quo and that suited official interests. 
1119
1117 Pilbeam, “Conservatism and Postmodernism,” 35.
1118 Saussy, “Postmodernism in China,” 138.
1119 Yue Daiyun, “Western Literary Theory,” 114.
According to 
Yue Daiyun, the postcolonialists’ argument that the concepts of democracy, freedom, 
and human rights had to be denounced because they were part of a Western ideological 
framework suited the government’s criticism of “peaceful evolution” and spiritual 
pollution in particular. 
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On the other hand, there was also a tension between the cultural nationalism of 
postmodernists and official nationalism in that, as Guo Yingjie phrased it, “what 
constitutes Chineseness in the cultural nationalists’ imagination generally excludes 
socialist ideas and practices.”1120 Moreover, as Guo Yingjie has also pointed out, the 
“anti-imperialism” in official propaganda differed from the attack on imperialism in 
postcolonial discourse. Whereas the former’s critique of “colonial culture” went back to 
Mao Zedong, the latter relied on Western postcolonial theories. Moreover, the former 
was especially concerned with the negative effects of colonialism, whereas the latter 
interpreted colonialism first and foremost as a discursive practice.1121
This ambiguous relation between postmodernism and official ideology was in 
accordance with the complex relation between intellectual practice and official policy 
during the 1990s, as demonstrated throughout the previous chapters. This relation could 
neither be depicted as a relation of “complicity,” nor as a relation of dual opposition. As 
Michelle Yeh has remarked, during the 1980s, Western theories were still perceived of 
as “oppositional” in a Chinese context, whereas during the 1990s, they were interpreted 
by some overseas critics as supportive of the government. Michelle Yeh has made use 
of Chen Xiaomei’s theory of “Occidentalism” to illustrate what this perceived shift 
entailed.1122 In Chen Xiaomei’s analysis, “Occidentalism” was “a discursive practice” 
of constructing the Western Other that enabled the Orient to “participate actively and 
with indigenous creativity in the process of self-appropriation.”1123 Chen Xiaomei has 
distinguished between two discursive practices during the 1980s: “official 
Occidentalism,” and “anti-official Occidentalism.” The Chinese government used the 
former in the service of nationalism and in order to dominate the Chinese people at 
home. “Anti-official Occidentalism,” on the other hand, was applied by members of the 
intelligentsia for the purpose of political liberation.1124
The logic of the overseas Chinese critics implies that the usage of postmodern 
theories in China during the 1990s, because of its nationalist traits, would be in line 
with Chen Xiaomei’s “official Occidentalism” of the 1980s. Michelle Yeh has rightly 
asserted that this interpretation is too simplistic; the framework of “official” versus 
1120 Guo, Cultural Nationalism, 109.
1121 Ibid., 111.
1122 Xiaomei Chen, Occidentalism: A Theory of Counter-Discourse in Post-Mao China (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1995).  
1123 Ibid., 4-5.
1124 Ibid., 5, 8.
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“anti-official” does not apply to 1990s China because of the conditions of 
commercialization, the rise of popular culture, and the concomitant development of a 
private sphere.1125 Chen Xiaomei has also noted that she employed the terms “official” 
and “non-official” in a strategic sense, in order to explain a reality that was much more 
complex. Both forms overlapped in practice.1126
Guo Yingjie has also declared that, especially since 1989, there was “a large 
degree of congruence and convergence” between “official Occidentalism” and “anti-
official Occidentalism.”
As demonstrated throughout this study, 
intellectual trends based on Western concepts or ideas, although at first sight they 
appeared to be examples of an “official” Occidentalism, more often than not, they also 
contained elements of an “anti-official” Occidentalism. “Neo-conservatism” can serve 
as an example of this complexity: although its argument for stability and political 
centralization certainly served official interests, at the same time, its implicit rejection 
of revolution posed a challenge to the very legitimacy of the CCP. 
1127 Similarly, Zhang Xudong has noted that some critics of 
postmodernism had wrongly turned it into “a forced reductionist choice between 
socialism and capitalism, despotism and liberal democracy, state command and free 
market, ‘official’ and ‘unofficial,’ popular culture and elitism, right and wrong.”1128
Another objection to Zhao Yiheng’s accusation of the conspiracy between 
postmodernists and officials was that intellectuals such as Zhang Yiwu, as one critic 
phrased it, “could be active only within very limited critical and academic circles that 
are far from the official discourse and mainstream ideology.” 1129
6.6 FROM HISTORY TO “GEOGRAPHICAL DETERMINISM”
As a humanistic 
scholar based at a university, Zhang Yiwu had little political impact. Moreover, as 
argued in the introduction, many intellectuals were concerned with transmitting the 
truth about their object of research rather than with their relation to policy circles. 
6.6.1 Uncritical Confirmation of the Present, or Dialogue with the Past?
Other Chinese scholars who were located both on mainland China and in the United 
States shared Zhao Yiheng’s conviction that mainland Chinese postmodernism was a 
1125 Yeh, “International Theory,” 259, 274.
1126 Chen, Occidentalism, 24-25.
1127 Guo, Cultural Nationalism, 129. 
1128 Zhang Xudong, “Epilogue,” 420. 
1129 Wang Ning, “The Mapping of Chinese Postmodernity,” 40, fn. 42.
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distortion of “radical” and critical theories. They attributed this misappropriation of the 
theory to the political circumstances of mainland China in particular, which resulted in a 
politicized and ahistorical debate on postmodernism, in which the incipient reflections 
on modernity of Zheng Min and Zhang Yiwu were replaced with accusations of 
political appeasement. The consequence of the merging of Zheng Min’s revaluation of 
May Fourth with the debate on postmodernism was thus that true historical reflections 
in accordance with Zheng Min’s concern with historical continuity were forestalled. As 
Davies put it, in this battle between mainland and overseas intellectuals, the physical 
location of intellectuals became a factor to judge the authenticity of their concerns.1130
Some examples of this focus on the physical location of intellectuals in the 
debate on “Chineseness” can be found in the contributions to the debate on 
postmodernism by Zhang Longxi, a Professor of Comparative Literature at the 
University of California, Riverside, and Xu Ben, an Associate Professor of English at 
Saint Mary College, California. In an article that appeared in the February 1996 issue of 
Twenty-first Century, Zhang Longxi praised Zhao Yiheng’s analysis for being 
“modern” and “rational,” for being rooted in modern Western democracy and science, 
and for continuing the “critical tradition” of May Fourth.
In other words, intellectuals fell prone to the logic of what can be called a “geographical 
determinism.”
1131 Zhang Longxi attributed 
the Chinese usage of postmodernism in the service of the promotion of tradition and 
national interest to historical and cultural factors, but mostly to the Chinese political 
system. Like Zhao Yiheng, Zhang Longxi contended that postmodernism in a Chinese 
setting merely safeguarded the existing order, which prevented the realization of 
modernization and democratization. 1132 Zhang Longxi further condemned the self-
contradictory move in the application of Western theories to attack the West, as well as 
the fact that mainland Chinese intellectuals conceived of overseas Chinese academics as 
part of the Western academic system.1133
In the same issue of Twenty-first Century in which Zhao Yiheng had launched 
his attack on “post-isms,” an article by Xu Ben appeared in which the latter found fault 
1130 Davies, Worrying about China, 99.
1131 Zhang Longxi, “Duoyuan shehui zhong de wenhua piping,” EYS 33 (February 1996), 18-25.
Reference from 19.
1132 Ibid., 24.
1133 Ibid., 22, 25.
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with what he termed “Chinese style ‘third world criticism.’” For Xu Ben, as for Zhang 
Longxi, the answer to the question of why cultural criticism after 1989 had turned 
“conservative” on mainland China had to be sought merely in the Chinese 
circumstances.1134
Contrary to postcolonial criticism in the West, which had been an oppositional 
discourse that aligned with social movements, the theories of Zhang Yiwu and the like 
were characterized by “nativism.” Consequently, the fight against oppression became 
the “discursive oppression of the First World against the Third World,” which implied 
that Chinese intellectuals avoided dealing with the oppression within Chinese 
society.
After 1989, Xu Ben claimed, literary criticism on mainland China 
had lost its political character; intellectuals only disapproved of “safe” objects, such as 
commodity culture, the “loss of the humanist spirit,” or the “Orientalism” of Western 
culture. Xu Ben attributed this de-politicization of literary criticism to the state of affairs 
of political control, the spread of the commodity economy, and the instrumental use of 
nationalism by the authorities. 
1135 In brief, Chinese “third world criticism” was marked by the tendency to 
“reject what is near and seek what is far away” (shejin qiuyuan), and “to dwell on the 
abstract and avoid real issues” (bishi jiuxu).1136 Elsewhere, Xu Ben called “Chinese 
nativist post-ist theory” “a prima facie unlikely union of Western postmodern, 
postcolonial theories and Chinese concerns about national authenticity and identity.”1137
One mainland intellectual whose criticism resembled that of both Zhao Yiheng 
and Xu Ben was Lei Yi, an intellectual with liberal inclinations who worked for the 
Institute of Modern Chinese History at CASS. Lei Yi criticized Zhang Yiwu and the 
like for “gulping down uncritically” a foreign theory without exploring its concrete 
background.
Since intellectuals were very careful in their attitude towards the official nationalist 
discourse, mainland cultural criticism and official nationalism could coexist peacefully. 
1138
1134 Xu Ben, “‘Di san shijie piping’ zai dangjin Zhongguo de chujing,” EYS 27 (February 1995), 
16-27.
1135 Ibid., 17.
1136 Ibid., 27.
1137 Xu Ben, Disenchanted Democracy, 178.
1138 Lei Yi, “Beijing yu cuowei,” Dushu 1995:4, 16-20.  Reference from 18. 
The theories of Foucault and others had been truly revolutionary in a 
Western context because they stood up to the Enlightenment discourse. Since this 
discourse had only been marginal in China, both the spearhead and the revolutionary 
character of the theory had disappeared in a Chinese context. For this reason, Lei Yi 
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spoke of a “feeling of ‘dislocation’” with regard to postmodernism and postcolonialism 
in China. 1139 To indicate the danger of the mainland usage of postmodern theories 
against the West, Lei Yi referred to “Asianism” of the early twentieth century, in which 
the “yellow race” had been opposed to the “white race.”1140
Other mainland scholars addressed the nationalist elements of mainland 
postmodernism in particular. According to Wang Yuechuan, postcolonialism should 
reflect on modernity instead of becoming an “oppositional ideology” of East and West, 
which could create an outmoded “Cold War consciousness.” With nationalism in the 
back, Wang Yuechuan claimed, China had often bumped into new problems—could the 
postcolonial and the postmodern truly provide a new value choice to face Western 
cultural hegemony? 1141 According to the cultural critic Tao Dongfeng, the quest for 
“Chineseness” of Chinese postcolonialism in particular obscured its cultural-political 
quest for liberal democracy.1142
For Wang Hui, it was paradoxical that Chinese post-theorists used the 
postmodernist attack on Eurocentrism to argue for “Chineseness.”1143 Wang Hui noted 
that, in its context of origin, postmodernism had represented a minority criticism of 
mainstream culture, whereas in China, after its merger with nationalism, postmodernism 
strengthened mainstream forces instead of challenging them.1144 Another paradox Wang 
Hui mentioned was that in China, reactions to postcolonialism and to Huntington’s 
theory of the “clash of civilizations” had become part of the same nationalist trend. In 
their context of origin, however, they had represented two sides of the political 
spectrum, namely a minority attack on mainstream culture versus a defense of this 
culture.1145
As can be derived from the above, all discussants of mainland appropriations of 
postmodernism focused on its non-critical, nationalist, and “dangerous” elements. None 
1139 Ibid., 17-18.
1140 Lei Yi, “‘Yangjingbing xuefeng’ jufan,” EYS 32 (December 1995), 14-18. Reference from 
17-18.
1141 Wang Yuechuan, “Xuyan,” 7-8. In an interview, Wang Yuechuan criticized nationalist and 
“tribalist” appropriations of postcolonialism. For Wang, it was crucial to have a “global 
consciousness” at the turn of the century. Interview with Wang Yuechuan, Beijing, June 21, 
2006.
1142 Tao Dongfeng, “Ershi shiji Zhongguo de baoshou zhuyi,” 253-261.
1143 Wang Hui, China’s New Order, 170.
1144 Wang Hui, Zhang Tianwei, “Wenhua pipan lilun yu dangdai Zhongguo minzu zhuyi wenti,” 
ZYG 1994:4, 17-20.
1145 Ibid., 19.
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of the critics investigated the engagement of Chinese postmodernism with both the May 
Fourth heritage and China’s revolutionary identity. Instead, Chinese postmodernism 
was interpreted as a mere denial of modernity and as an uncritical stance. In this respect, 
the observations of the liberal intellectual Xu Jilin are useful. Xu Jilin contended that, 
pace Zhao Yiheng, mainland postmodernism could not be labeled “neo-conservative” 
because it differed from “national studies”; it could also not be linked to popular culture 
in all instances.1146 As in the debate on “conservatism” versus “radicalism,” Xu Jilin 
claimed, the problem was that critics such as Zhao Yiheng did not clarify what 
yardstick they applied to measure “neo-conservatism.”1147
Although Xu Jilin was very critical of the accusations of overseas Chinese 
intellectuals concerning mainland appropriations of postmodernism, on the other hand, 
he also did not spare mainland intellectuals—the theory did indeed contain nationalist 
elements. Nonetheless, Xu Jilin also pointed out its merits: postmodernism raised 
questions to which all modern theories should provide an answer. For Xu Jilin, the year 
1989, which was comparable to 1968 in the West, was crucial for understanding 
postmodernism in China. With the repression of the Tiananmen demonstrations, the 
main discourse of Enlightenment and modernization became exchanged for historical 
reflections. Criticism of the 1980s occurred in the form of the socio-historical debate on 
“conservatism” and “radicalism,” as well as in the form of “postmodernism.” The latter 
did have a critical ability, because it attacked “master narratives,” a factor that 
distinguished it from modernity, as both Habermas and Lyotard have pointed out.1148
1146 Xu Jilin, “Bi piping geng zhongyao de shi lijie,” EYS 29 (June 1995), 130-136. Reference 
from 130, 133. Xu Jilin distinguished between the “discourse on postmodernism” and the 
“phenomenon of postmodernism” in China. The former consisted of two layers, namely (1) 
theoretical research on and the introduction of Western postmodernism to China, which had 
already started during the 1980s, and (2) the usage of postmodern theories to conduct cultural 
criticism on Chinese history and reality.  The “phenomenon of postmodernism” consisted of (1) 
avant-garde and experimental literature and art, such as the works of Yu Hua, Ge Fei, Sun 
Ganlu, Su Tong, Ye Zhaoyan, and others, and (2) mass and commercial popular works, such as 
the novels of Wang Shuo, MTV, karaoke, popular TV series, songs, and the like.
1147 Ibid., 132-135.
1148 Ibid., 130-132.
Consequently, as distinct from other intellectuals who only interpreted Chinese 
postmodernism as a reaction to a Western Enlightenment—which explained the 
nationalist traits of Chinese postmodernism—Xu Jilin also paid attention to the fact that 
Chinese postmodernism engaged in a dialogue with the Chinese Enlightenment of the 
1980s and the 1910s. In addition, whereas other liberal critics conceived of 
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postmodernism as an uncritical and outright rejection of the Chinese Enlightenment, Xu 
Jilin presented a much more nuanced picture that also left room for a critical attitude. 
This interpretation did much more justice to the multi-faceted nature of a complex 
phenomenon. 
6.6.2 “Western Centralism” and the “Anxiety to Interpret China”
As already noted above, much energy in the debate on postmodernism was thus devoted 
to the creation of a division between “mainland” and “overseas” scholars; mainland 
intellectuals applied the same logic of “geographical determinism” as some of the 
overseas scholars discussed earlier. Given the fact that postmodernism intended to 
eradicate all boundaries, this was an ironic twist of fate. Moreover, this division 
contradicted Zheng Min’s quest for “Chineseness” based on cultural markers; in 
practice, the boundaries appeared to be geographical rather than cultural in nature. In
contradistinction to the 1992 debate on “conservatism” and “radicalism,” in which 
mainland scholars had very much accepted overseas definitions of “Chineseness” based 
on cultural markers, as the influence of the theories of Yü Ying-shih and Lin Yü-sheng 
on mainland China demonstrates, in the debate on postmodernism, mainland 
intellectuals disparaged overseas intellectuals. Mainland scholars made it clear that they 
were the only intellectuals who had the right to represent China.
An example mentioned by Michelle Yeh regarding the creation of two “camps” 
of scholars was an article on “pidgin scholarship” by Liu Dong, a researcher at the 
Institute of Foreign Literature of CASS. In an article first published in Twenty-first 
Century in 1995, Liu Dong accused overseas scholars of “pidgin scholarship,” a 
scholarship “produced by deliberate acts of misreading.”1149 Liu Dong referred to the 
usage of the label “neo-conservatism” by some overseas intellectuals as “a strategy of 
calling things by dramatic names to mislead and whip up public opinion overseas.”1150
1149 Liu Dong, “Revisiting the Perils of ‘Designer Pidgin Scholarship,’” 102.  Liu Dong’s article 
was first published in December 1995 in EYS, together with responses from Lei Yi, Cui 
Zhiyuan, and Gan Yang. See Liu Dong, “Jingti renwei de ‘yangjingbing xuefeng,’” EYS 32
(December 1995), 5-13. Translated in Gloria Davies, Voicing Concerns, 87-108.
1150 Liu Dong, “Revisiting the Perils of ‘Designer Pidgin Scholarship,’” 103. 
Those who engaged in Chinese studies abroad lacked “in-depth cultural awareness”; 
they failed to make sense of the “problematic consciousness” of Chinese people, and 
290
they suffered from a “novelty-seeking” syndrome.1151 For Liu Dong, as Michelle Yeh 
has noted, Chinese intellectuals who had emigrated from mainland China were thus 
seen as having lost their identity and, consequently, their feeling of mission.1152
In Zheng Min’s response to Zhao Yiheng in Twenty-first Century, she accused 
the latter of being unfamiliar with cultural reflections on mainland China; he manifested 
signs of “Western centralism.” For Zheng Min, Zhao Yiheng’s view represented 
precisely the traditional view of the politically revolutionary character of the May 
Fourth Movement that she wanted to do away with. In this view, culture was but a 
byproduct of politics; language was but a tool. For Zheng Min, on the contrary, based 
on the language theories of Heidegger and Derrida, language was an infinite system that 
carried traces of history, culture, and tradition. From this perspective, the May Fourth 
Movement’s objective to reform language for political purposes was a “violent 
action.” 1153 For Zheng Min, Zhao Yiheng’s use of the label “neo-conservatism” 
contained a negative political meaning, as had “conservatism” during the May Fourth 
era.1154
Zheng Min also attacked Zhao Yiheng’s definition of poststructuralism as a 
“radical” theory in a Western context, because it was wrongly based on the notion that 
poststructuralism destroyed everything. In fact, Zheng Min claimed, Derrida had 
demonstrated that language and culture could not be created, but were always linked to 
tradition—was that “radical”? For Zheng Min, both a return to tradition and an 
adoration of Western ideas were signs of centralism; instead, one should, in a 
hermeneutical fashion, reread and reconstruct Chinese tradition. The “flesh and blood of 
the cultural heritage” should be transformed into “tomorrow’s living and new-born 
cultural tradition.”
Her concern, she reiterated, was the future of Chinese culture in a period of 
transition, and its appearance on the world stage—was that, she asked, “conservative”? 
1155 This could not be realized through vernacular language alone, 
because the mother tongue as a whole was the “true carrier” of Chinese culture.1156
The logic of a demarcation between “mainland” and “overseas” also ran through 
Zhang Yiwu’s response to Xu Ben, in which Zhang Yiwu noted that only for overseas 
1151 Ibid. 
1152 Yeh, “International Theory,” 264.
1153 Zheng Min, “Wenhua, zhengzhi, yuyan,” 122.
1154 Zheng Min, “Hewei ‘dalu xin baoshou zhuyi,’?” Wenyi zhengming, 1995:5, 40-48.  
1155 Zheng Min, “Wenhua, zhengzhi, yuyan,” 123.
1156 Ibid.
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critics did postmodernism become a “political problem.” 1157 For Zhang Yiwu, the 
attempts of Zhao Yiheng and Xu Ben were manifestations of what he called the 
“anxiety to interpret China,” which was caused by the complex state in which China 
found itself after quick social changes, the end of the Cold War, and increased 
commercialization.1158 Both authors sought new explanatory models to make sense of 
this changed condition; they turned China into an “Other” by treating post-trends as 
manifestations of nationalism or “neo-conservatism.” 1159 Both revealed postcolonial 
traits in their strong identification with the main Western discourse and ideology, as 
well as in their attack on mainland political life and ideology.1160
Important in this respect for Zhang Yiwu was the fact that both authors took 
cultural “universality” as a point of departure. This enabled them to legitimize Western 
ideology and to criticize mainland theories for pursuing “particularity,” which was “a 
repetition of cultural conservatism since May Fourth.”1161
1157 Xu Ben responded to this criticism by arguing that postmodernism was not a political 
problem on mainland China because it was part of the so-called “forbidden zones” of discourse. 
See Xu Ben, “Zai tan Zhongguo ‘houxue’ de zhengzhixing he lishi yishi,” EYS 39 (February 
1997), 132-137.
1158 The phrase “chanshi Zhongguo de jiaolü” was originally coined by Tao Dongfeng and Jin 
Yuanpu in their Chanshi Zhongguo de jiaolü: zhuanxing shidai de wenhua jieshi (Beijing: 
Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 1999). The authors explained that the phrase “chanshi 
Zhongguo de jiaolü” had two different meanings. Firstly, it referred to the anxiety in the 
intellectual world, which the authors attempted to explain. In this sense, it could be translated as 
“explaining China’s anxiety.” In a second sense, it expressed that intellectuals did not know 
how to interpret changing realities and were anxious to do so. Hence, in this sense, it could be 
translated as “the anxiety of explaining China.” Zhang Yiwu has applied the term in this second 
sense.
1159 Zhang Yiwu, “Chanshi ‘Zhongguo’ de jiaolü,” EYS 28 (April 1995), 128-135. Reference 
from 129.
1160 Ibid., 132. However, elsewhere, Zhang Yiwu has clarified that his criticism of “Western 
centralism” was not based on the simple fact that both authors were merely “part of the Western 
system”; it was based on the cultural logic they applied. See Zhang Yiwu,  “Zaishuo ‘chanshi 
Zhongguo’ de jiaolü,” EYS 34 (April 1996), 121-126. Reference from 122-123.
1161 Zhang Yiwu, “Chanshi ‘Zhongguo’ de jiaolü,” 132.
Zhang denied the fact that 
postmodernism opted for “particularity”; he outlined three different discourse models in 
response to marketization and globalization: the pursuit of the humanist spirit, “post-
national studies,” and explorations of the “postcolonial” and the “postmodern.” Of these 
three, only the second was typified by “particularity.” The first chose “universality,” 
whereas the third attempted to overcome the bifurcation of the “universal” and the  
“particular.” Postmodernism and postcolonialism tried to reach the viewpoint of “the 
Other of the Other”; although they denounced Western cultural hegemony, this was not 
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tantamount to a “‘conservative” absolutized native position’; they grasped the state of 
the context of “hybridity” of China anew.1162
What Zhang Yiwu discerned in the theories of Zhao Yiheng, Xu Ben, and 
others, was a political and moral criticism of mainland “post-isms”; all treated mainland 
reflections as politically motivated or linked to official concerns, and all regarded 
modernity as an absolute value. 1163 The political reductionism of a repressive 
government versus the repressed people as presented in overseas analyses was mistaken 
because there was a renewed cooperation between China and the West after 1989, the 
policy of reform and opening up was continued, and China constituted a part of the 
global capitalist system. In the cultural realm, the degree of liberty had increased, and 
culture was not tantamount to rule by ideology anymore.1164
6.7 CONCLUDING REMARKS
The creation of artificial boundaries between mainland and overseas Chinese 
scholars reveals the fact that the debate on “radicalism” had become embedded in new 
circumstances. After 1994, concerns about “radicalism” and “conservatism” were 
largely absorbed by concerns of commercialization and globalization, which is why an 
initially historical debate turned into a politically oriented and largely geographically 
determined debate about “Chineseness.” Zheng Min’s insistence on the cultural markers 
of “Chineseness”—language being the foremost of them—was in contradiction with her 
largely mainland orientation of “Chineseness.” Her argument got lost in a struggle over 
“Chineseness” that was not based on explorations of “conservatism” and “radicalism,” 
but on geographical determinism and political bias. 
This chapter has analyzed the merger of the revaluation of the May Fourth Movement 
with the debate on postmodernism in China. The poetess Zheng Min triggered a debate 
on the Literary Revolution of 1917 with a 1993 article in which she asserted that 
modern Chinese poetry had lost its “Chineseness” because it had been cut off from 
tradition. On the one hand, Zheng Min’s argument was made on conservative grounds: 
Zheng Min argued that language was based on experience; it could not be designed 
according to abstract laws. Also, language was the product of evolution and 
1162 Ibid., 133-135.
1163 Zhang Yiwu,  “Zaishuo ‘chanshi Zhongguo’ de jiaolü,” 123-126.
1164 Interview with Zhang Yiwu, Beijing, July 26, 2006.
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contingency; it was beyond the control of the individual. However, Zheng Min’s goal as 
such was not conservative: she desired to recover the “authenticity” of Chinese 
language, and in this situation, tradition was primarily a carrier of “Chineseness.” 
Although Zheng Min was very much against the instrumental use of culture for political 
purposes, she did not speak on behalf of tradition because it embodied certain norms 
and values that she identified with. 
What was new in Zheng Min’s defense of historical continuity and in her 
critique of binary oppositions was her reliance on postmodern theories. Zheng Min 
drew on the structuralism of de Saussure to contend that language was always above its 
users; she invoked the poststructuralism of both Derrida and Lacan to assert that the 
clarity of language, as the architects of the Literary Revolution envisioned it, was an 
illusion. Zheng Min’s argument, although its focal point was language, surpassed the 
issue of language proper, since she conceived of language as the embodiment of the 
historical spirit of a nation. Moreover, in Zheng Min’s view, the Chinese language was 
superior to other languages. This reveals that Zheng Min’s engagement with historical 
continuity was already overshadowed by her concern with the relation between China 
and the West, and, in relation to this, by her concern with Chinese cultural identity.
Those who responded to Zheng Min’s argument did not only attack her views on 
language; they also located the discussion within the framework of “cultural 
radicalism,” reflections on the May Fourth Movement, and Chinese modernity. Zhang 
Yiwu, a literary critic based at Peking University, made use of postcolonialism in 
particular to put forward his version of “Chineseness,” a knowledge model that would 
enable the obliteration of binary oppositions and the end of a modernity that had been 
tantamount to Westernization. With Zhang Yiwu’s participation in the debate, issues of 
historical continuity became even more repressed by the question of the relation 
between China and the West. Moreover, since the debate took place in 1994, the new 
interest in commercialization and globalization meant that the issue of “radicalism” was 
re-conceptualized in ways that differed radically from the fashion in which mainland 
intellectuals had discussed the matter in the 1992 debate. 
Critics such as Michelle Yeh have claimed that Zheng Min, regardless of her 
conviction that she overcame binary frameworks, reinforced the dual structure between
China and the West; Yeh even called Zheng Min’s stance a reversed “Orientalism.” In 
agreement with this stance, it has been argued that both the arguments of Zheng Min 
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and Zhang Yiwu were marked by a viewpoint of cultural nationalism. For both, 
language was the reflection of the historical spirit of the Chinese nation, and for both, 
the question of “Chineseness” was more about the relation between China and the West 
than about the relation between future, present and past. Paradoxically, although both 
Zheng Min and Zhang Yiwu had aimed to deconstruct binary oppositions by re-
conceptualizing “Chineseness,” they ended up reaffirming them through an essentialist 
interpretation of what it meant to be Chinese. The relativism that both authors defended 
ended up becoming a narrow particularism.
It has further been contended that Zheng Min’s resort to structuralism and 
poststructuralism in support of historical continuity appeared odd at first sight given the 
fact that neither theory was concerned with historical evolution; on the contrary, both 
theories were thoroughly unhistorical. Despite this, as Brian Whitton has demonstrated, 
both postmodernism and the linguistic nationalism of the eighteenth-century 
philosopher von Herder denounced the totalizing rationalism of the Enlightenment from 
the angle of linguistic creativity. In a similar vein, Zheng Min drew on postmodernism 
because she favored diversity, contingency, and creativity against a totalizing May 
Fourth discourse. What was odd about Zheng Min’s reliance on postmodernism was 
that the latter did not argue in favor of a return to tradition; for postmodernists, neither 
traditional nor modern societies had manifested the pluralism that the postmodern era 
had brought. Zheng Min, on the contrary, wanted to reconnect modern Chinese 
language with Chinese tradition, a stand that was hard to reconcile with the unhistorical 
pretensions of postmodernism. 
Chinese appropriations of postmodernism have been compared to the 
application of the theory in its context of origin. Notwithstanding the fact that 
postmodernism defies definition, it can be said that, both in the United States and in 
Europe, the theory took issue with Enlightenment reason. Therefore, it has been 
asserted that postmodernism should be understood in relation with modernity instead of 
as a product that merely came after modernity. Since theorists such as Jameson have 
defined postmodernism as the “cultural logic” of “late capitalism,” some have 
questioned the applicability of postmodernism to the Chinese situation. Yet for Chinese 
intellectuals, the introduction of market mechanisms against a socialist background and 
the intensification of reform since 1992 signified a thorough shift, regardless of the fact 
that China had not gone through several stages of capitalism.
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Contrary to the usage of postmodernism in its context of origin, as Davies has 
claimed, Chinese intellectuals were not concerned with dismantling absolute truths; 
they applied the theory to explain social changes and to validate opinions relating to 
these changes. In these circumstances, the distinction between postmodernism and 
postcolonialism was not so important, since both could be employed in the discussion of 
practical Chinese problems. Moreover, both theories obtained an explicitly nationalist 
edge because they were used as reflections on modernity as a Western product. As with 
some manifestations of Chinese conservatism that had opposed a Western modernity in 
particular, postmodernism on mainland China was invoked to discuss the century-old 
problem of the relation between China and the West. 
Nevertheless, it has been contended that postmodernism in China was more than 
a manifestation of nationalism; it was also an engagement with a Chinese modernity 
that was both liberal and socialist. After 1989, on the one hand, Chinese intellectuals 
employed the theory to reflect on the May Fourth heritage and the “second 
Enlightenment” of the 1980s, as the liberal intellectual Xu Jilin has noted. On the other 
hand, postmodernism was also used to contemplate and to critically engage with 
socialism and the revolutionary tradition of twentieth-century China. Since 
postmodernism in China also engaged in a dialogue with both the socialist heritage and 
the liberal tradition of the May Fourth Movement, in this respect, it overlapped with 
discussions on “radicalism.” Moreover, both postmodernism and debates on 
“radicalism” implicitly addressed the question of the role of the intellectual in Chinese 
society. In both instances, the political engagement and the strategy of direct 
confrontation of the 1980s were questioned; in both instances, intellectuals turned to 
scholarship and theoretical debate instead. All these aspects indicate that 
postmodernism in China was more than an expression of nationalism or an uncritical 
affirmation of the cultural and political status quo.  
The label “neo-conservatism” entered the discussion on postmodernism when 
the overseas critic Zhao Yiheng accused mainland appropriations of postmodernism of 
being uncritical in nature. For Zhao Yiheng, “neo-conservatism” signified the 
abandonment of the intellectual activism of the 1980s. In this context, Zhao Yiheng also 
referred to the debate on the “humanist spirit,” in which some intellectuals had upheld 
the continuation of ultimate ideals, where others had argued that popular culture offered 
pluralism and new liberties. Zhao Yiheng held the conviction that postmodernism had 
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been a “radical” and critical theory in its context of origin, but when it was transferred 
to China, it became employed in the service of “neo-conservatism.”
Zhao Yiheng’s argument concerning the conservative turn of radical theories is 
another example of the dualist and simplified logic in debates that contained the pair 
conservatism/radicalism. Instead of a “radical” theory turned “conservative,” it has been 
contended that the appropriation of postmodernism on mainland China was the 
consequence of some ambiguities inherent in postmodernism. In its context of origin, as 
Marxist critics have noted, the theory also contained conservative traits—in the sense of 
the preservation of the status quo—because it shunned political action and merely 
engaged in abstract discourses. Furthermore, from a philosophical angle, critics such as 
Habermas have pointed out the similarities between postmodernism and conservatism: 
both stood up to Enlightenment reason. Other critics have echoed these communalities 
between conservatism and postmodernism. Likewise, Zhao Yiheng’s accusation that 
postmodernism suited official interests was also a simplification of matters. Not only 
were there important differences between the nationalism upheld by intellectuals and 
the nationalism of official ideology, but also, the notions of “complicity” versus 
“opposition” did not suit the complexities of the 1990s. Using the terms of Chen 
Xiaomei, it was hard to distinguish between an “official Occidentalism” and an “anti-
official Occidentalism.” As already noted in previous chapters, in intellectual debates of 
the 1990s, different camps accused each other of complicity with the government; it 
was considered a positive asset to be independent. 
The debate became even more politicized when other overseas intellectuals, 
such as Zhang Longxi and Xu Ben, reduced the nationalist appropriation of mainland 
postmodernism to the political circumstances of mainland China. The result of this 
“geographical determinism” was the creation of artificial boundaries between mainland 
and overseas intellectuals in a debate in which Zheng Min and Zhang Yiwu also took 
part. Given this geographical conception of “Chineseness,” the cultural notion of 
“Chineseness” that both Zheng Min and Zhang Yiwu envisioned was hard to find in 
practice. Whereas the 1992 debate on “conservatism” and “radicalism” had been 
marked by the interaction between mainland and overseas intellectuals—mainland 
intellectuals embraced the theories of Lin Yü-sheng and Yü Ying-shih—the debate on 
postmodernism moved in opposite directions. In the context of a renewed nationalism, 
Tu Wei-ming’s cry for a “cultural China” seemed to have receded into the distance. 
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Instead, questions about the nature of change, and the relation between past, present and 
future had to make room for political accusations that interfered with historical 
reflections. 
298
7.
CONCLUSION
BEYOND “ISMS”
What I say today everybody will say tomorrow, though they will not remember who put 
it into their heads. Indeed they will be right for I never remember who puts things into 
my head: it is the Zeitgeist.
GEORGE BERNARD SHAW
7.1 “RADICALISM” AND THE CONTINUUM OF “CONSERVATISM”
As this study has demonstrated, during the early 1990s, “conservatism” (baoshou zhuyi)
was very much a contested concept. Technocratic intellectuals, historians, intellectual 
historians, philosophers, and literary critics all defined the concept in such a way that it 
was congruent with their respective agendas. This research has done justice to that 
variety of manifestations by taking the concrete use of concepts as a point of departure, 
and by shifting attention to the sense-making subjects themselves. However, the 
opposite extreme of ending up with a range of expressions that appear to have nothing 
in common has also been avoided by asking the question of whether these concrete uses 
of the concept were indications of a conservative “style of thought.” 
In concreto, the use of the concept of “conservatism” in discursive practice has 
been analyzed in relation to the “counterconcept” of “radicalism” (jijin zhuyi). This 
approach has enabled the study of “conservatism” as a continuum, because all 
references to “conservatism”—regardless of whether they were part of an argument to 
boost political legitimacy or whether they were invoked to promote traditional moral 
values—were made against the background of rejections of “radicalism.” This study has 
exposed the interaction between official ideology, the “neo-conservatism” of 
technocratic intellectuals who were close to the power center, and the “conservatism” of 
humanistic intellectuals based at universities. As argued, the overlap of concepts in 
official, semi-official and intellectual discourses did not point at an official 
orchestration of intellectual activity during the 1990s, but at the existence of a shared 
set of problems to which both officials and intellectuals responded. 
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A clear example of the interaction between technocratic and humanistic 
intellectuals has been exposed in the works of the historian Xiao Gongqin. On the one 
hand, in Chapter Two, it has been examined how both the princelings—relatives of 
officials who were close to the center of power—and Xiao Gongqin—a Professor at 
Shanghai Normal University—coined the concept of “neo-conservatism” within the 
framework of a reform program that consisted of gradual economic reform, centralized 
rule, political and social stability, and the instrumental use of traditional elements. On 
the other hand, however, it has been contended that Xiao’s intellectual construction 
resembled that of other humanistic intellectuals of the time: Xiao based his argument on 
a discussion of several “stages” of “radicalism” in modern Chinese history, an element 
that was absent from the princelings’ account. 
As explained in Chapters Four and Five, both the historian Yü Ying-shih, who 
triggered the 1992 debate on the nature of modern Chinese history, and the philosopher 
Chen Lai, a mainland New Confucian, also divided modern Chinese history into three 
“stages” of “radicalism.” Although there were some differences pertaining to the 
division of stages—unlike Yü Ying-shih and Chen Lai, Xiao Gongqin did not include 
Marxism in his analysis—Xiao’s intellectual framework revealed that he was also 
indebted to humanistic intellectuals of the time. In addition, Xiao’s thought was typified 
by the very same “crisis consciousness” as the thought of other intellectuals was; 
implicitly, Xiao’s works also dealt with the role of intellectuals in Chinese society. For 
these reasons, it has been contended that Xiao Gongqin could not simply be categorized 
as a mouthpiece of official reform policies. 
By bringing the concept of “radicalism” into focus, it has also been exposed that 
the relationship between intellectuals and the power center during the 1990s could 
neither be interpreted as a relationship of “complicity,” nor as a relationship of 
“opposition.” In addition, it has been put forward that “conservatism” could neither be 
simplistically associated with a “political” stance, nor could it be understood as a plain 
“cultural” position. Although some intellectuals clearly made a case for the preservation 
of elements in Chinese tradition—as discussed in Chapter Five—in general, most 
advocacies were not “either/or” cases, but they contained a fusion of political and 
cultural elements instead. The promotion of gradual economic reform on behalf of 
mainland intellectuals in Chapter Four can serve as an example of this tendency: none 
of these intellectuals explicitly argued in favor of the continuity of Chinese tradition, 
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but their advocacy of gradual economic reform could also not be reduced to a 
“political” position in which a strong central authority or the preservation of existing 
institutions was upheld. 
References to “conservatism” that were invoked in the framework of a political 
theory of “neo-conservatism” also contained cultural elements, and vice versa. Xiao 
Gongqin’s plea for social stability and political centralization, for example, was at the 
same time a promotion of gradual reform in which traditional Chinese elements 
functioned as “levers.” Similarly, even those who upheld a strictly cultural position, 
such as the New Confucian Chen Lai, were simultaneously committing a very political 
act: the identification with Confucian values implied a negation of the Marxist view of 
revolutionary change and struggle. It has been asserted that, instead of applying the 
adjectives “cultural” and “political” to debates on “conservatism” in 1990s China, it is 
more fruitful to concentrate on the nature of the reference to tradition. The princelings 
and Xiao Gongqin merely invoked tradition because it belonged to the Chinese past, not 
because it contained ultimate truths. Intellectuals such as Yü Ying-shih and Chen Lai, 
on the contrary, spoke for Chinese culture because of its intrinsic value: they were 
convinced that Confucian values could provide moral guidance in times of rapid 
change. 
A final element that has been noted is that the reference to “conservatism” in 
1990s China implied much more than a synchronic concern with the preservation of the 
political status quo, the defense of interests, or manifestations of a cultural nationalism; 
it was also an intellectual exercise in which the reference to the past was part of a 
dialogue with Chinese modernity. A case in point is Chapter Six, where the argument 
has been made that Chinese postmodernism, although it acquired nationalist and even 
essentialist traits in a Chinese environment, was also a critical engagement with the 
liberal and socialist conceptions of Chinese modernity, both of which had been 
iconoclastic in nature. Similarly, in Chapter Five, it has been asserted that Chen Lai’s 
resort to Confucianism was not an emotional exercise to balance “history” and “value,” 
as Levenson would have it, but an intellectual attempt to mitigate the negative effects of 
a narrow conception of modernization.
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7.2 HISTORY, LEGITIMACY, AND IDENTITY
Reflections on Chinese modernity took the form of revaluations of modern Chinese 
history; they were diachronic rather than synchronic in nature. With the exception of the 
princelings in Chapter Two, all the main intellectuals in this study applied the concept 
of “conservatism” to discuss events in modern Chinese history—history constituted the 
object of debate. In addition, however, intellectuals also invoked history to address a 
wide range of other issues, which implied that history was more than a mere object of 
research. As such, in this study, two roles of history can be discerned. 
The first role of history in debates on “conservatism” and “radicalism” was that 
of a vehicle or medium of discussion. History constituted a form of discourse that 
functioned as an entry point to engage with ethical, political, social, or economic 
matters that exceeded the scope of history proper. This has clearly been revealed in 
Chapter Three, in which Xiao Gongqin called modern Chinese history into use to 
address problems of economic reform during the 1980s. As Xiao made clear, he was 
convinced that history was like a “code” that could be applied to decipher contemporary 
problems. In Chapter Four, the 1992 debate on modern Chinese history was also a 
debate on economic reform during the 1990s. In Chapter Five, Chen Lai turned to the 
May Fourth Movement to address questions of morality. Finally, in Chapter Six, Zheng 
Min analyzed the Literary Revolution to tackle the topic of the “Chineseness” of 
modern Chinese poetry. The fact that history served as a medium to discuss other issues 
is further illustrated by the fact that most intellectuals who engaged with the topic of 
“radicalism” were not historians by training. 
In some instances, history was brought into play as a medium or vehicle to 
discuss sensitive political issues in particular, in the tradition of Chinese “allusion 
historiography.” Nevertheless, the role of this practice should not be overestimated, 
pace the interpretations of some overseas liberal scholars who reduced mainland 
criticisms of “radicalism” in modern Chinese history to a politically restrictive climate. 
In addition, and this brings us to the second role of history in the debates, Chinese 
intellectuals did not merely refer to events in modern Chinese history; they also 
reinterpreted these events. This meant that history also constituted the very object of 
discussion and academic research. Because of the element of reinterpretation, the 
engagement with modern Chinese history cannot just be conceived of as a “safe” and 
“hidden” means to deliver political criticism—the rewriting of history had important 
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consequences in connection with conceptions of political legitimacy and national 
identity. 
Rejections of “radicalism” often entailed a denial of the practice of revolution 
and a criticism of socialism. For a Party whose legitimacy was based on revolution, this 
signified an important challenge. As also argued, the rewriting of modern Chinese 
history as the history of modernization instead of the history of the struggle against 
feudalism and imperialism was interpreted by the CCP as an attack on Marxism. In this 
context, it was not strange that history was put to use to discuss questions of economic 
reform, since this issue was directly related to that of political legitimacy: what were the 
consequences of the fact that a Party whose legitimacy had been based on revolution 
had diverged from revolution in the present? As Dirlik has put it, the “socialism with 
Chinese characteristics” of the reform era was in fact a “post-socialism” that had given 
in to the demands of a capitalist order—how could this be reconciled with socialist 
ideals? 1165
It needs to be noted, however, that the CCP had also adapted its class-based 
notion of “Chineseness” and its political nationalism to the needs of the times. During 
the 1990s, the CCP had a “two-tiered” conception of the nation that included the people, 
on the one hand, and the citizens of the PRC and the descendants of the Yellow 
In Chapter Four, most participants in the 1992 debate underlined the 
importance of gradualism and economic reform; their reliance on liberal thinkers
revealed that they had moved away from an ideology that existed in tension with the 
economic reform of the times. Intellectuals did not only denounce revolution in the 
present—as the CCP had done—but they also questioned its usefulness for the past. 
On a more fundamental level, the rewriting of modern Chinese history also 
signified a reinterpretation of what it meant to be Chinese. Rejections of “radicalism” 
implied that the class identity of the Mao era and the state-centered conception of 
“Chineseness” made room for a broader conception of “Chineseness” that was not 
defined in political and territorial terms, but in cultural terms—it was a call for a 
“cultural China.” Intellectuals did not express their loyalty to the CCP, but to a cultural 
Chinese nation that surpassed the limits of the Chinese state. Contrary to the liberal and 
socialist conceptions of modernity that had been marked by revolutionary breaks with 
the past, proponents of a “cultural China” envisioned a modernity that was to develop in 
a gradual manner and continuous with Chinese tradition. 
1165 Dirlik, “Postsocialism?,” 362-384.
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Emperor on the other hand.1166 Whereas before, its political nationalism had been a 
Party-centered “iconoclastic nationalism,” now, it included culture in its conception of 
nationalism.1167
The cultural vision of “Chineseness” also suggested a reinterpretation of the role 
of intellectuals in Chinese society. Against the background of the repression of the 
spring 1989 demonstrations on June fourth, 1989, and the commercialization of Chinese 
society since 1992, the criticism of an antitraditional liberal and socialist past enabled 
intellectuals to reconnect with Chinese culture. As Smith has noted, a return to culture 
can be a means to restore dignity and to offer personal renewal or “status renewal.”
However, in spite of the fact that both Chinese intellectuals and the 
CCP incorporated culture in their understanding of “Chineseness,” the difference 
between the two was that the former implicitly supplanted class-based notions of 
“Chineseness,” whereas the latter merely intended to complement them in order to 
preserve its political legitimacy. 
1168
For some, this cultural conception of “Chineseness” was tied to the restoration 
of a lost moral order. In traditional Chinese historiography, the view had existed that the 
historical process also involved the rise and decline of an ideal moral order—history 
was the manifestation of a universal cosmological order.
Although some intellectuals envisioned the continuation of the political engagement of 
the 1980s, many others turned away from political action; the advocacy of the historical 
continuity of Chinese culture enabled these intellectuals to underscore their role of 
guardians and transmitters of this cultural heritage. The highly elitist view of Chinese 
culture that Chinese intellectuals put forward enabled them to claim an important role 
for themselves in the definition of “Chineseness.” 
1169
1166 Guo, Cultural Nationalism, 24.
1167 Ibid., 17.
1168 Ibid.,161-162.
1169 Schwartz, “History in Chinese Culture,” 23. 
As such, traditional 
Chinese historiography was not just a description of events; it was also an exposition of 
a moral order. Although the arrival of modern historiography in China had set in motion 
the rise of a historiography that was disconnected from the moral realm, traditional 
conceptions of historiography nevertheless still influenced Chinese intellectuals. For 
many, history was not just a discipline—it was the embodiment of past wisdom and 
Truth. 
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Yü Ying-shih’s account of “radicalism” revealed traits of traditional Chinese 
historiography in that his criticism of “radicalism” was the criticism of the destruction 
of a moral Confucian order through the eradication of intermediate groups in society. 
Yü’s use of the concept of “radicalism,” which had clear negative connotations, 
underscored both his indignation at the treatment of Confucianism and his normative 
stance vis-à-vis the cultural policies of the CCP. In addition, in line with traditional 
concepts of the literati, Yü implied that only Chinese intellectuals had the moral 
authority to restore this lost order. The New Confucian Chen Lai also implanted his 
account of “radicalism” in a plea for the restoration of a Confucian moral order. 
Nevertheless, Chen Lai’s advocacy of universal Confucian values did not entail the 
propagation of the restoration of a universal Confucian civilization. As maintained, for 
Chen Lai, the Confucian core values were manifested in particular cultures. In addition, 
Chen Lai did not engage in a political criticism of the CCP; he envisioned pure 
scholarship as the means to promote the restoration of moral values. 
The rewriting of modern Chinese history also had consequences on a more 
abstract level: it signified a different view of social change and of Chinese modernity. 
The advocacy of historical continuity and the positive revaluation of Chinese tradition 
implied that a Marxist conception of change as the struggle between opposites was now 
defunct. A gradual notion of reform that had to be partial instead of wholesale 
substituted for the notion of revolutionary breaks.  Intellectuals highlighted the central 
role of practice instead of blueprint designs, which was in line with the pragmatism of 
the reform era. These remarks concerning the nature of change lead us back to the 
question of a conservative “style of thought.” 
7.3 A CONSERVATIVE “STYLE OF THOUGHT”?
As demonstrated throughout this study, the content ascribed to “conservatism” and 
“radicalism” greatly varied. In the 1991 document “Realistic Responses and Strategic 
Options for China After the Soviet Union,” the princelings coupled “radicalism” to the 
“irrationalism” and “utopianism” of both quick political liberalization and an outdated 
socialism that had placed too much stress on revolutionary struggle. In response, the 
princelings coined the term “neo-conservatism” as part of an advocacy of rational, 
orderly, and gradual modernization. The historian Xiao Gongqin also connected 
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“radicalism” with immediate democratization, but he nevertheless tied the concept to 
the critique of abstract design and universalism. Xiao’s “neo-conservatism” was also 
concerned with political stability, but it paid more importance to the role of traditional 
elements in the modernization process. 
Yü Ying-shih conceived of “radicalism” as “progressivism” and “neoterism,” or 
the blind will to renew. However, Yü also associated “radicalism” with the cultural 
consequences of this blind will to renew, namely the attitude of “antitraditionalism.” 
Since Yü emphasized the importance of a stable political status quo to bring a halt to 
“radicalism,” his conception of “conservatism” included both the preservation of 
sociopolitical elements and the safeguarding of the Confucian tradition. In the 1992 
debate that followed from Yü’s theory of the “radicalization” of modern China, 
however, mainland intellectuals linked “radicalism” both with the concrete political 
content of socialism and with the “radical” French tradition of liberalism. 
“Conservatism” was coupled with the English tradition of liberalism, which, according 
to proponents, reconciled liberty with order.
For the New Confucian Chen Lai, “radicalism” also meant “antitraditionalism,” 
but Chen Lai added the extra component of “instrumentalism.” In accordance with the 
New Confucian criticism of the dominance of “instrumental rationality” at the cost of 
“value rationality,” two terms borrowed from the sociologist Max Weber, Chen Lai 
interpreted “cultural radicalism” as a denial of culture based on political and economic 
standards. As such, Chen Lai did not only locate “radicalism” within the framework of 
modern Chinese history, but within the broader framework of modernization-as-
rationalization. “Conservatism” for Chen Lai entailed the promotion of Confucian 
values not from the point of view of their efficiency, but from the perspective of their 
inherent value. 
Although the poetess Zheng Min did not rely on the concepts of “radicalism” 
and “conservatism” in the text that triggered the debate on the Literary Revolution, she 
did refer to the dual construction of “preservation” versus “renewal.” In addition, the 
concept of “radicalism” made its entry in the reactions to Zheng Min’s text; it was 
identified with the denunciation of the Chinese cultural tradition. In his assault on 
mainland appropriations of postmodernism, the overseas liberal critic Zhao Yiheng 
understood the term “radicalism” as the critical mode of thought and the intellectual 
activism of mainland intellectuals during the 1980s. As such, Zhao Yiheng was one of 
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the few intellectuals in this study who employed the concept of “radicalism” in a 
positive sense. “Neo-conservatism” for Zhao Yiheng had a clear negative connotation; 
he applied the label to appropriations of postmodernism that, in his view, uncritically 
preserved the cultural and political status quo. 
On a first level of abstraction, we can say that the study of the concrete use of 
the concepts of “conservatism” and “radicalism” offers a window on the social changes 
that occurred during the early 1990s. In 1990 and 1991, in the context of the decline of 
socialism and the aftermath of the repression of the spring 1989 demonstrations, the 
focus was on social stability and political centralization. At this point, liberalism in 
particular was perceived of as a disruptive force, and it was associated with 
“radicalism.” By 1992, under the effect of renewed reform, only the French type of 
liberalism was considered “radical,” whereas the British type was regarded as 
“conservative.” 
In addition, “radicalism” was now explicitly related to revolution and socialism. 
Intellectuals did not plead for centralized rule anymore, which indicates that the major 
political threats had been overcome, and that the impact of foreign liberal thinkers on 
Chinese intellectuals had increased. By 1993, new concerns entered intellectual 
discourse, the most important one of which was the commercialization of Chinese 
society. Now, some understood “radicalism” as the lack of communal values, whereas 
others linked it to the critical stance and political engagement of intellectuals during the 
previous decade. 
Rejections of “radicalism” during the 1990s also disclosed what Xu Jilin has 
called the three “rifts” in the intellectual world of the 1990s.1170
1170 Xu Jilin, “The Fate of an Enlightenment,” 194-200.
Firstly, there was the 
rift between “thought” (sixiang) and “scholarship” (xueshu). After the debacle of the 
1980s, many scholars turned towards specialized research and shunnend political action. 
The rejection of “radicalism” in this context was also the rejection of the rash academic 
style and the idealistic social engagement of the 1980s. This denunciation of political 
engagement was reflected in Chen Lai’s call for a pure scholarship, but it was also 
present in the embrace of economic reform by intellectuals in the 1992 debate, or in the 
stance of the postmodernists in Chapter Six. Although the turn to scholarship suggests 
that the term “intellectuals” is not suited for the 1990s because it involves political 
engagement, the term has nevertheless been applied throughout this research because 
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even those who merely engaged in scholarship were still concerned with the fate of the 
Chinese nation; they still took part in public debate. Many scholars turned away from 
political action because they looked for different channels to express their public 
concern.
The second rift in the intellectual world of the 1990s concerns that between the 
“humanist spirit” and what Xu Jilin has called “common concerns.”1171
Finally, during the late 1990s, there was the rift between the liberals and the so-
called “New Left.” Although this breaking line was not present during the early 1990s, 
this period nevertheless reflected the rise of interest in liberalism. As Xu Jilin has 
rightly noted, before the 1990s, Chinese intellectuals embraced the values of science 
and democracy; after 1989, these terms were replaced with an advocacy of liberalism. 
In Chapter Three, Xiao Gongqin adopted elements from the liberal discourse by 
advocating the importance of a middle class for democratization; in Chapter Four, 
mainland intellectuals spoke on behalf of British liberalism. The popularity of liberal 
thinkers such as Berlin, Popper, and Hayek also demonstrates that liberalism, as Xu 
Jilin has phrased it, obtained a “cultural cachet previously enjoyed by such terms as 
democracy and science, even a certain inviolability.”
Whereas some 
scholars, in the spirit of the 1980s, upheld “ultimate ideals,” others lauded the arrival of 
commercialism instead. In Chapter Six, it has been analyzed how Zhang Yiwu and 
others regarded the mass culture of the 1990s as a positive force that heralded cultural 
pluralism, political openness, and economic wealth, whereas others claimed that 
commercial culture had eroded the “humanist spirit.” Implicitly, however, the question 
of the “humanist spirit” also ran through other chapters. The majority of intellectuals in 
the 1992 debate, for example, relinquished the “ultimate concerns” of the 1980s in favor 
of a secular pragmatism. 
1172
On a second level of abstraction, and in order to answer the question of whether 
rejections of “radicalism” were manifestations of a conservative “style of thought,” it 
can be noted that all those who applied the term “conservatism” in relation to the 
counterconcept of “radicalism” abandoned abrupt and revolutionary breaks and upheld 
historical continuity instead. Hence, it can be said that the unifying “style of thought” 
behind all these manifestations was a different conception of change as gradualism, as 
1171 Ibid., 196.
1172 Ibid., 197.
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well as the idea that tradition could not be cut off from modern life. However, as has 
been argued throughout this study, a defense of historical continuity as such is not 
sufficient to speak of a “conservative” outlook. 
Instead, in this research, only those pleas for historical continuity in which 
conservative goals were advocated on conservative grounds have been considered 
manifestations of a conscious conservative position. True conservatives made a case for 
historical continuity because of a belief in the inherent value of tradition; tradition was 
not merely invoked because it was part of the Chinese past, but because it contained 
norms and values that were important for the present. Tradition was the accumulation of 
wisdom and experience of past generations; it was a historical chain that should not be 
broken. Regarding the advocacy of conservative goals, as Rossiter has maintained, this 
included the preservation of religion, habits, customs, intermediate communities, or 
certain institutions; it excluded a mere defense of the status quo, interests, or property. 
7.3.1 Yü Ying-shih and Chen Lai
Only Yü Ying-shih and Chen Lai promoted conservative goals on conservative 
grounds; their conservatism was a philosophical conservatism that surpassed the 
advocacy of the status quo or of private property. Yü Ying-shih’s goal was the 
preservation of intermediate groups and institutions in society; he was devoted to the 
Chinese community. His support for historical continuity was based on the inherent 
value of Confucianism, which he tied to concrete social institutions. Yü referred to 
Edmund Burke to emphasize his point that change was needed for preservation, but this 
change could only be gradual. Consequently, Yü fiercely criticized notions of 
progressivism according to which tradition had to be destroyed. Yü Ying-shih combined 
his conservative position with an advocacy of political liberalism, a viewpoint that he 
by no means considered to be contradictory. On the contrary, a democratic climate 
offered the best conditions for the flourishing of Confucian values. 
More so than other intellectuals in this study, the philosopher and New 
Confucian Chen Lai addressed the consequences of the modernization process and 
criticized Enlightenment rationality as instrumental reason. Chen Lai’s conception of 
Confucianism as a “religio-philosophy” connected him to certain manifestations of 
American “neo-conservatism” in which moral relativism was countered with the quest 
for a normative order. Chen Lai did not uphold Confucian values on the ground that 
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they had been the product of historical growth, but on the basis of their inherent moral 
quality: Confucian values were needed because they were good. Chen Lai’s goal was 
conservative in that he, like Yü Ying-shih, attempted to reintroduce a sense of 
community in times of a rampant individualism. In the spirit of Daniel Bell, Chen Lai 
further held that it was possible to combine a cultural conservatism with an economic 
socialism and a political liberalism. 
7.3.2 Xiao Gongqin and Zheng Min
Whereas Chen Lai’s argument was conservative, although it did not contain the typical 
Mannheimian and Burkean traits of the defense of the historically grown, the case of 
Xiao Gongqin has revealed the exact opposite. Xiao’s argument clearly contained all the 
elements that Mannheim had exposed in his characterization of conservatism: Xiao 
reiterated that tradition was the product of historical growth and that it was particular to 
a nation. Moreover, Xiao clearly opposed the abstract rationalism of the Enlightenment 
and its blueprint aspirations because, in his view, society was an organism that required 
gradual reform based on experience. As such, Xiao’s historical continuity was upheld 
on conservative grounds. 
However, since Xiao Gongqin’s “neo-conservatism” was a modernization 
theory, Xiao was not critical of modern time consciousness. Although Xiao invoked the 
positive role of the “moral autonomy” of Confucianism, the fact that Confucianism was 
a “lever” for the introduction of new systems suggests that his reference to tradition was 
more instrumental than based on its inherent value. Xiao’s advocacy of gradual change 
based on a Burkean reading of Yan Fu has also been questioned because Yan Fu’s 
theory of the social organism was a manifestation of a social evolutionism typified by 
optimism and the desire to make China strong and prosperous. Xiao’s goal was not the 
preservation of the Chinese community or the safeguarding of Chinese tradition, but the 
creation of the social, political, and economic foundations for successful market 
reforms. 
Likewise, in the debate on the Literary Revolution and postmodernism in China, 
Zheng Min’s argument for historical continuity contained some conservative grounds, 
but her goal as such was not conservative. Zheng Min denounced the abstract design of 
language based on theory; for her, language was the result of practice, historical growth, 
and contingent factors. Although Zheng Min supported the continuity of Chinese 
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tradition, this advocacy was based on her belief that the Chinese language was superior. 
Language, Zheng Min believed, was the main marker of national identity; it was the 
embodiment of the Chinese spirit, and a social action that united all members of the 
Chinese community. In a Levensonian sense, for Zheng Min, tradition had to be 
continued because it belonged to China (meum) more than because it contained truth 
(verum).
7.3.3 The Princelings and the 1992 Debate
As regards the princelings, both conservative grounds and conservative goals were 
lacking in their defense of gradualism. The “rational” elements in tradition were only 
championed for reasons of political legitimacy. The princelings did not base their 
argument on a disapproval of progressivism and rationalism; on the contrary, they 
opposed “irrationalism” and “romanticism” in order to put forward a rational 
modernization program. This emphasis on rationalism was in accordance with the 
portrayal of the post-Mao reform era as a rational era, in contrast with the dogmatism of 
the Mao era.1173
Similarly, in the 1992 debate on “conservatism” and “radicalism,” mainland 
intellectuals did not recommend gradualism based on the notion of historical growth, 
the opposition to “progressivism,” or the limits of human knowledge. Although 
participants relied on Edmund Burke, this reference was combined with a selective 
interpretation of the liberal thinkers Friedrich von Hayek and Karl Popper. This 
indicates that the goal was not conservative either: historical continuity and gradualism 
were but elements of a framework of economic liberalism. In this setting of the lack of a 
critical engagement with modernization as such, “radicalism” was not associated with 
“progressivism,” but with the evils of a utopian socialism in which the importance of 
economic development had been ignored. Many participants in the 1992 debate invoked 
Karl Popper’s notion of “piecemeal change” in their promotion of gradualism. As 
Benjamin Schwartz has noted, for conservatives, society was an organic whole that had 
to be preserved or discarded as a whole. 1174
1173 Davies, Worrying about China, 120.
1174 Schwartz, “Notes on Conservatism,” 11-12.
Even though Burke also embraced 
piecemeal change, Schwartz argued, he only did so for the periphery, and nevertheless 
affirmed society as a whole. The reference to Burke in the 1992 debate was thus 
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subordinated to a liberal notion of “piecemeal change” in which society was not 
perceived of as an organism. 
In brief, then, it can be said that those who upheld Chinese tradition merely 
because it belonged to the past, namely Xiao Gongqin, the princelings, and the majority 
of intellectuals in the 1992 debate, were by no means critical of modernization. They 
did not question the progressivism and rationalism inherent in the modernization 
process, but only sought ways to facilitate this process. As Barmé has noted, in 1990s 
China, “the ideology of progress, national wealth and power continue to inform public 
opinion.” 1175
7.4 A THOROUGH SHIFT
For many Chinese intellectuals, the bright future of a nation that had 
suffered and struggled was just more important than a concern with the limits of 
change. 
At first sight, after about three hundred pages of research on “conservatism” in China, 
the conclusion that few references to “conservatism” could be tied to a conservative 
outlook seems rather disappointing. However, at this point, the benefits of a 
Begriffsgeschichte approach become manifest; whereas a “style of thought” approach 
would end here, the Begriffsgeschichte approach can take us one step further. For, as 
has been analyzed, notwithstanding the fact that a conservative “style of thought” was 
certainly not omnipresent, the concepts of “conservatism” and “radicalism” were 
nevertheless widespread. What did this signify? 
In order to answer this question, we have to apply the Begriffsgeschichte
approach to a longer period of time; we have to ask how this positive reference to 
“conservatism” was related to its usage in previous decades. It is not within the scope of 
this research to investigate the plethora of usages of the concept of “conservatism”
before 1989, but for our purposes, it suffices to say that, in general, the term had an 
overtly negative connotation. For decades, both Marxists and liberals had applied the 
label “conservatism” to those who were perceived of as being hostile to their 
“progressive” beliefs; “conservatives” were die-hard defenders of tradition who 
obstructed modernization. An example that comes to mind is Lu Xun’s 1922 claim that 
1175 Barmé, “To Screw Foreigners,” 234.
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the scholars around the Xueheng journal were but “faked antiques.”1176
Although one might assert that the widespread revaluation of tradition was 
merely an echo of the official stress on economic reform and pragmatism, there was still 
a difference between the official reference to Chinese traditional culture and the positive 
revaluation of the concept of “conservatism.” As shown in Chapters Three and Four in 
particular, Marxists still linked the term “conservatism” with “culturalist” trends that 
Up to the 1980s, 
as exemplified in the documentary “River Elegy,” this perception was still extremely 
powerful. 
In contrast with the negative connotation attributed to the concept of 
“conservatism” under a Marxist and liberal framework, for most intellectuals of the 
early 1990s, “conservatism” was a “rational” and “healthy” mode of modernization that 
enabled historical continuity with the past. “Radicalism,” on the contrary, was mostly 
perceived of as a blind progressivism that had led to destruction. Here, we can also see 
the importance of the distinction between “labels” and “banners”: whereas the concept 
of “conservatism” had mostly been applied as a “label” in the past, now, the positive 
revaluation of the concept of “conservatism” led some intellectuals to actively use the 
term as a “banner.” “Conservatism” was not a verdict that was delivered by political 
opponents who considered themselves the “winners” of intellectual debates; 
intellectuals chose to make use of the term to denote their own point of view. 
The fact that the reference to “conservatism” was often not tied to a conscious 
conservative stance indicates that the conceptual shift of the early 1990s went far 
beyond the embrace of a new “ism”—it was rather a matter of a new Zeitgeist that 
united people of all political convictions. Regardless of whether they were Marxists, 
liberals, or conservatives, most intellectuals in this study adhered to the belief that 
change had to be gradual, and that the relation between past and present should be one 
of continuity instead of discontinuity. Apart from conservatives such as Chen Lai, 
liberals such as Liu Junning, and Marxists such as Li Zehou also refuted the belief that 
progress required the destruction of tradition. Nevertheless, as has been shown 
throughout this research, the advocacy of historical continuity took shape in a variety of 
forms, and despite the underlying similarities, there were still important differences 
between the opinions at hand. 
1176 Schneider, “Bridging the Gap,” 1. From Lu Xun, “Gu ‘Xueheng’” (Evaluation of the 
Xueheng), in Lu Xun quanji (Collected writings of Lu Xun) (Beijing: Renmin wenxue, 1989), 
Vol. 1, 377-381.
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were hostile to Marxism. In Chapter Three, it has been noted that Xiao Gongqin’s term 
“neo-conservatism” was supplanted with the term “gradualism” in official media 
because the concept of “conservatism” was still understood as an embrace of Confucian 
values. This indicates that, in intellectual circles, the revalution of tradition was much 
broader; it did not only include Chinese tradition, but also the reversal of verdicts on 
historical figures. 
Despite this difference, the official revaluation of Confucianism was still a 
remarkable break with past practices, and it offered the conditions for the flourishing of 
new intellectual trends. Although, as contended, the CCP’s reference to Confucianism 
was instrumental—Confucianism was invoked because it was part of the Chinese past, 
not because it contained absolute moral truths—this nevertheless signified a move away 
from past interpretations of tradition as but the feudal remnants of a backward past. 
Even the appearance of the term “gradualism” in official media was remarkable for a 
Party that based its legitimacy on revolutionary breaks with the past. As one Marxist 
historian phrased it, as long as tradition constituted but one aspect of the construction of 
a socialist civilization, it was not a threat to socialism, but an asset. 
Whereas liberals of previous generations had relegated Confucianism to the 
dustbin of history because they were convinced that a cultural revolution was needed to 
modernize China, now, they attempted to reconcile liberalism with conservatism. As 
Furth has claimed, May Fourth liberalism was an “existential liberalism” in which 
intellectuals pressed for “individual liberation from the constraints of Confucian 
ritualism.”1177
What the 1992 debate in particular demonstrates is that the renewed stress on 
gradualism—partly due to the influence of overseas figures such as Yü Ying-shih—
paved the way for the explosion of interest in Chinese tradition in the form of the 
During the 1990s, however, intellectuals posed the question of whether 
the liberation from tradition and the evolutionary optimism of previous generations—be 
it in the form of ambitious reform plans or revolutionary struggle—had gone too far. 
The ubiquitous reference to the “creative transformation” of Chinese tradition, which 
was a continuation of the advocacy of the liberal Lin Yü-sheng several decades earlier, 
shows that the cultural iconoclasm of May Fourth liberals was exchanged for a more 
moderate approach to tradition. 
1177 Furth, “Intellectual Change from the Reform Movement to the May Fourth Movement,” 
387.
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revival of “national studies” that took off in 1994. As has been noted in Chapter Four, 
the revival of interest in tradition during the 1990s would have been unthinkable 
without the reflections on Chinese culture that had occurred during the “culture fever” 
between 1985 and 1988. The role of the Academy of Chinese Culture in particular was 
important in relation to the shift in attitude towards tradition. 
During the 1990s, the focus of research changed to non-Marxist and non-liberal 
intellectuals who had been repressed and criticized during both the Mao era and the 
“New Enlightenment” frenzy. It was the arrival of the reform era and its focus on 
economic reform and modernization that had created the conditions for the revaluation 
of these historical figures. The main intellectuals in this study all invoked non-liberal 
and non-Marxist figures to make their arguments. Examples are Chen Lai’s discussion 
of the debates on Eastern and Western cultures, Xiao Gongqin’s reference to Yan Fu, 
Yue Daiyun’s discussion of the Xueheng group, and Chen Lai’s articles on Liang 
Shuming and Feng Youlan. As Schwartz has rightly noted, the neglect of scholars who 
were associated with an interest in Chinese tradition during the Mao era was “based on 
the premise that its presumed defeat in 1949 renders its ideas completely 
uninteresting.”1178
The return to Chinese tradition and to an elitist perspective on modernization 
was revolutionary in the modern sense of the word: it was, so to say, a radical new 
beginning against the background of the overall dominance of the “tradition of 
antitraditionalism,” as Tu Wei-ming has phrased it. At the same time, however, the 
renewed interest in Chinese tradition and in alternatives to a liberal and socialist 
modernity that had turned its back on Chinese tradition was also a revolution in the 
original sense of the word: it was a restoration, a return to a previous state of affairs in 
which “radicalism” had not claimed victory yet. 
That the ideas were now found interesting again indicates that the 
CCP’s past verdict on modern Chinese history was being questioned; it suddenly 
seemed much less evident that socialism was the outcome of modern Chinese history. 
1178 Schwartz, “Themes in Intellectual History,” 437.
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LIST OF CHINESE CHARACTERS
A Cheng棎⩝ (Zhong Acheng, 朮棎⩝)
bada shijian⏺⮶ℚↅ
baihua䤌幬
baihua kouyu 䤌幬♲幼
baihua shumianyu 䤌幬⃵槱幼
baihuawen 䤌幬㠖
baoshoupai≬⸗㿍
baoshou qingxiang≬⸗⋍⚠
baoshou sichao≬⸗㊬䇽
baoshou xingwei≬⸗嫛⃉
baoshou zhuyi≬⸗⃊⃘
baowei zhengquan, fangzhi heping 
yanbian ≬◺㟎㧒,棁㷱✛㄂䆣♧
Bei Dao ▦⼪
Beijing ribao▦℻㡴㔴
bishi jiuxu 挎⸭⻀壩
biyaoxing㉔尐㊶
bianhua♧▥
bianyuanhua 扈冧▥
biaozhun 㪖⑕
bubian de daodeₜ♧䤓拢㉆
bupo buliₜ䫃ₜ䵚
buzhou㷴洳
buzuhua 捷㡞▥
cengceng dijie ⻑⻑抡棅
chanshengℶ䞮
Chang Yansheng デ䑤䞮
Chen Duxiu 棗䕻䱏
Chen Feng 㼘歝
Chen Kejian 棗⏚哿
Chen Kuide 棗⯝㉆
Chen Lai棗㧴
Chen Sihe 棗㊬✛
Chen Tianhua 棗⮸◝
Chen Tongfu 棗⚛䞺
Chen Xiaoming棗㣢㢝
Chen Yi 棗㹔
Chen Yizi 棗₏✷
Chen Yinke 棗⹔㋹
Chen Yuan 棗⏒
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Chen Yun 棗℠
Cheng Yi 䲚欟
chixu 㖐兼
chuangxin⒪㠿
chuangzao de fazhan⒪抯䤓♠⻤
Cixi ㏗䰶
Cui Zhiyuan ⾣⃚⏒
cuowei枨⇜
cuozhi jutigan de miuwu 枨函␆⇢㎮䤓
庻幾
Dagongbao⮶⏻㔴
daluan cai you dazhi ⮶℀㓜㦘⮶䱸
Dai Zhen 㓃榖
danxiang yinjin ◤欈ㆤ扪
dangdai xin rujia㇢ⅲ㠿⎡⹅
daode zizhuxing拢㉆呹⃊㊶
daotong 拢兮
Deng Liqun 挢┪刳
Deng Xiaoping 挢⺞㄂
diyi daode yuanli䶻₏拢㉆☮䚕
ding 熝
dingdian ⸩䍈
Dongfang₫㡈
Dongfang zazhi₫㡈㧑㉦
Dongxi shuo₫導広
Du Weiming (Tu Wei-ming) 㧫冃㢝
Du Yaquan 㧫℩㽘
Dushu 床⃵
duoyuan de jinbu guannian⮩⏒䤓扪㷴
屑㊄
erlü beifan ℛ㈚卛♜
Ershiyi shiji ℛ◐₏₥儹
Faguo dagemingshi de lixiang zhuyi
㽤⦌⮶槸✌㆞䤓䚕㎂⃊⃘
Faguo dagemingshi de weili zhuyi de 
jijin zhuyi㽤⦌⮶槸✌㆞䤓➾䚕⃊⃘䤓
䉏扪⃊⃘
Fan Qinlin 喒朵㨦
Fan Wenlan 喒㠖䈫
fan’an♜㫗
fan daode zhuyi de minzhu㽪拢㉆⃊⃘
䤓㺠⃊
fandong ♜┷
fan fanchuantong zhuyi♜♜↯兮⃊⃘
fan zhengzhi zhuyi㽪㟎㽊⃊⃘
Fang Keli 㡈⏚䵚
fangquan rangli 㟍㧒常Ⓒ
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fangshou㟍㟅
Feibianshi de zhanlüe 忈扈㆞䤓㒧䟴
fei jiaowang bu zuyi guozheng 槭䩺㨘
ₜ恂ⅴ扖㷲
feilixing zhuyi槭䚕㊶⃊⃘
fenfengzhi⒕⺐Ⓟ
Feng Youlan ␾♚⏿
Fu Keng ⌔枎
fugu huaijiu ⮜♳㊏㡶
gaige kaifang 㟈槸㆏㟍
gaige youzhibing㟈槸ㄋ䲩䡔
Gan Yang 䞧棂
ganggan㧯㧕
Gao Di浧䕓
Gaoxiao lilun zhanxian 浧㪰䚕幉㒧兎
gemingdang 槸✌⏩
geti ₹⇢
Gonggong luncong⏻␀幉₪
gongju lixingぴ␆䚕㊶
gongxiang ␀䦇
Gu Mu廆䓶
Gu Zhun 欍⑕
gujin shuo♳⅙広
Guangming ribao⏘㢝㡴㔴
Guangxu ⏘兹
guiding 屓⸩
Guo Qiyong 捼營╖
Guocui xuebao⦌佈ⷵ㔴
Guoji ruxue lianhehui⦌棔⎡ⷵ勣⚗↩
guojia zhuyi ⦌⹅⃊⃘
Guomindang (Kuomintang) ⦌㺠⏩
guoqing⦌㍔
guoxing⦌㊶
guoxue ⦌ⷵ
Han Yu橸㎗
hanjian 㻘Ⰷ
he (harmony)✛
He Lin 忉焮
He Xin ⇤㠿
heli zhuangtai ⚗䚕䕅㊐
heping yanbian✛㄂䆣♧
Heshang 㽂㸖
hexu zhuangtai ⚗ㄞ䕅㊐
Hong Xiuquan 㾹䱏⏷
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Hongqi儱㡦
hou guoxue⚝⦌ⷵ
houxue⚝ⷵ
Hu Angang 印樜朱
Hu Cheng 印㒟
Hu Ping 印㄂
Hu Sheng 印冂
Hu Shi 印抑
Hu Yaobang 印劏挵
Huang Zongxi 煓⸦剁
huodong yangshi㿊┷㫆㆞
Ji Xianlin ⷲ到㨦
jidian䱾䁏
jiduan minzhuhua㨐䵾㺠⃊▥
jijin de gaigeguan䉏扪䤓㟈槸屑
jijin fanchuantong䉏扪♜↯兮
jijin gongli zhuyi䉏扪┮Ⓒ⃊⃘
jijin zhuyi䉏扪⃊⃘
jiti jingyan楕⇢兞洛
jiti wuyishi楕⇢㡯㎞幕
jixie tuanjie㧉㬿⥱兢
jizhi zhuyi 㨐咃⃊⃘
jiazhi lixingↆ⋋䚕㊶
jianjin zhuyi de baoshou zhuyi 䂟扪
⃊⃘䤓≬⸗⃊⃘
jianjin zhuyi de xiandaihua䂟扪⃊⃘䤓
䘿ⅲ▥
jianwang zhilai 攃㈏䩴㧴
Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) 圚⅚䪂
Jiang Qing 圚ㄕ
Jiang TaoⱫ䀪
Jiang Yihua Ⱬ⃘◝
Jiang Zemin 㻮㾌㺠
jiaolügan de jijin zhuyi 䎵壠㎮䤓䉏扪
⃊⃘
jiaowang guozheng 䩺㨘扖㷲
jie geming 屲槸✌
jiegou zhuyi屲㨓⃊⃘
jieji liyi棅儶Ⓒ䥙
jindaishi yanjiu扠ⅲ⚁䪣䴅
jingji shang de xiuke liaofa 兞㿝ₙ䤓
↠⏚䠦㽤
jingyan 兞洛
jingyan zhuyi兞洛⃊⃘
jingyan zhuyi leixing de zhuyi兞洛⃊⃘
伊⨚䤓⃊⃘
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jiuwang㟠ℰ
jiuye shipai ⃬⚅幦㿍
Kang Xiaoguang ㅆ㣢⏘
Kang Youwei ㅆ㦘⃉
kebian de daode♾♧䤓拢㉆
keguan buli tiaojian⸱屑ₜⒸ㧰ↅ
keji lixing 䱠㔏䚕㊶
ke xiandaihua de yinsu♾䘿ⅲ▥䤓
⥯侯
kexingxing♾嫛㊶
kexue yu renshengguan 䱠ⷵ₝ⅉ䞮屑
kongxiang shehui zhuyi䴉㎂䯍↩⃊⃘
kongxiang zhuyi䴉㎂⃊⃘
kongxiang ziben zhuyi䴉㎂忓㦻⃊⃘
kouyu♲幼
langman de minzu zhuyi 㿹䆺䤓㺠㡞
⃊⃘
langman zhuyi gaigeguan㿹䆺⃊⃘
㟈槸屑
Laozi 劐⷟
Lei Yi 榆欟
leitong zhiti jiegou伊⚛德⇢兢㨓
li (propriety) 䯋
li (heavenly principles) 䚕
Li Dazhao 㧝⮶朙
Li Jinquan 㧝枵⏷
Li Peng 㧝烞
Li Ruihuan 㧝䛭䘾
Li Shenzhi 㧝㏝⃚
Li Zehou 㧝㾌☩
linian juedinglun䚕㊄⑂⸩幉
lishi tonggouxing☕⚁⚛㨓㊶
lixian jiuguolun䵚⸹㟠⦌幉
lixing䚕㊶
lixing zhuyi䚕㊶⃊⃘
lixue䚕ⷵ
liyi jituan Ⓒ䥙楕⥱
lizhi䚕㤉
Liang Qichao 㬐⚾怔
Liang Shuming 㬐䇀䄮
liangban₳◙
liangge genben maodun₳₹㫈㦻䩪䦍
leixing伊⨚
Lin Gang 㨦␗
Lin Yusheng (Lin Yü-sheng) 㨦㹢䞮
Lin Zexu 㨦⒨㈟
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Liu Danian ⒧⮶㄃
Liu Dong⒧₫
Liu Junning ⒧␪⸐
Liu Kang⒧ㅆ
Liu Shuxian (Liu Shu-hsien) ⒧承⏗
Liu Xiaobo ⒧㣢㽱
Liu Zaifu ⒧␜⮜
liumang 㿐㺢
Lu Xiangshan 棕廰⼀
Lu Xun 漐扔
Luo Rongqu 処嗲䂯
Luo Yijun 処⃘≙
Ma Yifu 泻₏㿽
Ma Yong 泻╖
Mao Zedong㹪㾌₫
meijieⴡ⅚
minben zhuyi㺠㦻⃊⃘
minjian shehui 㺠梃䯍↩
Minyue pingyi 㺠儵㄂帽
minzhu gen ducai de zhengbian 㺠⃊恮
䕻子䤓℘戸
minzu de liyi㺠㡞䤓Ⓒ䥙
minzu texing㺠㡞䔈㊶
mozhe shitou guohe㜇䧏䪂⯃扖㽂
Mou Zongsan 䓮⸦ₘ
mubiao 䥽㪖
nanxun◦ば
neisheng waiwang␔⦲⮥䘚
neiyuan jichu␔䄟⪉䫏
nisi wihuo⇯㸊㒠㿊
nongye shehui zhuyi ␫₩䯍↩⃊⃘
Pan Yue 䇧⽂
pipan 㔈⒳
pipan de jicheng㔈⒳䤓其㔎
pohuaixing siwei 䫃⧞㊶㊬冃
pojiu lixin䫃㡶䵚㠿
pozi dangtou, li zai qizhong䫃ⷦ㇢⯃
䵚⦷␅₼
pubian benzhi㣽拜㦻德
qimeng⚾在
qiyuexing minzhu⯠儵㊶㺠⃊
qiyuexing renji guanxi ⯠儵㊶ⅉ棔
␂侊
Qian Mu 杀䳕
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Qian Zhixiu 杀㤉≽
qianlima ◒摛泻
qingxiang ⋍⚠
qingxu zhuyi㍔兹⃊⃘
Qiushi 㻑㢾
quanpan Xihualun⏷䥧導▥幉
quanxiang yinjin ⏷欈ㆤ扪
qun刳
ren ⅐
Renmin ribaoⅉ㺠㡴㔴
rensheng taiduⅉ䞮㊐ㄵ
renwen zhuyiⅉ㠖⃊⃘
renyi ⅐⃘
renzhi xianjing 帳䩴椆检
ruxue⎡ⷵ
sanci geming gaochaoₘ㶰槸✌浧䇽
sangang ₘ允
sange jietiₘ₹棅㬾
Shanghai wenxueₙ䀆㠖ⷵ
shehui 䯍↩
Shehui tongquan 䯍↩抩幯
shehui youjilun䯍↩㦘㧉幉
shejin qiuyuan 咜扠㻑扫
shencengci gaige silu䂀⻑㶰㟈槸㊬恾
shenceng jiegou䂀⻑兢㨓
Sheng Hong 䥪㾹
shi ⭺
Shi Zhong䪂₼
shifan ⯀喒
shifan zonghezheng ⯀喒冋⚗䡖
Shijie jingji baodao ₥䟛兞㿝㔴拢
shijie xiandaihua jincheng yanjiu 
zhongxin ₥䟛䘿ⅲ▥扪䲚䪣䴅₼㉒
shisuhua de rujia lunli₥≦▥䤓⎡⹅
↵䚕
shoucheng ⸗㒟
shouduan 㓚㹄
shoujiupai⸗㡶㿍
shouti ♦⇢
shumianyu⃵槱幼
shuxiang 㸙䦇
Shuodang広⏩
sixiang ㊬㎂
sixiang jiben yuanze ⥪欈⪉㦻☮⒨
sixiangjia danchu, xueshujia tuxian 
㊬㎂⹅䁰⒉ⷵ㦾⹅⒇㣍
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sixiang jiefang yundong ㊬㎂屲㟍扟┷
Sulian jubian zhihou Zhongguo de 
xianshi yingdui yu zhanlüe xuanze 啞勣
ぷ♧⃚⚝₼⦌䤓䘿⸭ㄣ⺈₝㒧䟴折㕸
Sun Guodong ⷨ⦌㪚
Sun Zhongshan (Sun Yat-sen) ⷨ₼⼀
tazhehuaⅥ劔▥
taidu ㊐ㄵ
taiping ⮹㄂
taizidang⮹⷟⏩
Tan Sitong 庼⡲⚛
Tang Junyi ➟⚪㹔
Tang Yijie 㻳₏⅚
Tao Dongfeng 椅₫歝
Tao Xisheng 椅゛⦲
teshu de guoqing 䔈㸙䤓⦌㍔
teshu neirong䔈㸙␔⹈
ti⇢
tiyong⇢䞷
tiyong bukelilun⇢䞷ₜ♾䱊幉
tizhinei ⇢Ⓟ␔
tizhiwai ⇢Ⓟ⮥
tian ⮸
Tiananmen ⮸⸘桷
tianxia zhuyi ⮸ₚ⃊⃘
Tianya ⮸䀾
Tianyan jinhualun⮸䆣扪▥幉
tianren heyi⮸ⅉ⚗₏
tiaojianlun 㧰ↅ幉
Tong Shijun 䵴₥≙
tonghua⚛▥
tongwen tongzhong⚛㠖⚛䱜
Tongzhi fuxing⚛㽊⮜␃
tongzhi geti⚛德₹⇢
Wang Fangsen (Wang Fanshen) 䘚⑰㭽
Wang Fuzhi 䘚⮺⃚
Wang Guowei 䘚⦌冃
Wang Huning 䘚㼹⸐
Wang Hui 㻹㣥
Wang Meng 䘚在
Wang Rongzu 㻹嗲䯥
Wang Shan 䘚⼀
Wang Shaoguang 䘚兜⏘
Wang Shuqian 㻹♣䇫
Wang Shuo 䘚㦣
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Wang Xiaodong 䘚⺞₫ (Shi Zhong,    
䪂₼)
Wang Xiaoming 䘚㣢㢝
Wang Yangming 䘚棂㢝
Wang Yichuan 䘚₏ぬ
Wang Yuanhua 䘚⏒▥
Wang Yuechuan 䘚⽂ぬ
Wang Zhaojun 䘚⏕␪
wanmei zhuyi⸛初⃊⃘
Wei Zhongguo wenhua jinggao shijie 
renshi xuanyan ⃉₼⦌㠖▥㟻⛙₥䟛
ⅉ⭺⸲岏
weiji lun☀㧉幉
weili zhuyi➾䚕⃊⃘
weili zhuyi leixing de zhuyi➾䚕⃊⃘
伊⨚䤓⃊⃘
weixin zhuyi➾㠿⃊⃘
wenhua baoshou zhuyi㠖▥≬⸗⃊⃘
wenhua jiaolügan㠖▥䎵壠㎮
wenhua linghun㠖▥䌄淑
wenhua re㠖▥䍼
wenhua shiguan㠖▥⚁屑
wenhua xinli jiegou㠖▥㉒䚕兢㨓
Wenhua: Zhongguo yu shijie 㠖▥:₼⦌
₝₥䟛
Wenhui bao㠖㻖㔴
wenjin zhuyi 䳂扪⃊⃘
wenshixing zhidu 䂸⸳⨚Ⓟㄵ
Wenxue pinglun㠖ⷵ幓幉
wenyan㠖岏
wenyanwen 㠖岏㠖
Wenyi zhengming 㠖唉℘炲
Wu Jiaxiang⛃䳋䯴
Wu Mi ⛃⸢
Wu Yifu ⛃拇⮺
wusi yundong℣⥪扟┷
wuwei er zhi㡯⃉力㽊
wuxu bianfa㒙㒛♧㽤
Xixue tiyong 導ⷵ⇢䞷
xiandaihua de duanlie䘿ⅲ▥䤓㠼孑
xiandaihua lishi yanjiu䘿ⅲ▥☕⚁
䪣䴅
xiandai xin rujia䘿ⅲ㠿⎡⹅
xiansheng duoren ⏗⭿⯉ⅉ
xianshi zhuyi䘿⸭⃊⃘
xianyi hounan zhanlüe⏗㢢⚝楍㒧䟴
xiao (piety) ⷬ
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Xiao Gongqin 嚶┮䱵
xiaokang ⺞ㅆ
Xie Wujun 庱㷵␪
xin baoshou zhuyi㠿≬⸗⃊⃘
Xinhai geming 截ℴ槸✌
xin jianjin zhuyi㠿䂟扪⃊⃘
Xin lixue㠿䚕ⷵ
xin qimeng yundong 㠿⚾在扟┷
Xin qingnian 㠿槡㄃
xin quanwei zhuyi㠿㧒Ⲑ⃊⃘
Xin shilun 㠿ℚ幉
xin shiqi 㠿㢅㦮
xintaishang de jijin zhuyi㉒㊐ₙ䤓
䉏扪⃊⃘
Xin weishilun 㠿➾幕幉
xin wenhua yundong㠿㠖▥扟┷
xin wenxue yundong㠿㠖ⷵ扟┷
xinxing zhi xue ㉒㊶⃚ⷵ
xinxue㉒ⷵ
xinzheng㠿㟎
xin zhixu zhuyi㠿䱸ㄞ⃊⃘
xin zuopai 㠿ふ㿍
xing ㊶
Xiong Shili 䐙◐┪
xiuke liaofa↠⏚䠦㽤
Xu Ben ㈟⯣
Xu Fuguan ㈟⮜屑
Xu Jilin 幇儹榥
Xu Ming 幇㢝
Xu Weicheng ㈟㍮幩
Xu Youyu ㈟♚䂣
Xuehengⷵ嫰
Xuerenⷵⅉ
xueshuⷵ㦾
Xunzi 嗏⷟
Yan Fu ₴⮜
Yan Fu beilun₴⮜㌥幉
Yan Jiayan ₴⹅䌝
Yang Fan 㧷ゕ
Yang Ping 㧷㄂
yangjingbang㾚㾍㿫
yangqi㓻㆒
yangwu pai 㾚┰㿍
yi pian gai quan ⅴ⋞㟈⏷
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yi ren wei ti, yi he wei yong ⅴ⅐⃉⇢
ⅴ✛⃉䞷
yitu lunli ㎞⦍↵䚕
yizhi geti ㆑德₹⇢
yizhong teshu de jingshen zhuangtai
₏䱜䔈㸙䤓位䯭䕅㊐
Yin Haiguang 㹆䀆⏘
yinzhen zhike 毽炸㷱䃃
Yingmeishi jingyan zhuyi de ziyou zhuyi
喀初㆞兞洛⃊⃘䤓呹䟀⃊⃘
yong (function) 䞷
youdaoxing zhidu 庀⺋⨚Ⓟㄵ
youhuan yishi㉶㌲㎞幕
youji tuanjie㦘㧉⥱兢
youni wuwo㦘⇯㡯㒠
Yu Yingshi (Yü Ying-shih) ⇨喀㢅
Yuan Mu 嬐㦷
Yuan Shikai嬐₥⑾
Yuan Weishi 嬐↮㢅
Yuandao☮拢
Yuanqiang☮㇉
yuanwang toushe ㏎㦪㔤⺓
Yue Daiyun ⃟煪℠
yueli梔☕
zaiti 戌⇢
zaoqi xiandaihua lishi yanjiu 㡸㦮
䘿ⅲ▥☕⚁䪣䴅
Zeng Guofan 㦍⦌塸
Zhanlüe yu guanli 㒧䟴₝丰䚕
Zhang Bingjiuㆯ䍂⃬
Zhang Fa ㆯ㽤
Zhang Haipeng ㆯ䀆烞
Zhang Hao (Chang Hao) ㆯ䋞
Zhang houzhuㆯ⚝⃊
Zhang Junmai ㆯ⚪┱
Zhang Longxi ㆯ椕䄹
Zhang Shizhao 䵯⭺朙
Zhang Taiyan 䵯⮹䌝
Zhang Xudong ㆯ㡼₫
Zhang Xun ㆯ╚
Zhang Yiwu ㆯ欟㷵
Zhao Yiheng 怄㹔嫰
Zhao Ziyang 怄侺棂
Zhexue yanjiu➁ⷵ䪣䴅
zhenjie 徭唑
Zheng Jiadong 捠⹅㪚
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Zheng Min 捠㟞
Zheng Yi 捠⃘
Zhengzhi jiangyi㟎㽊幁⃘
zhengzhi langman zhuyi㟎㽊㿹䆺⃊⃘
zhengzhi xingtai 㟎㽊ㇱ㊐
Zhi Zhong ㉦㉯
zhidu juedinglunⓅㄵ⑂⸩幉
zhidu wenhuaⓅㄵ㠖▥
zhijue䦃屘
zhiru㮜⏴
zhishi fenzi䩴幕⒕⷟
zhixiang zhengzhi xingwei de wenhua 
zhuyi 㖖⚠㟎㽊嫛⃉䤓㠖▥⃊⃘
zhizhengdang㓶㟎⏩
zhong ㉯
Zhongguo qingnian bao ₼⦌槡㄃㔴
Zhongguo wenhua shuyuan₼⦌㠖▥
⃵棱
Zhonghua₼◝
Zhonghua Kongzi yanjiusuo₼◝ⷣ⷟
䪣䴅㓏
Zhonghua wenhuajuan₼◝㠖▥⦗
Zhonghuaxing₼◝㊶
zhongji guanhuai 兗㨐␂㊏
zhongjie₼⅚
Zhongti xiyong₼⇢導䞷
Zhongxue tiyong ₼ⷵ⇢䞷
Zhou Cezong (Chow Tse-tsung) ⛷䷥兄
Zhou Zuoren ⛷⇫ⅉ
Zhu Xi 㧀䑈
zhuanhua懻▥
zhuanzaoxing de chuangzao懻抯㊶䤓
⒪抯
Zhuangzi pingyu ㄓ⷟幓幼
zhudao jingshen⃊⺋位䯭
zhuliu wenhua⃊㿐㠖▥
zhuti zhuyi⃊⇢⃊⃘
zhuyi juedinglun⃊⃘⑂⸩幉
ziran gong lilun 呹䏅⏻䚕幉
zonghe chuangxin 冋⚗⒪㠿
zonghe fanying nengli 冋⚗♜ㄣ厌┪
Zouxiang weilai 忿⚠㦹㧴
zuobiao ⧟㪖
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TABLES
Table 1. Xiao Gongqin’s Analysis of “Structures” and “System Cultures”1179
STRUCTURE 
(JIEGOU)
HETEROGENEOUS 
SOCIETIES
ORGANIC 
SOLIDARITY
DIVISION OF LABOR
HOMOGENOUS 
SOCIETIES 
MECHANICAL 
SOLIDARITY
NO DIVISION OF
LABOR
“PARA-HOMOGENOUS 
SOCIETY”
BY AND LARGE MECHANICAL 
SOLIDARITY
ARTIFICIAL DIVISION OF LABOR
SYSTEM 
CULTURE 
(ZHIDU 
WENHUA)
WESTERN 
INDUSTRIAL 
SOCIETY
TRADITIONAL 
CHINESE  SOCIETY
MODERN AND CONTEMPORARY 
CHINESE  SOCIETY
ECONOMY MARKET ECONOMY 
MIDDLE CLASS
NATURAL 
ECONOMY WITH 
FAMILY AS BASIS
MARKET ECONOMY AFTER
INTERMEZZO OF PLANNED
ECONOMY
POLITICS PLURALIST 
DEMOCRATIC 
SYSTEM AND CIVIL 
SOCIETY
MONARCHICAL 
AUTOCRATIC
SYSTEM WITH 
EXAMINATION 
SYSTEM AS BASIS
CONDITIONS FOR PLURALIST 
DEMOCRACY NOT RIPE 
AUTOCRATIC SYSTEM NEEDED
CULTURE LIBERAL VALUES RITES AND 
CONFUCIAN 
IDEOLOGY
CONDITIONS FOR LIBERAL 
VALUES NOT RIPE  RELIANCE 
ON TRADITION
SOCIAL BASIS HORIZONTAL 
CONTRACTUAL
RELATIONS
“FEN” (POSITION/
STATUS) TO 
SAFEGUARD 
ORDER
HORIZONTAL CONTRACTUAL  
RELATIONS ON LOWEST LEVEL 
STRATEGIES TO SAFEGUARD 
ORDER
1179 Table composed with data from Xiao Gongqin, “Lishi jujue langman,” XGJ, 111; and idem, 
“Du’erkaimu, Makesi yu Xunzi,” XGJ, 14, 16.   
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Table 2. Overview of Positions of Main Intellectuals 
“RADICALISM” SOURCES 
REFERRED TO
CONSERVATIVE 
GROUNDS 
CONSERVATIVE 
GOALS 
PRINCE-
LINGS
“ROMANTICISM,”
“IRRATIONALISM”
“UTOPIANISM”
LIBERALISM 
SOCIALISM
HAYEK
POPPER
HUNTINGTON
NO:
DEFENSE OF 
“RATIONAL”
REFORM
NO:
STRENGTHEN 
LEGITIMACY OF 
CCP
XIAO 
GONGQIN
REFORM AND 
REVOLUTION 
BASED ON 
ABSTRACT 
DESIGN AND 
“FIRST 
PRINCIPLES,”
UNIVERSALISM,
NEGLECT OF 
PARTICULAR 
CONDITIONS
BURKE
YAN FU
HAYEK 
HUNTINGTON
YES:
PARTICULARITY,
ANTI-
ENLIGHTENMENT 
THOUGHT,
ORGANICISM,
HISTORICAL 
GROWTH
NO:
MARKET 
ECONOMY,
INSTRUMENTAL 
USE OF 
TRADITION FOR 
MODERNIZATION
YÜ YING-
SHIH 
PROGRESSIVISM 
“NEOTERISM”
“ANTI-TRADI-
TIONALISM,”
ERADICATION OF 
INTERMEDIATE 
GROUPS 
BURKE YES:
REJECTION OF 
PROGRESSIVISM,
DEFENSE OF 
INTERMEDIATE 
GROUPS AS 
HISTORICALLY 
GROWN
YES:
PRESERVE 
COMMUNITY,
PRESERVE 
TRADITION 
BECAUSE IT 
CONTAINS TRUTH 
(MORAL NORMS 
AND STANDARDS)
CHEN LAI “ANTI-TRADI-
TIONALISM”
“INSTRUMENTAL 
REASON”
NEW 
CONFUCIANS
WEBER
YES:
CRITICISM OF  
MODERNITY,
DEFENSE OF 
COMMUNITY
YES:
PRESERVE 
COMMUNITY,
PRESERVE 
TRADITION 
BECAUSE IT 
CONTAINS TRUTH 
(MORAL NORMS 
AND STANDARDS)
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ZHENG MIN (REJECTION OF 
DICHOTOMIES,
LINGUISTIC 
DISCONTINUITY)
STRUCTURALISM 
POST-
STRUCTURALISM 
HEIDEGGER
GADAMER
YES:
ORGANIC GROWTH,
CONTINGENCY,
REJECTION OF 
ABSTRACT DESIGN 
OF LANGUAGE
NO:
PRESERVE 
TRADITION 
BECAUSE IT 
BELONGS TO 
CHINA 
(CULTURAL 
NATIONALISM)
330
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Alitto, Guy S. “The Conservative as Sage: Liang Shu-ming.” In Charlotte Furth, ed., 
The Limits of Change (q.v.): 213-241.
—. The Last Confucian: Liang Shu-ming and the Chinese Dilemma of Modernity.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979.
— (Ai Kai). Shijie fanwei nei de fan xiandaihua sichao: lun wenhua shoucheng zhuyi
(Anti-modernization thought in a global spectrum: on cultural conservatism). Guiyang: 
Guizhou renmin chubanshe, 1999 (1991).
—. Lecture on “Postmodernism.” Peking University, June 27, 2006.
Allen, David Y. “Modern Conservatism: The Problem of Definition.” The Review of 
Politics 43, no. 4 (October 1981): 582-603.
Ang, Ien. “Can One Say No to Chineseness?: Pushing the Limits of the Diasporic 
Paradigm.” In Rey Chow, ed., Modern Chinese Literary and Cultural Studies in the Age 
of Theory: Reimagining a Field. Durham, London: Duke University Press, 2000: 281-
300.
Apter, David E. The Politics of Modernization. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1965.
—. Political Change: Collected Essays. London: Routledge, 1973.
Arac, Jonathan. “Postmodernism and Postmodernity in China: An Agenda for Inquiry.” 
New Literary History 28, no. 1 (1997): 135-145.
Arendt, Hannah. On Revolution. New York, Toronto: Penguin Books, 2006 (New York: 
Viking Press, 1963). 
Arnhart, Larry. Darwinian Conservatism. Exeter, Charlottesville: Imprint Academic, 
2005.
Austin, John L. How to Do Things with Words. Eds. J.O. Urmson and Marina Sbisà. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975 (1962).  
Bakhtin, Mikhail. The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays by M.M. Bakhtin. Trans. 
Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981. 
Bakhtine, Mikhail (V.N. Volochinov). Le marxisme et la philosophie du langage: essai 
d’application de la méthode sociologique en linguistique (Marxism and the philosophy 
331
of language: application essay of the sociological method in linguistics). Trans. Marina 
Yaguello. Paris: Les éditions de minuit, 1977.
Barmé, Geremie R. “A Word of Advice to the Politburo.” The Australian Journal of 
Chinese Affairs 23 (January 1990): 49-76.
—. “To Screw Foreigners is Patriotic: China’s Avant-Garde Nationalists.” The China 
Journal 34 (July 1995): 209-234.
—. In The Red: On Contemporary Chinese Culture. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1999.
Baum, Richard. Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping. Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994. 
“Behind the CCP Princes Party.” Pai-hsing (The People) 260 (March 16, 1992): 32-35.
Beijing daxue shehui kexuechu (Peking University Social Sciences Department), ed. 
Beijing daxue jinian wusi yundong qishi zhounian lunwenji (Collection of articles at the 
occasion of Peking University’s commemoration of the seventieth anniversary of the 
May Fourth Movement). Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 1990.
Béja, Jean Philippe. “The Rise of National-Confucianism?” China Perspectives 2
(November-December 1995): 6-11.
Bell, Daniel. The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism. New York: Basic Books, 1976.
Berger, Peter L. “An East Asian Development Model.” In idem and Hsin-Huang 
Michael Hsiao, eds., In Search of an East Asian Development Model. New Brunswick, 
Oxford: Transaction Books, 1988: 3-11.
Berlin, Isaiah. “Two Concepts of Liberty.” In idem, Four Essays on Liberty. London, 
Oxford, et al.: Oxford University Press, 1969: 118-172.
—. “Herder and the Enlightenment.” In idem, Vico and Herder: Two Studies in the 
History of Ideas. London: Hogarth Press, 1976: 143-186.
—. “The Romantic Revolution: A Crisis in the History of Modern Thought.” In idem, 
The Sense of Reality: Studies on Ideas and Their History. London: Pimlico, 1996: 168-
193.
—. “The Counter-Enlightenment.” In idem, The Proper Study of Mankind: An 
Anthology of Essays. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giraux, 1998: 243-268.
Bevir, Mark. “Mind and Method in the History of Ideas.” History and Theory 36: 167-
189.
Bi Quanzhong. “Guoxue, zai yanyuan you qiaoran xingqi: Beijing daxue Zhongguo 
chuantong wenhua yanjiu sanji” (The quiet rise of national studies at old Peking 
332
University: random notes on Chinese traditional culture research at Peking University). 
Renmin ribao (People’s Daily), August 16, 1993: 3. 
Blaas, Herman. “Ideeëngeschiedenis: enkele recente ontwikkelingen.” In Herman 
Beliën and GertJan van Setten, eds., Geschiedschrijving in de twintigste eeuw: discussie 
zonder eind. Amsterdam: Agon B.V., 1991: 343-364.
Bloch, Ernst. “Nonsynchronism and Dialectics.” New German Critique 11 (Spring 
1977): 22-38.
Bonnin, Michel and Yves Chevrier. “The Intellectual and the State: Social Dynamics of 
Intellectual Autonomy During the Post-Mao Era.” The China Quarterly 127 (September 
1991): 569-593.
Bresciani, Umberto. Reinventing Confucianism: The New Confucian Movement. Taipei: 
Ricci Institute for Chinese Studies, 2001.
Brook, Timothy. “Profit and Righteousness in Chinese Economic Culture.” In idem and 
Hy V. Luong, eds., Culture and Economy: The Shaping of Capitalism in Eastern Asia.
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997: 27-44.
Brunner, Otto, Werner Conze and Reinhart Koselleck, eds. Geschichtliche 
Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland 
(Basic concepts in history: a dictionary on historical principles of political and social 
language in Germany). Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1972-1997.
Burke, Edmund. Reflections on the Revolution in France. Ed. Frank M. Turner. New 
Haven, London: Yale University Press, 2003. 
Butterfield, Herbert. The Whig Interpretation of History. New York, London: W.W. 
Norton and Company, 1965.
Cecil, Hugh. Conservatism. London: Williams and Norgate, 1912.
Ceng Yeying, ed. Wushi nian lai de Zhongguo jindaishi yanjiu (Research on modern 
Chinese history over the past fifty years). Shanghai: Shanghai shudian chubanshe, 2000.
Chan, Wing-tsit. “What Is Living and What Is Dead in Confucianism.” In idem, 
Religious Trends in Modern China. New York: Octagon Books, 1969: 3-53.
Chang Hao. “New Confucianism and the Intellectual Crisis of Contemporary China.” In 
Charlotte Furth, ed., The Limits of Change (q.v.): 276-302.
—. “Intellectual Change and the Reform Movement, 1890-1898.” In The Cambridge 
History of China, Vol. 11: Late Ch’ing, 1800-1911, Part Two. Eds. John King Fairbank 
and Kwang-ching Liu. Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1980: 274-338.
333
—. “Zhongguo jinbainian lai de geming sixiang daolu.” (The revolutionary road of 
China over the past hundred years). In Li Shitao, ed., Zhishi fenzi lichang (q.v.): 42-56.
Originally published in Kaifang shidai (Open Times) 1999, no. 1.
Chang Jiang. “Shehui zhuanxingqi de yizhong wenhua xianxiang: ping Gaobie geming”
(A cultural phenomenon in societies in a transitional stage: on Farewell to Revolution).
Ershiyi shiji (Twenty-first Century) 33 (February 1996): 68-71.
Cheek, Timothy. “Historians as Public Intellectuals in Contemporary China.” In 
Edward Gu and Merle Goldman, eds., Chinese Intellectuals Between State and Market.
London, New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004: 204-222.
Chen Baiming. “Jinnianlai guonei dui wenhua jijin zhuyi de pipan zongshu” (Summary 
of mainland criticism of cultural radicalism in recent years). Wenyi lilun yu piping
(Literature and Art Theory and Criticism) 1997, no. 1 (April 1997): 128-141.  
Chen, Feng. “The Dilemmas of Eudaemonic Legitimacy in Post-Mao China.” Polity 29,
no. 3 (1997): 421-440.
—. “Order and Stability in Social Transition: Neoconservative Political Thought in 
Post-1989 China.” The China Quarterly 151 (September 1997): 593-613.
Chen Feng and Jin Guantao. From Youthful Manuscripts to River Elegy: The Chinese 
Popular Cultural Movement and Political Transformation, 1979-1989. Hong Kong: 
Chinese University Press, 1997.
Chen Feng and Zhi Zhong. “Kua shiji zhi jiao: wenxue de kunhuo yu xuanze.”
(Stepping into a new century: literature’s puzzlement and options). In Li Shitao, ed., 
Zhishi fenzi lichang (q.v.): 219-230. Originally published in Wenxue pinglun (Literary 
Review) 1994, no. 6: 121-126, 34. 
Chen Kejian, ed. Lixing yu shengming: dangdai xin ruxue wencui (Reason and life: 
collection of texts on New Confucianism). Shanghai: Shanghai shudian chubanshe, 
1993.
Chen Kuide. “Wangchao mori de xinzheng” (“New deal” of a dynasty’s doomsday). 
Zhongguo zhi chun (China Spring) 1 (January 1992): 24-25.
Chen Lai. “‘Wusi’ dongxi wenhua lunzheng de fansi” (Reflections on the May Fourth 
debates on Eastern and Western cultures). In Beijing daxue shehui kexue chu, ed., 
Beijing daxue jinian wusi yundong (q.v.): 157-174. Also appeared in Dushu (Reading) 
1989, no. 5. 
—. “Zhenxia qiyuan” (A propitious new start). Ershiyi shiji (Twenty-first Century) 10 
(April 1992): 10-11.
—. “Shisu rujia lunli yu houfa xiandaihua” (Vulgar Confucianism and the 
modernization of late developing countries). Ershiyi shiji (Twenty-first Century) 22 
(April 1994): 112-120.
334
—. “Jiushi niandai bulü weijian de ‘guoxue yanjiu’” (“National studies research” of the 
1990s: walking with difficulty). Dongfang (Orient) 1995, no. 2: 24-28.
—. “‘Guoxue re’ yu chuantong wenhua yanjiu de wenti” (The “national studies craze” 
and the problem of research on traditional culture). Kongzi yanjiu (Confucius Research) 
1995, no. 2: 4-6.
—. “Huajie ‘chuantong’ yu ‘xiandai’ de jinzhang: ‘wusi’ wenhua sichao de fansi”
(Dissolving the tension between tradition and modernity: reflections on the cultural 
trend of “May Fourth”). In idem, Chen Lai zixuanji (Self-selected works of Chen Lai). 
Guangdong: Guangdong shifan daxue chubanshe, 1997: 373-398. Originally published 
in Lin Yü-sheng et al., Wusi: duoyuan de fansi (q.v.): 151-185.
—. “Renwen zhuyi de shijie” (The scope of humanism). Dongfang wenhua (Eastern 
Culture) 18, no.1 (1997): 14-20. A modified version of this text was published in idem, 
Chuantong yu xiandai (q.v.): 1-12.
—. “Ershi shiji Zhongguo wenhua zhong de ruxue kunjing” (The predicament of 
Confucianism in twentieth-century Chinese culture). Zhejiang shehui kexue (Zhejiang 
Social Sciences) 1998, no. 3 (May 1998): 26-32. A modified version of this text was 
published in idem, Chuantong yu xiandai (q.v.): 84-96.
—. “Ershi shiji wenhua yundong de jijin zhuyi” (Radicalism in twentieth-century 
cultural movements). In Li Shitao, ed., Zhishi fenzi lichang (q.v.): 293-308. Originally 
published in Dongfang (Orient) 1, no.1 (1993), and in Zhexue zazhi (Philosophy 
Journal) 1992, no. 2.
—. “Dui xin wenhua yundong de zai sikao: cong ‘wusi’ houqi de Liang Shuming 
shuoqi”  (Repondering the New Culture Movement: on Liang Shuming in the post-May 
Fourth era). Nanchang daxue xuebao (Nanchang University Journal) 31, no. 1 (January 
2000): 1-5.
—. Chuantong yu xiandai: renwen zhuyi de shijie (Tradition and modernity: the scope 
of humanism). Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2006. Revised edition of idem, 
Renwen zhuyi de shijie  (The scope of humanism). Nanning: Guangxi jiaoyu chubanshe, 
1997.
—. “Zhongguo jindai sixiang de huigu yu qianzhan” (Retrospect and prospect of 
modern Chinese thought). In idem, Chuantong yu xiandai (q.v.): 13-30. Originally 
published in Tianjin shehui kexue (Tianjin Social Sciences) 1989, no. 5.
—. “‘Wusi’ sichao yu xiandaixing” (The “May Fourth” trend and modernity). In idem, 
Chuantong yu xiandai (q.v.): 60-67.
—. “Liang Shuming zaoqi de dongxi wenhuaguan” (Liang Shuming’s early cultural 
view of East and West). In idem, Chuantong yu xiandai (q.v.): 97-129.
335
—. “Feng Youlan wenhuaguan de jianli yu fazhan” (The foundation and development 
of Feng Youlan’s cultural perspective). In idem, Chuantong yu xiandai (q.v.): 130-162.
Originally published in Xueren (The Scholar) 4, 1993.  
—. “Xin lixue yu xiandaixing siwei de fansi” (New rational philosophy and reflections 
on modernity thought). In idem, Chuantong yu xiandai (q.v.): 163-178. Originally 
published in Beijing daxue xuebao (Peking University Journal) 1995, no. 1.
—. “Rujia sixiang yu xiandai dongya shijie” (Confucian thought and the modern East 
Asian world). In Idem, Chuantong yu xiandai (q.v.): 179-187. Originally published in 
Dongfang (Orient) 1994, no. 3.
—. “Rujia lilun yu Zhongguo xiandaihua” (Confucian ethics and Chinese 
modernization). In idem, Chuantong yu xiandai (q.v.): 188-206. Originally published in 
Ershiyi shiji (Twenty-first Century) 22 (April 1994).
—. “Kunjing yishi yu huxiang yilai” (Problem consciousness and mutual reliance). In 
idem, Chuantong yu xiandai (q.v.): 219-228. Originally published in Dushu (Reading) 
1992, no. 3.
—. “Jiazhi, quanwei, chuantong yu Zhongguo zhexue” (Values, authority, tradition, and 
Chinese philosophy). In idem, Chuantong yu xiandai (q.v.): 254-266. Originally 
published in Zhexue yanjiu (Philosophy Research) 1989, no. 10.
—. “Bayu: shiji zhi jiao hua chuantong” (Afterword: on tradition at the end of the 
century). In idem, Chuantong yu xiandai (q.v.): 286-289.
Chen Shaoming. “Didiao yixie: xiang wenhua baoshou zhuyi jinyan” (Tone down a 
little: advice to cultural conservatism). In Li Shitao, ed., Zhishi fenzi lichang (q.v.): 507-
513. Originally published in Dongfang (Orient) 1996, no. 3. 
Chen Song. Wusi qianhou dongxi wenhua wenti lunzhan wenxuan (Selections from the 
debates on the issue of Eastern and Western cultures around May Fourth). Beijing: 
Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1985.
Chen, Xiaomei. Occidentalism: A Theory of Counter-Discourse in Post-Mao China.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.  
Chen Xiaoming. “Baoshouxing yu hefahua: pingxi dalu zheng xingcheng yizhong 
wenhua lichang” (Conservative disposition and legitimation: reviewing a kind of 
cultural position that is taking shape on the mainland). Zhongguo luntan (China Forum) 
16 (February 1, 1992): 93-97.
—. “Fan jijin yu dangdai zhishi fenzi de lishi jingyu” (Anti-radicalism and the historical 
situation of contemporary intellectuals). In Li Shitao, ed., Zhishi fenzi lichang (q.v.):
309-320. Originally published in Dongfang (Orient) 1994, no. 1. 
336
Chen Xiaoming, Zhang Yiwu, Dai Jinhua, and Zhu Wei. “Dongfang zhuyi he 
houzhimin zhuyi” (Orientalism and postcolonialism). Zhongshan (Zhongshan) 88 
(1994, no.1): 126-148.
China Youth Daily Ideology and Theory Department. “Realistic Responses and 
Strategic Options for China after the Soviet Upheaval.” Trans. David Kelly. Chinese 
Law and Government 29, no. 2 (March-April 1996): 13-31.
Chong, Woei-Lien. “Su Xiaokang on His Film ‘River Elegy.’” China Information 4, no. 
3 (Winter 1989-1990): 44-55.
—. “Mankind and Nature in Chinese Thought: Li Zehou on the Traditional Roots of 
Maoist Voluntarism.” China Information 11, nos. 2-3 (Autumn-Winter 1996): 138-175.
—. “Philosophy in an Age of Crisis: Three Thinkers in Post-Cultural Revolution China: 
Li Zehou, Liu Xiaobo, and Liu Xiaofeng.” In idem, ed., China’s Great Proletarian 
Cultural Revolution: Master Narratives and Post-Mao Counternarratives. Lanham et 
al.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002: 215-254.
Chow, Rey. “Introduction: On Chineseness as a Theoretical Problem.” In idem, ed., 
Modern Chinese Literary and Cultural Studies in the Age of Theory: Reimagining a 
Field. Durham, London: Duke University Press, 2000: 1-25.
Chow, Tse-tsung. The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern 
China. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960.
“Chuantong wenhua nengfou zaixie huihuang: bufen laozhongqing xuezhe jiexi 
‘guoxuere’” (Can traditional culture write brilliance again?: some old, middle-aged, and 
young scholars analyze “national studies”). Renmin ribao (People’s Daily), December 
6, 1994: 11. 
Cohen, Paul. Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent 
Chinese Past. New York: Columbia University Press, 1984.
—. “Cultural China: Some Definitional Issues.” Philosophy East and West 43, no. 3 
(July 1993): 557-563.
Crespi, Franco. “Review of Max Weber’s Insights and Errors; L’ordine infranto: Max 
Weber e i limiti del razionalismo; and Calvinism and the Capitalist Spirit: Max Weber’s 
Protestant Ethic.” European Sociological Review 1, no. 3 (December 1985): 250-252.
Cui Zhiyuan. “Zhidu chuangxin yu di’erci sixiang jiefang” (Institutional innovation and 
a second thought liberation). Ershiyi shiji (Twenty-first Century) 8 (August 1994): 5-16.
Davies, Gloria. “Anticipating Community, Producing Dissent: The Politics of Recent 
Chinese Intellectual Praxis.” The China Review 2, no. 2 (Fall 2002): 1-35.
—. Worrying about China: The Language of Chinese Critical Inquiry. Cambridge, MA, 
London: Harvard University Press, 2007.
337
Davies, Gloria, ed. Voicing Concerns: Contemporary Chinese Critical Inquiry.
Lanham, Boulder: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001.
de Bary, Wm. Theodore. “The New Confucianism in Beijing.” The American Scholar
Spring 1995: 175-189.
de Bary, Wm. Theodore and Richard Lufrano, eds. Sources of Chinese Tradition: 
Volume II: From 1600 Through the Twentieth Century. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2000 (1960).
Deng Xiaoping. Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, (1975-1982). Trans. The Bureau for 
the Compilation and Translation of Works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin Under the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Beijing: Foreign Languages 
Press, 1984.
Ding Chu. “Cong ‘yi’ xiang ‘li’ de zhanlüe zhuanbian” (Strategic change from 
“principle” to “interest”). Zhongguo zhi chun (China Spring) 1 (January 1992): 30-31.
Ding Dong and Sun Min, eds. Shiji zhi jiao de chongzhuang: Wang Meng xianxiang 
zhengminglu (Collisions at the turn of the century: collection of debates on the Wang 
Meng phenomenon). Beijing: Guangming ribao chubanshe, 1995.
Ding Xiaoqiang and Xu Zi, eds. Wusi yu xiandai Zhongguo: wusi xinlun (May Fourth 
and modern China: new views on May Fourth). Taiyuan: Shanxi renmin chubanshe, 
1989.
Dirlik, Arif. “T’ao Hsi-sheng: The Social Limits of Change.” In Charlotte Furth, ed., 
The Limits of Change (q.v.): 305-331.
—. “Postsocialism?: Reflections on ‘Socialism with Chinese Characteristics.’” In idem 
and Maurice Meisner, eds., Marxism and the Chinese Experience: Issues in 
Contemporary Chinese Socialism. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1989: 362-384.
—. “The Postcolonial Aura: Third World Criticism in the Age of Global Capitalism.” 
Critical Inquiry 20, no. 2 (Winter 1994): 328-356.
—. “Confucius in the Borderlands: Global Capitalism and the Reinvention of 
Confucianism.” Boundary 2 22:3 (Fall 1995): 229-273.
—. “Reversals, Ironies, Hegemonies: Notes on the Contemporary Historiography of 
Modern China.” Modern China 22, no. 3 (July 1996): 243-284.
—. “The Past as Ideology and Critical Resource: Politics and Historical Revisionism 
after the Fall.” Unpublished conference paper for workshop on Revisionism. Leiden, 
November 2005.
Dirlik, Arif and Xudong Zhang. “Introduction: Postmodernism and China.” In idem, 
eds., Postmodernism and China. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2000: 1-
17.
338
Djilas, Milovan. The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System. New York, 
Washington: Praeger Publishers, 1971 (1957).
Duara, Prasenjit. “De-constructing the Chinese Nation.” In Jonathan Unger, ed., 
Chinese Nationalism. Armonk, London: M.E. Sharpe, 1996: 31-55.
Dunlop, John B. “The August 1991 Coup and Its Impact on Soviet Politics. ” Journal of 
Cold War Studies 5, no. 1 (Winter 2003): 94-127.
Durkheim, Émile. The Division of Labor in Society. Trans. George Simpson. New 
York: The Free Press, 1964.
Eagleton, Terry. Literary Theory: An Introduction. Malden, MA: Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing Ltd., 1996 (1983).
—. The Illusions of Postmodernism. Oxford, Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1996.
Eisenstadt, Shmuel N. “Post-Traditional Societies and the Continuity of Reconstruction 
of Tradition in Post-Traditional Societies.” In idem, ed., Post-Traditional Societies.
New York: Norton, 1974: 1-27.
Epstein, Klaus. “Introduction.” In idem, The Genesis of German Conservatism.
Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966: 3-25.
Fairbank, John King and Ssu Yu-teng. China’s Response to the West: A Documentary 
Survey, 1839-1923. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954.
Fan Dainian. “Science, Open Society and China.” In W.H. Newton-Smith and Jiang 
Tianyi, eds., Popper in China. London, New York: Routledge, 1992: 11-20.
Fan Qinlin. “Ruhe pingjia ‘wusi’ baihuawen yundong?: yu Zheng Min xiansheng 
shangque” (How to evaluate the May Fourth vernacular language movement?: a 
discussion with Zheng Min). In Li Shitao, ed., Zhishi fenzi lichang (q.v.): 187-197.  
Originally published in Wenxue pinglun (Literary Review) 1994, no. 2: 112-117.
Fan Wenlan. “Zhongguo jindaishi de fenqi wenti” (The problem of the periodization of 
modern Chinese history), Part one. In Fanwenlan lishi lunwen xuanji (Selected 
historical papers of Fan Wenlan). Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1979: 
113-160.
Fan Xing. “Fulu: jiushi niandai de sixiang liebian” (Addendum: thought fission of the 
1990s). In idem, Shiji mo wenhua sichaoshi (History of cultural trends at the end of the 
century). Wuhan: Hubei jiaoyu chubanshe, 1999: 281-301.
Fang Keli. “Guanyu xiandai xin rujia yanjiu de jige wenti” (On some issues in New 
Confucianism research). In idem and Li Jinquan, eds. Xiandai xin ruxue yanjiu lunji 
(Collected essays on New Confucianism studies), Part one. Beijing: Zhongguo shehui 
kexue chubanshe, 1989, Vol. 1: 1-13.
339
—. “Yao zhuyi yanjiu jiushi niandai chuxian de wenhua baoshou zhuyi sichao” (One 
should attentively research the cultural conservative trend that appears during the 
1990s). Gaoxiao lilun zhanxian (Theoretical Front in Higher Education) 1996, no. 2: 
30-36.
—. Xiandai xin ruxue yu Zhongguo xiandaihua (New Confucianism and Chinese 
modernization). Tianjin: Renmin chubanshe, 1997.
—. “Lüelun jiushi niandai de wenhua baoshou zhuyi sichao” (A brief discussion of the 
cultural conservative trend of the nineties). In Sha Jiansun and Gong Shuduo, eds.  Zou 
shenme lu (q.v.): 145-161.
Fang Wang. “Huaxia wenming chuantong yu zuguo xiandaihua de sikao: lun He Xin de 
wenhuaxue yanjiu” (Reflections on Chinese civilization and culture and the 
modernization of the motherland: on He Xin’s research on culture studies). Zhongguo 
qingnian bao (China Youth Daily), January 10, 1991: 4.
Feng Lin, ed. Chongxin renshi bainian Zhongguo: jindaishi redian wenti yanjiu yu 
zhengming (Re-apprehending a hundred years China: research and debate on popular 
issues in modern Chinese history). 2 vols. Beijing: Gaige chubanshe, 1998. 
Feng Youlan, Xin shilun (A new discourse on events). Changsha: Shangwu yinshuguan, 
1940.
—. The Hall of Three Pines: An Account of My Life. Trans. Denis C. Mair. Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 2000. 
Fewsmith, Joseph. “Neoconservatism and the End of the Dengist Era.” Asian Survey 25,
no. 7 (July 1995): 635-651.
—. Elite Politics in Contemporary China. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2001.
—. China Since Tiananmen: The Politics of Transition. Cambridge, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Fischer, David Hackett. Historians’ Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought.
New York: Harper and Row, 1970.
Friedman, Edward. “Reconstructing China’s National Identity: A Southern Alternative 
to Mao-Era Anti-Imperialist Nationalism.” The Journal of Asian Studies 53, no. 1 
(February 1994): 67-91.
Fu Keng. “Langman lixiang yu shigong jingshen” (Romantic ideals and the spirit of 
cause and contribution). Dushu (Reading) 1992, no. 1: 30-37.
—. “Dalu zhishi fenzi de jijin zhuyi shenhua” (The myth of radicalism of mainland 
intellectuals). Ershiyi shiji (Twenty-first Century) 11 (June 1992): 144-147.
340
Furth, Charlotte. “Culture and Politics in Modern Chinese Conservatism.” In idem, ed., 
The Limits of Change  (q.v.): 22-53.
—. “The Sage as Rebel: The Inner World of Chang Ping-lin.” In idem, ed., The Limits 
of Change  (q.v.): 113-150.
—. “Intellectual Change: From the Reform Movement to the May Fourth Movement, 
1895-1920.” In The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 12: Republican China, 1912-
1949, Part 1. Ed. John King Fairbank. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1983: 322-405.
Furth, Charlotte, ed. The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservative Alternatives in 
Republican China. Cambridge, MA, London: Harvard University Press, 1976.
Gamer, Robert E. “Modernization and Democracy in China: Samuel P. Huntington and 
the ‘Neo-Authoritarian’ Debate.” Asian Journal of Political Science 56.2, no. 1 (June 
1994): 32-65.
Gan Yang. “Ziyou de linian: wusi chuantong zhi queshimian” (The concept of freedom: 
deficiencies of the May Fourth tradition). Dushu (Reading) 1989, no. 5.
—. “Yangqi ‘minzhu yu kexue,’ dianding ‘ziyou yu zhixu’” (Discarding “democracy 
and science,” establishing “liberty and order”). Ershiyi shiji (Twenty-first Century) 3 
(February 1991): 7-10.
—. “Fan minzhu ziyou zhuyi haishi minzhu ziyou zhuyi” (Anti-democratic liberalism or 
democratic liberalism?). Ershiyi shiji (Twenty-first Century) 39 (February 1997): 4-17.
—. “A Critique of Chinese Conservatism in the 1990s.” Trans. Zhang Xudong. Social 
Text 55 16, no. 2 (Summer 1998): 45-66.
—. “Debating Liberalism and Democracy in China in the 1990s.” In Xudong Zhang, 
ed., Whither China?: Intellectual Politics in Contemporary China. Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2000: 79-101.
Gasster, Michael. Chinese Intellectuals and the Revolution of 1911: The Birth of 
Modern Chinese Radicalism. Seattle, London: University of Washington Press, 1969.
Giddens, Anthony. Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics. Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press, 1994.
Goldman, Merle. Sowing the Seeds of Democracy in China: Political Reform in the 
Deng Xiaoping Era. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994. 
—. “Politically-engaged Intellectuals in the Deng-Jiang Era: A Changing Relationship 
with the Party-State.” The China Quarterly 145 (March 1996): 35-52.
341
Goldman, Merle, Perry Link, and Su Wei. “China’s Intellectuals in the Deng Era: Loss 
of Identity with the State.” In Lowell Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim, eds., China’s Quest 
for National Identity. Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press, 1993: 125-153.
Goldman, Merle and Roderick MacFarquhar, eds. The Paradox of China’s Post-Mao 
Reforms. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999.
Gong Shuduo, Jin Chongji, and Song Xiaoqing. Lishi de huida: Zhongguo jindaishi 
yanjiu zhong de jige yuanze lunzheng (History’s response: some principal debates in 
modern Chinese history research). Beijing: Beijing shifan daxue chubanshe, 2001.
Gong Shuduo, Li Wenhai, Zhang Haipeng et al. “Wusi yundong yu ershi shiji 
Zhongguo de daolu” (The May Fourth Movement and the road of twentieth-century 
China). Gaoxiao lilun zhanxian (Theoretical Front in Higher Education) 1996, no. 6: 
16-25.
Gong, Ting and Feng Chen. “Neo-Authoritarian Theory in Mainland China.” Issues & 
Studies 27, no. 1 (1992): 84-99.
Gu, Edward and Merle Goldman. “Introduction: The Transformation of the Intellectual 
Public Sphere.” In idem, eds., Chinese Intellectuals Between State and Market. London, 
New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004: 1-17.
Gu Xin. “Anggelu ziyou chuantong yu Falanxi langman jingshen” (On the Anglo-Saxon 
liberal tradition and the romantic spirit of France). Ershiyi shiji (Twenty-first Century) 6 
(August 1991): 138-140.
Gu, Xin and David Kelly. “New Conservatism: Intermediate Ideology of a New Elite.” 
In David S.G. Goodman and Beverley Hooper, eds., China’s Quiet Revolution: New
Interactions between State and Society. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994: 219-233.
Gu Zhun. Gu Zhun wenji (Collected works of Gu Zhun). Guiyang: Guizhou renmin 
chubanshe, 1994.
—. Gu Zhun riji (Gu Zhun diaries). Eds. Chen Minzhi and Ding Dong. Beijing: Jingji 
ribao chubanshe, 1997.
Guo Jian. “Wenge sichao yu ‘houxue’” (The Cultural Revolution intellectual trend and 
“postism”). Ershiyi Shiji (Twenty-first Century) 35 (June 1996): 116-122.
Guo, Yingjie. Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary China: The Search for National 
Identity under Reform. London, New York: Routledge Curzon, 2004. 
Habermas, Jürgen. Legitimation Crisis. Trans. Thomas McCarthy. London: Heinemann, 
1976.
—. The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures. Trans. Frederick
Lawrence. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987.
342
Hampsher-Monk, Iain. The Impact of the French Revolution: Texts from Britain in the 
1790s. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Han Demin. “Chuantong wenhua de weiji yu ershi shiji fanwenhua sichao” (The crisis 
of traditional culture and twentieth-century anti-culture trends). Yuandao (Original 
Path) 1 (1994): 311-340.
Hao, Zhidong. Intellectuals at a Crossroads: The Changing Politics of China’s 
Knowledge Workers. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003.
Harvey, David. The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of 
Cultural Change. Cambridge, MA, Oxford: Blackwell, 1990.
Hayek, Friedrich A. von. The Collected Works of F.A. Hayek, Vol. 1: The Fatal 
Conceit: The Errors of Socialism. Ed. W.W. Bartley III. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1989 (London: Routledge, 1988).
—. The Constitution of Liberty. London, New York: Routledge, 2006 (University of 
Chicago Press: 1960). 
He Pin. “‘Disanzhiyan’ haishi ‘disanzhi shou’?: Liu Huaqing nüxu Pan Yue he 
‘Disanzhi yanjing kan Zhongguo’” (A “third eye” or a “third hand”?: Liu Huaqing’s 
son-in-law Pan Yue and Looking at China Through a Third Eye). Beijing zhi chun
(Beijing Spring) 1994, no. 10 (17): 21-22.
He Xin. Dongfang de fuxing: Zhongguo xiandaihua de mingti yu qiantu (The 
renaissance of the East: issues and prospects of Chinese modernization). Ha’erbin: 
Heilongjiang renmin chubanshe, Heilongjiang jiaoyu chubanshe, 1991. 
—. Zhonghua fuxing yu shijie weilai (China’s renaissance and the future of the world). 
Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1996.
—. Lun zhengzhi guojia zhuyi. (On political statism). Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 2003  
Holquist, Michael. “Introduction.” In idem, ed., The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays 
by M.M. Bakhtin. Trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist. Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 1981: xv-xxxiii.
Houang, François. Les Manifestes de Yen Fou. Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1977.
Hu Angang and Wang Shaoguang. Jiaqiang zhongyang zhengfu zai shichang jingji 
zhuanxing zhong de zhudao zuoyong: guanyu Zhongguo guojia nengli de yanjiu baogao 
(Strengthening the guiding role of the central government in the transition to market 
economy: a research report on China’s state capacity). Shenyang: Liaoning renmin
chubanshe, 1993.
—. “Zhongguo zhengfu jiqu nengli de xiajiang ji qi houguo” (The decrease in the 
extractive capacity of the Chinese government and its consequences). Ershiyi shiji
(Twenty-first Century) 21 (February 1994): 5-14.
343
—. The Political Economy of Uneven Development: The Case of China. Ed. Mark 
Selden. Armonk, NY, London: M.E. Sharpe, 1999.
Hu Cheng. “Jijin zhuyi yihou shi baoli zhuyi” (Radicalism, or is it violism?). Ershiyi 
shiji (Twenty-first Century) 13 (October 1992): 137-145.
Hu Ping. “Ping ‘xin baoshou zhuyi’” (Criticizing “neo-conservatism”). Zhongguo zhi 
chun (China Spring) July 1991: 59-60.
—. “Bitan Zhonggong jiebanren de gangling: ruhe kandai ‘yingdui yu xuanze’” (Notes 
on the programme of the CCP heirs apparent: how to treat “Realistic Responses”). 
Zhongguo zhi chun (China Spring) 1 (January 1992): 23-24.
—. “Notes on the Program of the CCP Heirs Apparent: How to Treat “Realistic 
Responses.” Trans. David Kelly. Chinese Law and Government 29, no. 2 (March-April 
1996): 35-37.
Hu Sheng. Cong yapian zhanzheng dao wusi yundong (From the Opium War to the 
May Fourth Movement). 2 vols. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1981.
Hughes, Christopher R. Chinese Nationalism in the Global Era. London, New York: 
Routledge, 2006.  
Huntington, Samuel P. “Conservatism as an Ideology.” American Political Science 
Review 51, no.2  (June 1957): 454-473.
—. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 
1968.
—. “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 22-49.
Hutchinson, John. The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism: The Gaelic Revival and the 
Creation of the Irish Nation State. London, Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1987.
Huters, Theodore. “Appropriations: Another Look at Yan Fu and Western Ideas.” 
Xueren (The Scholar) 9: 296-355.
Idema, Wilt en Lloyd Haft. Chinese letterkunde: een inleiding. Amsterdam: Amsterdam 
University Press, 1996.
Interview with Chen Lai. Beijing, August 10, 2005.
Interview with Jiang Yihua. Shanghai, August 8, 2006.
Interview with Ma Yong. (I) Beijing, August 8, 2005; (II) Beijing, September 1, 2005; 
(III) Beijing, June 6, 2006.
Interview with Tao Dongfeng. Beijing, June 28, 2006.
344
Interview with Wang Yuechuan. Beijing, June 21, 2006.
Interview with Xiao Gongqin. Shanghai, August 4, 2006.
Interview with Xu Jilin. Shanghai, August 6, 2006.
Interview with Yue Daiyun. Beijing, July 12, 2006.
Interview with Zhang Yiwu. Beijing, July 26, 2006.
Interview with Zheng Min. Beijing, July 6, 2006.
Jameson, Fredric. Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1991.
Jenner, William J.F. “Review of The August Sleepwalker.” Australian Journal of 
Chinese Affairs 23 (January 1990): 193-195.
Ji Guangmao. “Nanyuan yu beizhe zhijian: cong liangpian wenzhang lüekui baoshou 
zhuyi yu jijin zhuyi de xunxi” (In between opposite directions: taking a quick peek at 
the message of conservatism and radicalism from two texts). Wenyi zhengming (Debates 
on Literature and Art) 1995, no. 4: 12-20.
Ji, Shu-li. “The Worlds of Cultures and World 3: A Discussion of Popper’s Theory of 
Three Worlds”. In W.H. Newton-Smith and Jiang Tianyi, eds., Popper in China. 
London, New York: Routledge, 1992: 109-124.
Ji Xianlin. “Cong hongguan shang kan Zhongguo wenhua” (A macroscopic view of 
Chinese culture).  In Beijing daxue shehui kexue chu, ed., Beijing daxue jinian wusi 
yundong qishi zhounian lunwenji (q.v.): 1-9.
Jiang Tao. “Wanqing zhengzhishi” (Late Qing political history). In Ceng Yeying, ed., 
Wushinian lai de Zhongguo jindaishi yanjiu (q.v.): 19-43.
Jiang Xudong. Lun dangdai Zhongguo wenhua baoshou zhuyi de jiazhi tezheng (On the 
value characteristics of contemporary Chinese cultural conservatism). Ph.D. diss., 
Zhongguo renmin daxue, 2003.
Jiang Yihua. “Ershi shiji ruxue zai Zhongguo de chonggou” (The reconfiguration of 
twentieth-century Confucianism in China). Ershiyi shiji (Twenty-first Century) 1 
(October 1990): 28-35.
—. “Jijin yu baoshou: yu Yü Ying-shih xiansheng shangque” (Radicalism and 
conservatism: a discussion with mister Yü Ying-shih). Ershiyi shiji (Twenty-first 
Century) 10 (April 1992): 134-142.
—. “Zhongguo minzu zhuyi de tedian ji xin jieduan” (Characteristics and new stages of 
Chinese nationalism). Ershiyi shiji (Twenty-first Century) 15 (February 1993): 60-64.
345
—. “Ershi shiji Zhongguo sixiangshi shang de zhengzhi baoshou zhuyi” (Political 
conservatism in twentieth-century Chinese intellectual history). In Li Shitao, ed., Zhishi 
fenzi lichang (q.v.): 57-73. Originally published in Tansuo yu zhengming (Exploration 
and Contention) 1993, no. 1: 47-56, 30.
—. “Zhongguo zouxiang xiandaihua de heping geming yu xin lixing zhuyi” (China’s 
peaceful revolution towards modernization and new rationalism). In Li Shitao, ed., 
Zhishi fenzi lichang (q.v.): 493-506. Originally published in Wenshizhe (Literature, 
History, Philosophy) 1996, no. 3: 3-11.
Jiang Yihua and Chen Yan. “Jijin yu baoshou: yiduan shangwei wanjie de duihua”
(Conservative and radical: an unfinished dialogue). In Li Shitao, ed., Zhishi fenzi 
lichang (q.v.): 30-36. Originally published in Kaifang shidai (Open Times) 1997, no. 1: 
37-41.
Jin Yuanpu. “He yi ‘baoshou zhuyi’ er you ‘xin’?” (Why “conservatism” and why 
“neo”?). In Li Shitao, ed., Zhishi fenzi lichang (q.v.): 385-390. Originally published in 
Dushu (Reading) 1996, no. 5.
Jin Zhong. “Pulinsitun lun ‘bian’: he Yü Ying-shih jiaoshou Liu Binyan xiansheng 
zuotan Zhongguo bianju” (Princeton on “change”: an informal discussion on the 
changed situation in China with Professor Yü Ying-shih and mister Liu Binyan). 
Kaifang zazhi (Open Times) August 1992: 43-44.
“Jiuyuan le, guoxue!” (National studies, it has been a long time). Renmin ribao 
(People’s Daily), August 18, 1993: 1.
Kang Xiaoguang. Xin baoshou zhuyi zhenglunji (Collected political essays on neo-
conservatism). Beijing: s.n., 2002.
—. “Political development and political stability in the era of reform.” Trans. Joseph 
Fewsmith. The Chinese Economy 35, no. 5 (September-October 2002): 6-92.
Karl, Rebecca E.  Staging the World: Chinese Nationalism at the Turn of the Twentieth 
Century. Durham: Duke University Press, 2002.
Kelley, Donald R. “What Is Happening to the History of Ideas?” Journal of the History 
of Ideas 51, no. 1 (January-March 1990): 3-25.
Kinneging, Andreas. “Het conservatisme: kritiek van de Verlichting en de moderniteit.” 
At http://www.burkestichting.nl/picture_library/pdf/conservatismemoderniteit.pdf.
Accessed July 2, 2008. Originally published in Philosophia Reformata, Fall 2000.
Kirk, Russell. The Conservative Mind from Burke to Eliot. Chicago, Ill., Washington, 
D.C.: Regnery Books, 7th rev.ed., 1986.
—. The Politics of Prudence. Bryn Mawr, PN: Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 1993.
Kluver, Alan R. Legitimating the Chinese Economic Reforms: A Rhetoric of Myth and 
Orthodoxy. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1996.
346
Knoblock, John. Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works. 3 vols. 
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988.
Kong Lingzhao. “Ba lishi de neirong huangei lishi: ping yizhong guannianlun de 
wenhua shiguan” (Returning the content of history to history: critique of a conceptual 
cultural view of history). Zhexue yanjiu (Philosophy Research) 1995, no. 4: 3-7.
Koselleck, Reinhart. “The Historical-Political Semantics of Assymetric 
Counterconcepts.” In idem, Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time. Trans. 
Keith Tribe. New York: Colombia University Press, 2004: 155-191.
—. “Historical Criteria of the Modern Concept of Revolution.” In idem, Futures Past 
(q.v.): 43-57.
Kramnick, Isaac, ed. The Portable Edmund Burke. New York, London: Penguin Books, 
1999.
Kristol, Irving. Neoconservatism: The Autobiography of an Idea. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 
1999 (New York: Free Press, 1995). 
Kroes, Rob. “Neo-conservatism: What’s New?” In idem, ed., Neo-conservatism: Its 
Emergence in the USA and Europe. Amsterdam: Free University Press, 1984: 7-15.
Kwan, Daniel. “Stability Put Before Reform.” South China Morning Post, May 8, 1992: 
12.
La Capra, Dominick. Rethinking Intellectual History: Texts, Contexts, Language.
Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press, 1983.
Lam, Willy Wo-Lap. “Chen’s Son Bids to Expand Power Base.” South China Morning 
Post, May 19, 1992: 11. 
—. “Think-tank Challenge on Reform.” South China Morning Post, June 11 1992: 8.
—.“China’s ‘Gang of Princelings’ Miss Out on Top Posts.” South China Morning Post,
July 3, 1992: 1.
Latham, Kevin. “Rethinking Chinese Consumption: Social Palliatives and the Rhetorics 
of Transition in Postsocialist China.” In C.M. Hann, ed., Postsocialism: Ideals, 
Ideologies and Practices in Eurasia. London, New York: Routledge, 2002: 217-237.
Lee, Gregory B. Troubadours, Trumpeters, Troubled Makers: Lyricism, Nationalism 
and Hybridity in China and its Others. London: Hurst, 1996.  
Levenson, Joseph R. “‘History’ and ‘Value’: The Tensions of Intellectual Choice in 
Modern China.” In Arthur F. Wright, ed., Studies in Chinese Thought. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1953: 146-194.
347
—. Liang Ch’i-ch’ao and the Mind of Modern China. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1953.
—. Confucian China and Its Modern Fate: A Trilogy. 3 vols. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1968. 
Li Dazhao. “Fa’e geming zhi bijiaoguan” (A comparison of the French and Russian 
revolutions). In Li Dazhao wenxuan (Selected works of Li Dazhao). Beijing: Renmin 
dabanshe, 1984, Vol.1: 572-575.
Li Jinquan. “Zhongguo jindaishi jige wenti pingjia de zai pingjia” (Re-evaluating 
assessments on some issues in modern Chinese history). In Li Shitao, ed., Zhishi fenzi
lichang (q.v.): 84-92. Originally published in Zhexue yanjiu (Philosophy Research) 
1995, no. 10: 3-7.
Li Shitao, ed. Zhishi fenzi lichang: jijin yu baoshou zhijian de dongdang (Intellectual 
positions: the turbulence between radicalism and conservatism). Changchun: Shidai 
wenyi chubanshe, 1999.
Li Yi. Zhongguo makesi zhuyi yu dangdai wenhua baoshou zhuyi sichao yanjiu
(Chinese Marxism and research on contemporary cultural conservative trends). Tianjin: 
Tianjin shehui kexueyuan chubanshe, 1994.
Li, Youzhuo. “Will Neo-Conservatism Dominate Post-Deng China?” China Strategic 
Review 2, no. 1 (January-February 1997): 31-40.
Li Zehou. “Qimeng jiuwang de shuangzhong bianzou” (The double variation of 
Enlightenment and salvation). In idem, Zhongguo xiandai sixiangshi lun (On modern 
Chinese intellectual history). Beijing: Dongfang chubanshe, 1987: 7-49. Originally 
published in Zouxiang weilai (Towards the Future) 1986, no. 1.
—. “Heping jinhua, fuxing Zhonghua: tan ‘yao gailiang bu yao geming’” (Peaceful 
evolution, reviving China: on “we need reform, not revolution”). Zhongguo shibao 
zhoukan (China Times Weekly) May 3-9, 1992: 42-45 (Part 1), and May 10-16, 1992: 
44-47 (Part 2).
—. “Chu ni ruxue shenceng jiegou jiangshuo” (An account of my initial thoughts on the 
deep structure of ruxue). In Li Minghui, ed., Rujia sixiang de xiandai quanshi (Modern 
interpretations of rujia thought). Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan, Zhongguo wenzhe 
yanjiusuo choubeichu, 1997: 59-78.
Li Zehou, Lin Yü-sheng et al. Wusi: duoyuan de fansi (May Fourth: multiple 
reflections). Taipei: Fengyun shidai chuban gongsi, 1989/ Xianggang: Sanlian shudian 
youxian gongsi, 1989.
Li Zehou and Liu Zaifu. Gaobie geming: huiwang ershi shiji Zhongguo (Farewell to 
revolution: looking back at twentieth-century China). Hong Kong: Tiandi tushu youxian 
gongsi, 1995.
348
Li Zehou and Wang Desheng. “Guanyu wenhua xianzhuang, daode chongjian de 
duihua”  (A dialogue on the cultural status quo and moral reconstruction). In Li Shitao, 
ed., Zhishi fenzi lichang (q.v.): 74-83. Originally published in Dongfang (Orient) 1994, 
no 5: 69-73 and ibid., 1994, no. 6: 85-87.
Liang Shuming. Dongxi wenhua ji qi zhexue (Eastern and Western cultures and their 
philosophies). Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1922.
Lei Yi. “Beijing yu cuowei” (Background and dislocation). Dushu (Reading) 1995, no. 
4: 16-20.
—. “‘Yangjingbang xuefeng’ jufan” (“Pidgin scholarship” exemplified). Ershiyi shiji
(Twenty-first Century) 32 (December 1995): 14-18.
—. “Zongxu: wei le qianzhan de huigu” (General preface: looking back in order to look 
ahead). In Feng Lin, ed., Chongxin renshi bainian Zhongguo (q.v.): 1-4.
Lin Gang. “Jijin zhuyi zai Zhongguo” (Radicalism in China). Ershiyi shiji (Twenty-first 
Century) 3 (February 1991): 17-27.
Lin, Yü-sheng.  “Radical Iconoclasm in the May Fourth Period and the Future of 
Chinese Liberalism.” In Benjamin Schwartz, ed., Reflections on the May Fourth 
Movement: A Symposium. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972: 23-58.
—. “The Suicide of Liang Chi: An Ambiguous Case of Moral Conservatism.” In 
Charlotte Furth, ed., The Limits of Change (q.v.): 151-168.
—. The Crisis of Chinese Consciousness: Radical Antitraditionalism in the May Fourth 
Era. Madison: the University of Wisconsin Press, 1979.
—. Zhongguo chuantong de chuangzaoxing zhuanhua (The creative transformation of 
Chinese tradition). Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 1988. 
—. “Reflections on the ‘Creative Transformation of Chinese Tradition.’” Trans. 
Michael S. Duke and Josephine Chiu-Duke. In Karl-Heinz Pohl, ed., Chinese Thought 
in a Global Context: A Dialogue between Chinese and Western Philosophical 
Approaches. Leiden, Boston: Brill, 1999: 73-114.
Lipset, Seymour Martin. “Neoconservatism: Myth and Reality.” In Carl-Ludwig 
Holtfrerich, ed., Ernst Fraenkel Vorträge zur amerikanischen Politik, Wirtschaft, 
Gesellschaft und Geschichte (Ernst Fraenkel lectures on American politics, economy, 
society, and history). Berlin: John F. Kennedy-Institut für Nordamerikastudien, 1988: 1-
18.
Liu Binyan. “Ping ‘Disanzhi yanjing kan Zhongguo’” (On Looking at China Through a 
Third Eye). Beijing zhi chun (Beijing Spring) 17 (October 1994): 23-39.
Liu Dong. “Jingti renwei de ‘yangjingbing xuefeng’” (Beware of “designer pidgin 
scholarship”). Ershiyi shiji (Twenty-first Century) 32 (December 1995): 5-13.
349
—. “Beida xuetong yu ‘wusi’ chuantong” (The tradition of learning of Peking 
University and the “May Fourth” tradition). In Li Shitao, ed., Zhishi fenzi lichang (q.v.): 
241-251. Originally published in Dongfang (Orient) 1994, no. 4: 12-17.
—. “Revisiting the Perils of ‘Designer Pidgin Scholarship.’” Trans. Gloria Davies and 
Li Kaiyu. In Gloria Davies, ed., Voicing Concerns (q.v.): 87-108.
Liu Guisheng and Zhang Buzhou, eds. Taigang ji haiwai wusi yanjiu lunzhu xieyao 
(Selection of essential works of Taiwanese, Hong Kong, and overseas research on May 
Fourth). Beijing: Jiaoyu kexue chubanshe, 1989.
Liu Jun and Li Lin, eds.  Xin quanwei zhuyi: dui gaige lilun gangling de lunzhen᧤Neo-
authoritarianism: debates on the theoretical reform program). Beijing: Beijing jingji 
xueyuan chubanshe, 1989.
Liu Junning, Baoshou zhuyi (Conservatism). Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chuban, 
1998.
Liu Kang. “Is There an Alternative to (Capitalist) Globalization?: The Debate about 
Modernity in China.”  Boundary 2 23:3 (Fall 1996): 193-218.
Liu Qingfeng. “The Topography of Intellectual Culture in 1990s Mainland China: A 
Survey.” Trans. Gloria Davies. In Gloria Davies, ed., Voicing Concerns (q.v.): 47-70.
Liu Shu-hsien. “Duiyu jijin zhuyi de fansi” (Reflections on radicalism). Ershiyi shiji 
(Twenty-first Century) 31 (October 1995): 40-42. 
Liu Xiaobo. “China’s Neo-Political Conservatism in the 1990s.” China Strategic 
Review 1, no. 9 (December 1996): 11-15.
Liu Zaifu. “Lixing chongping bainian Zhongguo” (Rationally re-evaluating a hundred 
years of China). Ershiyi shiji (Twenty-first Century) 31 (October 1995): 38-39.
Lovejoy, Arthur O. “Introduction: The Study of the History of Ideas.” In idem, The 
Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea. Cambridge, MA, London: 
Harvard University Press, 1933: 3-23.
Lu Jiandong. Chen Yinke de zuihou ershi nian (The last twenty years of Chen Yinke). 
Beijing: Xinhua shudian, 1995.
Lu Shan. “Xin baoshou zhuyi he ‘xin’ zhiyou?” (What is “new” about “neo-
conservatism”?). Zhongguo shibao zhoukan (China Times Weekly), April 19, 1992: 71-
73.
Lu, Sheldon Hsiao-peng. “Global POSTmodernIZATION: The Intellectual, the Artist, 
and China’s Condition.” In Arif Dirlik and Xudong Zhang, eds., Postmodernism and 
China. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2000: 145-174.
350
Lu Wei. “How the Princelings Launched their ‘Political Platform.’” Trans. David Kelly. 
Chinese Law and Government 29, no. 2 (March-April 1996): 32-34.
Luo Rongqu, ed. Cong “xihua” dao xiandaihua (From “Westernization” to 
modernization). Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 1990.
Luo Rongqu and Dong Zhenghua, eds. Dongya xiandaihua: xin moshi yu xin jingyan 
(East Asian modernization: new models and new experiences). Beijing: Beijing daxue 
chubanshe, 1997. 
Luo Yijun, ed. Lixing yu shengming: dangdai xin ruxue wencui (Reason and life: 
collection of texts on New Confucianism). Shanghai: Shanghai shudian chubanshe, 
1994.
Ma, Shu Yun. “The Rise and Fall of Neo-Authoritarianism in China.” China 
Information 5, no. 3 (Winter 1990-1991): 1-18.
Ma Yong. “Yan Fu wannian sixiang yanbian zhi chonggu” (A revaluation of the 
intellectual development of Yan Fu in his later years). Zhexue yanjiu (Philosophy 
Research) 1992, no. 4: 46-53.
—. “Jindai lishi renwu yanjiu” (Research on figures in modern history). In Ceng 
Yeying, ed., Wushi nian lai de Zhongguo jindaishi yanjiu (q.v.): 659-683.
Makeham, John. “The Retrospective Creation of New Confucianism.” In idem, ed., 
New Confucianism: A Critical Examination. New York, Houndmills: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2003: 25-53.
—. Lost Soul: “Confucianism” in Contemporary Chinese Academic Discourse.
Cambridge, MA, London: Harvard University Press, 2008.
Mandelbaum, Maurice. “The History of Ideas, Intellectual History, and the History of 
Philosophy.” History and Theory, Beihaft 5 (1965): 33-66.
Mandelbaum, Michael. “Coup de Grace: The End of the Soviet Union.” Foreign Affairs
71, no. 1 (1992): 164-183.
Mannheim, Karl. “Conservative Thought.” In Kurt H. Wolff, ed., From Karl 
Mannheim. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971: 132-222. Originally published in 
Karl Mannheim, Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1953.
Mao Zedong. Mao Zedong xuanji (Selected Works of Mao Zedong), Vol. 4. Beijing: 
Renmin chubanshe, 1991 (1966). 
McAllister, Ted V. Revolt Against Modernity: Leo Strauss, Eric Voegelin, and the 
Search for a Postliberal Order. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1995.
McCormick, Barrett and David Kelly. “The Limits of Anti-Liberalism.” Journal of 
Asian Studies 53, no. 3 (August 1994): 804-831.
351
McHale, Brian. “From Modernist to Postmodernist Fiction: Change of Dominant.” In 
idem, Postmodernist Fiction. New York: Methuen, 1987: 4-25.
Meissner, Maurice. “Leninism and Maoism: Some Populist Perspectives on Marxism-
Leninism in China.” The China Quarterly 45 (Jan-March, 1971): 2-36.
Meissner, Werner. “New Intellectual Currents in the People’s Republic of China.” In 
David C.B. Teather and Herbert S. Yee, eds., China in Transition: Issues and Policies.
Houndmills: Macmillan Press, 1999: 3-24.
Meng Fanhua. “Wenhua bengkui shidai de taowang yu guiyi: jiushi niandai wenhua de 
xin baoshou zhuyi jingshen” (The exile and conversion of the era of cultural collapse: 
the neo-conservative spirit of 1990s culture). In Li Shitao, ed., Zhishi fenzi lichang
(q.v.): 287-292. Originally published in Zhongguo wenhua yanjiu (Chinese Culture 
Research) 1994, no. 2.
Metzger, Thomas A. Escape From Predicament: Neo-Confucianism and China’s 
Evolving Political Culture. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977.
Min, Lin. “From Neo-Rationalism to Neo-Conservatism: An Overview of Chinese 
Intellectual and Ideological Developments in the Post-Mao Era.” New Zealand Journal 
of East Asian Studies 1, no.1 (June 1993): 50-83.
Misra, Kalpana. “Curing the Sickness and Saving the Party: Neo-Maoism and Neo-
Conservatism in the 1990s.” In Shiping Hua, ed., Chinese Political Culture 1989-2000.
Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2001: 133-160.
Mitter, Rana. A Bitter Revolution: China’s Struggle with the Modern World. Oxford, 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.
Moody, Peter. Conservative Thought in Contemporary China. Lanham, Boulder:  
Lexington Books, 2007.
Muller, Jerry Z. “Introduction: What is Conservative Social and Political Thought?” In 
idem, ed., Conservatism: An Anthology of Social and Political Thought from David 
Hume to the Present. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997: 3-31.
Neville, Robert Cummings. Boston Confucianism: Portable Tradition in the Late-
Modern World. New York: State University of New York Press, 2000.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Use and Abuse of History. Trans. Adrian Collins. 
Indianapolis, New York: the Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1957 (1949).
Nisbet, Robert A. Social Change and History: Aspects of the Western Theory of 
Development. London, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1969.
—. Conservatism: Dream and Reality. New Brunswick, London: Transaction 
Publishers, 2002 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986).
352
Oakeshott, Michael. Rationalism in Politics, and Other Essays. London: Methuen, 
1962.
Owen, Stephen. “What is World Poetry?: Poets Who Write to be Read in Translation 
are a Curious Breed, as Bei Dao Shows.” The New Republic, 19 November 1990: 28-32.
Petracca, Mark M. and Ming Xiong. “The Concept of Chinese Neo-Authoritarianism: 
An Exploration and Democratic Critique.” Asian Survey 30, no. 11 (Nov. 1990): 1099-
1117.
Pickowicz, Paul G. “Huang Jianxin and the Notion of Postsocialism”. In Nick Browne 
and idem, eds., New Chinese Cinemas: Forms, Identities, Politics. Cambridge, New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1994: 57-87.
Pilbeam, Bruce. “Conservatism and Postmodernism: Consanguineous Relations or 
‘Different’ Voices?” Journal of Political Ideologies 6, no. 1 (2001): 33-54. 
Pipes, Richard. “The Red Terror.” In idem, The Russian Revolution. New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 1990: 789-840.
Popper, Karl. The Open Society and Its Enemies. 2 vols. Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1962.
Pusey, James Reeves. China and Charles Darwin. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1983.
Qi Mo, ed. Xin quanwei zhuyi: dui Zhongguo dalu weilai mingyun de lunzheng (Neo-
authoritarianism: debates on the future fate of mainland China). Taipei: Tangshan 
chubanshe, 1991. 
Quirin, Michael. “Yü Yingshi, das Politische und die Politik” (Yü Yingshi, the political 
and politics). Minima Sinica: Zeitschrift zum Chinesischen Geist (Minima Sinica: 
Journal for the Chinese Mind) 6, no. 1 (1994): 27-69.
Richter, Melvin. “Reconstructing the History of Political Languages: Pocock, Skinner, 
and the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe.” History and Theory 29, no 1 (February 1990): 
38-70.
Riencourt, Amaury de. The Soul of China. London: Jonathan Cape, Honeyglen, 1958.
Robertson, David. “Neo.” In idem, The Routledge Dictionary of Politics. London, New 
York: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2004: 337-338.
Rosen, Stanley. “Guest Editor’s Introduction.” Chinese Law and Government 30, no. 6 
(November-December 1997): 3-7.
Rosen, Stanley and Gary Zou, eds. “The Chinese Debate on the New Authoritarianism.” 
Chinese Sociology and Anthropology 23, no. 2 (Winter 1990-1991), 23, no. 3 (Spring 
1991), 23, no. 4 (Summer 1991), and 24, no.1 (Fall 1991).
353
Rossem, Maarten Van. “The Intellectual Roots of Neo-conservatism.” In Rob Kroes, 
ed., Neo-conservatism: Its Emergence in the USA and Europe. Amsterdam: Free 
University Press, 1984: 16-25.
Rossiter, Clinton. Conservatism in America. Melbourne, London: William Heinemann 
Ltd., 1955.
Rostow, Walt. The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-communist Manifesto.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960.
Ruan Ming. “From New Authoritarianism to New Conservatism.” Trans. David Kelly.  
Chinese Law and Government 29:2 (March-April 1996): 58-70.
Said, Edward W. Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient. London: Penguin 
Books, 1995 (London: Pantheon Books, 1978).
Saussy, Haun. “Postmodernism in China: A Sketch and Some Queries.” In Yeh Wen-
hsin, ed., Cross-Cultural Readings of Chineseness: Narratives, Images, and 
Interpretations of the 1990s. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000: 128-158.
Sautman, Bary. “Sirens of the Strongman: Neo-Authoritarianism in Recent Chinese 
Political Theory.” The China Quarterly 129 (March 1992): 72-102.
Schell, Orville and David Shambough, eds. The China Reader: The Reform Era. New 
York: Vintage Books, 1999.
Schneider, Axel. “Between Dao and History: Two Chinese Historians in Search of a 
Modern Identity for China.” History and Theory 35, no. 4 (Dec. 1996): 54-73.
—. “Bridging the Gap: Attempts at Constructing a ‘New’ Historical-Cultural Identity in 
the PRC.” Manuscript: 1-33. Published in East Asian History 22 (December 2001): 129-
144.
—. “Reconciling History With the Nation?: Historicity, National Particularity, and the 
Question of Universals.” Historiography East and West 1, no. 1 (March 2003): 117-
136.
—. “The One and the Many”. Unpublished paper, AAS, 2005. 
—. “Nation, History and Ethics: The Choices of Post-Imperial Historiography in 
China.” Unpublished paper, 2009: 1-54.
Schneider, Laurence A. “National Essence and the New Intelligentsia.” In Charlotte 
Furth, ed., The Limits of Change (q.v.): 57-89.
Schram, Stuart S. “Mao Zedong a Hundred Years On: The Legacy of a Ruler.” The 
China Quarterly 137 (March 1994): 125-143.
354
Schubert, Gunter. “Was Ist Neokonservativismus?: Notizen zum Politischen Denken in 
der VR China in den 90er Jahren” (What is neo-conservatism?: notes on political 
thought in the PRC during the 1990s). Asien (Asia) 65 (October 1997): 57-74.
—. Chinas Kampf um die Nation: Dimensionen nationalistischen Denkens in der VR 
China, Taiwan und Hong Kong an der Jahrtausendwende (China’s struggle for the 
nation: dimensions of nationalist thought in the PRC, Taiwan, and Hong Kong at the 
change of the millennium). Hamburg: Institut für Asienkunde, 2002.
Schumpeter, Joseph A. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. London: George Allen 
and Unwin Ltd., 1976 (1943).
Schwarcz, Vera. The Chinese Enlightenment: Intellectuals and the Legacy of the May 
Fourth Movement of 1919. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California 
Press, 1986. 
Schwartz, Benjamin I. In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964.
—. “Notes on Conservatism in General and in China in Particular.” In Charlotte Furth, 
ed., The Limits of Change (q.v.): 3-21.
—. “Themes in Intellectual History: May Fourth and After.” In The Cambridge History 
of China: Vol. 12: Republican China, 1912-1949, Part One. Ed. John King Fairbank. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983: 406-451.
—. “History in Chinese Culture: Some Comparative Reflections.” History and Theory
35 (Theme Issue: Chinese Historiography in Comparative Perspective) (October 1996): 
23-33.
Sha Jiansun and Gong Shuduo, eds.  Zou shenme lu: yu Zhongguo jinxiandai lishi shang 
de ruogan zhongda shifei wenti (Which way to go: some major disputes on modern 
Chinese history). Jinan: Shandong renmin chubanshe, 1997.
Sheng, Anfeng. “Traveling Theory, or, Transforming Theory: Metamorphosis of 
Postcolonialism in China.” Neohelicon 34, no. 2 (2007): 115-136.
Sheng Hong. “Shenme shi wenming” (What is civilization). Zhanlüe yu guanli 
(Strategy and Management) 1995, no.5: 88-98.
—. “From Nationalism to Cosmopolitanism.” Trans. Ai Ping. Chinese Law and 
Government 30, no. 6 (November-December 1997): 31-42.
Shi Zhong. “Weilai de chongtu” (Future conflicts). Zhanlüe yu guanli (Strategy and 
Management) 1 (November 1993): 46-50.
—. “Zhongguo xiandaihua mianlin de tiaozhan” (The challenges that China’s 
modernization faces). Zhanlüe yu guanli (Strategy and Management) 2 (January 1994): 
7-9.
355
—. “Cong minzu zhuyi dao tianxia zhuyi” (From nationalism to cosmopolitanism). 
Zhanlüe yu guanli (Strategy and Management) 1996, no. 1: 14-19.
—. “Zhongguo de minzu zhuyi he Zhongguo de weilai” (Chinese nationalism and the 
future of China). Mingbao yuekan (Bright Report Monthly) 9 (1996). 
—. “Chinese Nationalism and the Future of China”. Trans. Ai Ping. Chinese Law and 
Government 30, no. 6 (November-December 1997): 8-27.
Shils, Edward. Tradition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981.
Skinner, Quentin. “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas.” History and 
Theory 8, no. 1 (1969): 3-53.
—. “Reply to my Critics.” In James Tully, ed., Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner 
and His Critics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988: 29-67.
Sleeboom, Margaret. Academic Nationalism. Ph.D. diss., University of Amsterdam, 
2001.
—. Academic Nations in China and Japan: Framed in Concepts of Nature, Culture and 
the Universal. London, New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004.
Smith, Anthony D.  National Identity. Reno, Las Vegas: University of Nevada Press, 
1993 (London, New York: Penguin Books, 1991).
Song, Xianlin. “Reconstructing the Confucian Ideal in 1980s China: The ‘Culture 
Craze’ and New Confucianism.” In John Makeham, ed., New Confucianism: A Critical 
Examination. New York, Houndmills: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003: 81-104.
Staiger, Brunhild. “Classical Heritage and May Fourth Movement.” In The May Fourth 
Movement in China: Major Papers Prepared for the XX International Congress of 
Chinese Studies. Prague: Orientalni ustav, 1968: 68-101.
Steinfels, Peter. The Neoconservatives: The Men Who Are Changing America’s Politics.
New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979. 
—. “The Short Happy Life of Neoconservatism.” In Carl-Ludwig Holtfrerich, ed., Ernst 
Fraenkel Vorträge zur amerikanischen Politik, Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft und Geschichte 
(Ernst Fraenkel lectures on American politics, economy, society, and history). Berlin: 
John F. Kennedy-Institut für Noramerikastudien, Freie Universität Berlin, 1988: 19-35.
Strauss, Leo. Natural Law and History. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971.
Stromberg, Roland N. European Intellectual History Since 1789. New Jersey: Printice 
Hall, Inc., 1981.
Su Wei. “Yifen taizi dang jiebande baipishu” (A white paper on the succession of the 
princelings’ faction). Zhongguo zhi chun (China Spring) 1 (January 1992): 28-29.
356
Su Xiaokang and Wang Luxiang. Heshang (River Elegy). Beijing: Xiandai chubanshe, 
1988.
—. Deathsong of the River: A Reader’s Guide to the Chinese TV Series Heshang. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991.
Sullivan, Michael. “The Impact of Western Political Thought in Chinese Political 
Discourse on Transitions from Leninism, 1986-1992.” World Affairs 157, no. 2 (Fall 
1994): 79-91.
—. Democracy and Developmentalism: Contending Struggles over Political Change in 
Dengist China, 1978-1995. Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1995. 
Sun Guodong. “Du Jiang Yihua ‘jijin yu baoshou’ shu hou” (After reading Jiang 
Yihua’s “conservatism and radicalism”). Ershiyi shiji (Twenty-first Century) 11 (June 
1992): 141-143.
Swedberg, Richard. The Max Weber Dictionary: Key Words and Central Concepts.
Stanford, California: Stanford Social Sciences, 2005.
Tang Xiaobing. “The Function of New Theory: What Does It Mean to Talk about 
Postmodernism in China?” In Liu Kang and idem, eds., Politics, Ideology, and Literary 
Discourse in Modern China: Theoretical Interventions and Cultural Critique. Durham, 
London: Duke University Press, 1993: 278-299.
Tang Yijie. “Some Reflections on New Confucianism in Mainland Chinese Culture of 
the 1990s.” Trans. Gloria Davies. In Gloria Davies, ed., Voicing Concerns (q.v.): 123-
134.
Tang Yijie, ed. Lun chuantong yu fan chuantong: wusi qishi zhounian jinian wenxuan
(On tradition and anti-tradition: selected works on the commemoration of the seventieth 
anniversary of May Fourth). Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiye gongsi, 1989. 
Tao Dongfeng. “Baoshou ziyou zhuyi: Zhongguo wenhua jiangou de disantiao daolu”
(Conservative liberalism: the third road of Chinese cultural construction). In Li Shitao, 
ed., Zhishi fenzi lichang (q.v.): 475-485. Originally published in Kaifang shidai (Open 
Times) 1997, no. 5.
—. “Ershi shiji Zhongguo de baoshou zhuyi: jianlun ziyou yu chuantong zhi guanxi”
(Conservatism of twentieth-century China: on the relation between liberty and 
tradition). In idem, Wenhua yu meixue de shiye jiaorong (The fusion of horizons of 
culture and aesthetics). Fuzhou: Fujian jiaoyu chubanshe, 2000: 217-261.
Tao Dongfeng and Jin Yuanpu. Chanshi Zhongguo de jiaolü: zhuanxing shidai de 
wenhua jieshi (The anxiety of explaining China/explaining China’s anxiety: cultural 
interpretations of the transitional era). Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 
1999.
357
Tong, Shijun. The Dialectics of Modernization: Habermas and the Chinese Discourse 
of Modernization. Sidney: Wild Peony, 2000.
Townsend, James. “Chinese Nationalism.” In Jonathan Unger, ed., Chinese 
Nationalism. Armonk, London: M.E. Sharpe, 1996: 1-30.
Tsai, Wen-hui. “New Authoritarianism, Neo-Conservatism, and Anti-Peaceful 
Evolution: Mainland China’s Resistance to Political Modernization.” Issues & Studies
28, no. 12 (December 1992): 1-22.
Tu, Wei-ming. “Hsiung Shih-li’s Quest for Authentic Existence.” In Charlotte Furth, 
ed., The Limits of Change (q.v.): 242-275.
—. Ruxue disanqi fazhan de qianjing wenti: dalu jiangxue, wennan, he taolun
(Prospective issues of the third epoch of Confucianism: mainland lectures, questions, 
and discussions). Taipei: Lianjing chubanshi gongsi, 1989. 
—. “Huajie qimeng xintai” (Beyond the Enlightenment syndrome). Ershiyi shiji
(Twenty-first Century) 2 (December 1990): 12-13.
—. “Introduction: Cultural Perspectives.” Daedalus 122, no. 2 (Spring 1993): vii-xxiv.
—. “Cultural China: The Periphery as the Center.” In idem, ed., The Living Tree: The 
Changing Meaning of Being Chinese Today. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994: 
1-34. Originally published in theme issue of Daedalus 120, no. 2 (Spring 1991): 1-32.
—. “Introduction.” In idem, ed., Confucian Traditions in East Asian Modernity: Moral 
Education and Economic Culture in Japan and the Four Mini-Dragons. Cambridge, 
MA, London: Harvard University Press, 1996: 1-10.
Turner, Frank M. “Introduction: Edmund Burke: The Political Actor Thinking.” In 
idem, ed., Reflections on the Revolution in France. New Haven, London: Yale 
University Press, 2003: xi-xliii. 
Valk, Jacobus M.M. de, ed. Democratie: wezen en oorsprong: de belangrijkste 
gedeelten uit Over de Democratie in America, Het Ancien Regime en de Revolutie. 
Kampen: Agora, Kapellen: Pelckmans, 2004.
Viereck, Peter. Conservatism from John Adams to Churchill. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 
1956.
Vierhaus, Rudolf. “Konservativ, Konservatismus” (Conservative, conservatism). In 
Otto Brunner, Werner Conze and Reinhart Koselleck, eds., Geschichtliche 
Grundbegriffe (q.v.), Vol. 3: 531-565.
Voegelin, Eric. The New Science of Politics: An Introduction. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1952.
358
Waldron, Arthur. “Warlordism Versus Federalism: The Revival of the Debate.” China 
Quarterly 121 (March 1990): 116-128.
Walzer, Michael. Interpretation and Social Criticism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1985.
Wan Zhi. “‘Houxue’ pipan de pipan” (A critique of the critique of “post-isms”). Ershiyi 
shiji (Twenty-first Century) 31 (October 1995): 144-146.
Wang, Ban. Illuminations from the Past: Trauma, Memory and History in Modern 
China. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2004.
Wang, Chaohua. “Introduction: Minds of the Nineties.” In idem, ed., One Road, Many 
Paths. London, New York: Verso, 2003: 11-45.
Wang Fanshen. “Evolving Prescriptions for Social Life in the Late Qing and Early 
Republic: From Qunxue to Society.” Trans. Joan Judge. Chinese Studies in History 29, 
no. 4 (Summer 1996): 73-99.
Wang Hui. “Bianzhe qianyan” (Editor’s foreword). In idem and Yu Guoliang, eds., 
Jiushi niandai de “houxue” lunzheng (The 1990s debates on “post-isms”). Xianggang: 
Xianggang Zhongwen daxue, 1998: v-vii. 
—. “The New Criticism.” In Wang Chaohua, ed., One Road, Many Paths. London, New 
York: Verso, 2003: 55-86. 
—. China’s New Order: Society, Politics, and Economy in Transition. Ed. Theodore 
Huters. Cambridge, MA, London: Harvard University Press, 2003.
Wang Hui and Zhang Tianwei. “Wenhua pipan lilun yu dangdai Zhongguo minzu zhuyi 
wenti” (Cultural criticism theory and the issue of contemporary Chinese nationalism). 
Zhanlüe yu guanli (Strategy and Management) 1994, no. 4: 17-20.
Wang, Jing. High Culture Fever: Politics, Aesthetics, and Ideology in Deng’s China.
Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1996.
Wang Meng. “Duobi chonggao” (Shunning the sublime). Dushu (Reading) 1993, no. 1: 
10-17.
Wang, Ning. “The Mapping of Chinese Postmodernity.” In Arif Dirlik and Xudong 
Zhang, eds., Postmodernism and China. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 
2000: 21-40.
Wang Rongzu. “Ziyou zhuyi yu Zhongguo” (Liberalism and China). Ershiyi shiji
(Twenty-first Century) 2 (December 1990): 33-37. 
—. “Jijin yu baoshou zhuiyan” (The unnecessary words of radical and conservative). 
Ershiyi shiji (Twenty-first Century) 11 (June 1992): 133-136.
359
Wang Shan. Disanzhi yanjing kan Zhongguo (Looking at China through a third eye). 
Taipei: Zhouzhi wenhua, 1994. 
Wang Shaoguang. “Qiubian paluan de xin baoshou zhuyi sichao” (The neo-
conservative trend that seeks change and fears chaos). Zhongguo shibao zhoukan (China 
Times Weekly), March 8, 1992: 76-77.
—. “‘Baoshou’ yu ‘baoshou zhuyi’” (“Conservative” and “conservatism”). Ershiyi shiji
(Twenty-first Century) 12 (August 1992), 135-138.
—. “Wang Shaoguang Proposal (I) and (II).” Trans. Joseph Fewsmith. The Chinese 
Economy 28, no. 3 (May-June 1995) and 28, no. 4 (July-August 1995).
Wang Shi, ed. Yan Fuji (Collected works of Yan Fu). 5 vols. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 
chubanshe, 1986. 
Wang Shuren. “Wenhua de weiji, ronghe yu chongjian” (The crisis of culture, 
reconciliation and reconstruction). Yuandao (Original Path) 1 (1994): 95-114.
Wang Sirui. “Jinri Zhongguo de xin baoshou zhuyi” (Neo-conservatism of today’s 
China). In Li Shitao, ed., Zhishi fenzi lichang (q.v.): 406-421. Originally published in 
Beijing wenxue (Beijing Literature) 1999, no. 3.
Wang Xiaoming. Renwen jingshen xunsilu (Collection of reflections on the humanist 
spirit). Shanghai: Wenhui chubanshe, 1996.
Wang Yuanhua. “Lun chuantong yu fan chuantong” (On tradition and anti-tradition). In 
Tang Yijie, ed., Lun chuantong yu fan chuantong (q.v.): 13-38.
—. “Ji wo de sanci fansi licheng” (Remembering the course of my three successive 
reflections). In Qingyuan jinzuoji (Collection of recent writings of the Pure Garden). 
Shanghai: Wenhui chubanshe, 2004: 10-22.
—. Sibianlu (Record of intellectual enquiries). Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 
2004.
Wang Yuanhua and Fu Jie. “Guanyu jinnian de fansi dawen.” Wenyi lilun yanjiu
(Literary Theory Research) 1995, no. 1: 2-8.
Wang Yuanhua and Li Hui. “Duiyu ‘wusi’ de zai renshi da kewen” (Answering 
questions on the reacknowledgment of “May Fourth”). In Li Shitao, ed., Zhishi fenzi 
lichang (q.v.): 271-286. Originally published in Wenhui dushu zhoubao (Wenhui 
Reading Weekly), May 1, 1999: 8-9.
Wang Yuechuan. “Dangdai wenhua yanjiu zhong de jijin yu baoshou zhi wei” (The link 
between radical and conservative in contemporary culture research). In Li Shitao, ed., 
Zhishi fenzi lichang (q.v.): 422-438.
360
—. “Xuyan” (Preface). In Zhongguo houxiandai huayu (The Chinese postmodernism 
discourse). Guangzhou: Zhongshan daxue chubanshe, 2004: 1-13.
Wang Zhaojun. “Xin baoshou zhuyi yu dalu zhishi fenzi” (Neo-conservatism and 
mainland intellectuals). Zhongguo luntan (China Forum), July 1, 1992: 106-114.
—. “New Conservatism and the Intellectuals in Mainland China.” Trans. David Kelly. 
Chinese Law and Government 29, no. 2 (March-April 1996): 83-96.
Wang Zhongjiang and Yuan Shuya, eds. Xin qingnian: minzhu yu kexue de huhuan
(New Youth: the call for science and democracy). Zhengzhou: Zhongzhou guji 
chubanshe, 1999.
Waterman, Harold. “Which Way to go? Four Strategies for Democratization in Chinese 
Intellectual Circles.” China Information 5, no. 1 (Summer 1990): 14-33.
Weber, Max. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Trans. Talcott Parsons. 
New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1958. 
—. The Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism. Trans. Hans Gerth. New York 
and London: The Free Press and Collier-Macmillan Ltd., 1968.
—. Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. Eds. Günther Roth and 
Claus Wittich. Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978. 
Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, Susanne. “Party Historiography.” In Jonathan Unger, ed., Using 
the Past to Serve the Present: Historiography and Politics in Contemporary China. 
Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993: 151-173. 
—. “Linear Versus Cyclical Time: The Problem of Restoration in Marxist Chinese 
Historiography.” Conference Paper for the Conference on the Writing of History in 20th
Century East Asia: Between Linear Time and the Reproduction of National 
Consciousness.” Leiden, June 4-7, 2007. 
Wende, Peter. “Radikalismus” (Radicalism). In Brunner, Otto, Werner Conze and 
Reinhart Koselleck, eds. Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe (q.v.), Vol. 5: 113-133.
Whitehead, Alfred. Science and the Modern World. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1927 (1926).
Whitton, Brian J. “Herder’s Critique of the Enlightenment: Cultural Community Versus 
Cosmopolitan Rationalism.” History and Theory 27, no. 2 (1988): 146-168.
Wohlfahrt, Günter. “Modernity and Postmodernism: Some Philosophical Remarks on 
the Necessity of an East-West Dialogue.” In Karl-Heinz Pohl, ed., Chinese Thought in a 
Global Context: A Dialogue Between Chinese and Western Philosophical Approaches.
Leiden, Boston: Brill, 1999: 14-28.
361
Wright, Mary. The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T’ung-Chih Restoration,
1862-1874. New York: Atheneum, 1966 (Stanford University Press, 1957).
Wu Jiaxiang. “Xin quanwei zhuyi shuping” (Commenting on neo-authoritarianism). In 
Qi Mo, ed., Xin quanwei zhuyi (q.v.): 4-8. Originally published in Shijie jingji baodao 
(World Economic Herald), January 16, 1989.
Wu Yifu. “Lun ziyou zhuyi he ‘xin baoshou zhuyi’ zhi zheng” (On the struggle between 
liberalism and “neo-conservatism”). Beijing zhi chun (Beijing Spring), August 1993: 
14-19.
Xiao Gongqin. Rujia wenhua de kunjing: Zhongguo jindai shidaifu yu Xifang tiaozhan 
(The predicament of Confucian culture: modern Chinese literati and the challenge of the 
West). Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1986.
—. “Yan Fu dui Zhongguo xiandaihua de sikao jiqi qishi” (Yan Fu’s reflections on 
China’s modernization and its enlightenment). Zhongguo qingnianbao (China Youth 
Daily), February 6, 1991: 3.
—. Xiao Gongqinji (Collected works of Xiao Gongqin). Ha’erbin: Heilongjiang jiaoyu 
chubanshe, 1995. 
—. “Zixu” (Preface). In idem, Xiao Gongqin ji (q.v.): 1-16.
—. “Du’erkaimu, Makesi yu Xunzi dui tongzhi shehui de yanjiu ji qi qishi” (The 
research of Durkheim, Marx, and Xunzi on homogenous societies and its 
enlightenment). In idem, Xiao Gongqinji (q.v.): 3-17. Originally published in Tianjin 
shehui kexue (Tianjin Social Sciences) 1992, no. 6.
—. “‘Yan Fu beilun’ yu jindai baoshou zhuyi biangeguan” (The “Yan Fu paradox” and 
the modern conservative reform view). In idem, Xiao Gongqinji (q.v.): 18-41.
Originally published in Zhongguo yanjiu (China Research) 1996, no. 6.
—. “Quanwei yu minzhu: houfazhan guojia xiandaihua de liangnan xuanze” 
(Authoritarianism and democracy: a dilemma for modernization in late developing 
countries). In idem, Xiao Gongqinji (q.v.): 42-52. Adapted reprint of article in 
Wenhuibao (Wenhui Daily), January 17, 1989. 
—. “Guoduxing quanwei zhengzhi de xiandaihua yiyi” (The meaning of transitional 
authoritarian rule for modernization). In idem, Xiao Gongqinji (q.v.): 53-66. Originally 
published in Qingnian xuezhe (Young Scholar) 1989, no. 2.
—. “Lun dangdai Zhongguo de langman zhuyi gaigeguan: dui ‘zhidu juedinglun’ de 
piping” (On the romantic reform view in contemporary China: a criticism of “system 
determinism”). In idem, Xiao Gongqinji (q.v.): 87-108. Originally appeared in Zhishi 
fenzi (The Intellectual) 1989, no.1.
—. “Lishi jujue langman: Zhongguo gaige di’er sichao de jueqi” (History rejects 
romanticism: the rise of the second trend of Chinese reform). In idem, Xiao Gongqinji
(q.v.): 109-122. Originally published in Zhongguo xiandaihua yanjiu (China 
362
Modernization Research), 9 December 1994. An abstract appeared in Beijing qingnian
bao (Beijing Youth Daily), 19 January 1992.
—. “Zouxiang chengshu: Zhongguo gaige de fansi yu zhanwang” (Towards ripening: 
reflections on and prospects of Chinese reform). In idem, Xiao Gongqinji (q.v.): 123-
139. An earlier version of the article appeared in Zhongguo shibao zhoukan (China 
Times Weekly), February 1993. An abstract was published in Beijing qingnianbao 
(Beijing Youth Daily), 13 May 1993.
—. “Zhuanxingqi Zhongguo renwen zhishi fenzi de sizhong leixing” (Four types of 
humanistic intellectuals in transitional China). In idem, Xiao Gongqinji (q.v.): 182-189.
Originally published in Tansuo yu zhengming (Exploration and Contention) 1994, no. 8.
—. “Zhongguo zaoqi xiandaihua de cuozhe ji qi lishi houguo” (The setbacks of China’s 
early modernization and its historical results). In idem, Xiao Gongqinji (q.v.): 199-223.
Originally published in Yang Nianqun, ed., Jiawu bainian cha: duoyuan shiye xia de 
Zhongri zhanzheng (Investigating 1895 a hundred years on: the Sino-Japanese war 
under a pluralist vision). Beijing: Zhishi chubanshe, 1995.
—. “Wuxu bianfa yu Zhongguo zaoqi zhengzhi jijin zhuyi de wenhua genyuan” (The 
Hundred Days Reform Movement and the cultural root of early Chinese political 
radicalism). In idem, Xiao Gongqinji (q.v.): 224-250.
—. “Qingmo xinzheng yu Zhongguo xiandaihua yanjiu” (Late Qing “new policies” and 
research on Chinese modernization). In idem, Xiao Gongqinji (q.v.): 251-264.
Originally published in Zhanlüe yu guanli (Strategy and Management) 1993, no. 1.
—. “Cong zhengzhi langman zhuyi dao zhengzhi jijin zhuyi: dui Zhongguo zaoqi yihui 
minzhu sichao de lishi kaocha” (From political romanticism to political radicalism: 
historical research on the early parliamentary democracy trend). In idem, Xiao 
Gongqinji (q.v.): 265-280. Originally published in Zhongguo shehui kexue jikan (China 
Social Sciences Quarterly), 1993, no. 2. 
—. “‘Ziran gonglilun’ yu xiandai jijin sixiang: Yan Fu yu Hu Shi de sikao ji qi qishi”
(“Natural law theory” and modern radical thought: reflections on Yan Fu and Hu Shi 
and their enlightenment). In idem, Xiao Gongqinji (q.v.): 281-299. Originally published 
in Wenhua Zhongguo (Cultural China) (Canada), June 1995.
—. “Ruxue de sanzhong lishi xingtai” (The three historical forms of Confucianism). In 
idem, Xiao Gongqinji (q.v.): 315-337.
—. “Minzu zhuyi yu Zhongguo zhuanxing shiqi de yishi xingtai” (Nationalism and the 
ideology of China’s transitional era). In idem, Xiao Gongqinji (q.v.): 350-358.  
Originally published in Zhanlüe yu guanli (Strategy and Management) 1994, no. 4. 
—. “Lishixue zai Zhongguo biange shidai de yiyi” (The meaning of historical studies in 
the era of Chinese reform). In idem, Xiao Gongqinji (q.v.): 359-364. Originally 
published in Shixue lilun (History Theory) 1988, no. 4.
363
—. “Dangdai Zhongguo xin baoshou zhuyi de sixiang yuanyuan” (The intellectual 
origin of contemporary Chinese neo-conservatism). Ershiyi shiji (Twenty-first Century) 
40 (April 1997): 126-135. 
—. “Wuxu jijin zhuyi ji qi yinxiang” (The radicalism of the 1898 Reform Movement 
and its influence). Ershiyi shiji (Twenty-first Century) 46 (April 1998): 41-48.
—. Weiji zhong de biange: Qingmo xiandaihua jincheng zhong de jijin yu baoshou 
(Reform amidst crisis: radical and conservative in the process of late Qing 
modernization). Shanghai: Shanghai sanlian shudian, 1999.
—. “Wuxu bianfa de zai fanxing: jianlun zaoqi zhengzhi jijin zhuyi de wenhua genyuan
(Re-examing the Hundred Days Reform Movement: discussing the cultural root of early 
political radicalism). In Li Shitao, ed., Zhishi fenzi lichang (q.v.): 121-141. Originally 
published in Zhanlüe yu guanli (Strategy and Management) 1995, no. 4. 
—. “Jindai sixiangshi shang de ‘zhuyi yu wenti’ zhizheng de zai sikao” (Rethinking the 
debate on “isms and problems” in modern intellectual history). In Li Shitao, ed., Zhishi 
fenzi lichang (q.v.): 142-157.
—. “The Political Attitudes of the Various Strata in China’s Society and Their Prospects 
for the Future.” The Chinese Economy 32, no. 3 (May-June 1999): 56-78.
—. Yu zhengzhi langman zhuyi gaobie (Parting with political romanticism). Wuhan: 
Hubei jiaoyu chubanshe, 2000.
—. “Zixu” (Foreword). In idem, Yu zhengzhi langman zhuyi gaobie (q.v.): 1-13.
—. “Zhongguo xin baoshou zhuyi de sixiang yuanyuan: Yan Fu dui zhengzhi jijin zhuyi
de pipan ji qi dangdai yiyi” (The intellectual origin of Chinese neo-conservatism: Yan 
Fu’s criticism of political romanticism and its contemporary meaning). In idem, Yu 
zhengzhi langman zhuyi gaobie (q.v.): 25-40.
—. “Sixiangshi de meili” (The charm of intellectual history). In idem, Zhishi fenzi yu 
guannian ren (Intellectuals and men of concepts). Tianjin: Tianjin renmin chubanshe, 
2002: 3-15. Also published in Kaifang shidai (Open Times), January 2002.
Xiao Gongqin and Zhu Wei. “Tongku de liangnan xuanze: guanyu ‘xin quanwei zhuyi’ 
lilun dawenlu” (A painful dilemma: a record of questions and answers on “neo-
authoritarianism”). In Qi Mo, ed. Xin quanwei zhuyi (q.v.): 13-19. Originally published 
in Wenhui bao (Wenhui Daily), January 17, 1989.  
—. “A Painful Dilemma: A Dialogue on the Theory of ‘New Authoritarianism.’” 
Chinese Sociology and Anthropology 23, no. 2 (Winter 1990-1991): 69-76.
Xie Wujun. “Ping Zhongguo dangdai de baoshou zhuyi sichao” (Commenting on the 
contemporary Chinese conservative trend). Dangdai sichao (Contemporary Trends) 
2001, no. 4: 13-29.
364
Xu Ben. “‘Di san shijie piping’ zai dangjin Zhongguo de chujing” (The predicament of 
“Third World criticism” in present China). Ershiyi shiji (Twenty-first Century) 27 
(February 1995): 16-27.
—. “Zai tan Zhongguo ‘houxue’ de zhengzhixing he lishi yishi” (Again on the political 
nature and historical consciousness of Chinese “post-isms”). Ershiyi shiji (Twenty-first 
Century) 39 (February 1997): 132-137.
—. Disenchanted Democracy: Chinese Cultural Criticism after 1989. Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1999. 
Xu Jilin. “Jijin yu baoshou de mihuo” (The confusion of radicalism and conservatism). 
Ershiyi shiji (Twenty-first Century) 11 (June 1992): 137-140. Reprinted in Li Shitao, 
ed., Zhishi fenzi lichang (q.v.): 37-41.
—. “Bi piping geng zhongyao de shi lijie” (What is more important than criticizing is 
understanding). Ershiyi shiji (Twenty-first Century) 29 (June 1995): 130-136.
—. “Zhongguo zhishi fenzi de ziyou zhuyi chuantong” (The tradition of liberalism of 
Chinese intellectuals). In idem, Xu Jilin zixuanji (Self-selected works of Xu Jilin). 
Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, 1999: 98-109. Originally published in Ershiyi 
shiji (Twenty-first Century) 42 (August 1997): 27-35.
—. “The Fate of an Enlightenment: Twenty Years in the Chinese Intellectual Sphere 
(1978-1998).” Trans. Geremie Barmé and Gloria Davies. In Edward Gu and Merle 
Goldman, eds., Chinese Intellectuals Between State and Market. London, New York: 
RoutledgeCurzon, 2004: 183-203.
Xu Ming. “Wenhua jijin zhuyi de lishi weidu: cong Zheng Min, Fan Qinlin de zhenglun 
kaiqu” (The historical dimension of cultural radicalism: on the debate between Zheng 
Min and Fan Qinlin). In Li Shitao, ed., Zhishi fenzi lichang (q.v.): 207-218. Originally 
published in Wenxue pinglun (Literary Review) 1994, no. 4. 
Xue Wei. “Heping yanbian bu ke zudang” (Peaceful evolution cannot be prevented). 
Zhongguo zhi chun (China Spring) 1 (January 1992): 26.
Yaguello, Marina. “Introduction.” In Mikhail Bakhtine, Le marxisme at la philosophie 
du langage (q.v.): 9-18.
Yan Jiayan, “Ping wusi, wenge yu chuantong wenhua de lunzheng” (On the debate 
about May Fourth, the Cultural Revolution and traditional culture). Ershiyi shiji 
(Twenty-first Century) 42 (August 1997): 129-136. 
Yang Chunshi. “Xin baoshou zhuyi yu xin lixing zhuyi: jiushi niandai renwen sichao 
pipan” (Neo-conservatism and neo-rationalism: a critique of 1990s humanities trends). 
In Li Shitao, ed., Zhishi fenzi lichang (q.v.): 486-492. Originally published in Hainan 
shifan xueyuan xuebao (Hainan Normal College Journal) 1996, no. 2.
Yang Fan. Gongheguo de disandai (The third generation of the PRC). Chengdu: 
Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1991.
365
Yang, Ch’ing-k’un. “Introduction.” In Max Weber, The Religion of China: 
Confucianism and Taoism (q.v.): xiii-xliii.
Ye Wen. “Ying qubie zhengzhi de baoshou zhuyi he wenhua de baoshou zhuyi” (One 
should distinguish between political conservatism and cultural conservatism). Ershiyi 
shiji (Twenty-first Century) 40 (April 1997): 137-138.
Yeh, Michelle. Modern Chinese Poetry: Theory and Practice Since 1917. New Haven, 
London: Yale University Press, 1991.
—. “Chinese Postmodernism and the Cultural Politics of Modern Chinese Poetry.” In 
Wen-hsin Yeh, ed., Cross-Cultural Readings of Chineseness: Narratives, Images, and 
Interpretations of the 1990s. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000: 100-127.
—. “International Theory and the Transnational Critic: China in the Age of 
Multiculturalism.” In Rey Chow, ed., Modern Chinese Literary and Cultural Studies in 
the Age of Theory: Reimagining a Field. Durham, London: Duke University Press, 
2000: 251-280.
Yin Huimin. “New Conservatism and China’s Outlook.” Trans. David Kelly. Chinese 
Law and Government 29, no. 2 (March-April 1996): 77-81.
Young, Ernest P. “The Hung-hsien Emperor as a Modernizing Conservative.” In 
Charlotte Furth, ed., The Limits of Change (q.v.): 171-190.
Yü Ying-shih, Zhongguo jinshi zongjiao lunli yu shangren jingshen (The modern 
Chinese religious ethic and the spirit of merchants). Taipei: Taipei lianjing chubanshe, 
1987.
—. “Dai congtou, shoushi jiu shanhe” (Picking up the pieces for a new start). Ershiyi 
shiji (Twenty-first Century) 2 (December 1990): 5-7.
—. “Zhongguo zhishi fenzi de bianyuanhua” (The marginalization of Chinese 
intellectuals). Ershiyi shiji (Twenty-first Century) 6 (August 1991): 15-25.
—. “Zailun Zhongguo xiandai sixiang zhong de jijin yu baoshou: da Jiang Yihua 
xiansheng” (Again on radicalism and conservatism in modern Chinese thought: a 
response to mister Jiang Yihua).  Ershiyi shiji (Twenty-first Century) 10 (April 1992): 
143-149.
—. “The Radicalization of China in the Twentieth Century.” Daedalus 122, no. 2 
(Spring 1993): 125-150.
—. “Zixu” (Preface). In Qian Mu yu Zhongguo wenhua (Qian Mu and Chinese Culture).
Shanghai: Shanghai yuandong chubanshe, 1994: 1-6.
—. “Qian Mu yu xin rujia” (Qian Mu and the New Confucians). In idem, Qian Mu yu 
Zhongguo wenhua (q.v.): 30-90.
366
—. “‘Chuangxin’ yu ‘baoshou’” (“Renewal” and “preservation”). In idem, Qian Mu yu 
Zhongguo wenhua (q.v.): 288-295.
—. “Zhongguo jindai sixiangshi shang de jijin yu baoshou” (Radicalism and 
conservatism in modern Chinese intellectual history). In Li Shitao, ed., Zhishi fenzi 
lichang (q.v.): 1-29. Originally appeared in Qian Mu yu Zhongguo wenhua (q.v.): 188-
222.
Yuandao bianweihui (Editorial committee of Yuandao). “Yuandao shinian zishu” (An 
account of ten years of Yuandao). In Chen Ming and Zhu Hanmin, eds., Yuandao
(Original Path) 11.  Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2005: 98-101.
Yuan Weishi. “Xiandaihua yu lishi jiaokeshu” (Modernization and History Textbooks). 
Online version at http://edu.people.com.cn/GB/1055/4016350.html. Retrieved on 
February 27, 2008. Originally published in Bingdian (Freezing Point), January 11, 
2006.
Yue Daiyun. “Chonggu ‘xueheng’: jianlun xiandai baoshou zhuyi” (Revaluating 
Xueheng and concurrently discussing modern conservatism). In Tang Yijie, ed., Lun 
chuantong yu fan chuantong (q.v.): 415-428.
—. “Shijie wenhua duihua zhong de Zhongguo xiandai baoshou zhuyi: jianlun 
‘Xueheng’ zazhi” (Modern Chinese conservatism in global cultural dialogue: on the 
Xueheng journal). In Beijing daxue shehui kexue chu, ed., Beijing daxue jinian wusi 
yundong (q.v.): 56-67. The article was also published in Zhongguo wenhua (Chinese 
Culture) 1989, no. 1: 132-136.
—. “On Western Literary Theory in China.” Trans. Gloria Davies. In Gloria Davies, 
ed., Voicing Concerns (q.v.): 109-122.
Zhang Fa, Zhang Yiwu, and Wang Yichuan. “Cong ‘xiandaixing’ dao ‘Zhonghuaxing’: 
xin zhishixing de tanxun” (From “modernity” to “Chineseness”: explorations of a new 
knowledge model). Wenyi zhengming (Debates on Literature and Art) 1994, no. 2: 10-
20.
Zhang Haipeng. “Jinnian lai Zhongguo jindaishi yanjiu zhong de ruogan yuanzexing 
lunzheng” (Several principal debates in research on modern Chinese history of recent 
years). Makesi zhuyi yanjiu (Marxism Research) 1997, no. 8: 14-22.
—. “The Main Theme in Modern Chinese History Is Anti-Imperialism and Anti-
Feudalism.” Online version at http://zonaeuropa.com/20060302_1.htm. Retrieved on 
February 27, 2008. The Chinese article was originally published in Bingdian (Freezing 
Point), March 1, 2006.
Zhang Junmai. “A Manifesto for a Re-appraisal of Sinology and Reconstruction of 
Chinese Culture.” In idem, The Development of Neo-Confucian Thought, Vol. 2. New 
York: Bookman Associates, 1962: 455-483.
Zhang Lin, Wang Yinhuan, Jing Jianbin, et al. “Qingnian xuesheng shiye zhong de 
Zhongguo yilai de lishi daolu” (The historical road of China since modern times in the 
367
view of young students). Gaoxiao lilun zhanxian (Theoretical Front in Higher 
Education) 1997, no. 6: 31-40.
Zhang Longxi. “Duoyuan shehui zhong de wenhua piping (Cultural criticism in 
pluralistic societies). Ershiyi shiji (Twenty-first Century) 33 (February 1996): 18-25.
Zhang Nan and Wang Renzhi, eds. Xinhai geming qianshinian jianshi lun xuanji
(Anthology of essays during the ten years preceding the 1911 revolution), Vol. 2, Part 1. 
Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 1960.
Zhang Xudong. “Intellectual Politics in Post-Tiananmen China: An Introduction.” 
Social Text 55 16, no. 2 (Summer 1998): 1-8.
—. “Epilogue: Postmodernism and Postsocialist Society: Historicizing the Present.” In 
Arif Dirlik and Xudong Zhang, eds., Postmodernism and China. Durham and London: 
Duke University Press, 2000: 399-442.
—. “The Making of the Post-Tiananmen Intellectual Field: A Critical Overview.” In 
idem, ed., Whither China?: Intellectual Politics in Contemporary China. Durham, 
London: Duke University Press, 2001: 1-75.
Zhang Yiwu. “‘Xiandaixing’ de zhongjie: yige wufa huibi de keti” (The end of 
“modernity”: an unavoidable issue). Zhanlüe yu guanli (Strategy and Management) 
1994, no. 3: 104-109.
—. “Chonggu ‘xiandaixing’ yu Hanyu shumianyu lunzheng” (A re-evaluation of 
“modernity” and the debate on written Chinese). Wenxue pinglun (Literary Review) 
1994, no. 4: 107-113, 120.
—. “Chanshi ‘Zhongguo’ de jiaolü” (The anxiety of interpreting “China”). Ershiyi shiji
28 (Twenty-first Century) (April 1995): 128-135.
—.  “Zaishuo ‘chanshi Zhongguo’ de jiaolü” (Again on the anxiety of “interpreting 
China”). Ershiyi shiji (Twenty-first Century) 34 (April 1996): 121-126.
—. “Miandui quanqiuhua de tiaozhan” (Facing the challenge of globalization). Ershiyi 
shiji (Twenty-first Century) 38 (December 1996): 138-142.
—. “Chaoyue wenhua lunzhan: fansi jiushi niandai wenhua de xin shidian”
(Transcending the culture debates: reflecting on the new viewpoint of the culture of the 
1990s). Tianjin shehui kexue (Tianjin Social Sciences), March 1998: 98-103. 
Zhang Zhizhong. “Shiji mo huimou: wenhua jijin zhuyi yu wenhua baoshou zhuyi de 
sikao” (Looking back at the end of the century: reflections on cultural radicalism and 
cultural conservatism). Wenyi pinglun (Art and Literary Criticism) 1998, no.1: 37-50,
62.
Zhao, Suisheng. “Chinese Intellectuals’ Quest for National Greatness and Nationalistic 
Writing in the 1990s.” The China Quarterly 152 (December 1997): 725-745.
368
—.  “Chinese Nationalism and Authoritarianism in the 1990s.” In idem, ed., China and 
Democracy: Reconsidering the Prospects for a Democratic China. New York, London: 
Routledge, 2000: 253-270.
—. A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004.
Zhao Yiheng. “‘Houxue’ yu Zhongguo xin baoshou zhuyi” (“Post-isms” and Chinese 
neo-conservatism). Ershiyi shiji (Twenty-first Century) 27 (February 1995): 4-15.
—. “Wenhua pipan yu houxiandai zhuyi lilun” (Culture criticism and postmodernism 
theory). Ershiyi shiji (Twenty-first Century) 31 (October 1995): 148-151.
—. “‘Houxue,’ xin baoshou zhuyi yu wenhua pipan” (“Post-isms,” neo-conservatism 
and culture criticism). In Li Shitao, ed., Zhishi fenzi lichang (q.v.): 343-356. Originally 
published in Huacheng (Flower City) 1995, no. 5.
—. “Ruhe miandui dangjin Zhongguo wenhua xianzhuang: haineiwai dalu xuezhe de 
yichang bianlun” (How to confront the status quo of present Chinese culture: a debate 
between mainland and overseas scholars). In Li Shitao, ed., Zhishi fenzi lichang (q.v.): 
357-367. Originally published in Wenyi zhengming (Debates on Literature and Art) 
1996, no. 5.
Zhao Yuesheng. “Xin faxisi zhuyi de xuanyan” (Manifesto of neofascism). Zhongguo 
zhi chun (China Spring) 1 (January 1992): 29-30.
Zheng Dahua. “Xiandai Zhongguo wenhua baoshou zhuyi sichao de lishi kaocha” (A 
historical investigation of the modern Chinese cultural conservative trend). In Feng Lin, 
ed., Chongxin renshi bainian Zhongguo (q.v.), Vol. 2: 439-450.
Zheng Min. “Hewei ‘dalu xin baoshou zhuyi’?” (What is “mainland neo-
conservatism”?). Wenyi zhengming (Debates on Literature and Art) 1995, no. 5: 40-48.
—. “Wenhua, zhengzhi, yuyan sanzhe guanxi zhi wo jian” (My view on the relationship 
between culture, politics, and language). Ershiyi shiji (Twenty-first Century) 29 (June 
1995): 120-124.
—. “Shiji mo de huigu: Hanyu yuyan biange yu Zhongguo xinshi chuangzao”
(Retrospect at the end of the century: the chinese language reform and the creation of 
new Chinese poetry). In Li Shitao, ed., Zhishi fenzi licheng (q.v.): 158-186. Originally 
published in Wenxue pinglun (Literary Review) 1993, no. 3.  
—. “Guanyu ‘ruhe pingjia ‘wusi’ baihuawen yundong?’: shangque zhi shangque” (A 
rejoinder to the rejoinder “How to evaluate the ‘May Fourth’ vernacular language 
movement?”). In Li Shitao, ed., Zhishi fenzi lichang (q.v.): 198-206. Originally 
published in Wenxue pinglun (Literary Review) 1994, no. 2. 
Zheng, Yongnian. Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China: Modernization, Identity, 
and International Relations. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
369
“Zhengque renshi Zhongguo jindaishi shang de geming yu gailiang” (Correctly 
understanding revolution and reform in modern Chinese history). Guangming ribao 
(Guangming Daily), March 12, 1996: 5.
“‘Zhongguo jindai sixiangshi shang de baoshou yu jijin’ xueshu taolunhui zongshu” 
(Summary of the academic symposium on “conservatism and radicalism in modern 
Chinese intellectual history”). Jindaishi yanjiu (Modern History Research) 2004, no. 2: 
291-301.
Zhongguo qingnianbao sixiang lilunbu (China Youth Daily Ideology and Theory 
Department). “Sulian zhengbian hou Zhongguo de xianshi yingdui yu zhanlüe xuanze
(Realistic responses and strategic options for China after the Soviet Coup). Zhongguo 
zhi chun (China Spring) 1 (January 1992): 35-39. 
Zhongguo shibao zhoukan bianji (Editors of China Times Weekly). “Dalu xin baoshou 
zhuyi de jueqi: fangwen dalu ‘di’er sichao’ lilunjia Xiao Gongqin” (The rise of 
mainland neo-conservatism: an interview with mainland “second trend” theorist Xiao 
Gongqin). Zhongguo shibao zhoukan (China Times Weekly), January 26, 1992: 66-69 
and February 2, 1992: 98-100.
Zhongwai mingren yanjiu zhongxin (Research center on Chinese and foreign eminent 
persons), ed. Zhongguo dangdai mingrenlu (Record of contemporary Chinese eminent 
persons). Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1991. 
Zhou Yangshan, ed., Cong wusi dao xin wusi (From May Fourth to the new May 
Fourth). Taipei: Shibao wenhua chuban qiye youxian gongsi, 1989.
Zhou Yangshan and Yang Suxian, eds. Jindai Zhongguo sixiang renwulun: baoshou 
zhuyi (On modern Chinese thought and figures: conservatism). Taipei: Shibao wenhua 
chuban shiye youxian gongsi, 1980.
Zhu Xueqin. “For a Chinese Liberalism.” Trans. Wu Shenqing. In Wang Chaohua, ed.,
One Road, Many Paths. London, New York: Verso, 2003: 87-107.
Zou Dang (Tsou Tsang). “Du ‘gaobie geming’: zhi Li Zehou, Liu Zaifu” (Reading 
Farewell to Revolution: to Li Zehou and Liu Zaifu). Ershiyi shiji (Twenty-first Century) 
33 (February 1996): 62-67.
Zurndorfer, Harriet T. “Confusing Confucianism with Capitalism: Culture as 
Impediment and/or Stimulus to Chinese Economic Development.” Online version at 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/economicHistory/GEHN/GEHNPDF/ConfusingConfu
cianismwithCapitalism-HarrietZurndorfer.pdf. Retrieved on October 5, 2007. 
370
SAMENVATTING
Dit onderzoek heeft aangetoond dat de betekenis van het concept “conservatisme”
(baoshou zhuyi) zeer betwist was onder intellectuelen tijdens de vroege jaren 1990. 
Technocratische intellectuelen, historici, intellectuele historici, filosofen en 
literatuurwetenschappers definieerden het concept zodanig dat het overeenstemde met 
hun respectievelijke agenda’s. Door het gebruik van het concept “conservatisme” als 
uitgangspunt te nemen en door de aandacht te vestigen op hoe Chinese intellectuelen 
invulling gaven aan dit concept heeft dit onderzoek deze verscheidenheid aan 
interpretaties tot zijn recht laten komen. Desalniettemin is de vraag gesteld of deze 
concrete verwijzingen ook manifestaties waren van een algemene conservatieve “stijl 
van denken,” namelijk de verdediging van conservatieve doeleinden waarbij 
conservatieve gronden werden aangevoerd. Alleen in die gevallen waarin intellectuelen 
het behoud van de Chinese gemeenschap beargumenteerden op grond van de inherente 
waarde van de Chinese traditie is gesteld dat de verwijzing naar “conservatisme” een 
manifestatie was van een conservative “stijl van denken.”
Meer bepaald is in dit onderzoek het concept “conservatisme” bestudeerd in 
relatie tot het “tegenconcept” (Gegenbegriff) van “radicalisme” (jijin zhuyi). Dit heeft 
het mogelijk gemaakt om het begrip “conservatisme” als een continuüm op te vatten, 
aangezien alle verwijzingen naar “conservatisme”—ongeacht of zij deel uitmaakten van 
een argument ter bevordering van politieke legitimiteit, dan wel of zij gesitueerd waren 
binnen een pleidooi voor traditionele morele waarden—plaatsvonden tegen de 
achtergrond van de verwerping van “radicalisme.” Deze aanpak heeft er ook voor 
gezorgd dat de interactie tussen officiële ideologie, het “neo-conservatisme” van 
technocratische intellectuelen dicht bij het machtscentrum en het “conservatisme” van
humanistische intellectuelen verbonden aan universiteiten kon worden blootgelegd. De 
wederzijdse toeëigening van concepten wees in deze context niet op een officiële 
orkestratie van intellectuele activiteiten tijdens de jaren 1990, maar op het bestaan van
een gezamenlijke reeks problemen waarop zowel de CCP als intellectuelen een 
antwoord trachtten te bieden.
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Het “neo-conservatisme” van de historicus Xiao Gongqin kan beschouwd 
worden als een duidelijk voorbeeld van de interactie tussen technocratische en 
humanistische intellectuelen. Net zoals het “neo-conservatisme” van de “prinsjes”—
familieleden van hooggeplaatste functionarissen—bestond Xiao’s “neo-conservatisme” 
uit een pleidooi voor graduele economische hervormingen, gecentraliseerd bestuur, 
politieke en sociale stabiliteit en het instrumentele gebruik van traditionele elementen. 
Anderzijds is echter aangetoond dat Xiao Gongqin net als andere humanistische 
intellectuelen drie stadia van “radicalisme” onderscheidde in de moderne Chinese 
geschiedenis, met name het “mentale radicalisme” van de Honderd Dagen hervormers, 
het “systeem determinisme” van denkers ten tijde van de Republiek, en de “politieke 
romantiek” van Vier Mei denkers. De verdeling van de moderne Chinese geschiedenis 
in drie “stadia” van “radicalisme” was ook aanwezig in de werken van de filosoof Chen 
Lai en de historicus Yü Ying-shih. Chen Lai duidde respectievelijk de Vier 
Meibeweging, de Culturele Revolutie en de jaren 1980 aan als stadia van “cultureel 
radicalisme,” terwijl Yü Ying-shih de laat-negentiende eeuw, de Vier Meibeweging en 
de komst van het marxisme als stadia van “radicalisering” bestempelde.
Als gevolg van deze interactie tussen technocratische en humanistische 
intellectuelen is gesteld dat het vaak gemaakte onderscheid tussen een zogenaamd 
“politiek” “neo-conservatisme” en een “cultureel conservatisme” weinig doeltreffend is 
voor de analyse van de intellectuele situatie van de jaren 1990.  Er is verder geopperd 
dat het nuttiger is de aandacht te richten op de aard van de verwijzing naar de Chinese 
traditie in plaats van de adjectieven “cultureel” of “politiek” te hanteren met betrekking 
tot “conservatisme.” Voor intellectuelen zoals de prinsjes en Xiao Gongqin was de 
traditie een middel dat gebruikt kon worden voor de realisatie van modernisering. Voor 
Yü Ying-shih en Chen Lai daarentegen was de promotie van de Chinese traditie 
gestoeld op het feit dat deze waarden en normen belichaamde die zij onmisbaar achtten 
in de toenmalige maatschappij.
Het is ook beargumenteerd dat “conservatisme” niet zomaar een manifestatie 
van “cultureel nationalisme” of een blinde verdediging van belangen was; voor vele 
intellectuelen maakte de verwijzing naar “conservatisme” deel uit van een kritische en 
intellectuele reflectie op de liberale en socialistische versies van de Chinese moderniteit. 
Deze reflectie kon dus onmogelijk gereduceerd worden tot een emotionele reactie op de 
invloed van een “Westerse” traditie; intellectuelen gingen ook een dialoog aan met het 
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Chinese verleden. Bovendien werd de terugkeer naar de Chinese traditie niet 
noodzakelijk ingegeven door het feit dat deze deel uitmaakte van een Chinese identiteit; 
voor sommige intellectuelen belichaamde de traditie bepaalde normen en waarden die 
bovenal waardevol waren en niet zozeer “Chinees.” Dat “conservatisme” deel uitmaakte 
van een reflectie die diachronisch eerder dan synchronisch van aard was kan afgeleid 
worden uit het feit dat de term “conservatisme” vooral gebruikt werd om gebeurtenissen 
uit de moderne Chinese geschiedenis te evalueren.
In deze historische debatten fungeerde de geschiedenis niet alleen als een 
medium om economische, politieke, ethische of sociale kwesties te bediscussiëren, maar 
ook als een object van discussie. Omdat intellectuelen niet alleen verwezen naar 
gebeurtenissen in de moderne Chinese geschiedenis, maar deze ook herinterpreteerden,
kan gesteld worden dat de geschiedenis niet zomaar een “veilige omweg” was om 
gevoelige politieke zaken te bespreken, in tegenstelling tot wat sommige liberale critici 
beweerden. De herschrijving van de moderne Chinese geschiedenis als een proces van 
“radicalisering” was niet zomaar een voorbeeld van kritiek op het toenmalige beleid aan 
de hand van historische zinspelingen; de herschrijving van de geschiedenis in se had 
belangrijke gevolgen met betrekking tot de opvatting van politieke legitimiteit en 
nationale identiteit. 
De associatie van “radicalisme” met revolutie en socialisme gaf aan dat 
intellectuelen de politieke legitimiteit van de CCP in vraag stelden na het neerslaan van 
de opstand op het Tiananmenplein in 1989 en in de context van de internationale 
ondergang van het socialisme. De herschrijving van de moderne Chinese geschiedenis 
als de geschiedenis van modernisering in plaats van de geschiedenis van de strijd tegen 
feodalisme en imperialisme stelde impliciet de legitimiteit van de CCP in vraag. 
Hoewel de officiële ideologie de economische hervormingen voorstelde als de 
voortzetting van de revolutie, terwijl de legitimiteit van de revolutie in het verleden niet 
in vraag werd gesteld, projecteerden intellectuelen de notie van hervorming ook op de 
moderne Chinese geschiedenis. De verwerping van “radicalisme” was dus geenszins 
louter een echo van het economische hervormingsbeleid, in tegenstelling tot wat 
sommige critici beweerden.
Met de verwerping van “radicalisme” stelden intellectuelen ook het alleenrecht 
van de CCP op de definitie van de nationele identiteit in vraag. Intellectuelen vervingen 
de nationale identiteit van het Mao-tijdperk waarin klasse en de staat centraal stonden 
373
door een bredere notie van identiteit die cultureel van aard was in plaats van politiek en 
territoriaal—het was een roep om een “cultureel China.” Het object van loyauteit was 
niet de CCP, maar een culturele Chinese natie die de grenzen van de Chinese staat 
overschreed. In tegenstelling tot de liberale en socialistische opvattingen van Chinese 
moderniteit die waren gekenmerkt door revolutionaire breuken met het verleden, 
bepleitten de voorstanders van een “cultureel China” een moderniteit die zich gradueel 
en met respect voor de continuïteit van de Chinese traditie ontwikkelde. 
De culturele opvatting van de Chinese nationale identiteit betekende ook een 
herinterpretatie van de rol van intellectuelen in de Chinese maatschappij. Met het einde 
van de “Verlichting” van de jaren 1980 en de toegenomen commercialisering van de 
maatschappij sinds 1992 bood de kritiek op het antitraditionalisme van liberalen en 
marxisten uit het verleden intellectuelen de mogelijkheid om zich opnieuw te verbinden 
met de Chinese traditie. Na het falen van het politiek engagement van de jaren 1980 en 
na decennia van “marginalisering” van Chinese intellectuelen bood de terugkeer naar de 
traditie een vorm van “statusvernieuwing.” Door de Chinese identiteit op te vatten in 
termen van een elitaire cultuur waarvan intellectuelen de dragers bij uitstek waren, 
kenden intellectuelen zichzelf een centrale rol toe in het proces van de herwaardering 
van de Chinese traditie.
Een cruciale implicatie van de verwerping van “radicalisme” was dat de relatie 
tussen verleden, heden en toekomst werd herdacht; een nieuwe kijk op hoe 
veranderingen moesten worden teweeggebracht bood zich aan. De voorstand van 
historische continuïteit en de herwaardering van de Chinese traditie impliceerden dat 
een marxistische opvatting van verandering als de strijd tussen tegengestelden had 
plaatsgemaakt voor een nadruk op harmonie. Intellectuelen bepleitten niet langer 
revolutionaire breuken met het verleden of totale sociale veranderingen, maar graduele 
en gedeeltelijke hervormingen. Intellectuelen benadrukten ook het belang van de 
praktijk in plaats van idealistische plannen gebaseerd op “blauwdruk” ontwerpen. 
Hoewel de verwerping van “radicalisme” overeenstemde met het pragmatisme van de 
jaren 1990, was het eveneens in strijd met de ideologie van het marxisme.
Uit de verschillende betekenissen die de zogenaamde prinsjes, Xiao Gongqin, 
Yü Ying-shih, de deelnemers aan het debat van 1992, Chen Lai, Zheng Min en anderen 
hebben toegekend aan de concepten van “radicalisme” en “conservatisme” is 
geconcludeerd dat alleen Yü Ying-shih en Chen Lai de termen gebruikten als deel van 
374
een conservatief argument voor conservatieve doeleinden. Zij verdedigden het behoud 
van de Chinese gemeenschap op grond van de inherente waarde van de Chinese traditie, 
die voor hen onmisbare normen en waarden belichaamde. Xiao Gongqin en Zheng Min, 
daarentegen, hoewel hun argument gebaseerd was op de verwerping van abstracte rede 
en de historische groei van respectievelijk de traditie en de taal, hadden geen 
conservatieve bedoelingen. Xiao Gongqin had als opzicht de efficiëntie van 
economische hervormingen, terwijl Zheng Min’s verwijzing naar de taal deel uitmaakte 
van een positie die kan omschreven worden als cultureel nationalisme. De prinsjes en de 
meeste intellectuelen die deelnamen aan het debat van 1992 hadden niet alleen geen 
conservatieve oogmerken; zij voerden evenmin conservatieve gronden aan. De prinsjes 
verwezen naar “rationalistische” denkers om de politieke legitimiteit van de CCP op te 
krikken, terwijl de meeste intellectuelen in het debat van 1992 liberale denkers 
aanriepen om graduele economische hervormingen te promoten.
Hoewel de verwijzing naar “conservatisme” dus lang niet altijd gekoppeld was 
aan een bewuste conservatieve positie, geeft de wijdverbreide referentie naar de term 
tijdens de vroege jaren 1990 aan dat er toch een belangrijke verandering had 
plaatsgevonden in de intellectuele wereld. Het feit dat de term gebruikt werd door 
intellectuelen met verschillende politieke overtuigingen geeft aan dat de omarming van 
gradualisme en de continuïteit van de Chinese traditie deel uitmaakten van een nieuwe 
tijdgeest. Vóór de jaren 1990 had de term “conservatisme” een negative connotatie in 
een Chinese context; het was een etiket dat gebruikt werd door liberalen en marxisten 
om die intellectuelen te bekritiseren die in hun ogen de traditie hadden verdedigd ten 
koste van de vooruitgang. Tijdens de jaren 1990 echter kozen intellectuelen er bewust 
voor om de term met hun positie in verband te brengen. “Conservatisme” werd nu 
geassocieerd met een “gezonde” en “rationele” vorm van modernisering.
Liberalen, die in het verleden een radicale breuk met de traditie hadden 
voorgestaan, pleitten nu voor de “creatieve transformatie” van de traditie. Zelfs de CCP, 
wiens legitimiteit gebaseerd was op een revolutionaire breuk met het verleden, 
incorporeerde de Chinese traditie in haar “socialisme met Chinese karakteristieken.” 
Niet-liberale en niet-marxistische denkers die onder het socialisme onderworpen waren 
geweest aan onderdrukking en zelfkritiek werden nu het object van analyse. In de 
context van de neergang van het socialisme en de tanende morele en politieke 
legitimiteit van de CCP na 1989 was het minder evident dat socialisme de uitkomst was
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van de moderne Chinese geschiedenis. De terugkeer naar de Chinese traditie was een 
revolutie in de moderne zin van het woord omdat dit een eind maakte aan decennia van 
“anti-traditionalisme.” Anderzijds was het ook een revolutie in de originele zin van het
woord; het was een restoratie, een terugkeer naar een tijdperk waarin “radicalisme” nog 
niet was doorgedrongen tot in de wortels van de Chinese geest.
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